ML20030B809

Technical Evaluation of Electrical Instrumentation & Control Design Aspects of Override of Containment Purge Valve Isolation & Other Signals for Jm Farley Nuclear Power Plant

ML20030B809
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	08/05/1981
From:	Broderick N, Debby Hackett, Radosevic J EG&G, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20030B802	List: ML20030B801 ML20030B806 ML20030B807 ML20030B808 ML20030B809 ML20030B810
References
1183-4146, UCLR-15155, UCRL-15155, NUDOCS 8108240244
Download: ML20030B809 (12)

Text

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ENCLOSURE TO ENCLOSURE 5

'UCR L - 15155 c

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' Energy F5eacurements Group

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t TECHNICAL EVAI.UATION OF THE ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL DESIGN ASPECTS OF THE

,1 OVERRIDE OF CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION AND OTHER ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE SIGNALS FOR THE JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (DOCKET N O. 50-348)

NOVEhASER 1979

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Werk Performed for Lawrence Livermore Laboratory under U.S. Department of Energy Contract N o D E-AC OS-76 NVO 1183.

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if Energy Measurements Group Sen Ramon Operations 3

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TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL DESIGN ASPECTS i

OF THE i

OVERRIDE OF CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION AND OTHER ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE SIGNALS FOR THE JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

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(OOCK ET NO. 50-3eR) by I

D. B. "ickett 1

Approved for Puolication i

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- John R. Radosevic Department Manager i

This Document is UNCLASSIFIED L

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' Nicholas E. Broderick i

Department Manager Derivative Classifier Work Performed for Lawrence Livermore Laboratory under U.S. Department of Energy Contract N o. D E-AC O8-76 NVO 1183.

SAN RAMON CPERATIONS asesew=caew ca~ cN =cao SAN maMCN. CAvFC ANSA 94583

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ABSTRACT

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Titis report documents the technical evaluation of the electrical,-

instrumentation, and control design aspects of the override of containment t

purge valve isolation and other engineered safety. feature signals for the Joseph M.

Farley nuclear power plant.

The review c+iteria ar2 based on

'IEEE Std-279-1971 requirements for the safety ' signals to all ourge and ventilation isolation valves.

- Thi s report i s supplied as part of the Selected Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control Systems Issues Program being conducted - for the U.

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Nuclear Regulatory Comission by Lawrence Liyerncre Laboratory.

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' FOREWORD F

L Pj This report is supplied as part of the Selected El ectrical,

Instrumentation, and Centrol Systems Issues (SEICSI) Program being con-ducted for the U.

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Nuclear Regul atory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors, by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Field Test Systems Division of.the Electronics Engineering Department.

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission funded the work under an -

authori zation entitled " Electrical, Instn M atation and Control System.

Support," B&R 2019 04 031, FIN A-0231.

The work sas performed by EG&G, Inc., Energy Measurements Group, San Ramon Operations, for Lawrence Livermore Laboratcry under V. S. Depart-ment of Energy w as. cc: numoer DE-AC08-76NV01183.-

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t TABLE OF CONTENTS l

Pace 1.

INTRODUCTION.

1 2.

EVALUATION OF JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 3

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2.1 Review Criteria 3

2.2 Containment Ventilation Isolation Circuits Design Description 4

2.3 Containment Ventilation Isolation System Design Ev al uati on.

5 2.4 Other Engineered Safety Feature System Circuits 6

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CONCLUSIONS.

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REFERENCES.

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TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE ELECTRICAL, r

INSTRUMENTATION,-AND CONTROL DESIGN ASPECTS P

1 0F THE OVERP.IDF 9F CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION AND

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OTHER ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE SIGNALS L.

FOR THE JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

..i (Docket No. 50-348) i D. B. Hackett EG&G, Inc., Energy Measurements Group, San Ramon Operations 1.

INTRODUCTION Sevar: 1

, stances have been reported where automatic closure of the containman: centilation/ purge valves would not have occurred because the safety actuation signals were either manually overridden or blocked l

during normal piant eqerations.

These events resulted from proce' dural inadequacies, design deficiencies, and lack of proper management controls.

These events also brought into question the mechanical operability of the containment isolation valves themselves.

These events were determined by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to be an Abnormal Occurrence

(=.73-5) and were, accordingly, reported to t)e U. S. Congress.

