ML20028G239
| ML20028G239 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 02/01/1983 |
| From: | Garde B GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT |
| To: | Johnson W, Moore T, Rosenthal A NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8302070549 | |
| Download: ML20028G239 (10) | |
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u- GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT
- COLKETED Institute for Policy Studies er .:c 1901 Que Street l N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009 (202)234 0382
'83 FEB -3 80146 February 1, 1983 Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq., Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. W. Reed Johnson, Member Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Thomas S. Moore, Esq. , Member Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Re: In the Matter of Texas Utilities Generating Com'pany, et al.
for an operating license for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units #1 and #2, Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446
Dear Sirs:
It has come to our attention that the Appeals Board of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), is involved with deliberations dealing specifically with the confidentiality of nuclear witnesses at the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant.
The Government Accountability Project (GAP) is a project of the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) , Washington, D.C. The purpose of GAP's three clinics
-- Federal Government, Citizens Clinic, and Nuclear Clinic -- is to broaden the understanding of the vital role of the public employee, private citizen, and nuclear worker in preventing waste, corruption or health and safety dangers. GAP also offers legal and strategic counsel to whistleblowers, provides a unique legal education for law student interns, brings meaningful and significant reform to -
the government workplace, and exposes government actions that are repressive, wasteful or illegal, or that pose a threat to the health and safety of the American public. Presently, the Project provides a program of multilevel assistance for governmnt employees, citizens and corporate employees who report illegal, wasteful or improper actions. GAP also regularly monitors governmental reforms, offers '
expertise to Executive Branch offices and agencies, state and local governmental bodies, al.3 responds to requests by Congress and state legislatures for analysis l of legislation to make government more accountable to the public.
I. Background Specifically, GAP has been involved in three major nuclear power plant investi-gations. All of our investigations involved nuclear workers who may not have i revealed serious problems had confidentiality not been arranged with NRC staff. f These cases have been summarized below for you.
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Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq.
g Dr. W. Resd Jchncen-Thomas S. Moore, Esq. February 1, 1983 A. Zimmer Nuclear Power Plant s' ~
Our work began over two years ago when an undercover detective who was fired l from the Zimmer Nuclear Power Plant after uncovering severe safety problems and l ranpant criminal activities brought his evidence to GAP. GAP launched its own extensive investigation and worked in close cooperation with national, local and state citizens groups, the city attorneys of Dayton and Cincinnati, members of the Cincinnati City Council, state attorneys for the Consumer Counsel Office and members of Congress to expose the many problems at the plant. Eventually, GAP's investigation led to two NRC probes -- an internal investigation and a re- r j investigation of the detective-whistleblower's original allegations.
The results of both investigations, returned in November 1981, substantiated GAP's accusations. The NRC internal investigation revealed that the NRC's original investigation was " incompetent" -- in effect, a whitewash. The probe of detective Applegate's actual allegations led to the finding of across-the-board violations o f quality assurance regulations -- for example, quality assurance records had been doctored, mandatory inspections had been skipped and quality assurance inspectors harassed, several times with water including firehoses and buckets of urine. Over [
forty whistleblowers shared their information with us. i Since November 1981, a flood of new whistleblowers from the NRC, from the construction company building the Zimmer plant and from the executive offices of the utility have brought us devastating new evidence about the plant and the NRC.
The latest information demonstrates that the NRC investigations, as meticulous and j comprehensive as they seemed, were meant to contain the scandal at the plant and shift the focus away from exposure of the most fundamental defects, hardware prob- j lems and possible criminal prosecutions. i On November 12, 1982 the NRC Commissioners, in an unprecedented move, ordered ;
all safety-related construction at the plant halted. The Regional Administrator i admitted that the problems at Zimmer were coming in faster than he could deal with :
them. Zimmer was out of control. Without the "whistleblowers" -- it is extremely ?
likely that Zimmer would be ready to operate. (Attachment 1.)
- B. Midland Nuclear Power Plant f
In March 1982 GAP's Citizens Clinic becane actively involved with the Midland ,
Nuclear Power Plant. A local citizens organization asked GAP to pursue allegations i i from workers of major problems at the Midland plant. After our preliminary investi-gation, we complied six affidavits which we filed with the NRC on June 29, 1982. (
Since then we have filed four additional affidavits resulting from the heating / l ventilation / air conditioning (HVAC) system's quality assurance breakdown revelations.
