ML20028H087
| ML20028H087 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 09/28/1990 |
| From: | Hannon J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028H088 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9010090088 | |
| Download: ML20028H087 (8) | |
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~ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 6
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20556 1
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4 THE CLEVELAND' ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY. ET AL.
DOCKET NO. 50-440-1 PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANTi UNIT NO. I l
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE 1
1 Amendment No. 35 -
License No. NPF i 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory CoMssion (the Comission) has found that:
A,, The application for amendment by The Cleveland Electric; Illuminating Company, Duquesne. Light Company, Ohio Edison Company,. Pennsylvania Power Company, and Toledo Edison Company (the licensees) dated-c March 16 1990 com.clies with the standards and requirements of-F the Atomic Energy _ Act of 1954, as amended'(the Act), and the
_ Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; s
B.
The facility will operate in conformity.with the application, the m
provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the-Comission;
-t C..
There is i.asonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by
- 1 this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and~
safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted.
.in' compliance with' the Comission's regulations; i
D.
The issuance of-this amendment will not be' inimical to '.he common-
- defense' and
- security or to the health'and safety of the public;t and-E.
The issuance of. thi, amendment is in ac:ordance with 10 eFR Part 51 a
of/ the Comission's regulatior and all applicable requirements have'
'been satisfied.-
" 2.1 " Accordingly,,he license is amended by changes,to the' Technical Specifi-cations'as indicated in the attachment to'this license amendment, and.
a paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-58 is hereby amended to read'as follows.
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(2)' Techr,ical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Eny' in-mental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B,'as revised through Amendment No.35 are hereby incorporated into this-license.
The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company sha11' operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
9 3.
This license amendment is effective as of-its date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGUl.ATORY COMMISSION John N. Hannon, Director Project Directorate III-3 i-Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects-O'fice of Nuclear Reactor Regu b ent Atta chment:
Charges to the Technical
. Specifications j
- Date of issuance:. September 28, 1990-
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 35 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-58 DOCKET NO. 50-440 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attacheo pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. Overleaf.pages are provided to maintain document completeness.
Remove Insert 3/4 6-2 3/4 6-2 B 3/4 6-1 B 3/4 6-1 i
B 3/4 6-2a B 3/4 6-2a-i
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3/4.6 CONTA!WENT[YSTEMS
'3/4.6.1' PRIMARY CONTAI M ENT
' PR!mRY CONTAIMENT INTEGRITY - OPERATING LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1.1 PRIMARY ~ C0hTAIMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.
APPLICABILITYt OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2* and 3.
ACTION:
Without PRIMIRY CONTAI M ENT INTEGRITY, restore PRIMARY CONTAI M ENT INTEGRITY
, within 1 hout or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in 1
COLD SHUTDO&:d within'the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.6.1.1.1 PruAARY CONTAINNENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:
After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, a.
except the primary containment air locks, if opened following Type A or B test, by leak rate testing the seals with gas at Pa,-11.31 psig, and verifying that when the measured leakage rate for these seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Survalliance Requirement 4.6.1.2.d for all other type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.60 La.
b.
At least once per 31 days by verifying that all primary containment penetrations ** not capable of being closed by 0PERABLE primary con--
tainment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed.during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deacti-L vated' automatic valves secured in position, except as provided in L
Table 3.6.4-1 Eof Specification 3.6.4.
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By verifying each primary containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.
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By verifying' the suppression pool is. in compliance with the L
requirements of Specification 3.6.3.1.
- See Special Test Exception 3.10.1.
- Except valves : blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are-located inside the primary containment, drywell, or the steam tunnel portion or the auxiliary building, and are locked, Usied, or otherwise secured in the closed position.
These penetration = M i be verified closed during each COLD SHUT 00WN except such verifi M ' a need not be performed more often
- than once per 92 days.-
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PERRY.- UNIT 'l 3/4 6-1
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3.4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS' 4
3/4. 6;1 CONTAINMENT.-
3/4.5.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restri.cted to those leakage paths ssociated leak rates' assumed in the accident analyses.
This restrictu, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limit., of 10 CFR Part 100 during accident conditions.
During shutdown when irradiated fuel is being handled in the primary containment, and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, the # footnote permits the opening of six vent.
and drain pathways for the purpose of performing containment isolation valve-leak rate surveillance testing provided the reactor has been suberitical for at least seven days.
Offsite doses were calculated assuming the postulated fuel handling accident inside primary containment after a seven day decay time, and assuming all-the airborne activity existing inside containment after the accident is immediately discharged directly to the environment (i.e., no containment).
Although this analysis would indicate that no restriction on i
L the number of vent and. drain-pathways was required,-the number of'open pathways'was restricted to six for conservatism.
3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the.~ total contain-ment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the accident-analyses at the peak accident pressure =of 11.31 psig, P.
