ML20031C311
| ML20031C311 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 04/10/1967 |
| From: | Robert Carlson US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20031C308 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-029-67-01, 50-29-67-1, NUDOCS 8110070047 | |
| Download: ML20031C311 (19) | |
Text
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U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION REGION I DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE April 10, 1967 CO REPORT NO. 29/67-1
Title:
YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY LICENSE NO.
DPR-3 and SNM-906 Dates o Visit:
March 20 - 22, 1957
&.T 0 By R. T. Carlson, Reactor Inspector
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SUMMARY
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t The plant was shutdown March 8 - 20, 1967, to investigate and repair primary to secondary leaks in Steam Generators
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Nos. 3 and 4.
A total of nine leaking tubes, eight in g.
Unit No. 3 and one in Unit No. 4, were located and plugged.
The affected tubes were all centrally located in the vertically oriented tube bundles, with the actual leaks being located directly above the tube sheets.
Eight of the nine leaking tubes were on the outlet side.
The cause for the leaks has not been determined. Normal four loop operation e
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commenced on March 20, 1967.
Full power, 600 Mwt, was achieved on March 22, 1967.
Information received from the
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licensee subsequent to the visit indicates that, as of April 4, 1967, the total primary to secondary leakage rate was less than 10 gpd.
A problem with one of the two throttle valves, failure to close fully, that is related to the primary to secondary 4
leakage, is discussed in the report.
Several significant organizational changes were made since l
the last visit.
The changes, discussed in the report, represent a further reduction in the experience level at the site.
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w-Summary (continued)
A significant portion of Core VI operatton, two and one-half months, has been conducted with the main coolant pH at values less than 5.0, the lowest being 4.6.
The minimum pH level specified in the Technical Specifications is 5.0.
This is an item of noncompliance and a Form AEC-592 was issued.
Prior to the recent outage, and during the period '. f three loop operation, two reactor scrams were experienced.
No clear indication of cause was evident in either case.
The licensee's investigation revealed the most probable cause to have been a spurious feedback signal combined with the half, low main coolant flow signal imposed by the isolated 3.,
loop.
Isolation transformers we re installed as a corrective 4 r; measure.
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t' The irradiated fuel shipment records were reviewed by the inspector and, with some minor exceptions, considered to be adequate.
Several instances of train wrecks are discussed k
in the report.
None of the wrecks involved the irradiated it fuel shipping cask; however, two of them involved the route j
normally used for the shipments.
Some of the derailed cars were totally demolished.
l 1
i DETAILS I.
Scope of Visit
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The Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Yankee) reactor facility in Rowe, Massachusetts, was visited by Mr.
R. T.
e Carlson, Reactor Inspector, Region I, Division of Compliance, L'
on March 20 - 22, 1967, for the purpose of a routine, announced inspection.
The visit included a tour of the facility, ob-servation of a plant startup, and a review of the following subject areas:
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.c. Scope of Visit (continued)
A.
The significant aspects of the plant outage for
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steam generator repairs.
B.
The operation of the facility since the last visit.
C.
The status of irradiated fuel shipments.
The principal persons contacted were as follows:
[1; 1;
Mr. Wendell P. Johnson, Plant Superintendent 1.
Mr. John B. Randazza, Assistant Plant Superintendent Mr. Robert F. Jones, Special Assistant to the P3 ant Superintendent Mr. Louis H. Heider, Technical Assistant to the Plant SuperintendeC
[
Mr. Ellery L. Hammond, Plant Reactor Engineer Mr. David B.
Pike, Plant Health Physicist Mr. John M. Connelly, Chemical Engineer j.
Mr. Roy E. M.
Reid, Control Supervisor 8
II.
Resul_ts of Visit
?
A.
Organization 1.
Changes i
l Several signiff Int organizational changes were h
made since the last visit, November 28 - December
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1966.
Two of the changes involved top company management; the remainder involved personnel at the site.
The changes were as follows:
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Mr. William Webster, former President, was named Chief Executive Officer.
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%; Results of Visit (continued) 1 h.
Mr. D. G. Allen, Counsel, was named President.
c.
Mr. W.
