ML20029E249

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Insp Rept 70-0824/94-02 on 940324-25.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Program for Receipt of SNM
ML20029E249
Person / Time
Site: 07000824
Issue date: 04/22/1994
From: Masnyk O
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20029E242 List:
References
70-0824-94-02, 70-824-94-2, NUDOCS 9405180036
Download: ML20029E249 (4)


Text

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UNITED STATES i

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2

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'1 REGloN 11 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE N10 r,.

'E AT LANTA, GEORGIA 30323 0199

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Report No:

70-824/94-02 J

Licensee:

Babcock and Wilcox Cumpany Nuclear Environmental Services Division i

Lynchburg Technology Center Lynchburg, VA 24505 Docket No.:

70-824 License No.:

SNM-778 Facility Name:

Lynchburg Technology Center Inspection Conducted:

March 24 - 25, 1994 Inspector:

E h 4 f/1 FM(

]9d'Y Orysia Ml Masnyk, Safege'ards Specialist Date Signed Approved by:

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ra n t David R. McGuire, Chief i

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Date Signed Safeguards Section Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

SUMMARY

Scope:

This special, announced inspection was conducted in.the area of the licensee's program for the receipt of special nuclear material.

Results:

In the areas inspected, one violation was identified.

Failure to adequatoly make provisions for back shift receipt of special nuclear material (Paragraph 2).

9405180036 940422

{DR ADOCK 07000824-PDR

REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • C. Boyd Jr., Licensing and Compliance Officer
  • K. Long, Nuclear Materials Accountability Specialist / Hazardous Materials Transportation Specialist
  • C. Yates, Certified Health Physicist Naval Nuclear Fuels Division Security Staf f:

C. Dickerson, Shift Supervisor T. King, Security Specialist J. Noel, Manager Training and Compliance Other Organizations

  • G. Dixon Jr., Nuclear Assurance Corporation
  • Attended exit interview 2.

On March 22, 1994, at approximately 6:30 p.m., a scheduled shipment of spent fuel departed Duke Power Company's McGuire Nuclear Plant enroute to the Babcock and Wilcox Lynchburg Technology Center (B&W LTC). The shipment was being handled by Tri-State Motor Company. An NRC inspector was present at the McGuire plant to observe activities involved in the i

preparation of the shipment. On March 23, 1994, the NRC learned that the shipment had arrived at the B&W Commercial Nuclear Fuels Plant (B&W CNFP) rather then B&W LTC.

An inspector was dispatched to Lynchburg to ascertain the cause of this error. The following is a summary of the events leading to this event.

i i

Prior to leaving the McGuire facility, the escort / drivers were provided

'l with two sets of paperwork. One set consisted of the correctly completed shipping papers, including the Bill of Lading, Shipping i

Instructions and other required paperwork.

B&W LTC had provided Duke j

Power Company a Material License Certificate and Materials License to expedite the completion of this paperwork.

The driver was also given a DOE /NRC Form 741 which was contained in a sealed enveloped.

Both the form and the envelope indicated that the shipment was destined for B&W CNFP. This is attributed by Duke Power Company to personnel error on the piirt of the individual completing the DOE /NRC Form 741. The shipment was scheduled to arrive at B&W LTC at approximately 11:00 p.m.,

i after normal working hours so the licensee made arrangements with Babcock and Wilcox Naval Nuclear Fuel Division (B&W NNFD) to have the I

driver / escorts remain with the shipment until morning, when the licensee would take receipt of the shipment.

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B&W NNFD is located adjacent to B&W LTC, and the B&W NNFD security force provides security for the B&W LTC as described in the B&W LTC Physical Security Plan for Special Nuclear Material of Low Strategic Significance, Revision 1, dated May 1993. The plan states in Chapter 3, on page 3-1, "The Security Force at the Babcock and Wilcox, Naval Nuclear Fuel Division (NNFD), SNM Licensee No. SNM-42, provides uniformed contract and/or proprietary security officers to perform routine patrols and response to LTC CAA security alarms after normal working hours and on weekends" and "The NNFD Security Force controls the access road to the LTC after normal working hours and on weekends." B&W LTC notified the B&W NNFD security force on the day shift of March 22, 1994, that the shipment would be arriving during the evening of that same day.

