ML20031D094
| ML20031D094 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001100 |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1981 |
| From: | Crocker H, Roth J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20031D075 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-1100-81-08, 70-1100-81-8, NUDOCS 8110090273 | |
| Download: ML20031D094 (15) | |
Text
-
w U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I
~ Report No.
70-1100/81-08 Docket No.
70-1100 License No.
SNM-1067 Priority 1
Category UR Licensee:
Combustion Engineering, Incorporated P. O. Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095 Facility Name: Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing and Nuclear Laboratories Inspection at: Windsor, Connecticut Inspection conducted: August 25-28, 1981 Inspectors:
i 9/#/C/
J. R
,~ Project Inspector d te 'stgned
~
Approved by:
[/[/#[P/
.W.Crockef, Chief,Fue Fac
- y Projects dYte 's$gned Section, DR&PI Inspection Summary
Inspection on August 25-28,1981 (Report No. 70-1100/81-08)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by a region-based inspector of the licensed program including:
10 CFR Part 21; organization; facility changes and modifications; internal review and audit; safety committees; training; review of operations; nuclear criticality safety; transportation program; nonroutine events; followup on previously identified enforcement items; and followup on regional office requests.
The inspection was initiated on the day shift and involved 27 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspecter.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77) 8110090273 010922 PDR ADOCK 07001100 C
v.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Nuclear Manufacturing
- H. V. Lichtenberger, Vice President - Nuclear Fuel
- G. A. Johnstone, Supervisor, Health Physics and Safety Nuclear Laboratories W. P. Cherrock, Vice President - Development P. R. Rosenthal, Manager, Health Physics J. Limbert, Radiological Engineer The inspector also interviewed 18 other licensee employees during the course of the inspection.
- denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items (0 pen)
Inspector Follow Item (1100/78-10-02): Training program for response organization. The licensee has initiated revision of emergency procedures and checklists to incorporate the requirements of the new site contingency plan which must be submitted to NRC-NMSS by October 9, 1981.
The training program will be revised to incorporate the new site contingency plan following approval of the contingency plan by NMSS.
(0 pen) Unresolved (1100/79-12-01):
Emergency procedures review and revision. As stated above, the facility emergency procedures and checklists are being revised in conjunction with the preparation of a site Radiological Contingency Plan as required by NRC-NMSS.
(Closed) Unresolved (1100/79-12-03):
Radiation workers training -
emergency training.
The inspector verified that the licensee has incorporated emergency training into the new worker and annual.adiation worker retraining programs. The licensee has also initiated a program of training " occasional workers" in required emergency responses.
" Occasional workers" are defined as those licensee employees who normally work elsewhere but are allowed unescorted access to the manufacturing facility.
Licensee actions have been completed on this item.
(Closed) Violation (1100/81-01-01):
Failure to maintain a coplanar slab array in the pellet shop and failure to maintain one foot separation betwean storage and work stations.
The inspector observed that there were no instances of noncoplanar slabs ard/or storage locations abutting work stations during this inspection.
Facility foremen appeared to be cognizant of the requirements. The licensee has initiated a study to evaluate the elimination of the currently required spacing between noncop-lanar slabs.
g 3
37 (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (1100/81-01-02):
Posting of RWP's in area of work. The licensee evaluated the posting of Safe Work Permits 2
-(SWPs) in the area of work and concluded that if the work being done was hazardous enough to require an SWP, then continuous health physics coverage was also required which would eliminate the need to post the SWP.
3.
Review of Operations The inspector examined all areas of the plant and the nuclear laboratories to observe operations and activities in progress; to inspect the nuclear safety aspects of the facilities; and, to examine the general state of cleanliness, housekeeping and adherence to fire protection rules.
a.
Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing Facilities (1) Unidentified Sealed Rods The inspector noted that there were eleven unidentified sealed rods located on a non-fuel rod cart.
The cart was located near the lower end cap welding unit. The shop traveler was not with these rods to' maintain identity. The shop foreman indiciated that these rods contained metal blanks (no fuel) and that the traveler had been s.ent to engineering prior to the rods being removed to the proper storage location.
