ML20028G383
| ML20028G383 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000142 |
| Issue date: | 02/08/1983 |
| From: | Frye J, Luebke E, Paris O Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | CALIFORNIA, UNIV. OF, LOS ANGELES, CA, COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP, NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8302090227 | |
| Download: ML20028G383 (38) | |
Text
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OCCKET.ED UBr u UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:
John H Frye, III, Chairman
$3VED FEB 81983 Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Dr. Oscar H. Paris In the Matter of
)
Docket No. 50-142 OL (Proposed Renewal of THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY Facility License) 0F CALIFORNIA (UCLA Research Reactor)
)
February 8,1983 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Ruling on Motions for Summary Disposition)
On September 1,1982, Staff and UCLA filed motions for summary disposition of all admitted contentions in this proceeding except Contentions XX (concerning the security plan, which is already the subject of a Sta. motion for summary disposition) and XXI (conceirning emergency planning).
On September 7,1982, CBG moved for summary disposition of Contentions XIII (concerning UCLA's special nuclear materials license) and XVII (concerning seismic matters).
Sub-sequently, CBG moved to summarily dismiss Staff's and UCLA's September 1 motions. After the other parties responded to this motion, the Board issued a Memorandum and Order denying CBG's motion to dismiss UCLA's and Staff's motions and instituting a bifurcated procedure to be followed in resolving the pending motions for summary disposition (LBP-82-93, 16 NRC
, October 22,1982).
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. The first step required the movants to furnish citations to authority forthe statements of facts attached to their motions which they allege are not in dispute. Opposers of the motions were then required to address each of the facts listed by the movants, as well as to submit a list of facts which they believe'to be relevant to a contention and may be in dispute. Both CBG and UCLA sought reconsidera-tion of these procedures. On November 8, the Board held a telephone conference call to hear the positions of the parties and to rule on the motions for reconsideration.
It was agreed that while the first step of the procedure would be followed, evidentiary rulings would be left to the second step, which would not begin until a prehearing con-ference, to be scheduled following the filing of first step responses.
All parties have completed the first step of the procedure. On January 20, the Board, anticipating the instant Order, scheduled a prehearing conference to be held in Los Angeles on February 23 and 24.
On January 28, a Memorandum and Order was issued which indicated that the Board had completed its preliminary view of the factual materials supporting Staff's and UCLA's motions for summary disposition and the factual material submitted by CBG in opposition. The Board tentatively concluded that genuine disputes of fact existed with respect to the key facts, conclusions, and assumptions underlying UCLA's and Staff's fundamental positions. As we understand it, UCLA and Staff maintain that UCLA's Argonaut University Training Reactor is an inherently safe machine. We find that this conclusion is subject to dispute.
This Memorandum and Order details the Board's conclusions.
. tiotions for sumary disposition on the pleadings are governed by Section 2.749 of the Commission's Rules of Practice.1/ Motions for summary disposition under 10 CFR 5 2.749 are analogous to motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the same standards are generally applied. Alabama Power Company (Joseph M. Farl'ey Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-182, 7 AEC 210, 217(1974); Texas Utilities Generating Company (Comanche Peak Steam
~
Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-17,15 NRC 593, 595 (1982);
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit No.1)
LBP-77-45, 6 NRC 159, 163; Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-74-36, 7 AEC 877, 878-79 (1974).
Under 10 CFR s 2.749(d), summary disposition will be granted if it is shown that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a decision as a matter of law.
The burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the movant.
Louisiana Power and Light Company (Waterford Steam Electric Station', Unit 3), LBP-81-48,14 NRC 877, 883 (1981); 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice para. 56.15[3]
(2d ed. 1982). The Supreme Court has said that in determining whether the movant's burden has been satisfied, the papers supporting his position are viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party, while the opposing papers are indulgently treated.
See Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Company, 398 U.S. 144, 154 (1970); 6 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, Id. Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine 1/ 10 CFR I 2.749.
O issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party.
Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v.
- Pico, U.S.
, 73 L.Ed.2d 435, 444 (1982); Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Company, 398 U.S. at 157.
The party opposing the motion has the burden of going forward to show that a genuine issue of fact exists.
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (Perry Nuclear Power Plants, Units 1 and 2),
LBP-81-35, 14 NRC 682, 686 (1981). The opposing party.need not show that he would prevail on the issues, but only that there are genuine issues to be tried. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v.
American Broadcasting - Paramount Theaters, Inc., 388 F.2d 272, 280 (2d Cir. 1967).
Even if no party presents evidence opposing the motion, sumary disposition will be denied where the evidentiary matter in support of the motion does not establish the absence of a genuine issue.
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Company, 398 U.S. at 159; Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (Perry fluclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2),
l ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 753-54 (1977).
1 The 1963 Amendment to Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which says that the adverse party may not rest on his pleading l
l but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 1
for trial, is rot intended to modify the burden of the moving party under Rule 56(c) to show initially the absence of a genuine issue concerning any material fact. The purpose of the MG3 amendment is to overturn a line of cases holding that a. party opposing summary l
disposition cou:d successfully create a dispute as to a material fact l
. asserted in an affidavit by the moving party simply by relying on a contrary allegation in a well-pleaded complaint. Stanislaus, Id.
To satisfy the moving party's burden, the evidentiary material before the court, if taken as true, must establish the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.2/ It must appear that there is no real question as to the credibility of the evidentiary material, so that it is to be taken as true.
If the non-existence of any genuine issue of material fact is established by credible evidence, and on the facts and the law the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the motion should be granted,3/ unless the opposing party shows good reason why he is at the time of the hearing unable to present facts in opposition to the motion.
If, however, the papers before the court disclose a real issue of credibility, or, apart from credibility, fail to establish clearly that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the motion must be denied. Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Company, Id. Where there are undisputed facts from which different ultimate inferences might reasonably be drawn and as to which a reasonable person might differ, the case is not suitable for summary judgment.