P. Johnson, Plant Superintendent, was promoted to operations Manager, a position left vacant with the departure of Mr. G. A. Reed in May 1966*.
Mr. Johnson will serve in both caoacities pending his transfer to the Boston Office, scheduled for July 1967.
His successor
,9-as Plant Superintendent has not been announced a..1 by management.
ppy
.U!d d.
Mr. D. A. Hansen, Jr.,
former Technical Assistant hp to the Plant Superintendent, was promoted to i{
the position of Head of the Electrical, In-
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strumentation and Control Section in the Boston Office.
Mr. Hansen has completed his transfer a
to Boston.
e.
Mr. L. H. Heider, former Chemical Engineer, was promoted to Technical Assistant to the Plant Superintendent.
f.
Mr. J. M. Connelly, former Chemist, was promoted f
to Chemical Engineer vice Mr. Heider.
The l
licensee is currently seeking another chemical l
engineer to fill the position vacated by Mr.
Connelly.
[
I g.
Mr. G. C. Andognini, Jr.,
former Plant Reactor Engineer, was transferred to Connecticut Yankee (CY) on temporary assignment as a startup test advisor.
According to Mr. Johnson, Mr.
(-
Andognini will be assigned responsibilities in the Boston Office subsequent to the work at CY.
(continued)
- CO REPORT NO. 29/66-2, paragraph II.A.
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Results of Visit (continued) h.
Mr. E. L. Hammond, former Technical Assistant to the Plant Reactor E.gi.esr, was promoted to Plant Reactor Engineer.
A review of the changes did not reveal any area of immediate concern to the inspector.
It should be noted, however, that tho=e 7hanges involving site personnel, although not representing a loss of talent to the Company, da represent a further reduction in the experience level at the site *.
?p 2.
Job Description - Plant Reactor Engineer i
,h The licensee's job description for the Plant
}N" Reactor Engineer, dated February 6, 1966, was noted by the inspector to include the following statement under " Duties and Responsibilities":
H El "To take charge of the c ontrol rocm 00l and direct nuclear plant operation should he feel that the condition war-t rants this type of acti7n."
Paragraph 50.54 (1) of the Regulations specifies
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that persons designated to be responsible for directing licensed activlties will be licensed senior reactor operators.
Both Messrs. Andognini l
and Hammond are licensed reactor operators.
l In discussing this subj ect, Mr. Johnson acknowledged i
the apparent discrepancy between the licensed status of the Plant Reactor Engineer and the requirements of the Regulations. He stated that for the present, h
he would revise the wording in the job description h.
to make the position tenable by a reactor operator.
3 He said that consideration would be given to up-grading the Plant Reactor Engineer to a senior reactor operator in the future.
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- Previous organizational changes discussed in several reports l3 including CO REPORT NO. 29/66-4, paragraph II.D.4.
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e Results of Visit (continued)
B.
Primary to Secondary Leakage in Steam Generators -
Reactor Outage The reactor was shutdown March 8 - 20, 1966, to in-vestigate and repair primary to secordary leakage in two steam generators, Unit Nos. 3 and 4.
The significant aspects of the ou tage, including related events preceding it, were reviewed by the inspector and are discussed in the following paragraphs:
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ed 1.
Even'.s Preceding Outage
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The No. 4 main coolant loop was isolated on December 22, 1966, when the total primary to secondary leakage reached 520 g9d Between then and the time of the outage, the leakage in the three on-line loops, principally loop No. 3, gradually increased from a low of 17 gpd to 600 gpd.
2.
Results of Licensee's Invest.iqation and Corrective r
Action The licensee's investigation revealed a total of nine leaking tubes, eight in Unit No. 3 and one in Unit No. 4.
The affected tubes were all l
l-centrally located in the vertically criented tube bundles, with the actual leaks being located directly above the tube sheets.
Eight l
of the nine leaking tubes were on the outlet l
l side.
A cross sectional view of a steam generator,
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indicating the approximate location of the leaks, f
I is shown in Figure 1.
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- Results of Visit (continued)
The cause of the leaks has not been determined.