The shop foreman immediately identified these rods as nonfuel bearing and moved them to the proper storage locations.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
(2) Examination of Building 21 During examination of Building 21, the inspector noted that the south wall was posted with a sign which indicated the existence of a 20 foot special nuclear material (SNM) isolation zone within the building extending from the south wall. This isolation zone was established because of the storage array of SNM bearing waste containers located outside the building against the south wall.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
(3) Pellet Shop Nuclear Safaty Slab Geometry The inspector noted that the licensee had implemented the 4.1 inch slab thickness authorin d by Table 19.1 of the approved license application for enrichments of less than 3.5% U-235.
The inspector verified that the enrichment being processed 1
-.,,,,x
L f
4 7
y through the plant at the time of this inspection was less than 3.5% U-235. Measurements made by the inspector indicated that the overall slab thickness on a tray cart located in the fuel
' loading area of the pellet shop was as much as 4.375 inches.
However,.this thickness included the fuel height plus the thickness of two trays and two tray covers.
Correcting for metal thickness, the fuel slab height was found to be abcut 4.125 inches which is safe according to the nuclear safety evaluation contained in the license application. The inspector also determined that the inside dimension of the pellet trays was 1.9 inches for a total of 3.8 inches.
The measured slab height of 4.125 inches, therefore, would indicate that the trays were being overfilled with pellets which was demonstrated to the inspector by the shop foreman.
In view of the above discussion, the inspector informed the licensee representatives at the exit interview, that current practices in the loading of trays of pellets, if not controlled, could lead to slab thickness in excess of the 4.1 inch limit.
Licensee representatives indicated that this observation would be examined in detail.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
(4) Fuel Bundle Storage The inspector noted that the licensee had reduced the spacing between bundles in rows from 28 inches to 14 inches center-to-center as authorized by Amendment No. 29. Measurements made by the inspector indicated that the spacing was as close as 13 and one half inches in 6 cases of about 20 measurements. However, the licensee has conducted a nuclear safety evaluation for a center-to-center spacing of 10 inches and has shown this config-uration to be safe. The inspector also insured that the center-to-center spacing between rows of bundles was a minimum of 37 inches as required by Amendment No. 29.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
(5) Combustible Waste Storage The inspector observed that there appeared to be an appreafable quantity of combustible waste stored on the mezzanine of wie pellet shop annex. The combustible waste included approx 1ately 35 absolute filters plus approximately 100 cubic feet of chntam-inated plastic in plastic bags.
It appeared that the majo ity L
of this waste was outside the reach of installed water sprinklers.
j This was discussed during the exit interview.
The licensee was 1
f 1
1
-2:------~
-r~-----.,-.c-.m--.-.m--~,-+,,
--~r-
7-
- v
-:y i:.
5 aware of the accumulation of combustible waste and indicated that a concerted effort would be made to reduce the accumulation.
According to licensee representatives, the excessive accumulation was caused by work conducted during vacation shutdown and by several enrichment change cleanups conducted during the few weeks just prior to plant vacation shutdown.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
l (6) Nuclear Safety Log Sheets i
l The inspector examined the micronizer and hammermill log sheets i
i i
for the time period June 1, 1981 through August 26, 1981. The I
records indicated that the appropriate posted nuclear s2fety limit was not exceeded during the time period.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
(7) Discussions with Operators The inspector reviewed the safety implications concerned vith the operation of the micronizer in the pellet shop annex and the down draft tables in the pellet stacking and rod loading areas with operators. The operators exhibited a good knowledge of their respective operations and the associated safety consid-erations.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
b.
Nuclear Laboratories (1). Nuclear Safety Signs The inspector examined all areas of the Nuclear Laboratories in Building 5.
It was noted that the nuclear safety sign on the ceramics laboratory had been posted on a previously used entrance l
and not at the entrance which was currently being used. The inspector t.cmmented that tFe licensee should move this sign to i
the currently used entrance so that employees would be cognizant of the SNM content and applicable limits in the laboratory.
Licensee representatives stated that the sign would be moved.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
,e---
e
,,----,g-n.
--m,
,----sm--
-.m.,-----,ny,,
--gs-v--
~
6-(2) Emergency Exits The inspector observed that the emergency exit from the warm metallography laboratory.in Building 5 was blocked by photographic equipment-(photo-flood lights and an equipment cart) on the afternoon of August 25, 1981 and the afternoon of August 27, 1981. At the time of these observations, the laboratory was not in use. After each observation, licensee representatives cleared the emergency exit.