We are also preparing an expanded affidavit from one of our original witnesses, j Mr. E. Earl Kent, who has alleged serious welding construction problems at the !
Midland site. Other alarming allegations, ranging from security system breakdowns l to worker safety problems, have come to our attention recently. As a result, we have expanded our investigation of the Midland plant.
As we are all painfully aware, the most serious problem at Midland is a con- .
struction flaw unprecedented within the nuclear industry. The Midland site is l plagued by a foundation soil settlement problem that has left the diesel generator i building cracked, the auxiliary building unstable, and other safety structures in !
1
Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq.
Dr. W. Reed Johnson Thomas S. } bore, Esq. Februatr 1, 1983 serious jeopardy of shifting or settling. The result has. been a massive construc-tion boondoggle, which has not yet been, and may never be, solved. It has been characterized recently as " corporate mismanagement on a massive scale" by the CBS National News.
Finally, the legal " guns" of Consumers Power focused on GAP itself. As part of its NRC licensing proceeding, the utility has issued, but not yet served, sub-poenas for the documents GAP has obtained and for depositions of Billie Garde, Tom Devine, Iouis Clark, and local resident Lucille Hallberg. The Midland community and especially the whistleblowers who have spoken to us in confidence are watching these newest developrents with concern.
A Midland housewife, who has served as our liaison with plant workers who want to speak with us, was also targeted by the utility for deposition. She has declared her intent to go to jail before she will submit to interrogation; we have agreed to provide legal representation. If Consumers Power goes through with its threat, the resulting struggle will very clearly demonstrate the threat imposed by a large, powerful utility upon the civil liberties of anyone who stands in its way -- in this case a housewife and mother. (Attachment 2.)
C. LaSalle Nuclear Power Plant In January 1982 two local groups in Illinois contacted the Government Accounta-bility Project about a number of construction workers who wanted to speak to some-one who would do something about problems at the LaSalle Nuclear Power Plant. Some of the workers had contacted the NRC but were dissatisfied about its lack of action.
Others had so little faith in the NRC that they refused to disclose information directly to that agency.
In March 1982 Billie Garde and Tom Devine went to IaSalle, a plant that was reportedly 100% complete and ready to go on line on July 1,1982. They met with local community leaders and plant workers. The construction employees reported numerous construction flaws. GAP's findings were announced at an April 28 press con ference. NRC Chairman Palladino toured the plant a day later and at his own press conference announced an NRC investigation into the alleged problems. The start-up of the plant was delayed indefinitely.
Insiders have told us that the NRC probe was the fastest one in their memories.
Even the Regional Administrator spoke to us often of the trerendous pressure he was facing at LaSalle to conplete the investigative work. On July 20 the NRC Region III announced its findings. It reported that most of the charges were true, but the problems had been corrected or were not significant enough to affect safety.
The NRC relied on company paperwork in arriving at its conclusions, rather than the eyewitness accounts recorded in GAP af fidavits.
Three days after the release of its findings, the NRC received a highly public
" black eye." While the NRC was launching its first investigation, four employees of the Zack Company, a subcontracting firm for the LaSalle plant, had approached the NRC about " widespread falsification of quality assurance records." One of the erployees, the supervisor of quality assurance documentation for the company, had I reported to the NRC that Zack officials had harassed and intimidated him for pursuing 250 major discrepancies in the company's files. He said his three subordinates had 1
Alan S. Ro Znthal, Esq.
' Dr. W. Reed Johnson Thomas S . ' Moore , E sq. February 1, 1983 discovered udssing test data that would indicate whether materials were up to industry standards, discrepancies in the qualification of welders, and altered and falsified documents.
We delivered to the NRC Commissioners an ' extensive packet of materials, includ-ing a series of affidavits, supporting verification memoranda and hundreds of falsified documents. The GAP report and supporting material led the NRC Commis-sioners to reject the recommendation of NRC Region III to grant a full-power license to LaSalle. They instead turned down the license until after Region III reinvestigated the LaSalle plant. .
