ML20030B801
| ML20030B801 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 08/05/1981 |
| From: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Clayton F ALABAMA POWER CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20030B802 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-B-24, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8108240231 | |
| Download: ML20030B801 (8) | |
Text
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m DISTRIBUTION Docket 1
NRC PDR lN J
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Docket 110. 50-348 ORB #1 Rdg N
- 5 DEisenhut O I"I M N E
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fir. F. L. Clayton, Jr.
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Senior Vice President AE0D g/
Alabana Power Company S% rga S D/W 9
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Post Office Box 2641 EReeves - 2
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Birningham, Alabana 35291 CParrish JThoma
Dear fir. Clayton:
Gray File
SUBJECT:
C0tiPLETIO!! 0F GENERIC ITEli B-24 AtID TT!I ACTION ITEM II.E.4.2.5 In our letter of tiovenber 28, 1978, we identified the generic concerns of purging and venting of containments to all operating reacter licensees and requested your. response to these cMcerns. Our review of your response for Farley Unit 1 was inturupted by the Tf1I accident and its dcrands on staff resources. Consequently, as you know. an Interim Position on containment purging and venting was transoitted to you on October 23, 1979. You were requested to implement short-tern corrective actions to reatain in effect pending completion of our longer-tem review of your response to our !!nvember 28, 1978 letter. Our longer-tem review is now complete.
Over the past several months we and our contractors have been reviewing the responses to our Hovenber 1973 letter to close Out our long-tem review of this rather complex issue. The components of this review are as follows:
1.
Conformance to Standard Review Plan Section 6.2.4 Revision 1 and
~
Branch Technical Position CSB 6-4 Revision 1.
There docuants were provided as enclosures te our Noveober 1978 letter.
2.
Valve Operabililty Although the Interim Position of October 1979 allowed blocking of the valves at partial-open positions, this was indeed an interin position. Earlier we requested a program demonstrating operability of the valves i. acccrdance with our " Guidelines for Deacnstrative Operability of Purge and Vent Valves." These huidelines were sent to you in our letter of Septenber 27, 1979. There is an acceptable i
alternative which you may wish to consider in lieu of completing the valve qualification program for the larcer butterfly-type valves.
This would be th=. 'nstallation of a fully-qualified mini-purge system with valves 8-inches or scaller to bypass the larger valves. Such a system change night prove more timely and more cost-effective.
The systen would nect BTP CSB 6-4 iten B.1.c.
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Safety Actuation Sinnal Override This involves the review of safety actuation signal circuits to en-sure that overriding of one safety actuation signal does not also cause the bypass of any other safety actuation signal.
4.
Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration Position B.4 of the Bl? CSB 6-4 requires that provisions be made to test the availability of the isolation function and tl e leakage rate of the isolation valves in the vent and purge lines, individually, during reactor operations. But CSB 6-4 does not explain when or how these tests are to be performed. Enclosure 1 is an amplification of of Position B.4 concerning these tests.
5.
Containment Pressure Setuoint for Containment Isolation Position 5, Iten II.E.4.2 of NUREG-0737, is the cnly part of Item II.E.4.2 which was not part of the origintal generi concern relating to containment purging 7nd venting. However, it relates to Generic Ital B-24 and is included herein.
The status of our long-tern reviev completions of the above items for the Joseph M. Farley Unit No.1 facility is as follows:
l l.
Conformance to Standard Reviev Plan Section 6.2.4 Revision 1 and branch Technical Position CSB 6-4 Revision 1.
We have completed our review. However, since there may be sone mis-understanding regarding the use of containment purge / vent valves, a restatement of salient features of the position as interpreted by the staff is provided in Enclosure 2 to assist in your understanding of this important matter. Enclosure 3 is our Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for this item. Certain plant codifications, as discussed in our SER, will assure compliance with the NRC positions stated in the SER.
We will condition the operating license accordingly to show your modification schedule with the next <nendment to be issued.
?.
Valve Operability Me have concleted our review. Enclosure 4 is our SER for this item.
The 48-inch butterfly valves will be kept closed except for operational nodes 5 and 6.
The 18-inch butterfly valves may be open during nodes 1-4 for safety related reasons. However, ycur staff should continue with the 3-inch systen design or with *.he alternate 8-inch system design to meet BTP C33 6-4 item B.1.c.
Techni;al Specification changes may be accomplish-ed during +he cur rent upgradinq to the Unit lio. 2 type specifications.
Movever, you may provide a separate license amendront request along with appropriate fees to have the Technical Specifications nodified per the
.+nie specifications or wciosure o 3
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9 Please contact your !!RC Project ttanager should you have any questions.
Sincerely, Oricinal signed by:.
S. A.1.~arsa Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reacto s Branch #1 Division of Licensing 4
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Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ enclosures See next page i
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tjr. F. L. Clayton, Jr;
, Alabama Power Company t.
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Mr. W. O. Whitt Executive Vice President Alabama Power Company Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 3,5291 Ruble A'. Thomas, Vice President Southern Company Services, Inc.
Post Office Box 2625 p
Birmingham, Alabama 35202 l'
George F. Trowbridge, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.W.
. Washington, D. C.
20036 Mr. Robert A. Buettner, Esquire Balch, Bingham, Baker, Hawthorne, Williams and Ward Post Of fice Box 306 Sirmingham, Alabama 35201 George S. Houston Memorial Library
'212 W. Surdeshaw Street Cothan, Alabama 36303 Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccnmission Post Office Box 1814 Dothan, Alabama. 36302 i
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- i It is intended that the above proposed surveillance specification be applied i
to the active purge / vent lines, as well as passive purge lines:
1.e., the purge lines that are administratively controlled closed during reactor oper-ating modes 1-4.
The reason for including the passive purge lines is that B-20 is concerned wtih the potential adverse effect of seasonal weather con-
.,b ditions on the integrity of the isolation valves. Consequently, passive purge lines must also be included in the surveillance program.
+
The purpose of the leakage integi ity tests of the isciation valves in the containment purge and vent lines is to identify excessive degradation of the resilient seats for these valves. Therefore, they need not be conducted with the precision required for the Type C isolation valve tests in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 0.
These tests would be performed in addition to the
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quantitative Type C tests required by Appendix J and would not relieve tne licensee of the responsibility to conform to the requirements of Appendix J.
In view of the wide variety of vs Ive types and seating materials, tne acceptance criteria for such tests should be developed on a plant-specific basis.
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-Ei! CLOSURE 2
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Furging/ venting should be minimized-during reactor operation li
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.because~ the plant is inherently safer with closed vent valves -
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t, i-j' (containment)=than with open lines which recuire valve action to
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provide ccatainment.
(Sericus censideration is being given to' l '.
-ultimately recuiring that future plants be designed such that purging / venting is 'nct required during operation)'
I 2.
Some purging / venting en'curient pl:rits will be permitted provided i
that:
I a) purg'.ng is needed and j astified for rr.fety purposes,' and b) valves are judged by the staff to be both operable and reliable, and c) the estimated amount.cf radioactivity released during the time required to-close the valve (s) following i LOCA either l
i.
does not cause the total dose to exceed the 10 CFR Part l
100 Guidelines; t'.en a scal should be established which re; resents a limit en the annual hours of purging expected throu;h each particular valve, or l
j ii. causes the total. dose to exceed the guideline valves; i
l then purging / venting shall be limited to 90 hours0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> / year.
l 3.
Purging / venting should not be permitted when valves are being used that are known to be not operable or reliable under transient
.or accident conditiens.
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