Sankovich v. Life Insurance Company of North America, 638 F.2d 136,140 (9th Cir.1981).
-2/ Objections made on evidentiary grounds are therefore considered disputes of fact.
In this bifurcated proceeding, they will await decision until the hearing phase.
-3/ Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 362 n.16 (1973).
' We have viewed the UCLA and Staff motions in light of the legal principle discussed above. We find, as we indicated in our January 28 Order, that most of the premises and assumptions underlying the fundamental UCLA and Staff position that this reactor is inhe:ently safe are disputed.
Genuine issues for hearing thus are presented.
UCLA and Staff, having failed to carry their burden, are not entitled to summary relief.
Consequently we deny the motions to the extent that they address the following contentions presenting the-issue of. inherent safety:
V - Excess Reactivity; XIX - Maximum Credible and Design Basis Accidents; VIII-Radiation Exposure - Maximum Credible Accident; XV - Siting -
Population Considerations; XII - Inadequate Safety Features; and XIV - Generic Problems of Argonaut Reactors.!/Because we perceive that many of the remaining contentions may be dependent to some degree upon the conclusions reached on the issue of inherent safety, we hold in abeyance the motions pending our conclusions regarding inherent safety.
In the pages which follow, we briefly discuss the factual disputes which we have identified. As indicated in our prior orders, we have addressed this matter by reviewing UCLA's and Staff's authority for the propositions which they allege are not subject to dispute as well as CBG's cited authority which it maintains establishes disputes and thus issues for hearing.
In reaching the conclusion that an issue is disputed, we have not formed any opinion regarding the merits of any party's position on that issue.
Rather, we have' simply found that sufficient conflicting authority has been presented to require a hearing.
4_/ We have also denied the motions with respect to so much of Contention XIII that concerns issues of inherent safety.
0.
Because, among other issues, this conflicting authority goes to the fundamental iss'ue of the inherent safety of the UCLA Argonaut University Training Reactor, we have chosen to set this issue for hearing first.
Because contentions raising collateral issues are to some extent dependent upon the outcome on this fundamental issue, we have chosen to hold in abeyance a decision on the n.otions regarding the collateral issues.
. )
Contention V EXCESS REACTIVITY Staff and UCLA maintain that the following propositions are not subject to dispute.
Staff:
1.
ileither step insertion of 2.6% a k/k
($3.90) excess reactivity nor prompt criticality would produce fuel melting at the UCLA Research Reactor.
UCLA:
- 12. The stepwise insertion of 2.6% a k/k excess reactivity in Argonaut reactors will not cause melting of the fuel.
Staff relies on para.14 of Mr. Hawley's affidavit for this con-tention, which contains this conclusion.
The preceding paragraph con-tains more elaboration. There Mr. Hawley relies on the data from the SPERT I series of tests for the proposition that a step insertion of 2.6% a k/k would raise fuel temperatures to no more than 590 C, below the eutectic temperature of the fuel (640 C).
Similarly, UCLA also relies on the SPERT and BORAX tests and the Hawley analyses.
CBG disputes these propositions, relying principally on the declaration of Mr. Norton who conducted the SPERT I series of tests.
In paragraphs 39 through 47 of his declaration, Mr. Norton criticizes this approach and concludes that Mr. Hawley's extrapolations from SPERT cannot be relied upon.
A dispute exists.
Staff:
2.
The available excess reactivity in Argonaut reactors is not sufficient to cause fuel mel ting.
1 Staff relies on para. 4 of the Hawley affidavit. This paragraph states that the amount of excess reactivity available in Argonaut-type reactors is less than the amount necessary to cause fuel melting if l
l
O
_g-inserted rapidly, and refers to " response No.13." Presumably this means para.13, discussed immediately above. As noted in that' discussion, the Norton criticism of this ~ analysis creates a genuine issue to be heard.
Staff:
3.
The $3.00 amount of excess reactivity allowed by the UCLA technical specifica-tions is well within the margin of safety and poses no threat of fuel melt.
UCLA:
- 13. The stepwise insertion of $3.00 excess reactivity in Argonaut reactors will not cause melting of the fuel.
Staff again relies on para.14 of the Hawley affidavit.
UCLA relies on the affidavit of Mr. Ostrander, who discusses the SPERT and BORAX data and a Brookhaven study. Apparently, Mr. Ostrander considers the Brookhaven study to be similar to the SPERT tests, al-though it used a computer model.
In contrast, Dr. Kaku in his declara-tion on behalf of CBG concludes his criticism of the Hawley analysis with the opinion that the insertion of either $3.00 or $3.54 excess reactivity must be considered a credible cause of fuel melting. A genuine issue exists to be heard.
Staff:
4.
The graphite temperature coefficient in the Argonaut affects reactivity more slowly than the negative water temperature coefficient.
UCLA:
- 14. The graphite temperature coefficient does not operate quickly enough in AFgonaut reactors to be of any consequence in the analysis of fast transients.
Staff relies on para. 6 of the Hawley affidavit, in which Hawley notes that the positive graphite temperature coefficient takes more time to be seen than the negative water temperature coefficient because of the increased time necessary to transfer heat to the graphite. However, both Norton (para. 61-68) and Kaku (para. 80-81) note that there are
. 3 situations in which this does not hold true.
For example, there is a prompt component to the graphite. temperature coefficient because of prompt gamma and neutron bombardment. Mr. Ostrander of UCLA recognizes this component but considers it negligible. A genuine issue exists for hearing.
Staff:
5.
The negative worth of the control blades in an Argonaut Reactor can compensate for an amount of positive graphite temperature coefficient equal to the negative water temperature co-efficient.
