ML20029E978
| ML20029E978 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nuclear Energy Institute |
| Issue date: | 01/10/2020 |
| From: | Austgen K Nuclear Energy Institute |
| To: | William Reckley, Nanette Valliere NRC/NRR/DANU/UARP, Nuclear Energy Institute |
| Valliere N. NRR/DANU/UARP, 301-415-8462 | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20029E959 | List: |
| References | |
| NRC-2017-0227, RIN 3150-AK19 | |
| Download: ML20029E978 (10) | |
Text
January2020NEIAdditionalInputfortheRulemakingforPhysicalSecurityforAdvancedReactors (RINNumber:3150AK19/NRCDocketID:NRC20170227)
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ThecommentsbelowshouldbereviewedinconjunctionwiththoseprovidedinNEIletter,NEICommentsonDraftRegulatoryBasis,Rulemakingfor PhysicalSecurityforAdvancedReactors[DocketID:NRC20170227],datedAugust15,2019.Anycommentsthatwouldprolongtherulemaking scheduleorrequireadditionaldirectionfromtheCommissionshouldbeheldforfuturedispositioninanothereffort.
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Regulation Comments 1
Generalcomment Theassessmentofpotentialregulationchangesshouldexamineall prescriptiverequirementsin10CFR73.55todeterminetheirnecessity withinaperformancebasedframework.Ingeneral,afacilitylicenseshould begrantediftheapplicantcandemonstratethatthesitephysicalprotection program,toincludeindividualsperformingsecurityfunctions,inconjunction withthefacilitydesignandsafetyfeatures,providesreasonableassurance thatadversaryactionscouldnotleadtooffsitedosesabovespecifiedvalues (e.g.,thereferencevaluesdefinedin10CFR50.34and52.79).Thiswould provideflexibilityforanapplicanttoproposeacombinationofbarriers, accesscontrols,searchprograms,detectionandassessmentcapabilities,etc.
tomeetaperformancemeasure.Performancebasedapproachesare particularlyimportantfordesignswithverylowpotentialoffsite consequences(e.g.,microreactors).
2 10CFR§73.2Definitions Includetermsanddefinitionsasneededtosupportclearunderstandingof newrulerequirements.
Considerrevisingthedefinitionofphysicalbarrierorcreateanewterm anddefinitionforbarriertoallowforobstructionsbasedonothermethods andtechnologythatcouldaccomplishtheintendedfunction(e.g.,
deterrence,delay,denial,supportotherelementsofthephysicalprotection program).
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§73.55(a)Introduction (5)TheTennesseeValleyAuthorityWattsBarNuclearPlant,Unit 2,holdingacurrentconstructionpermitundertheprovisionsof part50ofthischapter,shallmeettherevisedrequirementsin paragraphs(a)through(r)ofthissectionasapplicabletooperating nuclearpowerreactorfacilities.
ThereferencetoWattsBarUnit2canberemovedsinceconstructionis completedandanoperatinglicenseissued.
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Regulation Comments 4
§73.55(a)Introduction (6)Applicantsforanoperatinglicenseundertheprovisionsofpart 50ofthischapter,orholdersofacombinedlicenseunderthe provisionsofpart52ofthischapterthatdonotreferencea standarddesigncertificationorreferenceastandarddesign certificationissuedafterMay26,2009shallmeettherequirement of§73.55(i)(4)(iii).
Achangemaybenecessarytorecognizenewalternativerequirementsfor secondaryalarmstations.
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§73.55(b)Generalperformanceobjectiveandrequirements.
(1)Thelicenseeshallestablishandmaintainaphysicalprotection program,toincludeasecurityorganization,whichwillhaveasits objectivetoprovidehighassurancethatactivitiesinvolvingspecial nuclearmaterialarenotinimicaltothecommondefenseand securityanddonotconstituteanunreasonablerisktothepublic healthandsafety.
(2)Tosatisfythegeneralperformanceobjectiveofparagraph (b)(1)ofthissection,thephysicalprotectionprogrammustprotect againstthedesignbasisthreatofradiologicalsabotageasstatedin
(3)Thephysicalprotectionprogrammustbedesignedtoprevent significantcoredamageandspentfuelsabotage.Specifically,the programmust:
(i)Ensurethatthecapabilitiestodetect,assess,interdict,and neutralizethreatsuptoandincludingthedesignbasisthreatof radiologicalsabotageasstatedin§73.1,aremaintainedatall times.