The day shift briefed the next shift, but due to personnel error, the night shift, which comes on duty at 10:00 p.m. was not advised of the shipment.

When the shipment arrived at approximately 11:00 p.m. the driver / escorts found the road leading to the B&W LTC blocked.

They had expected the licensee to take receipt of the shipment upon arrival. A B&W NNFD security officer approached the driver / escorts' to assist them.

Based on a review of the incorrectly addressed envelope, (indicating B&W CNFP as the recipient), and based on previous experience, the security officer escorted the shipment to B&W CNFP, a short distance down the road.

The B&W CNFP security officer on duty, following standard operating procedures, which allow for the receipt of Tri-State trucks without prior notification, accepted receipt of the shipment. The officer signed the shipping papers and allowed the trailer containing the spent fuel to be parked within the protected area.

The driver / escorts, mistakenly retained possession of the shipping papers, but left the DOE /NRC Form 741. ' The Tri-State driver / escorts notified the dispatcher that the shipment had been delivered, and the dispatcher notified Duke Power Company.

The error was not discovered until the next morning when the B&W LTC and B&W CNFP staff arrived for work. After some discussion between licensees, Duke Power notified the Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards staff in Washington, DC of the error.

On the morning of March 23, a B&W LTC health physics technician was sent to B&W CNFP to survey the shipment.

Radiation readings were less than 0.6 mR per hour at 3 feet.

The shipment was moved to the B&W NNFD parking lot on March 24, 1994, at approximately 9:30 p.m., where the driver / escorts remained with it until receipt by B&W LTC the next morning.

The inspector arrived at B&W CNFP on the evening of March 24, 1994, observed this transfer, and interviewed all personnel in Lynchburg i

involved in the shipping error.

Condition S-1 of Special Nuclear Material License No. SNM-778, requires use of SNM to be in accordance with the statements, representations, and conditions of Chapters 1 thru 8 of the license application dated November 26, 1985, and supplements dated May 27 and June 19, 1986; January 20, January 29, April 27, May 26, August 10, September 1, and December 8, 1987; March 30, June 14, and June 20, 1988; March 31,

4 3

May 19, and July 17, 1989; July 17, 1990; May 14, 1992; and February 1 and March 31, 1993.

Chapter 2, Section 2.7.1.1 specifies that all operations with licensed material shall be conducted in accordance with Area Operating Procedures or Radiation Work Permits.

The licensee utilizes Area Operating Procedure, B-GP-3, Receipt of Radioactive Materials, Revision 7, dated November,1993 for the receipt of nuclear material.

Section 12.1.4 on page 6 of this procedure, states "For after normal working hours receipts of RM, NNFD guards will have a call list of whom to call and notify of the receipt. The Nuclear Materials Accountability Specialist shall maintain the call list." A form is in use which provides B&W NNFD with a call list for notification.

The call list was not utilized by the B&W NNFD security force, the shipment was not anticipated by B&W NNFD, and the shipment was sent to B&W CNFP due to personnel error.

Knowing that the shipment was expected on March 22, 1994, B&W LTC failed to ensure that it was properly handled upon receipt, and did not realize anything was wrong until 7:00 a.m. the next day when personnel noticed that the shipment was not at the plant when they arrived for work.

This failure to follow the procedure is a violation (94-02-01).

3.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on March 25, 1994, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.

The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results. The inspector advised that there was an apparent violation in that the shipment arrived at the wrong facility.

Licensee personnel stated that it was their belief that they were not responsible for the shipment until they took receipt of it on the morning of March 25, 1994.

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