Staff again relies on para. 6 of the Hawley affidavit which str, tes:
... the negative wcrth of the control blades should com-rensate for the reactivity gain, even if the positive graphite temperature i
coefficient is about equal to the negative water temperature coefficient."
Thus the Staff's statement of fact is far stronger than the authority on which it is based. To make matters worse, Norton (para. 62) points out that the value attributed to the positive temperature coefficient of the graphite (+ 0.006% a k/k/*F) is larger than the negative temperature co-efficient of the water (- 0.0048% a k/k/*F).
A genuine issue exists.
Staff:
6.
The increase in power level from 10 kw to 100 kw in 1963 at the UCLA research reactor required only a trivial increase in excess reactivity, and no greater likelihood of a power excursion leading to fuel melt.
CBG does not dispute this assertion but notes that the increase in power level does result in an increased fission product inventory.
Staff:
7.
Only a few elements or isotopes in significant quantities could affect reactivity if in-serted into the reactor by the pneumatic sample
(" rabbit") system.
Staff relies on para.12 of the Hawley affidavit which supports this statement. CBG relies on Norton and Kaku (para. 72 and 82, respectively), but notes that the statement is too vague. We agree with
. CBG that the phrase "enly a few" does not permit a precise response.
Moreover, there seems to be no dispute that such " elements or isotopes" exist. The real controversy seems to be stated by Norton and Kaku, who point out that if UCLA doesn't intend to irradiate samples with a large negative reactivity coefficient, it doesn't need $3.00 excess reactivity. We find that no genuine issue to be heard is posed by the literal terms of this statement.
Staff:
8.
All experiments at UCLA are subject to prior review and approval by the Reactor Use Committee or the Supervisor and Halth Physicist and technical specification limits l
in Section 3.5 of the Technical Specifica-tions.
CBG disputes this relying upon a November 16, 1981 notice of violation and the Monosson declaration. CBG has not furnished the notice of viola-tion, and the Monosson declaration discusses old problems arising under a previous director of the NEL. Monosson's discussion of the June, 1982, inspection report does not touch on the subject of this statement.
Staff relies on the technical specifications attached to the SER as its authority. The technical specifications do provide for the review l
and approval of experiments as set out in the statement. CBG's differences I
with Staff do not appear to center on whether prior review and approval of experiments is required, but rather on whether in fact it is carried i
out. We find no dispute with the literal terms of Staff's statement.
i l
UCLA:
15.
' Appendix B' of the 1960 Hazards Analysis l
Report does not state that melting of the i
fuel will occur at 2.3% keff.
CBG disputes this relying upon the Norton declaration. While it is undoubtedly true that the Hazards Analysis Report does not state in i
l l
t
. so many words that melting of the fuel will occur, the Norton declaration does establish that a dispute exists with regard to the calculations leading to that conclusion.
UCLA:
- 16. The maximum reactivity changes that can be induced by the ' rabbit' system at the UCLA Reactor are less than 504 CBG disputes this relying on the Kaku and Norton declarations and certain interrogatory answers from UCLA. The Kaku and Norton declara-tions clearly place this assertion, which is based on Mr. Ostrander's statement, in dispute.
UCLA: 36. The worst accident deemed credible for the UCLA reactor facility does not endanger public health and safety.
The preceding and ensuing discussions establish that a dispute exists on this proposition.
I O
9
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. Contention XIX MAXIf1UM CREDIBLE AND DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS Staff and UCLA maintain that the following propositions are not subject to dispute:
Staff:
1.
The SER l 14 analysis of the consequences of the collapse of the Belter Hall Classroom Building and the collapse of the UCLA reactor biological shield 'which crushes the core re-sulted in finding radiological releases would not exceed 10 CFR Part 10 [ sic] limits.
Staff relies on page 14-7 of the SER for this proposition. This page contains the figures postulated to result from a fuel handling accident.
CBG disputes this proposition relying upon the Aftergood declaration.
We find that a dispute exists.
(See discussions of Staff 5, Contention VIII.)
Staff:
2.
The most serious common mode failure possible at the UCLA reactor is a simultaneous failure of the coolant dump valve and control blade in-sertion.
Staff relies on Mr. Bernard's affidavit and the SER at page 17-3 for this proposition.
CBG disputes it relying in part on Mr. Norton and Dr. Kaku's full declarations. We believe that Mr. Norton in particular has laid out another common mode failure scenario which might indeed be more serious than that postulated by the Staff. Mr. Norton has among other things pointed to the consequences of a wrenching of the control blade presumably stuck from the reactor core in order to start the reactor. A dispute exists.
. Staff:
3.
The simultaneous failure of the coolant dump valve and control blade insertion would result in loss of moderator due to evaporation from boiling.
CBG disputes this assertion. However we believe it is self evident. The materials cited by CBG seem to assume a situation slightly different from that postolated by this statement. No dispute exists.
Staff:
4.
Loss of coolant water-moderator in an Argonaut results in loss of fission.
CBG disputes this statement. However we believe that, insofar as it goes, it is self evident. While CBG relies upon the declaration of Mr. Norton who in paragraph 58 notes that some additional event coupled with a loss of coolant water moderator could result in an increase in reactivity, that posutlation is outside the scope of this statement.
No dispute exists.
Staff:
5.
The design of the Argonaut Control Panel is such that operator error causes reactor scram.
Staff relies on Mr. Bernard's affidavit for support for this proposition.
In his affidavit Mr. Bernard indicates that the combination of "several instrumental control and safety systems" and "the inherent safety and simplicity of the design" of the reactor mean that there is no operator error which could lead to a serious accident at the reactor.