As an added conservatism, the a
measured overall integrated leakage' rate is further limited to.less than or-J equal to 0.75 La during' performance of the periodic tests to account for i
possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.
ii 0verall integrated. leakage rate-means the leakage rate which obtains from ll a summation of leakage through all potential leakage paths. Where a leakage l
l path contains.more than one valve, fitting, or component in series, the leakage for that path will be:that leakage of the worst leaking valve, fitting, or L
component and not the sunnation of the leakage of all valves, fittings, or
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components in that leakageLpath, Operating experience with the main steam line isolation valves has n.
E indicated that degradation has occasionally occurred in the leak tightness I
of the valves; therefore the special requirement for testing these valves.
PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-1 Amendment No. M/,35 1
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W CON'IAINMENT SYSTEMS, BASES 3/4.6.1.6: CONTAINMENT INTERNAL PRESSURE
. The limitations on primary containment to, secondary containment differential pressure. ensure.that the primary containment peak' pressure *6f 11.31'psig does not exceed the design pressure of 15.0 psig during LOCA.
conditions or that the external pressure differential ' se not exceed the-design maximum external pressure differential of +0.8 ps.u.
The limit of
-0.1 to +1.0 psid for initial positive primary containment to secondary containment pressure will' limit the primary containment pressure to 11.31 psid which is less.than the design pressure and is consistent with the safety analysis.
3/4. 6.1. 7 CONTAINMENT AVERAGE AIR TEMPERAL_URE The limitation on containment average air temperature ensures.that the containment peak air temperature does not exceed the-design temperature of 185*F during LOCA conditions-and is consisterd w.'th the safety analysis.
3/4.6.1.8 DRYWELL AND CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEE
- The use of the drywell and containment purge lines is. restricted to the 42-inch outboard and 18-inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valves. These i
valves.will close during a LOCA or steam line break accident and therefore the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would' not be exceeded.in the event'of an accident during purging operations ~
The term-sealed closed as used:in this context means that the valve is secured in its closed position by deactivating the-valve motor operator, and does not pertain to injecting seal water between the isolation valves by a seal > water system.
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PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-2a Amendment No. D 35
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(Next page is B 3/4 6-3)
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j 3/4.6 CONTAIWENT(YSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAIMENT PRIMARY CONTAI MENT INTEGRITY - OPERATING _
LIMITING CONDIT'.0N FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1.1 PRIhARY CONTAIMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.
APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2* and 3.
' ACTION:
Without PRIMARY CONTAIMENT INTEGRITY, restore PRIMARY CONTAIMENT. INTEGRITY within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />'and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.6.1.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAI M ENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:
After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, a.
except the primary containment air locks, if opened following Typt A o
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or B test, by leak rate testing the seals with gas at Pa, 11.31 psig, and verifying that when the measured leakage rate for these seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.2.d for all other type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.60 La.
e h.
At least once per 31 days by verifying that all primary containment penetrations ** not capable of being closed by OPERABLE primary con.
tainment automatic ~ isolation valves and_ required to be closed.during-accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges,<or deacti-E vated automatic valves secured'in position, except as'provided in Table 3.6.4-1 of Specification 3.6.4.
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By verifying each primary containment air lock is in compliance with f
the requirements'of Specification 3.6.1.3.
L d.
By verifying the suppression pool is in compliance with the y
p requirements of Specification 3.6.3.1.
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- See Srscial Test Exception 3.10.1.
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- Except. valves, blind flanges and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the primary containment, drywell, or the steam tunnel portion of the auxiliary building, and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in p,
the closed position'.
These penetrations shall be verified closed during L
wach COLD. SHUTDOWN except such verification need not be performed more of ten than once per 92 days.
PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-1
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r L3/4.6.1:PRIMARYCONTAINMENT-PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ~ INTEGRITY - SHUTDOWN.
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i
3.6.1.1.2 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY
- shall be maintained.#
APPLICABILITY:
When irradiated fuel is being handled 'in the primary containment, and'during CORE ALTERATIONS, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
Under 'these conditions, the requirements of PRIMARY CONTAINMENT
'ISTEGRITY do not apply to normal operation of the inclined fuel transfer systrm.
ACTIOL.
Without PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, suspend handling of irradiated fuel ~ in-the primary containment, CORE ALTERATIONS, and operations with a potential for.
draining the-reactor vessel.
.5URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.'l.2 L PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be' demonstrated:
i a.
. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all primary containment 1 i
penetrations not capable of being closed by OPERABLE primary contain-ment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves,~ blind flanges, or deacti-vated automatic valves secured in position..except as provided in Table 3.6.4-I Lof LSpecification 3.6.4.#
1 b.
By-verifying each primary. containment air -lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.'6.1.3.
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- The primary conteinment leakage rates in accordance with Specification 3.6.1.2 K
-lare not applicable.
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- Except that six (6) 3/4" vent and drain line pathways may be opened for the purpose:of performing containment isolation valve leak rate' testing provided the plant has been subcritictl for at least seven (7) days.