Although the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation authorized LaSalle to go to full power on December 3,1982 following a questionable audit, the allegations of serious problems at the plant continue to come to us. In fact, we are about to re-open our own investigation of the plant , (Fortunately for the residents of Illinois the plant has been "down for repairs" since Commonwealth Edison attempted to put it up to full power. (Attachment 3.)
D. Other Plants In addition to our work at Zimmer, La Salle, and Midland, we have recently disclosed welding problems on control panels at numerous plants across the nation.
Even more recently, a witness that we are assisting has exposed severe welding problems at two Michigan (Palisades and Midland) and a California (San Onofre) plant.
Groups in California, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Tex 6 s, Florida, Ohio, Illinois, Arizona, and Michigan have formally requested that we open an investigation at nuclear plants in their vicinities in response to unresolved or ignored worker alle-gations. (Attachment 4.)
Our total commitment to those who want to reveal information has led us to the position of missing link between the conditions inside the plants and the public, effectively destroying the utilities ' attengts to smoke screen the truth behind " pro or anti-nuclear labels. " The skill and experience we have gained with federal whistleblowers over the years have given us a unique perspective into the fears and concerns of those considering risking "all" for the benefit of their fellow citizens.
Until nuclear workers believe that the NRC understands the risks they are taking and are willing to "go the distance" with them, it is unlikely that the workers will be willing to take difficult stands. GAP has made its stand on behalf of workers who are sincerely worried -- legitimately so -- about the safety of the plants they are building.
It is unfortunate for the many nuclear worxers who are left to drown in the wake of the waves created by their allegations that the NRC staff has so blatantly broken trust with nuclear industry employees.
II. The Case at Hand: THE INFORMANTS PRIVILEGE SHOULD PROTECT APPLICANT EMPLOYEES WHO ARE MOST VUINERABLE TO REPRISAL.
Any director or responsible officer of a firm constructing, owning or supplying a _
Alan S. Rosenthal, E:q.
Dr. W. Re;d Jrhnron Thomas S.eMoore, Esq. February 1, 1983 4-the conponents of a facility regulated under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, has an affirmative duty to notify the NRC immediately of any safety defect or failure to conply with the Atomic Energy Act. 42 U.S.C. E5846 (1974) and 10 C.F.R. 21.1 through 21.61.
Upper management and some middle management level enployces at Comanche Peak, as at other plants, are required by these statutes to report defects of a safety nature and non-conpliance with the Atomic Energy Act.
In this specific case the Licensing Board in its Order of September 30, 1982 notes that an informer is "one who confidentially volunteers information." The Board further goes on to say that these are individuals who were responding to a lawfully conducted investigation by the NRC and therefore do not meet the definition of an informer. (Board Order, p.4. )
This division between those who are required to inform the NRC -- either as a result of a lawful investigation or due to an affirmative duty is one way to distinguish between those individuals who should and shouldn't receive confi-dentiality. However, it is not absolutely indicative of all persons who may need confidentiality, such as certain middle level management persons or perhaps quality control inspectors who write reports that ultimately go the NRC through their supervisors. These individuals are as susceptible to harassment and employer re-prisal as individuals with no duty to inform the NRC. At Zimmer we saw QC inspectors harassed and intimidated so badly that it became inpossible for them to do their job.
Among the craftspeople there is a need for protection from reprisal by their enployer. This is recognized in 42 U.S.C. 85851 (1978) which protects enployees from discharge or discrimination for testifying, assisting or participating in NRC proceedings. The legislative history of the statute also recognizes the possibility of enployer-reprisal and the need for protection of the employee. Senate Reports, Report 95-848, p. 29. (This section does not apply to any engloyee who, acting without direction from his/her employer or agent, deliberately causes a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.)
Lower level employees, such as Charles Atchison whose job it was to report to applicant, not the NRC, by the fact that they are supplied with materials, a job site, directions and a direct supervisor,can be assumed to be carrying out the directive of the employer (or agent). This presumption is necessary to protect those employees who produce work to the satisfaction of the enployer yet have no concrete proof of orders to act in a certain manner. The three retaliatory firings of Charles Atchison that are documented in the record is evidence of the need for such protection.