(ii)Providedefenseindepththroughtheintegrationofsystems, technologies,programs,equipment,supportingprocesses,and implementingproceduresasneededtoensuretheeffectivenessof thephysicalprotectionprogram.
Thissectionwillneedrevisiontorecognizetheavailabilityofperformance measuresfordeterminingtheapplicabilityofrevisedsecurityrequirements andtheassociatedperformancebasedalternativestoprescribed requirements.
Considerreplacinghighassurancewithreasonableassurancetoalign withCommissiondirectioninStaffRequirementsMemorandums;thiswill eliminateconfusionandprovideconsistencyofterminologyusedwithinthe regulation.
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Regulation Comments (4)Thelicenseeshallanalyzeandidentifysitespecificconditions, includingtargetsets,thatmayaffectthespecificmeasuresneeded toimplementtherequirementsofthissectionandshallaccount fortheseconditionsinthedesignofthephysicalprotection program.
(5)Upontherequestofanauthorizedrepresentativeofthe Commission,thelicenseeshalldemonstratetheabilitytomeet Commissionrequirementsthroughtheimplementationofthe physicalprotectionprogram,includingtheabilityofarmedand unarmedpersonneltoperformassigneddutiesandresponsibilities requiredbythesecurityplansandlicenseeprocedures.
(6)Thelicenseeshallestablish,maintain,andimplementa performanceevaluationprograminaccordancewithappendixBto thispart,todemonstrateandassesstheeffectivenessofarmed respondersandarmedsecurityofficerstoimplementthe licenseesprotectivestrategy.
(9)Thelicenseeshallestablish,maintain,andimplementaninsider mitigationprogramandshalldescribetheprograminthePhysical SecurityPlan.
(i)Theinsidermitigationprogrammustmonitortheinitialand continuingtrustworthinessandreliabilityofindividualsgrantedor retainingunescortedaccessauthorizationtoaprotectedorvital area,andimplementdefenseindepthmethodologiestominimize thepotentialforaninsidertoadverselyaffect,eitherdirectlyor indirectly,thelicenseescapabilitytopreventsignificantcore damageandspentfuelsabotage.
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§73.55(d)Securityorganization.(1)Thelicenseeshallestablish andmaintainasecurityorganizationthatisdesigned,staffed, trained,qualified,andequippedtoimplementthephysical protectionprograminaccordancewiththerequirementsofthis section.
Theorganizationatanadvancedreactorsitemaybesignificantlydifferent thantheorganizationsatcurrentlyoperatingLLWRsites.Inparticular,itis likelythatindividualswillbetrainedandqualifiedtoperformanumberof functionsanddutiesconcurrently(withsupporting/enablingtechnologies),
includingsecurityfunctionsandduties.Thisshouldbepermittedprovided
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Regulation Comments (2)Thesecurityorganizationmustinclude:
(ii)Atleastonemember,onsiteandavailableatalltimes,whohas theauthoritytodirecttheactivitiesofthesecurityorganization andwhoisassignednootherdutiesthatwouldinterferewiththis individualsabilitytoperformthesedutiesinaccordancewiththe securityplansandthelicenseeprotectivestrategy.
thereisreasonableassurancethatthesecurityplanfunctionsnecessaryto preventoffsitedosesabovespecifiedvalues(e.g.,thereferencevalues definedin10CFR50.34and52.79)canbeperformed.
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§73.55(e)Physicalbarriers.
(3)Physicalbarriersmust:
(i)Bedesignedandconstructedto:
(A)Protectagainstthedesignbasisthreatofradiologicalsabotage; (9)Vitalareas.
(v)Ataminimum,thefollowingshallbeconsideredvitalareas:
(A)Thereactorcontrolroom; (B)Thespentfuelpool; (C)Thecentralalarmstation;and (D)Thesecondaryalarmstationinaccordancewith§ 73.55(i)(4)(iii).
(10)Vehiclecontrolmeasures.Consistentwiththephysical protectionprogramdesignrequirementsof§73.55(b),andin accordancewiththesitespecificanalysis,thelicenseeshall establishandmaintainvehiclecontrolmeasures,asnecessary,to protectagainstthedesignbasisthreatofradiologicalsabotage vehiclebombassault.