However, in order to eliminate the problem, subsequent to the second observation, licensee represen-tatives placed the equipment into a locked storage area and indicated to.the inspector that personnel using this equipment would have to'obtain permission from the Health Physics group to reaquire the equipment.
In this manner, the Health Physics group could control the safe use and proper storage of this equipment.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
(3) Contu' on Monitors The in... actor noted, upon exiting from the warm metallography laboratory, that the portable contamination monitor (an Eberline RM-14 with a beta gamma pancake probe) had to be taken outside tee leboratory to conduct an cequate personnel contamination survey because of high background levels in the laboratory.
According to a licensee representative, the detection probe was not shielded sufficiently to reduce the background levels so that an adequate survey could be conducted prior to leaving the laboratory. Since the conduct of contamination surveys outside the laboratory is a poor practice, licensee representatives indicated that the probe would be changed so that adequate shielding could be used.
No items of noncompliance wereidentified.
4.
Nuclear Criticality Safety a.
Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing (1)
Internal Review and Audit (a) Daily Audits Records of daily audits conducted by health physics technicians for the time period February 10, 1980 through August 22, 1981, were examined by the inspector.
These audits examined signs, logs, radiation alarms, criticality safety compliance, contamination levels and airborne contamination levels.
Items requiring correction were corrected immediately.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
l 7
(b) Monthly Audits The ?nspector examined documentation of monthly audits conducted by the Supervisor, Health Physics and Safety or a Criticality Safety Specialist during the time period February 25, 1980 through August 26, 1981.
The inspector verified that appropriate corrective actions were taken or had been initiated by the licensee for the items identified in the 13 reports which required ccrrection.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
(2) Nuclear Safety Evaluations (a) Facili_ty Changes and Modifications As ciscussed previously in paragraph 3.a.(4), the licensee has modified the spacing between bundles in rows and between rows of bundles in the fuel bundle storage room as aathorized by Amendment Nos. 28 and 29.
The licensee installed and has been operating rod welder No. 2 since June,1981. The welder was installed in the southeast corner of the pellet stacking and rod loading area.
The licensee is currently in the process of installing a pellet press in the location previously occupied by the General Purpose Hood. The General Purpose Hood has been relocated into the Pellet Shop Annex but reinstallation has not been completed and this hood is not currently in use.
A new work station containing a fuel material particle sizer analyzer has been installed on the Pellet Shop Annex mezzanine near the Filter Knockdown Hood.
The pellet drying furnace has been relocated from the pellet shop in frcnt of the Centrifuge Hood to a location at the west end of pellet stacking and rod loading area.
No items of noncompliar:e were identified.
(b) Review of Nuclear Safety Evaluations The inspector reviewed the records of 'the review ar.d approval of process equipment or facility changes performed by the Nuclear Licensing Consultant for criticality safety or by the Supervisor, Health Physics and Safety for Radiolog-ical Safety.
From December 2, 1980 through August 21,
~ _.
y-.
e m
8.
1981 (Request No. 88) 28 requests for review and approval were_made by Engineering including the changes previously
~
discussed.
Twenty-seven of the requests were reviewed and approved. Twenty-three of the 27 involved nuclear safety 4
and.4 involved radiological safety only.
Conditions of approval were imposed, as needed, for criticality and radiological safety considerations.
The requests involving criticality safety considerations were independently "eviewed by a qualified person designated by the Nuclear safety Committee and by the Nuclear Licensing Consultant if the original review was conducted by the Supervisor, i
Health Physics and Safety. These evaluations were then countersigned by these qualified persons as required.
I No items of noncompliance were identified.
b.
Nuclear Laboratories I-(l') Monthly Audits of the Nuclear Laboratories-The inspector examined the records of 6 audits of the Nuclear l
Laboratories conducted by the Supervisor, Health Physics and l
Safety for the time period February,1981 through July 31, 1981. The inspector determined that no problem areas were identified during the conduct of these monthly audits.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
l (2) Facility Changes and Modifications l
The licensee is currently installing a high radiation baron meter into the northeast corner of Building 16.
The licensed fission chambers and Am-Be sources will be used in this area and when not attended will be placed in a locked safe which is located inside a locked chain-link enclosure.
l l
c.
Criticality Monitors The inspector noted that the licensee was in the process of installing a new criticality alarm system in Building 17 to correspond with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a)(1). The old installation corresponding to the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a)(2) wil,' remain operational until installation, testing and calibration of the new system has been completed.