However, 42 U.S.C.15851 (1978) does not offer any protection against industry
" blackballing" or harassment by individuals other than the enployer. It is for this reason that confidentiality is needed for individuals who do not have an af firnative duty to report to the NRC.
The Appeals Board in the Matter of Houston Lighting and Power Ccmpany, et al.,
ALAB 535,11 NRC 477 (1980), suggests that a licensing board should take steps to protect the identity of a person where reprisal may occur. They go further to state
4 Alan S. Romnth21, Esq.
Dr. W. Reed Johnson
? Thomas S. Moore, Esq. February 1, 1983 that the method by which this could be a achieved is a protective order.
{W]here revealing the name of an informant or propoced witness or member, in response to discovery or other NRC requirement, would occasion harm or reprisal against such person, a licensing board can and should take steps to protect that person, consistent with achieving to the e'xtent possible the purposes of NRC's discovery rules or other requirements. For that reason, even though some revelation or names may be required, the Board may well limit disclosure to an extent necessary to avoid the anticipated harm or reprisal. Therefore if CEU believes that. . . [by revelation) it will subject its informants or witness to harrassment, it should request a protective order.. . outlining its view that a protective order is warranted.. .and delineate the degree of protection deemed to be needed to avoid the fear of harrassment." South Texas, supra at 480.
Protective orders are also dealt with in the Matter of Wisconsin Electric Power Company, (Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2) lap-81-55,14 NRC 1017 (1981).
Here, the issue was the revelation of proprietary information during discovery.
This was an expedited proceeding where intervenors were allowed to participate in discovery even though they had not been formally admitted to the proceeding as a party. The Board chose to examine the materials, in camera. The intervenors chose not to participate in these in camera proceedings taking a " strong, principled stand concerning the right of the public to know about information which ray be relevant to the decision of the Board." Point Beach, p.1024. The Board felt that confidentiality was a separate issue from whether or not it could be arranged for the intervenors to examine the documents, subject to a protective or&ur until such time that the issue of confidentiality was resolved. Point Beach, p. 1021.
Given the time available in the instant case it would seem appropriate to allow the Board to exandne the documents irl canera, and decide if confidentiality is warranted.
Prior to Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S. Ct. 623 (1957), the informant's privilege was frequently considered absolute. Roviaro establishes several parts to the informer's privilege: that the applicability of the privilege is for the court to decide once it has been invoked and the court rejects the theory that the privilege guarantees the informer anonymity and imports a concept of fair-ness stating that the court must balance competent interests in reaching a decision on privilege. Westinghouse Electric v. the City of Burlington, Vermont, 351 F.2d 762, 768 (1965). Here, it is the NRC and not the Board that is making the decision as to whether it is appropriate to invoke a claim of privilege and, if so, as to whether it should stand. The Board in an in camera proceeding could examine the situations of the individuals involved and determine if, in fact, protection is necessary.
The court in Robbins Tire and Rubber Company v. N.L.R.B. , 563 F.2d 724 (1977) recognized the need to protect potential employee witnesses from harassment by the e nploye r. The court looks to the history of labor relations at the plant and in the community and the nature of the testimony to determine if employee harassment ;
or intimidation is likely. Robbins, supra at 732. It has also been recognized that where enployee cooperation is necessary to investigation and fear of reprisal is strong it may be necessary to maintain confidentiality. T.V. Tower v. Marshall, ;
444 F.S upp. 12 33 (1978) (OSHA investigation.) l l
Alan S. Ronnthal, E q.
, Dr. W. Reed Johnson Thomas S. ? bore, Esq. February 1, 1983 Additionally, there is no privilege once the identificatio,n.of the informant has been disclosed to those who would resent the communication. United States v.
Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F.Supp.1,17 (1969); Westinghouse, supra at 769. He re ,
the party that would resent communication is the applicant. One of applicant's own high-ranking employees, Ronald Tolson, supplied the identities of individuals A thourgh K (Tr. 2509-13). Since the licensee is aware of the identity of these individuals it is curious that staff is seeking to protect their identities.