(i)Landvehicles.Licenseesshall:
(A)Design,construct,install,andmaintainavehiclebarrier system,toincludepassiveandactivebarriers,atastandoff distanceadequatetoprotectpersonnel,equipment,andsystems necessarytopreventsignificantcoredamageandspentfuel
- 1) Seecomment#2above.
- 2) Thephysicalbarriersrequiredforanadvancedreactorfacilityshouldbe thosenecessarytomeettheperformancemeasurethatpermittedthe facilitytoqualifyforperformancebasedalternativestoprescribed requirements.
- 3) Advancedreactorfacilitiesmayormaynotincludevitalequipment,as definedin§73.2,inthelistedareas.Theareasrequiringdesignationas avitalareashouldbethosewiththeequipmentthatpermittedthe facilitytoqualifyforperformancebasedalternativestoprescribed requirements(i.e.,equipmentsupportingtheapplicableperformance measure).
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Regulation Comments sabotageagainsttheeffectsofthedesignbasisthreatof radiologicalsabotagelandvehiclebombassault.
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§73.55(g)Accesscontrols.
(3)Vehiclesintheprotectedarea.
(iv)Vehiclestransportinghazardousmaterialsinsidetheprotected areamustbeescortedbyanarmedmemberofthesecurity organization.
Ifvehiclestransportinghazardousmaterialscouldnotbeemployedtocause unacceptableoffsiteconsequences(e.g.,dosesgreaterthanthereference valuesdefinedin10CFR50.34and52.79),thenanarmedsecurityescort shouldnotberequired.
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§73.55(h)Searchprograms.
(1)Theobjectiveofthesearchprogramistodetect,deter,and preventtheintroductionoffirearms,explosives,incendiary devices,orotheritemswhichcouldbeusedtocommitradiological sabotage.
(2)Ownercontrolledareasearches.
(iv)Vehiclesearchesmustbeaccomplishedthroughtheuseof equipmentcapableofdetectingfirearms,explosives,incendiary devices,orotheritemswhichcouldbeusedtocommitradiological sabotage,orthroughvisualandphysicalsearches,orboth,to ensurethatallitemsareidentifiedbeforegrantingaccess.
(3)Protectedareasearches.Licenseesshallsearchallpersonnel, vehiclesandmaterialsrequestingaccesstoprotectedareas.
(iii)Whenanattempttointroducefirearms,explosives,incendiary devices,orotheritemswhichcouldbeusedtocommitradiological sabotagehasoccurredorissuspected,thelicenseeshall implementactionstoensurethatthesuspectindividuals,vehicles, andmaterialsaredeniedaccessandshallperformavisualand physicalsearchtodeterminetheabsenceorexistenceofathreat.
Thesearchprogramsandcapabilitiesrequiredforanadvancedreactor facilityshouldbethosenecessarytosupporttheperformancemeasure thatpermittedthefacilitytoqualifyforperformancebasedalternativesto prescribedrequirements.
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§73.55(i)Detectionandassessmentsystems.
(2)Intrusiondetectionequipmentmustannunciateandvideo assessmentequipmentshalldisplayconcurrently,inatleasttwo TheserequirementsshouldrecognizetheestablishmentofaSecondary AlarmStation(SAS)ataremotelocation.Further,therequirementsshould beflexiblewithrespecttoacceptableremotelocations,detectionand
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Regulation Comments continuouslystaffedonsitealarmstations,atleastoneofwhich mustbeprotectedinaccordancewiththerequirementsofthe centralalarmstationwithinthissection.
(4)Alarmstations.
(i)Bothalarmstationsrequiredbyparagraph(i)(2)ofthissection mustbedesignedandequippedtoensurethatasingleact,in accordancewiththedesignbasisthreatofradiologicalsabotage definedin§73.1(a)(1),cannotdisablebothalarmstations.The licenseeshallensurethesurvivabilityofatleastonealarmstation tomaintaintheabilitytoperformthefollowingfunctions:
(ii)Licenseesshall:
(B)Continuouslystaffeachalarmstationwithatleastonetrained andqualifiedalarmstationoperator.Thealarmstationoperator mustnotbeassignedotherdutiesorresponsibilitieswhichwould interferewiththeabilitytoexecutethefunctionsdescribedin§ 73.55(i)(4)(i)ofthissection.
