ML20030C913

Interim Deficiency Rept Re Nonconformance in Installation of safety-related Pipe Hangers,Initially Reported 800319. All Accessible Hangers Reworked.All Inaccessible Hangers Will Be Completed by 811015.Final Rept by 811030

ML20030C913
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	08/20/1981
From:	Mcgaughy J MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, AECM-81-289, NUDOCS 8108280351
Download: ML20030C913 (5)

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MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Helping Build Mississippi P. O. B O X 164 0, J A C K S O N, MIS SIS SIP PI 3 9 2 0 5 d

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JAMES P. McGAUGHY, JR.

August 20, 1981 o

Office of Inspection & Enforcement

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Ld-l Q

101 Marietta Street, N.W.

I AUG 2 71981"' 72 Suite 3100

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Atlanta, Georgia 30303 g

Attention:

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director 4

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SUBJECT:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-416/417 File 0260/15525/15526 PRD-80/09, Interim Report #2, Safety Related Pipe Hanger Nonconformances AECM-81/289 References 1) Responses to PRD-80/09 a) AECM-81/37, 1/15/81 b) AECM-80/174, 7/30/80 c) AECM-80/82, 4/18/80

2) Responses to NRC Site Inspection 80-08 a) AECM-80/132, 6/17/80 b) AECM-80/104, 5/19/80 On March 19, 1980, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. F.

Cantrell, of your office, of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site. The deficiency concerns nonconformances in the installation of safety-related pipe hangers. This matter was first identified in NRC Site Inspection 50-416/80-08. A Notice of Violation was issued for failure to follow pipe support installation and inspection procedures.

Our Constructor issued Management Corrective Action Request (MCAR)-66 to track this condition. The deficiency was evaluated to be reportable under the provisions of 10CF'150.55(e) and the NRC was notified of this by letter AECM-81/37, January 15, 1981. The deficiency is not reportable under ':he provisions of 10CFR21, as explained in our attached interim report.

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S P R Member Middle South Utilities System

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly AECM-81/289 NRC Page 2 Our Constructor has not completed formulation of all corrective actions. We expect to have this completed and to submit a final report by September 30, 1981.

Yours truly, J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

KDS:dr ATTACHMENT cc:

Mr. N. L. Stampley Mr. R. B. McGehee Mr. T. B. Conner Mr. Victor Stello, Director Of fice of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. G. B. Taylor South Miss. Electric Power Association P. O. Box 1589 Hattiesburg, MS 39401 f

bec: Dr. D. C. GibiJ Mr. J. Letherman Mr. J. N. Ward Manager of BWR-6 Licensing Mr. J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

General Electric Company Mr. W. A. Braun 175 Curtner Avenue Mr. R. Trickovic San Jose, CA. 95125 Mr. J. W. Yelverton Mr. L. F. Dale Mr. C. K. McCoy Mr. D. M. Houston Mr. T. H. Cloninger U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. R. A. Ambrosino Division of Licensing Mr. A. J. Iosue Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. G. B. Rogers Mr. M. R. Williams Mr. L. E. Ruhland Mr. J. Matore Mr. D. L. Ilunt U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. A. G. Wagner Division of Licensing Mr. P. A. Taylor Washington, D. C.

20555 PRD File File a

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p Attachment to AECM-81/289 Page 1 of 2 INTERIM REPORT NO. 2 FrR PRO-80/09 1.

Description of the Deficiency C?.C Site Inspection 50-416/80-08 of March 3-6, 1980, resulted in a Notice of Violation (80-08-01) involving the failure to follow installation and accept-ance procedures for safety-related pipe hangers. After the above concern was identified, our Constructor performed an investigative inspection of seventy-seven (77) previously accepted safety-related pipe hanger installations. This inspection revealed that twenty-three (23) hangers did not conform to installa-tiu drawings, specifications, or inspection criterir.. The nonconforming conditions included dimensional errors, undersized fillet welds, bolt hole patterns dimensionally incorrect, stif fener bars not installed, and abandoned bolt holes not grouted per specification. Additionally, Iive (5) hangers were found disassembled af ter final inspection and had not been re-inspected.

This deficiency affects the Nuclear Boiler System (B21), Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System (Cll), Standby Liquid Control System (C41), Residual Heat Removal (E12), Low Pressure Core Spray (E21), High Pressure Core Spray (E22),

Suppression Pool Makeup (E30), Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (E51), Reactor Water Cleanup (G33, G36), Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup (G41), Standby Service Water (P41), Component Cooling Water (P42), Plant Service Water (P44), Flou-and Equipment Drains (P45), Service Air System (PS2), Instrument Air System (P53), and Control Room HVAC System (Z51).

Pipe support QlB21G022 R17, for Main Steam Relief Valve (MSRV) Line #4 was identified as having an undersized fillet weld. This support could fail and then cause the failure of three other pipe supports Q1821G022 R11, QlB210022 RIS, and Q1821G022 R16 on this line, which is an automatic depressurization line. The failure of the MSRV Line could possibly cause damage to other safety-related equipment in the drywell by pipe whip or possible missile hazards. Therefore, this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50. 55(e). The af fected systems had not been turned over to MP&L for acceptance, so this deficiency is not repnetable under the provisions of 10CFR21.

II.

Approach to Resolution of the Problem The cause of this deficient condition was that existing procedures were inade-quate for appropriate detailing of the inspection requirements, allowing for misinterpretation by responsible personnel. Also, installation instructions l

and inspection procedures were not correctly followed.

l The deficiency extends to all previously accepted safety related pipe hangers in both Unit I and Unit 2.

This was a total of 2,041 hangers.

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Attachment to AECM-81/289 Page 2 of 2 Our Constructor first instructed all Quality Control and Field Engineering personnel involved in the inspection process as to the proper inspection and l,

acceptance criteria for safety-related pipe hangers. Quality Control Instruc-tion 0715T was revised to conform to the requirements of the correct inspection j

and acceptance criteria.

l All previously installed and accepted safety-related hangers were reinspected l

by our Constructor. Of these, a total of 1,996 hangers were eitner accepted "as is" or reworked. Ten (10) hangers were voided and will not be used.

Thirty five (35) hangers were inaccessible and could not be reinspected. Our Constructor is presently evaluating these hangers.

The instruction of our Constructor's Quality Control and Field Engineering l

personnel in the proper inspection and acceptance criteria for safety-related 1

pipe hangers will serve to prevent recurrence.

III. Status of Proposed Resolution l

All rework has been completed. Our Constructor has not completed the dis-position of the hangers that were inaccessible for rcinspectiuon. This should be completed by September 15, 1981.

IV.

Reason Why a Final Report Will Be Delayed l

l The evaluation of the inaccessible hangers has not been completed.

V.

Date When Final Report Will Be Submitted We expect to submit a Final Report by September 30, 1981.

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