As a toilow-uo on this Abnormal Occurrence, the NRC. staff is reviewing the electrical override aspects and the mechanical operability ascects of containment purging for all operating power reactcrs.

Or Nover.ber 23, 1978, the NRC issued a letter entitled " Containment Purging During Nomal Pl ant Operation"1 m 'all boiling water reactor (BWR) and i

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lt pressurized water reacter (PWR) licensees.

In a letter dated January 9,.

g 1979, a letter

• dated January 10, 1979, and a letter dated February 5, jh 1979, the Al abama Power Company (APC), the licensee for the Joseoh M.

I-Farley nuclear power plant, replied to the NRC generic letter.

A meeting" was held between the APC and the NRC in Washington, D. C. on July 31, 1979 and.a conference call was made on October 29, 1979 to discuss this issue farther.

In a letter dated August 7,1979, APC provided the information requested at the July 31, 1979 meeting.

This document addresses only the electrical, instrumentation, and j

control (El&C) design aspects of the containment ventilation isolation

('CVIj :nd other engineered safety features (ESF's).

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2.

EVALUATION OF JOSEr"i M. FARLEY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT '

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3 2.1

-REVIEW CRITERIA a

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The primary intent of this evaluation is to determine if the

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-follo ung NRC staff criteria are met for the safety signals to aii purge l[

and ventilation isolation valves:

(1)

Criterion no.1 -The overriding of one type of safety actuation signal (e.g.,

radiation) must not c ause the blocking of any Other type of safety actuation signal (e.g., pressure) to the isolation valves.

(2)

Criterion no.

2--Sufficient physical features (e.g.,

key lock switches) are provided to facilitate adequate acministrative controls.

(3)

Criterion no. 3--The system-level annunciation of the overridden status i s provided f or every safaty system impacted when any override is a n' /e.

Inc w"il to this review, the felicwing additional NRC staff design criteri, are used in the evaluat on:

i (1)

Criterion no. 4--Diverse s-ignals should be pro-vided to initiate isolation of the containment ventilation system.

Specifically, containment high radi? tion, safety injection actuation, and containment high onssure shoul d automatically initiate CVI.

This is in conformance with Branch Technical Fosition 5 4 of 5ection 6.2.4 of the

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Standard Re~iew Plan.'

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Criterion no. 5--The instrumentation and control systems provide-to initiate CVI should be designed and cualified as safety-crade equipment.

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• ine following cefinition is given for clarity of use in this evaluation:

Oterride:

The signal is sti't present, and it is blocked in order to perform a function centrary to the signal.

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f (3)

Criterien no. 6--The overriding or : resetting of P.

the isolation actuation sicnal should not cause I.

the automatic reopening of any isolation / purge i.

valve.

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2.2 CO:iTAINMEtii VENTILATIOli ISOLATION C!oCU! S DESIG!i DESCRIPT10ii-t The Joseph M. Farley nuclear power plant containment. ventilation /

1 purge system is comprised ci an 18-inch " mini-purge" system combined with 48-inch main-purge system.

The " mini-purge" system was designed to maintain containment-atmosphere radioactivity levels consistent with occupancy requirements.

The Josep" M. Farley nuclear power plant has two ESF trains which can each cause isolation of the containment ventilation / purge system.

The initiating contacts that effect CVI are listed below:

(1)

Autcmatic Contacts (s)

Containment hich radiation (either of two separate monitors).

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.l Safety injection actuation.

- Contact-(2)

Containment isolation pushbuttons.

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(c)

Containment spray pushbuttons.

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l Each train in:ludes as an input, the safety injection actuation signal to -he solid-state oratection systen (SSPS). When a monitred plant condition (or manual input) calls for isolation, electric power is removed from tne CVI s'olenoid-valve c'ircuits causing the iso!ation valves to close.

The manual containmeilt spray pushbuttons, the containment isolation push-buttens., and the safety-grade radiation monitors have normally open con-tacts directly in the CVI solenoid-valve circuits.

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-Tle foiicwing cefinition is given for clarity of use in this evaluation:

Reset:

The signal has come and - gone, ar.d the circuit is being cleared in crder to return it to the normal condition.

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.Soth safety injection trains have a " reset" switch, as defined in

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this report.

These switches are unprotected, T-handle, spring-loaded to neutral, momentary-contact switches.

Upon clearing of both safety injec-h t'on tr'ains, the CVI signal will clear.