CBG disputes this proposition relying on Dr. Plotkin's declara-tion in which his observation of several non fail-safe modes in the control equipment are noted, as well as a tendency on the part of the operators to rely blindly upon the fail-safe nature of the reactor, illustrated by their action in bringing the reactor back to criticality l
I l
.5 -
after an emergency shutdown without knowing the reason for the emergency shutdown. As we have seen, Mr. Norton and Dr. Kaku take the position that the reactor is not inherently fail-safe. A dispute exists.
Staff:
6.
The Argonaut controls are designed to compensate for student error.
CBG disputes this assertion. We are unable to find any support for or against this assertion in any of the materials cited by CBG or Staff. Consequently we find that a dispute exists.
Staff:
7.
The SER H 14 Analysis of severe core damage is equivalent to damage possible to the UCLA reactor from a heavy aircraft crash, or explosives placed in the reactor by a saboteur.
CBG disputes this proposition. The Staff relies on Mr. Bernard's affidavit. With regard to explosives, Mr. Bernard takes the position that the heavy concrete biological shield prevents damage from explosives being greater than the damage that would occur from the collapse of the building on top of the reactor. However, Professor Kaku in paragraph 76 points out that an explosive or incendiary device inserted into the reactor itself through one of the irradiation ports could produce results far greater than those of the accident sequences analyzed. Consequently we find that a dispute exists.
Staff:
8.
A credible accident at the UCLA research reactor is a fuel handling accident.
CBG does not dispute this proposition. However CBG takes the position that it is not the maximum credible accident.
Staff:
9.
The UCLA proposed technical specification 3.6.3.4.
prohibits fuel handling prior to 21 days of shutdown condition.
CBG does not dispute this proposition, but does not concede that UCLA will obey it.
1
16 -
Staff:
- 10. Twenty-one days of decay time reduces fission product inventory significantly.
CBG does not dispute this proposition.
Staff:
- 11. The accident analysis in the UCLA Applica-tion concludes that doses of 0.2 x 10-3 rem (whole body) and 1.58 rem (thyroid) would be produced within the reactor room from a fuel handling accident.
CBG, while not disputing this proposition, points out that it agrees only that that is what the application says.
UCLA:
- 17. Credible accidents at the UCLA reactor facility pose no threat to the public.
This is no more than a summary of the overall position taken by UCLA and Staff and has been discussed previously. A dispute exists.
UCLA:
- 36. See Contention V.
e
-c.--.
n..-
. Contention VIII RADIATION EXPOSURE - MAXIf10M CREDIBLE ACCIDENT Staff and UCLA make the following assertions which they allege are.
not disputed.
Staff:
1.
The Safety Analysis Report submitted with the 1980 UCLA application for the second license renewal rests on the assumption that fuel melting has occurred.
l CBG disputes this assertion, citing certain pages of the 1980 Safety Analysis Report and comparing the releases and doses stated in that report with the releases and doses stated by Hawley in the Battelle Study. Nowhere does it appear that the statement here in question is disputed.
Rather CBS's arguments go more to the consequences than to the cause of the release. No dispute exists.
Staff:
2.
Fuel melting cannot occur in an Argonaut-UTR reactor limited to $3.00 excess reactivity and 100 kw power level.
The Staff relies principally on the Battelle and Los Alamos studies to support this proposition. CBG disputes it.
In paragraph 46 of his declaration Professor Kaku takes issue with this assertion and asserts that insertions considerably below $3.00 can be expected to cause melting of the fuel.
See also the discussion of Contention V.
A dispute exists.
Staff:
3.
An inadvertent stepwise insertion of $3.90 excess reactivity would produce a fuel temperature of 500 C.
For this proposition the Staff relies on the Battelle study, page 21. The Battelle study is sharply criticized for this assertion
. by Mr. Norton in pages 16 through 19 of his declaration and by Professor Kaku in paragraph 54. A dispute exists.
Staff:
4.
The aluminum fuel cladding of the UCLA fuel plates melts at 660 C.
CBG does not dispute this assertion but points to certain so-called "counterfacts" which it maintains are relevant.
Staff:
S.
The extremely conservative analysis in the UCLA SER of a worst case accident which crushed the reactor core so that 750 guillotine breaks in the fuel plates occurred, resulted in a calculated re-lease of fission products inside the reactor room causing a dose of 0.047 rem, whole body, and 30 rem to the thyroid.
Staff relies on i 14 of the SER for this proposition.
It appears that the doses stated in the proposition are, as pointed out by CBG, less than the doses postulated by Hawley for his hypothetical fuel handling accident.
In addition on page 26 of the Battelle Report, Hawley points out that "[t]he similar consequences from a core-crushing accident would be some multiple of the consequences of a fuel-handling accident." The Battelle study questions the Staff's assertion and a, dispute exists.
Staff:
6.
The only chemical reaction which could produce an explosion in the UCLA reactor core is a metal-water reaction between the aluminum in the fuel plates and the coolant water, and resulting hydrogen gas formation.
The Staff relies on the SER for this proposition, which CBG disputes.
CBG relies on several declarationg particularly that of Professor Warf, whodescribes several possible chemical reactions in paragraph 16, and that of Professor Kaku. A dispute exists.
o i,
Staff:
7.
For a metal-water reaction to occur, the aluminum cladding in the fuel plates must be broken down into aluminum filings.
Staff again relies on the SER for this proposition.
It is specifically disputed by Professor Kaku in paragraphs 55 through 57 of his declaration. A dispute exists.
Staff:
8.
No credible mechanism could reduce the fuel plate cladding into.the filings at an Argonaut-UTR.
CBG does not dispute this assertion.
Staff:
9.
A graphite fire in the UCLA reactor would occur only if an experiment failed and a general building fire occurred and the reactor's graphite blocks were exposed to a free flow of air.
Staff relies on the Battelle study for this proposition. CBG disputes it citing the Pulido declaration. Mr. Pulido notes that the Battelle study lists a number of fire scenarios.