According to licensee records, a criticality alarm has been installed and is operational in the new vault being constructed in Building 2.
9 The into.c.. _xamined the installation of remote criticality alarm indicators for Building 2, 5 and 17/23 located in the central guard station.
The inspector discussed guard response to criticality alarms with guards on duty at the guard station.
These guards indicated a good knowledge of the response described in the site emergency pis1 The inspector examined the operational alarm systems installed in Buildings 5, 17 and 21 and determined that each monitor appeared to be working properly and was set to alarm at 5 mR/hr.
The inspector also reviewed licensee records for the calibration of the operational alarm systems for the time period February 8,1980 through August 6, 1981.
Each alarm was calibrated quarterly or after repair as required.
The new monitor located in Building 2 was calibrated on July 23, 1981.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Safety Committees The inspector cetermined, through discussions with licensee representatives and review or licensee records, that the Nuclear Safety Committee has not met since the annual meeting held on December 12, 1980.
As a part of that meeting, the committee corducted an audit of the Nuclear Fuel Manufac-turing facilities.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
l 6.
Organization Through discussions with licensee representatives and review of licensee records, the inspector determined that the Supervisor, Health Physics and Safety (G. A. Johnstone) had the following personnel reporting to him:
J. Vollero, Senior Technician 1st Shift A. Joseph, Senior Technician 2nd Shift W. Looby, Jr., Health Physic. Technician 3rd Sbift R. Kula, Health Physic > ~~
.ician (In Training)
Former Senior Technicians Watson and Spaulding left the department during May, 1981 and July, 1981, respectively.
Mr. Looby had been working as an operator 17 the pellet shop since December 14, 1972 and was transferred to Health Physics on March 16, 1981.
Mr. Kula started working for the company on May 11, 1981, and was transferred to Health Physics on July 6, 1981.
Each of these individuals has been or is being trained in accordance with the Health Physics Training program discussed in paragraph 12.3.(1).
No items of noncompliance w're identified.
10 7..
-10 CFR Part 21 Procedures
'The inspector verified that the licensee had posted the proper notices as 1
required by 10.CFR 21.6 and that procedures required by 10 CFR 21.21 had been written. -The procedure:. API-17, " Reporting of Safety Hazards
. Applicable to Requirements of 10 CFR Part 21", Revision 2, dated January l
23, 1979, is contained in the dPower Systems Group Administrative Manual" as an Administrative Policy Instruction and is available for any employee to use as required. This procedure also contains a copy of a " Substantial l
Safety. Hazard Report" form which is to be used to report the item to applicable management.
No items'of noncompliance were identified.
L 8.
Shipment of Special Nuclear Materials The inspector observed the loading of six Certificate of Compliance No.
l 6078 containers, filled with two fuel bundles each, onto a Tri-state l
Motor Transport Company flatbed trailer for shipment to the reactor site.
l Each container wa's tagged with a label which contained information relative l
to bundle designation, contract number, shipping container number, whether an impa t recorder was attached to the shipping container and a Caution -
Radioactive Material sign.
Each container was also labeled on two sides j
with Radioactive Yellow III labels. Each label indicated the number of curies of SNM contained, the weight of SNM conttined and the transpor'.
index, A transport index of 6.3 was assigned t> each container based on a maximum of 50 TI units per shipment and a nur lear safety limit of 8 containers per shipment. An impact recorder is placed on at least one l
container in each shipment (usually the lower right front container).
The trailer was properly placarded as required since each container was labeled Radioactive Yellow III and the shipping containers were properly marked, labeled, and braced to prevent shifting under conditions normally incident to transportation.
No items of noncompliance were fdentified.
9.
Nonroutine Events a.
Rod Loading Table Ventilation During the third shift on May 5, 1981, the fuel manufacturing foreman was informed by operators that the valve which controls ventilation to the rod loading downdraft table was not properly functioning.
l The table ventilation system could not be turned on or off to weigh l
pellet troughs. The Health Physics group was not informed of the l
problem until lunch break during the following shift. At that time, the table ventilation system was not operating.
ec 11 A
Although general air. samples in the area for the 3rd shift and the following ist shift were over.the action limit, licensee records indicated that breathing zone samples taken from operators during L
the two shifts did not indicate airborne contamination uptake by the operators in excess of license limits.