According to Mr. Johnson, at+.empts were made to examine the inside of the tutes with a borescope but were unsuccessful.
He said that the a f fected tubes were not visible frem the secondary side.
Access to the primary side war made by way of the 16" manways; the secondary side was viewed via the 6" handholes.
According to Mr. Jones, a layer p
of black magnetite crud, approximately 10 mils thick, was found on the primary side of the tubes and the water box.
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The affected tubes were closed with tapered plugs 1/?
on both the inlet and outlet sides.
Both the 3,
tubes and the plugs are made of Type 304 stainless steel.
An additional tube was erreneously plugged
'3 in Unit No. 3.
The plugs were driven into place
- F and seal welded; the welds were checked with dye-m penetrant.
The secondary sides were hydro tested at 900 psig subsequent to the plugging.
In discussing the probable size of the holes in the tubes, Mr. Jones said that their calculations, based on leak rates, indicated the maximum size g.
of the holes to be about a few mils in diameter.
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He stated that the I D.
of the tubes, 1620 in t
each unit, is 0.623".
r 3.
Debris in Steam Generators r:
Two lif ting bales from ir.tadiation test specimen containers wer e found on the blet sides of g
the steam generators, one in er7h unit.
The bales were found wedged inside tubes other than
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those known to be leaking.
Mr. Jones stated that there was ne damage noted attributable to the bales.
The radiation rates fr~m the b3les, 20 mr/hr, indicate that they probably had not been in the reactor core.
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~- Results of Visit (continued)
A previous review by the inspector of the licensee's inventory records of debris col-lected from the main coolant system, con-ducted at the time of the Core IV - V refueling outage, indicated that all of the bales had been accounted for*.
In discussing this, Mr. Johnson stated that he could not explain the apparent discrepancy.
When asked if the debris inventory
,77 records were kept current, he stated that they p.f had been discontinued.
He acknowledged, however,
- ij that it would be proper to maintain a current inventory and said that it would be done.
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4.
Problem with Throttle Valve 2,
The facility records show that one of the two throttle valves failed t o close fully by about 2" during the process of shutting down.
The 24 stoppage was caused by a deposit of boron and phosphate on the valve stem; the boron from primary coolant inleakage and the phosphate as a result of increasing the normal addition rate of this chemical g
to the secondary coolant to compensate for the boron.
According to Mr. Randazza, some deposit was also p
noted on the stem of the other throttle valve but it closed without apparent dif ficulty.
Both valves were subsequently cleaned.
The licensee attributed the problem to inadequate j
capacity of the valve leakoff system.
Mr. Johnson stated that the leakoff system was modified on both valves to minimize this problem.
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- CO REPORT NO. 29/65-4, paragraph II.A.S.
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- Results of Visit (continued) 5.
Health Physics The facility records indicate that radiation rates as high as 20 r/hr in Unit No. 3 and 6 r/hr in Unit No. 4 were experienced during the repair work.
Both measurements were made one foot from the bottom of the tube sheet.
The maximum personnel exposure for the job was 2498 mrem.
According to Mr. Pike, all personnel on the
$ki-job were required to wear full face masks j
equipped with a positive air supply.
In addition, continuous air monitoring was pro-
[p.f[
vided.
The records indicate that the maximum
- fp sample result was 4.12 x 10-8 uc/cc.
The principal lF constituent was Co-58 (restricted MPC = 5 x 10-8 uc/cc).
The highest concentrations of airborne contamination were detected during the cutting
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of the manway diaphragms for Unit No.
3.
When asked if any air samples were taken inside the primary side of the steam generators - an area occupied by those doing much of the work -
f Mr. Pike stated that all of the air samples f
were obtained from outside the water box, about 4' from the manway.
According to Mr.
l Pike, the maximum residency time inside the
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water box for any individual was less than 20 g
minutes.
The records of personnel exposures tend L
to confirm this figure.
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e In discussing the air monitoring aspects of the j ob, Messrs. Johnson and Pike stated that although no p
credit was taken for the respiratory protective equipment, they were confident that no one was l
exposed to excessive concentrations.