It would appear that the Staff's reliance on the Battelle study is misplaced. A dispute exists.
Staff:
- 10. Severe damage to fuel plates due to a fuel handling accident at the UCLA reactor would not produce doses inside the reactor room above 2 rem whole body and 43 rem, thyroid.
Staff relies on the Battelle study for this proposition. CBG disputes it, relying on Aftergood's declaration in which Mr. Aftergood calculates the doses from a fuel handling accident to be much larger.
A dispute exists.
UCLA:
9.
The Appendix C study of the 1960 Hazards Analysis Report included in the 1980 Safety Analysis Report of the application is based on a core melting assumptior that is expressly stated to be ' implausible'.
i
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. UCLA:
- 10. The Appendix C study assumption of fission product releases is expressly stated to be an ' arbitrary' assumption.
UCLA:
- 11. The Appendix C study was not based on any accident deemed credible.
CBG regards these facts as being included within Staff's Fact I under this contention. The Board believes that the facts stated by UCLA are slightly different than Staff's Fact 1, and that they merely repeat what is stated in Appendix C to the 1960 Hazards Analysis.
Therefore we find no dispute.
UCLA:
- 36. See Contention V.
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. Contention XV SITING - POPULATION CONSIDERATIONS The Staff maintains that the following facts are not subject to dispute.
Staff:
1.
The maximum credible accident at the UCLA research reactor would not produce signifi-cant radiological releases outside the reactor building.
Staff relies on 514 of the SER for this proposition. A similar Staff proposition under Contention XII was found to be disputed. See Staff fact I under Contention XII.
Staff:
2.
The dose limits in 10 CFR i 20 [ sic] for releases into unrestricted areas are based on doses to the individual.
Staff:
3.
The number of' persons in the nearby population is not relevant to the Part 20 calculations.
Staff:
4.
The accident considerations for research reactors are based on dose calculations in 10 CFR Part 20.
CBG regards these three assertions as legal conclusions. The Board agrees. These assertions go to the appropriate interpretation to be placed on the regulations independent of the facts that may be developed in this proceeding.
Staff:
5.
The addition of classroom and office buildings near the UCLA reactor has no l
effect on individual dose limits in 10 CFR Part 20.
CBG disputes this statement.
However, we believe that, like statements 2, 3, and 4, it is a legal conclusion.
Staff:
6.
The maximum dose to an individual in a nearby classroom from the UCLA reactor radiological releases is 1.0 mrem /yr.
U e
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Staff relies on the Block affidavit which calculates maximum dose at this level. CBG has furnished a calculation of the same dose at 24 mrem /yr. This latter calculation was furnished to S. Bryan, Assistant Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, OIE, by R. Reid, Chief of Operating Reactors Branch #4, Division of Operating Reactors, NRR, on April 11, 1980. Additionally, in his declaration Mr. Foster criticizes the Staff's position on this point. A dispute exists.
UCLA: 37.
UCLA reactor facility operations during the past 22 years have not resulted in any harm to members of the public or to property.
UCLA relies on the docket file and numerous sections of the SER. CBG relies upon the Plotkin, Monosson and Hirsch declarations.
The dispute seems to center on what constitutes "danage to property or harm to persons". The most significant event raised by CBG con-cerns the dispatch from UCLA of a container of spent fuel and a truck one or both of which were contaminated with Cobalt-60.
It therefore appears that a dispute does exist.
. Contention XII INADEQUATE SAFETY FEATURES The Staff and UCLA maintain the following assertions are not subject to dispute:
Staff:
1.
No significant releases would result from the maximum credible accident at the UCLA Research Reactor.
Staff, in its SER, has analyzed five accident scenarios:
1.
Insertion of excess reactivity; 2.
Explosive chemical reaction; 3.
Graphite fire; 4.
Earthquake induced rearrangement of the core; and l
5.
Fuel handling accident.
Staff concluded that the fuel handling accident posed the greatest threat.
CBG disputes this relying upon the Norton and Kaku declarations. Both Mr. Norton (para. 75-6, 78) and Dr. Kaku (para. 83-6) take issue with the Staff's assumptions as to the credibility and consequences of various accidents considered. A dispute clearly exists.
Staff:
2.
Containments at power reactors are constructed to prevent release of highly radioactive effluents in the event of accident.
CBG does not dispute this assertion.
Staff:
3.
The inherent safety of the Argonaut UTR reactor requires only structural housing.
Staff relies on the affidavit of Mr. Bernard for this proposition, which states that because the consequences of a credible accident are not
. severe, no special containment is necessary. As seen in connection with Contentions V and VIII, this assumption regarding consequences of accidents is sharply questioned by Norton and Kaku. Consequently, a genuine dispute exists to be heard with regard to the adequacy of the housing of the reactor.
Staff:
4.
The Reactor Building is kept at negative pressure by an exhaust fan of 14,000 CFM.
Staff relies on the SER.
CBG disputes this statement, relying upon the declaration of Dr. Plotkin for Contention XII,particularly paragraph 8.
Dr. Plotkin questions whether in fact this requirement has been met at all times in the past. A dispute axists.
Staff:
5.
The stack monitor at the UCLA reactor serves as a back-up for the high radiation monitoring system.
Staff relies for this assertion on the affidavit of Mr. Bernard which was executed in October of 1981.
CBG points out that the application was amended in October 1982 to remove the stack monitor as a back-up. Thus a dispute exists.
Staff:
6.
Boron injection systems, radioactivity removal systems, emergency holding tanks, HEPA filters, emergency core cooling systems and spare motors are not necessary for safe operation of Argonaut UTR research reactors.
For this proposition the Staff again relies on Mr. Bernard's affidavit, in wnich he asserts that the inherent safety of the Argonaut UTR is such that safety systems required for power reactors are not necessary.