Counsel for staff argued at the appeal argument that the staff is also seeking to avoid any appearance that they have violated a confidence. The intervenors would assert that when the applicant knows the names of the individuals and has publicly stated so, and where the NRC has released the names of informers (Atchison, Stiner) that the appearance has been created. If the names of individuals have already been made public and secrecy has been breached, the informant privilege should not be a bar to disclosure. Glaxo, supra at p. 17.
The individuals A through K did not request anonymity originally. (Board Order 9/30/82, p. 4). The Staff has since gone back to these individuals and under questionable circumstances asked if they desired confidentiality. For there to be an informers privilege, the privilege must either be actively sought or be clear from the underlying circumstances of the contact between the govern-ment and the individual. Miller v. Webster, 483 F.Supp. 883, 889 (1979); North-ern States Power Company (Monticello), ALAB, 4 AEC 435 (1970) .
The Staff asserts in their Erief in Support of Its Exceptions to Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards Order Denying Reconsideration, 11/17/82, that they have followed an " historical pattern of non-disclosure"; and states that his-torically investigations are kept secret from Applicants and Licensees and that the informers are generally interviewed in private. This is patently untrue in the cases of Mr. Atchison, Henry and Darlene Stiner and Mr. Macomb. There is ample support in the testimony of Atchison and the Stiners that the're was no real attempt to keep their contacts with the Staff confidential. In fact, in the case of Atchison all but one of the deficiencies he reported were corrected within twenty-four hours of his contact with the NRC, before investigators ar-rived, because they were relayed to the Applicant by the On-site Staff individual, 1eaving the Staff's assertion of secrecy in doubt. (Testinony of Atchison.) ,
It is obvious that there is no hard-and-fast " historical pattern of non-disclosure" in the Region IV office of the Staff, and to assert so now is incorrect.
III. Conclusion A decision with regard to c6nfidentiality is a double-edged sword. While in the instant case Intervenors and the Licensing Board desire the release of the names by the NRC, there is still a deep concern over what effect a broad decision by the Appeals Board will have in the future.
It is a maxim that bad cases make bad law, and we have to consider this a bad case. But your decision in the matter before you is critical. Not only does it affect the confidentiality rights of nuclear workers to demand protection guaranteed under the law, it also is notice to the NRC Staff that the Licensing Board intends to enforce that law. If the decision rendered is too broad, the
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0 Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq.
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Dr. 'W. Reed Johnson Thomas S. ' Moore, Esq. -
B- February 1, 1983 C-effect will be devastating to those workers who have their fingers on major flaws in the nuclear plants in this country.
Although the stated issue before you is whether or not individuals need confidentiality, the true issue, as seen by GAP, is one of authority. That is, who has the authority to decide which individuals receive confidentiality.
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 553 (1957), establishes that the applica-bility of the informers privilege is for the court to decide, once it has been invoked by a party. Where there is a contested issue, it is the 11 censing Board's responsibility "to review the sufficiency of the record and the adequacy of the analysis. . . [and] . . . resolve disputes" in the evidence. Union of Concerned Scientists v. Atomic Energy Commission, 499 F.2d 1069 (D.C.Cir. 1974). Con fi-dentiality is a contested issue in the instant case (and usually anytime it is asserted) and for that reason the NRC should defer to the judgment of the Licensing Board on the issue.
The circumstances of an informant and the type of reprisals feared, varies with each individual. An informant, feeling frustrated and disillusioned by what is perceived to be or actually is NRC incompetence or mismanagement may also come to an institution such as GAP to report. Due to the great variety of conditions involved, a hard-and-fast rule as to who should receive confi-dentiality is not in the best interest of fairness. The issue of confidentiality is one best decided by the presiding board, an inpartial adjudicator familiar with the facts. The NRC is unfortunately not impartial -- they have a vested interest in the vindication of their own investigation. It is inappropriate, to say the least, for NRC officials to use the cloak of confidentiality to hide its own overzealous commitment to the proliferation of the nuclear industry --
particularly when, as in this case, the Staff has so badly abused legitimate nuclear whistleblowers.
With the tools of in, camera hearings and protective orders, the Board is well equipped to look at the situation of each individual, balance the opposing interests, and make a decision.