They based this on the following opini?ns:
Any significant i
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. Results of Visit (continued) contamination would have carried over to the monitoring point chosen the welding method employed heliarc - minimized any contamination from that source; and the relatively limited i
residency time allowed an additional margin of at least 120 times MPC.
When asked why at least one sample was not taken inside the water box, Mr. Johnson said that he could not justify it in lieu of the high exposure rates involved and 3g the considerations summarized above.
Mr. Pike bg(
stated that bioassay samples were obtained on all incividuals as an additional check.
The results were not available at the time of the q};[G A
visit.
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Current Status i
Normal four loop operation was resumed on March hEi. -I]
20, 1967.
Full power, 600 Mwt, was attained on
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March 22, 1967.
Information received from the i,1 licensee subsequent to the visit indicates that fh as of April 4, 1967, the primary to secondary
('f leakage was less than 10 gpd.
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No. 2 Circulating Pump
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1.
Problem with Thermal Barrier M.
a The facility records indicate that an increase in t
[j-main coolant flow past the thermal barrier, re-sulting in an increase in pump bearing temperatures from 140 to 180 F, was experienced in the No. 2 g
0 circulating pump subsegaent to the last visit.
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'5 This same problem had been experienced in this I
pump during Core V operation.
Corrective measures taken during the Core V - VI refueling outage ap-peared to have been success fu1*.
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- CO REPORT NO. 29/6t:-5, paragraph II.B.9.
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.lh s Results of Visit (continued)
The licensee investigated the recurrence of the problem during the current outage.
According to Mr. Johnson, the results indicate that the latest increase in flow resulted from improper retorquing of the bolts for the thermal barrier follower flange during the last repairs, per-formed by Westinghouse.
The current work was performed by the licensee.
Information received h'
z from the licensee subsequent to the visit in-1 y; dicates that the pump is operating normally. 2. Problem with Airborne Contamination d ?[ A problem with airborne contamination was experienced i(. during the latest work on the pump, which had been 1[ ' moved to the turbine-generator room for that (y purpose. The principal rel;2se of contaminant b* - occurred when the pump was opened to the room ']lf atmosphere. The records indicate that air monitoring was provided throughout the job. "{ The mgximum concentration experienced was 4.2 x 10" uc/cc. The principal constituent was co-58 (restricted MPC = 5 x 10-8). The most significant period of airborne contamination lasted for four hours. According to Mr. Pike, several scrubdowns j ,q q of the turbine generator room floor and equipment Pj. were necessary to remove the contamination. ,t i The inspector's review showed that there were j no personnel overexposures or releases to the un-1 restricted area in excess of the limits of the s '+ license or 10 CFR 20 as a result of this l>' occurrence. i ? e k (continu ed) iI '. ? $y he ^ ?V..
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- Results of Visit (continued)
D. Plant Startup The inspector witnessed the startup of the facility subsequent.to the outage for steam generator repairs. Opera-tions observed included: Plant heatup; nuclear startup; rolling, bringing to speed and phasing of the turbine generator; and the initial phases of plant loading. Mr. Jones, who is undertaking training for an operator's license, conducted the nuclear aspects of these operations. The performance of both personnel and equipment during the operations observed were considered by the inspector to be adequate. No problems of any significance were noted. A. E. Main Coolant Chemistry - Item of Noncomoliance i: Two items of significance were noted in the inspector's routine review of main coolant chemistry records. The items are discussed in the following paragraphs: 1. Low pH - Item of Noncompliance The records show that the pH of the main coolant was consistently below 5.0 for the first two and one-half months of operation with Core VI, with the lowest value being 4.60 on November 8, 1966. Ll The records also show that sub-5.0 values of main coolant pH, 4.8 and 4.83, were experienced during the initial period of opt ration following the recent outage. The periods of pH <;5.0 were noted to relate to comparable periods of relatively high boron concentration, 1650 - 1240 ppm. Opeia- ~ tion with the pH 4L5.0 is in noncompliance with paragraph B.2. of the Technical Specifications *, which specifies that the pH of the main coolant water shall always be within the range from 5.0 to 10.5. A Form AEC-592 was issued regarding this item. k (continued) f r
- Change No. 61.