(C)Notpermitanyactivitiestobeperformedwithineitheralarm stationthatwouldinterferewithanalarmstationoperators abilitytoexecuteassigneddutiesandresponsibilities.
(F)Ensurethatanalarmstationoperatorcannotchangethestatus ofadetectionpointordeactivatealockingoraccesscontrol deviceataprotectedorvitalareaportal,withouttheknowledge andconcurrenceofthealarmstationoperatorintheotheralarm station.
(G)Ensurethatoperatorsinbothalarmstationsare knowledgeableoffinaldispositionofallalarms.
(iii)Applicantsforanoperatinglicenseundertheprovisionsofpart 50ofthischapter,orholdersofacombinedlicenseunderthe provisionsofpart52ofthischapter,shallconstruct,locate, protect,andequipboththecentralandsecondaryalarmstations tothestandardsforthecentralalarmstationcontainedinthis assessmentalarmandmonitoringcapabilities,andstaffing.Forexample,a microreactorfacilitycouldhaveaSASarrangementwiththelocallaw enforcementagency(suchasremotealarmsinapolicestation)oranSMR vendormightsupplyasingleSAStoserveallsitesthatusetheirtechnology.
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Regulation Comments section.Bothalarmstationsshallbeequalandredundant,such thatallfunctionsneededtosatisfytherequirementsofthis sectioncanbeperformedinbothalarmstations.
(5)Surveillance,observation,andmonitoring.
(i)Thephysicalprotectionprogrammustincludesurveillance, observation,andmonitoringasneededtosatisfythedesign requirementsof§73.55(b),identifyindicationsoftampering,or otherwiseimplementthesiteprotectivestrategy.
(ii)Thelicenseeshallprovidecontinuoussurveillance,observation, andmonitoringoftheownercontrolledareaasdescribedinthe securityplanstodetectanddeterintrudersandensurethe integrityofphysicalbarriersorothercomponentsandfunctionsof theonsitephysicalprotectionprogram.Continuoussurveillance, observation,andmonitoringresponsibilitiesmaybeperformedby securitypersonnelduringcontinuouspatrols,throughuseofvideo technology,orbyacombinationofboth.
(iii)Unattendedopeningsthatintersectasecurityboundarysuch asundergroundpathwaysmustbeprotectedbyaphysicalbarrier andmonitoredbyintrusiondetectionequipmentorobservedby securitypersonnelatafrequencysufficienttodetectexploitation.
(iv)Armedsecuritypatrolsshallperiodicallycheckexternalareas oftheprotectedareatoincludephysicalbarriersandvitalarea portals.
(v)Armedsecuritypatrolsshallperiodicallyinspectvitalareasto includethephysicalbarriersusedatallvitalareaportals.
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§73.55(j)Communicationrequirements.
2)Individualsassignedtoeachalarmstationshallbecapableof callingforassistanceinaccordancewiththesecurityplansandthe licenseesprocedures.
Seecomment#10above.
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Regulation Comments (3)Allondutysecurityforcepersonnelshallbecapableof maintainingcontinuouscommunicationwithanindividualineach alarmstation,andvehicleescortsshallmaintaincontinuous communicationwithsecuritypersonnel.Allpersonnelescortsshall maintaintimelycommunicationwiththesecuritypersonnel.
(4)Thefollowingcontinuouscommunicationcapabilitiesmust terminateinbothalarmstationsrequiredbythissection:
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§73.55(k)Responserequirements.
(1)Thelicenseeshallestablishandmaintain,atalltimes,properly trained,qualifiedandequippedpersonnelrequiredtointerdict andneutralizethreatsuptoandincludingthedesignbasisthreat ofradiologicalsabotageasdefinedin§73.1,topreventsignificant coredamageandspentfuelsabotage.
(3)Thelicenseeshalltraineacharmedmemberofthesecurity organizationtopreventorimpedeattemptedactsofradiological sabotagebyusingforcesufficienttocountertheforcedirectedat thatperson,includingtheuseofdeadlyforcewhenthearmed memberofthesecurityorganizationhasareasonablebeliefthat theuseofdeadlyforceisnecessaryinselfdefenseorinthe defenseofothers,oranyothercircumstancesasauthorizedby applicableStateorFederallaw.