. This proposition is sharply disputed by Mr. Norton (See discussion of Contention V assertions) in his declaration on behalf of CBG in which he maintains that operating limits which UCLA seeks for this reactor mean that it is no longer inherently safe. A dispute exists.
UCLA:
- 20. The UCLA reactor facility has HEPA filters, liquid holdup tanks, an extra control blade motor, and a radioactivity removal system.
This assertion is based upon the affidavit of Mr. Ostrandor to the same effect'.
CBG in disputing the assertion relies on the declaration of Mr. Pulido who among other things points out that while the University had acquired HEPA filters at the time of his site visit, those filters were not installed and appeared to be too small for use in the exhaust stack. A dispute exists.
Staff:
7.
Water is the moderator in an Argonaut UTR.
For this proposition Staff relies on the SER. A similar proposition is contained in the application itself.
CBG maintains that the graphite which is described in the applica-tion as a reflector also serves as a moderator. See Plotkin declaration for Contention XII, paragraph 12.
Therefore, a dispute exists.
Staff:
8.
Loss of coolant water in an Argonaut results in termination of fission.
l Staff relies on the SER for this proposition.
It is questioned by Dr. Plotkin and Mr. Norton in their declarations in support of CBG's position. Mr. Norton notes in paragraph 58 of his declaration that l
"[s]ome event which induces some coolant boiling could also result in positive reactivity insertion."
It appears that an issue exists with regard to this proposition at least insofar as it includes a partial loss I
of coolant.
. Staff:
9.
The characteristics of the Argonaut UTR are an inherently safe design, lo,i operating tempera-tures and low radiation effluent levels.
These propositions have surfaced elsewhere in the Staff's statemen; of facts.
CBG disputes these propositions. The declarations of Mr. Norton, Dr. Kaku, Dr. Lyon and Mr. Foster question whether the Argonaut UTR at UCLA is inherently safe and whether its radioactive effluents are acceptably low. With the possible exception of operating temperatures, issues requiring hearing exist.
Staff:
- 10. The concrete biologica'l shield surrounding the UCLA Argonaut UTR effectively protects persons in the reactor room from significant exposure.
Staff relies on Mr. Bernard's affidavit for this proposition, in which Mr. Bernard refers to Section 12 of the SER which he adopts as his testimony.
CBG relies on the declaration of Dr. Plotkin for this contention in which he disputes the proposition that the concrete' shield provides an effective shield to protect persons in the reactcr room, pointing out that the UCLA personnel were extremely reluctant to accompany him on a tour of certain areas of the reactor room. Dr. Plotkin maintains that the concrete shield is not a monolithic shield but a pile of concrete l
blocks with numerous penetrations and that the shielding above the reactor appears to be espc ially insufficient.
(See discussion under Staff 11 below.) A dispute exists.
Staff:
- 11. An interlock system at the UCLA reactor facility would not increase safety since reactor room radiation is 1 mr/hr.
Again Staff relies on the affidavit of Mr. Bernard for this proposition.
. CBG disputes it relying on the declaration of Mr. Foster who indicates that his review of the radiation data indicates that the 1 mr/hr is incorrect by two orders of magnitude.
Further the applica-tion itself on page III/5-5 indi 4tes that "[t]he biological shield is adequate to maintain most of the reactor room as a Radiation Area.
However, the end of the thermal column and the reactor top are designated High Radiation areas. The measured ;adiation at the surface of these areas (gamma plus neutron) does not exceed 200 mrem per hour at 100 kilowatts steady state operation." A dispute exists.
Staff:
- 12. The UCLA research reactor has no turbine or other component which could create missiles.
Staff again relies on the affidavit of Mr. Bernard.
CBG disputes this statement,_but raises a different problem.
No dispute exists as to this statement, which does not address the problem raised by CBG: mechanical interference with the control blade drive mechanism leading to unintended withdrawal of a control blade.
Staff:
- 13. The control blades at the UCLA research reactor are not subject to the force necessary to become missiles.
CBG does not dispute this statement.
Staff:
- 14. Any increase in positive graphite reactivity in an Argonaut-UTR would be minimal in relation to the negative worth of the reactor coolant.
Staff again relies on Mr. Bernard's affidavit for this proposition which states that the effect of the graphite on reactivity is mininal.
Both Mr. Norton and Dr. Kaku strongly dispute this proposition.
(See Kaku declaration, paragraphs 80 and 81; Norton declaration, paragraphs 61-68 and the discussion of Staff 5 under Contention V.) An issue for hearing exists.
. Staff:
- 15. The inherent design safety; low power part time operation; and effluent monitoring at the UCLA research reactor preclude risk from fuel failure.
CBG disputes this assertion relying in part on the declarations of Dr. Plotkin, Dr. Kaku and Mr. Norton.
Dr. Kaku's and Mr. Norton's positions with respect to fuel failure resulting from the insertion of
$3.00 excess reactivity have been discussed under Contention V.
Dr. Plotkin indicates that there is a possibility that the extended period of time that the fuel remains immersed in water could result in corrosion of the clad and lead to a failure of the clad.
In support of this Dr. Plotkin points to the fact that the University indicates that a primary coolant leak of some years past was the result of corrosion of the aluminum piping in the primary coolant system.
Dr. Plotkin also refers to Mr. Aftergood's declaration in which he reports a conversation with Dr. Muno of the University of Maryland in which the latter indicated that the fuel in the University of Maryland had been replaced after 11 years because of the concern for corrosion. A dispute exists.
Staff:
- 16. The control blades at the UCLA research reactor have performed safely for 20 years.
CBG, relying on paragraph 20 of Dr. Plotkin's declaration for this contention takes sharp issue with this assertion, alleging that among other things the control blades have tended to warp and become l
Jammed and have required core disassembly or manual torquing. A dispute exists.