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l l PERRY -~ UNIT 1 3/4 6-2 Amendment No. 19, 35 L
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3.4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS _
. BASES
/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT-3 3/4.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restri.cted to those leakage paths and associated' leak rates assumed in the accident analyses.
This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the
. site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR Part 100 during
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accident conditions.
l During shutdown when irradiated fuel is being. handled in the primary
- containment, and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for
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draining the reactor vessel, the # footnote permits the opening of six vent and drain pathways for the purpose of perfoming contairment isolation valve leak rate surveillance testing provided the reactor has.veen suberitical for at least seven days.
Offsite doses were calculated assuming the postulated fuel handling accident inside primary containment after a seven. day decay time, and assuming all the airborne activity existing inside containment after.
a the accident is immediately discharged directly to the environment (i.e., no containment).'
Although this analysis would indicate that.no. restriction on the number of vent and drain pathways was required, the number of open pathways was restricted,to six for conservatism.
+
t 3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE i
The= limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that-the total contain '
ment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the accident analyses
.4 at the peak accident pressure of 11.31 psig,'P.
As an added conservatism, the-a
. measured overall integrated leakage rate is further limited to less than or L
equal to 0.75 La during performance of the periodic tests to account for-
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possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.
Overall-integrated leakage. rate means the leakage rate which obtains from a summation of leakage chrough all potential leakage paths.
Where a leakage path contains,more than one valve, fitting, or component in series, the leakage l
for that path Will be that leakage of the worst leaking' valve, fitting, or.
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componer.t-and not the sumation of the leakage of all valves, fittings, or i
N components in that leakage. path.
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-Operating experience with' the main steam line isolation valves has-q indicated that degradation has occasionally occurred in the leak tightness l'
of the valves; therefore the special requirement for testing these valves.
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PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-1 Amendment No. AS/,35 o
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' CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS-BASES 3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT (Continued) 3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENTLEAKAGE(Continued).
l The seveillance testing for measuring leakage rates is consistent with the requireinents of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 with the exception of exemptions granted for testing the airlocks af ter each opening.
3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT A1,R LOCKS The limitations on closure and leak rate for the'containmea: air locks are required to meet the restrictions on PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and the enntainment leakage rate given in Specifications 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.2.
The specification makes allowances for the fact that there may be lang periods r
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of time when the air locks will be in a closed and secured position during reactor operation.
Only one closed door in each. air lock is required to main-tain the integrity of the containment.
a.
The air supply to the containment air lock and seal system is the service and instrument air system.
The ';ystem consists of two 100% capacity air compressors per unit and can be cross-connected.
This system is redundant
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and extremely reliable and pr3vides system pressure indication in the :ontrol i
room.
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3/4.6.1.4 MSIV LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM Calculated doses resulting from the maximum' leakage allowance'for the main steam line isolation valves in the. postulated LOCA situations would be a small-fraction of the 10 CFR 100 guidelines, provided the main steam line F
system from the isolation valves up to:and inclu' ding the turbine condenser remains intact.. Operating experience has indicated that degradation has.
. occasionally occurred in the leak tightness of the MSIV's such that the specified leakage requirements have not always'been maintained continuously.
Tha requirement for the-leakage control system will reduce the untreated
. leakage from the MSIV's when isolation of the primary system and containment is required.
3/4.6.1.5 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
'This limitaticn ensures that the structural. integrity of the containment will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of'the unit._ Structural integrity is required to ensure that the containment will withstand the-maximum pressure of 15 psig in the event of a LOCA.
A visuale inspection in conjunction with Type A leakage tests is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.
l PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-2 Amendment No. 19 q
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-E CONTAINMENT-SYSTEMS
- 1 0
I BASES A
3/4.6.1 6 CONTAINMENT INTERWAL PRESE The. limitations on primary con:
.t to secondary containment differential pressure; ensure that the ;r aary containment peak pressure 6f 11.31 psig does not exceed the design pressure of 15.0 psig during LOCA conditions. or that the external. pressure differential does not exceed the L design maximum external pressure differential of +0.8 psid.
The limit of~
-0.1 to +1.0 psid for initial. positive primary containment to secondary containment pressure will limit. the primary containment pressure to 11.31 psid which :is less.than the design pressure and is consistent with the a
safety analysis.
3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT AVERAGE AIR TEMPERATURE
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The limitation on containment average air' temperature ensures that the containment peak ' air' temperature does not exceed the design temperature of-185*F during LOCA conditions and is consistent with the safety analysis, a
3/4.5.1.8 DRYWELL AND CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM she use of the crywell and containment purge lines is restricted to the
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42-inch occboard and 18-inch purge supply and exhaust-isolation valves. _ These valves will close during a LOCA-or. steam line' break accident and therefore-the i
h site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event'of an accident during purging operations.
The term sealed closed as
.used-in this. context means that the valve is secured 'in its closed position by' deactivating the valve motor _ operator, and does not pertain to injecting seal water between the isolation valves by a seal water system.
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PERRY
. UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-2a Amendment No. JS, 35 (Next ptge is B 3/4 6-3)
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