Each operator is required by the licensee to wear breathing samplers while working.in this area.
The foremen indicated that they have had problems with this valve in the past and have " fixed" it by replacing the pin; therefore, they did not feel it necessary to inform the health physics group.
In this case, the "fix" did not work. Corrective actions taken by the licensee included issuance of a memo to all foremen to require that h(alth physics be notified whenever there were any problems in the pellet shop which may affect safety of the operation, review of the problem by the plant engineering staff, modification of the valving system to eliminate the problem, and installation of an indicating l
light on the system to show whether the ventilation is on or off.
l This incident will be examined further during subsequent inspections.
(81-08-01)
No items of noncompliance were identified.
b.
Micronizer Malfunction L
At about 1:00 p.m., on August 17, 1981, an airline hose to the micronizer, pressurized to about 100 psi, disengaged from the unit j
inside a glovebox.
The air stream from the hose biaw off a glovebox l
glove from the face of the glovebox, and a small purr of uranium j
dioxide powder was released into the room. Because of the sound caused by the releasing hose, operators in the area evacuated prior to the release of the powder from the glovebox. Operators, working at the box, were wearing breathing zone samplers which indicated a maximum exposure of 21 percent of the 10 CFR 20 Appendix B Table 1 Column 1 limits for a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> time period.
There was no release from the facility to the environment. The room had minor contaminatian which was cleaned up prior to the end of the operating shift.
Region I was notified of this incident by telephone from the licensee on August 18, 1981.
During this inspection, the inspector examined licensee records, held discussions with operators and licensee representatives and determined that the following corrective actions have been or will be taken:
the area has been decontaminated, the micronizer unit has been disassembled, inspected, and cleaned up, and the rubber air hoses to the unit will be replaced with threaded pipe. An engineering investigation was conducted by the licensee.
The investigation L
J x;
12 findings indicated that the airline hose was not ruptured, the hose clamp at the unit was not damaged and the unit was not plugged with solids.
Therefore, the conclusion was made that the airline hose released from the unit as a result of a loose clamp. As indicated previously, the rubber hose will be replaced by threaded pipe.
In the interim, the licensee has installed two clamps on each rubber hose connection in the system.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
c.
Dropped Tray of Pellets At about 1:30 p.m. on August 20, an operator dropped a tray of pellets while hand carrying it from one work station to another in the pellet shop.
Licensee records indicated that nasal smears for the operator involved aid not show any uptake of radioactive material, general air samples in the area were not elevated and breathing zone samples obtained during the incident did not show any exposure to airborne contamination. A Radiation Work Permit (RWP) was issued immediately and the floor area involved was cleaned up.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
- 10. Disposal of Spent Acid 4
The inspector examined the use and disposal of component pickling acids.
It was determined that the licensee does not pickle fuel bearing components.
Nonfuel bearing rods and components are pickled, when necessary, prior to assembly into sealed rods or bundles.
Since fuel bearing components are not treated, spent 'cid is not sampled for radioactive material.
The acid is analyzed fc. pH, heavy metals etc.
Spent acid is stored in a 2000 gallon tank located outside the southwest corner of Building 17.
The storage tank is inspected at least once each week for corrosion, leaks and proper valve operation. When the tank is a maximum of 90% full, an outside contractor empties the tank and trucks the spent acid away.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
- 11. Contaminated Storage Area The inspector examined the " contaminated storage area" which was located in a wooded area of the licensee's site approximately 900 feet northwest of Building 2.
This area had been initially discovered during an aerial radiation survey and was subsequently reported to Region I on June 13, 1980.
The inspector determined through discussions with licensee representatives and examination of the area that the following actions had been completed 1
or were in process with respect to the cleanup of this site.
7 13 a.
NRC-NMSS issued Amendment No. 30 on June 29, 1981 to allow " processing" of the material for burial.
b.
All of the material in drums has been repackaged in new drums for burial according to written procedures.
The material in piles on the ground containing thorium has been packaged in drums.
The contaminated hard layer of dirt has been removed from about one-half the involved surface area and packaged in drums for burial.
c.
All drums have been sampled as specified in the approved Amendment 30 application request.
d.
P-eliminary analysis has been completed on the samples.