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i... h 'N ' Results of Visit (continued) In discussing the item of ncncompliance, Mr. Johnson said that the low pH was caused by the ~ relatively high concentrations of boron, that there was no safety problem related to it, and that in retrospect Yankee should have requested a change in me Technical Specifications relating to main coolant pH concurrently with the request for in-creased concentrations of boron *. He stated that a proposed change would be submitted to DRL re-questing authorization to operate with the main coolant pH at some value less than 5.0. 2. Silver in Main Coolant _. 4v L [ i~ Silver-110m, in concentrations as high,as 2.0 h1 5 [4 x 10 dpm/mg crud, has been detected in the crud ths in the main coolant system during Core VI operation. hjyO. Recent sample results show a gradual reduction in the concentration from the values noted earlier pjf;. [gg;cq in the cycle. The licensee attributes the con-y dition to tramp silver on the new inconel-clad, P' silver-lhdium-mambm control rods, installed during j;. the Cores V - VI refueling outage. f_ 1 i F. Reactor Scrams i The facility records indicate that two reactor scrams ** Ii. were experienced since the last visit, one each on December 24 ,f and 28, 1966. Both occurred during the per.iod of three loop operation. " No clear indication as to the cause of scram was j evident in either instance. The records of the licensee 's .;al investigations indicate the most probable cause in each case ., %J to have been a spurious feedback signal combined with the 7 7' l (continued) v ,l
- Change No. 74, approved September 29, 1966, f r.cludes authoriza-tI tion to operate with as much as 1700 ppm boron (up from 1300 ppm).
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- Scram Nos. 53 and 54 since initial startup.
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- s. Results of Visit (continued) half, low main coolant flow signal imposed by the isolated No. 4 main coolant loop.
Operation subsequent to the seco.nd scram until the current outage was conducted with the loss of flow scram circuit in the one-out-of-four loop scram logic mode and a test signal inserted for the No. 4 loop to simula te normal flow conditions. Operation in the described fashion is consistent with the requirements of the licensee. }1 The licensee subsequently installed isolatlan trans-Ils formers in the low main coolant flow and low pressurizer pressure 'Yh scram circuits during the recent outage in an attempt to pre-S vent a future recurrence of the problem. as "A G. Pressurizer Test Program
- 2 I.
The licensee has continued sample testing the gaseous 'I P ase of the pressurizer, both with and without the capillary h vents in operation. The more recent tests included the use of the new sample tap and vent arrangement located near the water-gas interface. According to Mr. Heider, the test g l results, reported by the licensee in Monthly Operation Report Nos. 73 and 74, confirm his postulation
- on the stratification of the gases.
He said that this was evident by the fact that j the oxygen showed a tendency to concentrate at the water-gas l interface during non-venting periods. l Further sample testing of the environment in the pressurizer is planned by the licensee. ,r l t t H. Irradiated Fuel Shipment,s - SNM-906 1. Records p The inspector made a detailed review of the licensee's records for irradiated fuel shipments (continued)
- Discussed in CO REPORT NO. 29/66-3, paragraph II.E.3.
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pm . Results of Visit (continued) made since the last review, July 27 - 29, 1966. All of the records reviewed were, with the exception of some minor instances of omissions, noted to be adequate and in accordance wit h the requirements of the license. The omissions relate principally to certain of the routine cask condi-tion checks required by 10 CFR 71.54. Mr. Johnson assurred the inspector that the required checks were made, and that the records would reflect this i, in the future. {* 2. Problem with Cask Power Supply In two instances, Shipment Nos. 19 and 20, the o$$ shipments were delayed in departing the site due g-to malfunctions in one of the two railcar-mounted, 3 diesel-generator sets. In each instance, the probLe m I 1 related to oil leakage on the No. 1 diesel engine. Either of the diesel-generator sets will, by design, y handle the cask power needs, with the second set {" serving as standby. In the case of Shipment No. I g 20, which was in-waiting at the time of the visit and eventually departed the site on March 28, 1967, i the diesel engine was sent off site for repairs. j On-site power is available at Yankee in the event of total failure of railcar-mounted sources. ? g 3. Train Wrecks ( s ? Discussions with licenree personnel revealed that train wrecks were experienced in the Hoosac Tunnel on two separate occasions. The tunnel, located within a few miles of the site, serves the railroad company p., that transports the Yankee irradiated fuel shipments f, authorized by license SNM-906. The cask used in [ these shipments was not involved in either wreck. ((( I (continued) 5g. . s. - L w., ,w Lu w __ __ __ _ _ ________ __ __ _ __ __ A er?>:_. & san % _.