Howeve.'

'hls will not cause the p

valves te automatically reopen.

To reopen ~ the. valves, the valve switch i:

must be manually reinitiated to the "open" position.

This will pick up a i

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- seal-in contact which will maintain electrical power to the CVI solenoid-'

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-valve circuit.

The seal-in will not nold the valve open if a CVI-signal is j

present or initiated.

j The CVI' actuation circuit does not contain a ' reset or override switch. -The radiation monitor: have " reset" switches, as defined in this j

report, but they do not contain an override or bypass feature.

There :s no i

apparent need to open any of the conta %=ent ventilation / purge v.lves following an accident condition, because the post-accident combustible gas 1

l recombiner system is located inside the centainment.

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2.3 CONTAlt'E F VENTILATION ISOLATIb SYSTEM DESIGN EVALUATION i

4 In c2. c 3: to tnis issue, the ccntainment large purge 'alves a:

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.: lear pow-3r plant are currently tagged shut on an in-i tri-basis.

fl. venting and purging is being perfor".ed with the " mini-4 j

ourge" system on an unlimited basis.

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The CVI actuation system contains no re ets or overrides.

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j conclude that NRC staff :riterion nos.1, 2, and 3 are satisfied.

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The safety, injection actuation signal is formed by 2n "0R" gate of several signals, including containment high pressure.

Since CVI is 4

j initiated by safety injection or contaircert high radiation, we conclude that 'aC staff criterion no. 4 is sitisfied.

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the information providec ay the licensee during the July 31, ro 1 i

1979 :aeeting with the NRC, the radi ation-moni t ori ng equipment at the s

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t Joseph M. Farley nuclear cower plant is designec and qualified as safety-gra'de equi pment. F2 conclude that NRC staff criterion no. 5 ie satisfied.

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Resetting the actuation signal cannot cause the CVI valves to l:

l, automatically reopen.

To recpen these valves, their individual switches c.u s t be reinitiated to the "open" position.

We conclude that NRC staff

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criterion no. 6 is satisfied.

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OTHER ENGINEERED SAFCY FEATURE SYSTEM CIRCUlTS l

As part of this review, it was detemined that the design of the c'entai nment isolation actuation system, che safety i nj ection actuation j

system, and the containment spray actuation system circuits are function-ally similar to tne CVI system.

None of these systems has an override f e at u re.

The safety inj ection actuation signal has a " reset" switch, as l

def.i ned in thi s report.

We conclude that the NRC staff criteria are l

sati sfied.

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t CO.CLUSIONS 3.

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9 The EI&C design aspects of containment purge valve isolation and o-her ESF signals for the Joseph M. Farley nuclear power plant were eval-uated using those design criteria stated in Section 2.1 of this report.

We conclude that the CVI system and other ESF circuit designs are acceptable and meet the NRC staff criteria.

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l REFERENCES

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1.

!'RC/ DOR letter (A.

Schwnncer) to APC, " Containment Purging During Normal Plan: Operation," dated November 28, 1978.

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APC letter (F. L. Clayton, Jr.) to NRC (4. Denton, Attn: A. Schwencer),

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'4. Farley Nuclear P1 ant-Unit 1, Containment Purging During Normal i

Plan: Operation," datec January 9,1979.

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3.. APC letter (F. L. Clayton, Jr.) to NRC (H. De,nton, Attn: A. Schwence'),

"J.

M.

Farley Nuclear Plant-Uni: 1, Containment Purging During Normal Pl ant Operaticn," dated J anuary 10, 1979.

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APC letter (F. L. Clayton, Jr.) to NRC (M. Denton, Attn: A. Schwencer),

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l "J. ". Farley Nuclear Pl ant-Unit 1, Containment Purging During Normal Plan: Operaticn," datec February 5, 1979.

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l APC meeting

--- 'AC in Washing:cn, D.

C.

held July 31, 1979, on i

l "Centainme-

_ ng During Normal Plan: 0?aratica."

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APC 1e::er ~... Clay:on, Jr.) to NRC (H. Den:cn, Attn: A. Schwencer),

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M.

Farlev Nuclear Plant, Docke No. 50-348, Containment Pu ge l

Valves," dated August 7, 1979.

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Standard Review Plan, " Containment Isolation System," GUREG 75/037, Rev. 1, Se,ction 6.2.4.

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