Staff:
- 17. If damage occurs to control blades at Argonaut UTRs they may be safely repaired or replaced.
CBG disputes this relying in part upon the declaration of Mr. Norton.
Mr. Norton indicates that should a control blade become stuck within the
e
. reactor the process of removing it could lead to an SL-1-type accident.
A dispute exists.
Staff:
- 18. The Argonaut UTR may be safely shutdown without control blade operation by dumping the moderator.
coolant water.
Staff relies on. the SER at pages 5-1 and 6-2 for this proposition.
The discussion on the referenced pages indicates that the dumping of the moderator from the reactor is intended to ba a safety feature. On page 6-2 the statement is made that it is a second and independent scram system.
CBG disputes the effectiveness of dumping of the moderator under all circumstances relying on the declaration of Dr. Kaku which in paragraph 79 raises the question whether the dump valve can operate quickly enough to safely shutdown the reactor in all circumstances. A dispute exists.
UCLA:
- 19. Contamination of the secondary effluent by primary water is prevented by the natural static head differential which drives any hypothetical leakage into, and not out of, the primary loop.
UCLA relies for this proposition on the affidavit of Mr. Ostrander.
l l
CBG disputes this assertion relying on the declaration of Mr. Pulido who among other things points out that the secondary system is connected to the citing water system and is therefore subject to pressure 1
l fluctuation common in such water systems. A dispute exists.
l UCLA:
- 21. No member of the public has been endangered by the bypassing of interlock systems at the UCLA facility.
UCLA relies on the affidavit of Mr. Ostrander in which he acknowledges that interlocks have been bypassed in the past and strongly implies that they will be bypassed in the future.
. CBG, relying on the declaration of Dr. Plotkin for this contention at the second paragraph 22, notes that the bypassing has a substantial effect on safety. A dispute therefore exists with regard to the safety significance of UCLA's practice of bypassing interlocks.
UCLA:
22.
No credible accident at the UCLA facility can create missiles.
The discussion with regard to Staff's fact 12 also applies.to this particular assertion. We note that CBG relies here, in addition to the Plotkin declaration, on the Norton declaration at paragraph 73 in which he postulates a steam explosion or chemical reaction. Theoretically such an event could create a missile inside the reactor. However the contention refers to the lack of missile shields on the reactor. We do not believe that the kind of missile contemplated by Mr. Norton is the same kind of missile contemplated by the contention.
UCLA:
- 23. The time required to generate a fast neutron fluence of consequence in UCLA's 100 kw reactor operated 5% of the time on average is in excess of 100 years.
UCLA:
24.
Since replacement of the fuel tie-bolts which occurred in the 1980's there have been no tie-bolt failures.
UCLA:
25.
Control blade scrams are backed by the in-dependent dump water scram in the UCLA reactor.
CBG has not specifically responded to these assertions, although at least number 25 is covered under Staff 18 for this Contention.
UCLA:
36.
See Contention V.
l l
l l
l
\\ Contention XIV GENERIC PROBLEMS OF ARGONAUT REACTORS Staff:
1.
No significant safety problems in Argonauts have developed in 20 years of operation.
For this proposition Staff relies upon the affidavit of Mr. Hawley who in turn relies upon his analysis set out in the Battelle Study.
CBG disputes this proposition relying upon the affidavit of Dr. Plotkin who points out that significant safety problems have been observed at other Argonauts during the same period. As examples, he points to pressure fluctuations in the secondary coolant system at the University of Florida, the positive temperature coefficient and in-f stabilities associated with the coolant boiling, Wigner energy storage, fire potential, power excursion potential, core crushing vulnerability, and explosive chemical reactions. A dispute exists.
Staff:
2.
The positive graphite temperature coefficient in an Argonaut is produced by heat transferrence.
CBG does not dispute this proposition.
However we note that Professor Kaku and Mr. florton in their declarations at paragraphs 80-81 and 61-68 respectively indicate that in addition to heat transference, heat is produced in the graphite as a result of neutron and gamma bombardment.
Mr. Ostrander also recognizes this phenomenon (Affidavit, p.12). A dispute exists.
(See also the discussion of Staff 4 and 5 and UCLA 14, Contention V.)
Staff:
3.
Heat transference to graphite in Argonauts occurs only after several hours of operation.
Staff relies upon the affidavit of fir. Hawley for this proposition.
Mr. Hawley points out that the heat must be transferred from the fuel to w
e,---
--,---a
. the coolant to the air and from there to the graphite, so that it requires several hours before the temperature has risen enough to be detectable.
CBG disputes this, relying upon the declarations of Professor Kaku and Mr. Norton cited immediately above. Both Professor Kaku and Mr. Norton point out that a graphite temperature rise can be effected because of neutron and gamma bombardment as a result of reactor operation so that the temperature begins to rise upon commencement of operation and continues to rise steadily even after the coolant tem-perature has reached its maximum. A dispute exists.
Staff:
4.
The Argonaut secondary water system is designed on a site specific basis.
Staff relies on the affidavit of Mr. Hawley for this proposition, who maintains that problems with the secondary water system are site specific.
However, he does offer some generic comments which indicate that pressure fluctuations in the secondary system (which may be presumed whenever the secondary system is connected to the public water supply) could cause problems of heat transference. On the surface, this appears to be a generic problem for Argonauts utilizing public water supplies for secondary cooling. The materials relied on by CBG to dispute this proposition do not elaborate further on the problem. While secondary water pressure may be considered generic for Argonaut Reactors tied to l
l public water systems, we conclude that such problems must be considered on a site specific basis.
Each public water system would have to be examined to determine whether the fluctuations were sufficient to create a problem.
No dispute exists.
l
. Staff:
5.
The secondary coolant for an Argonaut does not come into contact with the primary coolant.