GAP has recently been served with subpoenas by the Applicant for the Midland Nuclear Power Plant requesting the names and statements of individuals who have reported serious defects in the plant to us. GAP is concerned that any broad decision in this case will assist in forcing us to turn the names of individuals felt to be legitimate informers over to the very entity f rom which they fear reprisal.
We are equally concerned, n'ot only with the immediate effect of a broad decision by the Appeals Board here, but also with the long-range effect it will have with regard to informant confidentiality. In light of the precedential impact an Appeals Board ruling has, GAP would respectfully suggest that the Board issue a ruling limited to the cdse at hand. Such limitation recognizes that
Alan S. Rogenthal, Esq.
Dr. W. Reed Johnson Thomas S. Moore, Esq. February 1,1983 g.
s the ASLB as factfinder is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the evidence and the motivations of the parties, including the Region IV Staff.
Its finding that the NRC Region IV Staff failed to present an adequate reason why it had not revealed the nanes of the witnesses as originally ordered is clearly correct. The Staff failed to show in the firct place that it had pro-mised anonymity to the witnesses interviewed in the NRC investigation. The Staff further undernined its own credibility on the entire issue of confiden-tiality for these witnesses when it violated its promise to Mr. Atchison to keep his identity confidential. The ASLB decision properly prevents the Staff of Region IV from abusing the significant power of privilege for whistleblowers.
It correctly recognizes that the Region IV Staff in this instance seeks to confuse witnesses who do not seek anonymity, and do not need it, with whistle-blowers who do -- for the sole purpose of making sure that the Staff's investi-gative inadequacies are not brcught out into the sunshine.
v In view of the Staff's overriding purpose underlying its refusal to comply with the ASta order, that is, protecting its own reputation, it is respectfully submitted that the Asla's original order to reveal the witnesses' identities requires narrow application to this case on its special facts. The only harm that will be suffered in this instance is the potential damage to the Staff's reputation if its investigation was inadequate. The ASIS order should not be vulnerable to interpretation as precedent for findings in other cases that confidentiality can be violated under other factual circumstances. Confiden-tiality is a lifeline for whistleblowers and a valuable tool for ensuring that the NRC receives the information it needs to protect public health and safety.
Thus, any decision to pierce the veil of confidentiality must be made on a case-by-case basis.
This view of confidentiality supports the argument of Intervenor CASE, in its Response to Appeals Board Question Directed to NRC Staff on January 19, 1983, that the informant privilege must be held sacred in the nuclear regulatory con-te xt . We are in agreerent with the brief of Intervenor CASE on that point, but additionally urge this Appeals Board to limit the effect of the ASla's order to the facts in this case.
Respectfully submitted, M C BILLIE PIRNER GARDE Director, Citizens Clinic for Accountable Government BG/my cc: Service list attached.
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The foregoing Letter from the GAP Citizens Clinic for Accountable Government to Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq., Dr. W. Reed Johnson and Thomas,S..Moofe,iEsq., Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board, was mailed, prope$fpostaifeffiepaid, this 2nd day of February, 1983, to the following:
Administrative Judge Marshall E. Miller Thomas S. Moore, Esq., Member U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555
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Dr. Kenneth A.'McCollom, Dean Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Panel Division of Engineering, Architecture U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l and Technology Washington, D. C. 20555 l Oklahoma State University Stillwater, Oklahoma 74074 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary Dr. Richard Cole, Member U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Washington, D. C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D. C. 20555 Ms. Lucinda Minton, Law Clerk I
l Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Debevoise & Liberman Washington, D. C. 20555 1200 - 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036 David J. Preister, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General Marjorie Ulman Rothschild, Esq. Environmental Protection Division Office of Executive Legal Director P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station j U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Austin, Texas 78711 Washington, D. C. 20555 John Collins, Regional Administrator Atomic Safety and Licensin9 Region IV, Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Washington, D. C. 20555 Arlington, Texas 76011 Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq., Chairman Ms. Juanita Ellis, President Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal CASE (Citizens Assn for Sound Energy)
Board 1426 S. Polk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commi! sion Dallas, Texas 75224 Washington, D. C. 20555 Dr. W. Reed Johnson, Member Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 (UM- [Cttt BILLIE PIRNER GARDE