Those samples containing uranium have been sent to an outside vendor for t.omplete analysis.
e.
Drums containing only thorium have been sent to an approved burial site.
Drums containing uranium will not be sent to burial until the analytical work has been completed, f.
The original drums which could not be decontaminated will be repackaged in drums and sent to burial.
g.
The licensee is preparing a detailed plan for the decontamination of the soil in the waste material stagins area which will be submitted to NRC-NMSS for approval.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
- 12. Training a.
Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing (1) Health Physics Technician Training Through review of licensee records and discussions with licensee representatives, the inspector determined that two new health physics technicians were hired and trained in the Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing facility since January 1,1981.
Initial training consists of 160 hours0.00185 days <br />0.0444 hours <br />2.645503e-4 weeks <br />6.088e-5 months <br /> of formal training including lectures, textbook review and study, and on-the-job training.
The lectures include, but are not limited to:
fundament:13 cf radioactivity (including calculational methods), fundamentals of nuclear criticality safety, radiation detection and measurement instrumen-tation, emergency procedures and responsibilities, and contamina-tion control.
Textbook review includes, but is not limited to:
the NRC-SNM License, Federal Regulations, and the facility Nuclear Licensing and Safety Procedures Manual.
On-the-job training is conducted under the direction of an experienced technician for a minimum of 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.
In addition, the licensee j
has initiated the use of the "Rockwell International 15 Lecture Hour Home Study Health Physics Training Course."
p-u o :'
9
~
14 Training progress is monitored.by means.of a 6 page checklist
" Training Program-Health Physics Technician" which includes
. spaces for sign-off by the lecturing or teaching personnel to indicate that the trainee' appears to have,an understanding of the subject covered.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
. (2) Occasional Worker Training During the time period, August 25 to 27, 1981, the licensee trained occasional personnel (auditors, members of the Nuclear Safety Committee, consultants, etc.) who enter the unclad fuel handling area in applicable subjects (i.e., emergency procedures evacuation routes, use of protective clothing, contamination monitoring techniques, etc.).
No items of noncompliance were identified.
(3) Maintenance Personnel Training On May 6, 1981, the licensee conducted a training session for maintenance personnel who are to work in the unclad fuel handling area. This training included emergency procedures, nuclear criticality safety and radiological protection. Only those maintenance personnel who have received this training will be allowed to work in the unclad fuel handling area.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
(4) Operator Training On August 14, 1981, a special training session was held for about 19 new operators who had been hired within the past 6 months. This training included a review of the new hire training program and included a special session on emergency precedures.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
b.
Nuclear Laboratories (1) Health Physics Technician Training Three of the laboratory health physics personnel including two technicians and the Radiological Engineer completed the course work and testing conducted by the National Registry of Radiation Protection Technologist (NRRPT) on December 6, 1980.
Each has now been certified by this organization.
-,n---,
,e a~
,y r-
., -. ~
.,e-
--,---,,--.w-g 7
..E 15 g
A third technician started working.with the group during March 1981 and has been enrolled in the Rockwell International 15 Lecture Hour Home Study Health Physics Training Course.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
'(2) Laboratory Personnel Training Approximately 25 new employees.have been hired in the Nuclear Laboratories during 1981.
Each employee attended an indoctrination lecture which covers the following subjects prior to being authorized for entry into a restricted area.
The subjects include: badging; NRC postings; NRC Licenses; emergency plans; evacuation routes; principles of health physics; and, location of radioactive materials in-the various buildings.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4 (3) Radiation Worker Training Approximately 10 of the above 25 new employees were given radiation worker training as specified in Procedure NHP-74-045 1
dated October 17, 1975. This training included:
introduction to atomic particles; introduction to radiation; effects of radiation on the human body; personnel protection and monitoring; i
and, handling and use of radioactive material.
The radiation worker training course as outlined above is currently being revised by the licensee. The revised progrem will be reviewed in detail following completion and implementation during a subsequent inspection (81-08-02).
7 No items of' noncompliance were identified.
13.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) prior.to the conclusion of the inspection at 11:15 a.m. on August 28, 1981.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
Remarks made by licensee representatives have been incorporated intc the j
applicable, paragraphs of the report details.
Subsequent to the exit interview, the inspector examined the current status of the radioactive 4
waste material cleanup as discussed in Paragraph 11.
i l
I.
j-i
-~
-