CBG disputes this relying on paragraph 32 of Mr. Pulido's declara-tion. However in that paragraph Mr. Pulido assumes that a leak exists between the primary and secondary sides of the cooling system. The statement does not presume a leak.
If the system is properly built and operated, this statement is true.
No dispute exists.
Staff:
6.
The secondary coolant system of an Argonaut has higher pressure than the primary system.
CBG again disputes this proposition relying again on Mr. Pulide's declaration at paragraph 32. Mr. Pulido alludes to the fact, recognized by Mr. Hawley, that the coolant pressure in the secondary system can vary because it is tied to the public water system. Staff's next statement of fact seems to assume that the secondary coolant pressure might have dropped below the primary coolant pressure. There appears to be no dispute that water pressures in public water supplies fluctuate and thus may cause pressures lower in the secondary system than the primary system.
Staff:
7.
If the secondary coolant system pressure is insufficient to maintain core cooling, the increase in temperature will decrease the power le;.al in an Argonaut UTR.
CBG disputes this relying uoon paragraphs 57-58, 60-68 of Mr. Norton's declaration. This declaration does not address the specific statement here in question, but rather raises other mechanisms in which the power level might not be decreased as anticipated. We find no dispute with respect to this statement.
. Staff:
8.
In the event of primary coolant boiling, the Argonaut reactor will shutdown due to loss of moderator from evaporation.
Staff relies on paragraph 5 of the Hawley affidavit for this proposition as it did for proposition 7.
Similarly, CBG relies on the same paragraphs of the Norton declaration in seeking to establish that' a dispute of fact exists. We see no difference between this statement and fact No. 7.
No dispute exists.
Staff:
9.
In the event of loss of all water in an Argonaut during operation, the residual decay heat would not be sufficient to cause fuel mel ting.
Staff again relies on the Hawley affidavit, paragraph 5.
CBG disputes this assertion relying on the DuPont declaration, paragraphs 26 l
and 27. The DuPont declaration is premised upon the existence of some transients such as a power excursion or earthquake which would interfere with the operation of the reactor as designed.
Fact 9 on the other hand simply postulates a loss of all water. We find that no dispute e).ists.
Staff:
- 10. In the event of failure of control blade motors at the UCLA reactor, the control blades would fall into the core by force of gravity.
CBG does not dispute this assertion.
Staff:
- 11. Inability to withdraw control blades from the UCLA reactor core maintains shutdown.
CBG does not dispute this assertion.
Staff:
- 12. Research concerning Argonauts demonstrates no generic safety problems because of the reactor design and composition.
Staff relies on paragraph 8 of Mr. Hawley's affidavit which adds little to this statement.
Staff also relies upon the two safety studies
. performed at its instance. CBG disputes this assertion citing the Kaku, DuPont, Warf and florton declarations. As can be seen by perusal of the discussions to this point, CBG has demonstrated that disputes exist with regard to the existence of generic safety problems.
In addition, CBG also relies on the declaration of Dr. Plotkin which specifically takes
- issue with this assertion and gives examples of generic safety problems.
A dispute exists.
UCLA:
- 18. There are no known significant safety problems common to Argonaut reactors.
UCLA relies on the Ostrander affidavit at page 21, the SER, and the Los Alamos and Battelle Studies for this proposition. We do not believe this proposition differs significantly from Staff's facts 1 and 12.
Therefore we find a dispute exists.
UCLA:
36.
See Contention V.
l 1
L
O Contention XIII APPROPRIATE FUEL EilRICHMENT LEVEL The Board is addressing this contention only to the extent that it bears on the question o'f inherent safety of the UCLA Argonaut University Training I
Reactor. We note that Professce Kaku in para. 33 and 41 refers to the advantages of the Doppler effect in low-enriched fuel and the fact that this effect is not found in highly-enriched fuel. According to Professor Kaku, this effect reduces the number of neutrons available for capture as the fuel temperature increases, providing an inherent safety feature.
While the parties have not addressed Professor Kaku's statement with respect to the Doppler effect, they do dispute whether low-enriched fuel is available for the UCLA Argonaut University Training Reactor, and whether highly-enriched fuel is necessary for this reactor.
These dis-putes are of course relevant to the extent that they could pose practical barriers to the advantage of low-enriched fuel stated by Professor Kaku.
These disputes center on the following statements.
Staff:
1.
The 93% enrichment level of fuel in use by the UCLA reactor is necessary to maintain the optimum flux because of the reactor design.
Staff relies on Mr. Bernard's affidavit which states that a reduction in the enrichment level of the fuel would require an increase in the volume of fuel if the same flux levels are to be maintained.
CBG disputes this proposition relying on the declarations of Dr. Taylor and Mr. Aftergood. The cited portions of these declarations indicate that there may not be a significant lowering of the flux level ' accompanying the proposed changeover to a lower enrichment fuel. A dispute exists.
O CBG:
- 11. Reduced enrichment fuels are currently available on which the UCLA reactor can run.
- 15. Advanced reduced enrichment fuels of higher Uranium loading will soon be available on which all but the highest power research reactors can run.
UCLA and Staff have cited materials which question the current or future availability of such fuels. A dispute exists.
We note that CBG's assertions regarding the use of low-enriched fuel at other Argonauts are not disputed.
' ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is this eighth day of February, 1983, ORDERED 1.
UCLA's and Staff's motions for summary disposition of Contentions V, XIX, VIII, ^'!, XII, and XIV are.hereby denied.
2.
UCLA's, Staff's, and CBG's motions for summary disposition of Content 6 XIII are denied to the extent related above.
THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Emmeth A. Luebke ADt11NISTRATIVE JUDGE
-i M l)
~
Oscar H. Paris ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE e, III, Chairman Bethesda, Maryland February 8,1983
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