(4)Thelicenseeshallprovidearmedresponsepersonnelconsisting ofarmedresponderswhichmaybeaugmentedwitharmed securityofficerstocarryoutarmedresponsedutieswithin predeterminedtimelinesspecifiedbythesiteprotectivestrategy.
(5)Armedresponders.
(i)Thelicenseeshalldeterminetheminimumnumberofarmed respondersnecessarytosatisfythedesignrequirementsof§ 73.55(b)andimplementtheprotectivestrategy.Thelicenseeshall documentthisnumberinthesecurityplans.
Afacilitydesignmeetingaperformancemeasurewouldpermitthe applicanttoestablishadetect,assessandcommunicatesecurityresponse; anonsitearmedresponseforcewouldnotbenecessaryforthreat interdictionandneutralization.Shouldafacilityrequireanarmedresponse forcebecauseaperformancemeasurecannotbemet,thenthe Responserequirementsshouldbethosenecessarytoprovidereasonable assurancethatadversaryactionscouldnotleadtooffsitedosesabove specifiedvalues(e.g.,thereferencevaluesdefinedin10CFR50.34and 52.79).Thefacilityspecificrequirementscouldbedeterminedthroughan analysis(e.g.,usetheguidanceinNUREG/CR7145,NuclearPowerPlant SecurityAssessmentGuide).Aminimumnumbershouldnotbespecified inregulations.
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Regulation Comments (ii)Thenumberofarmedrespondersshallnotbelessthanten (10).
(iii)Armedrespondersshallbeavailableatalltimesinsidethe protectedareaandmaynotbeassignedotherdutiesor responsibilitiesthatcouldinterferewiththeirassignedresponse duties.
(6)Armedsecurityofficers.
(i)Armedsecurityofficers,designatedtostrengthenonsite responsecapabilities,shallbeonsiteandavailableatalltimesto carryouttheirassignedresponseduties.
(ii)Theminimumnumberofarmedsecurityofficersdesignatedto strengthenonsiteresponsecapabilitiesmustbedocumentedin thesecurityplans.
(7)Thelicenseeshallhaveprocedurestoreconstitutethe documentednumberofavailablearmedresponsepersonnel requiredtoimplementtheprotectivestrategy.
8)Protectivestrategy.Thelicenseeshallestablish,maintain,and implementawrittenprotectivestrategyinaccordancewiththe requirementsofthissectionandpart73,appendixC,SectionII.
Uponreceiptofanalarmorotherindicationofathreat,the licenseeshall:
ii)Initiateresponseactionstointerdictandneutralizethethreatin accordancewiththerequirementsofpart73,appendixC,section II,thesafeguardscontingencyplan,andthelicenseesresponse strategy.
13 AppendicesBandCtoPart73 Dependinguponhowthestaffstructuresthenewregulations,changesmay beneededtotheseappendicestoalignthecontentswithnew performancebasedalternativestoprescribedrequirements.Forexample, afacilitythatisnotrequiredtomaintainanonsiteresponseforceforthreat
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Regulation Comments interdictionandneutralizationwouldnotneedaperformanceevaluation programoraprotectivestrategy.
14 Variousother10CFRsectionsandparagraphs
Dependinguponhowthestaffstructuresthenewregulations,conforming changesmaybeneededtoothersectionsandparagraphsin10CFR.See NEIWhitePaper,ProposedPhysicalSecurityRequirementsforAdvanced ReactorTechnologies,Attachment1,ProposedChangesto10CFRfor NewPhysicalSecurityRequirementsforAdvancedReactorTechnologies, forexamples.
15 Additionalconsiderationsformicroreactors Thepotentialconsequencesformicroreactorsareexpectedtobesimilarto researchandtestreactors,forwhichthereisnoDBT.Therefore, establishmentoftherequirementsthatareapplicabletomicroreactors shouldconsidertherequirementsin10CFR73.60,Additional requirementsforphysicalprotectionatnonpowerreactors,and10CFR 73.67,Licenseefixedsiteandintransitrequirementsforthephysical protectionofspecialnuclearmaterialofmoderateandlowstrategic significance,applicabletononpowerreactors.Considerationshouldalso begiventoalternativestorequirementstoprotectagainsttheftand diversionandcybersecurity.Morespecificrecommendationsonthe physicalsecurityformicroreactorsareincludedintheNEIWhitePaper, MicroReactorRegulatoryIssues,AppendixE,PhysicalSecurity.