j s Results of Visit (continued) A total of 39 cars were derailed in the first wreck, on February 23, 1967. The second wreck, which occurred 22 days later, involved three cars. According to Mr. Johnson, frozen rails and switchgear were involved in each wreck. The inspector toured the tunnel site during this visit and noted a number of railcars that appeared to be totally demolished. Mr. Johnson also informed the inspector of a third train wreck that occurred on the temporary detour rcute established by the railroad during the cleanup period following the first wreck in 4 w the tunnel. The cask car was not involved in 'i" this instance either. Details of this wreck were 6 not available to the inspector. h i 4. Problem at Other Facility k \\ The inspector discussed with Mr. Johnson the recent experience at Dresden Unit No. 1, where l their irradiated fuel shipping cask, which had been erroneously returned from Nuclear i Fuel Services with water in it, subsequently } froze resulting in the failure of the cask { bolts. Mr. Johnson stated that he was aware of this occurrence, and that the .] cask used by Yankee had always been re-turned properly drained. I. Miscellaneous 1. Respiratory Protective Equipment Program The inspector reviewed the status of the licensee's t program preparation *. According to Mr. Johnson, 3 1 (continued)
- Previous status discussed in CO REPORT NO. 29/66-5, paragraph
~+ II.D.2. ) a. a .3.. _ } ~ A n;c:\\ 't --~ x,7 W ' 'i 'ak -~_ :. _ _ _ _ ~~ma a
v~ ^. Ricults of Visit (continutd) the completed program package together with the draft copy of the " Guide"* have been given to their consultant, Mr.-Samuel Levin, In dustrial Hygienist and Radiological Safety Officer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for an independent appraisal. Mr. Johnson stated that the program for the accredited use of the equip-ment would go into effect subsequent ta Mr. Levin's review. 2. Incident with Vapor Container Polar Crane One of the vapor container polar crane hooks, sf weighing approximately two tons, was accidentally ~j torn loose from its cable and dropped to the main fl floor of the vapor container during the recent gI; outage. No personnel injuries or equipment damage de resulted from the occurrence. According to Mr. [^T Johnson, who was inside the vapor container a t the time, the incident resulted fron a combination of the failure of the operator to properly observe I ' f, the hook while he was driving it to a raised posi-t;P tion, and the failure of the hook-up limit to func-hj' tion properly. p-l 3. Fire Incident at Foreign Reactor The recent fire incident at the Westinghouse-designed, Franco-Belgian PWR**, was discussed with f; the licensee. In the incident, imperfections in gg, F i layers of thermal insulation allowed a fast l neutron shield, made of a wood / plastic composi-IJO*f' tion, to rise above its ignition temperature. The resultant fire, which occurred around and above the i top flange of the reactor vessel, damaged some of l; the control rod cables. { l k: i (continued) p
- Division of Safety Standards draft publication, " Respiratory l
Protection Against Airborne Radioactive Materials", dated l August 4, 1966.
- Nuclear Engineering, February 1967.
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m n l i.'- ~, o Results of Visit (continued) Mr. Johnson stated that no such shielding material is in use in the Yankee reactor facility. J. Exit Interview An exit interview was held with Mr. Johnson on March 22, 1967. The principal subjects discussed were as follows: 1. The item of noncompliance regarding the pH of {f$g 9:n the main coolant. s jQ 2. The ctatement in the job description for the Plant Reactor Engineer as relates to the licensed p}s status of the Engineer and the requirements of y/P ~ M' the Regulations. 3. The adequacy of the monitoring for airborne con-f, tamination during the steam generator repair work. Significant comments by Mr. Johnson are included in the [' I' body of the report. '?
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