ML20028C257
| ML20028C257 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 12/24/1982 |
| From: | Marilyn Evans CALIFORNIA, STATE OF |
| To: | Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8301070268 | |
| Download: ML20028C257 (2) | |
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SEATE OF CAutonNIA lat$ouSCES AGENCY EDmuMO G. saOWN JRy Co mer CALIFORNIA REGIONAL WATER QUALITY CONTROL BOARb.c CENTRAL COAST REGION. NiWC tio2 A LAumet LANE CERTIFIED MAIL AND
$AN LUl$ ot45Po, CAUFoaNIA 9340 URN RECEIPT EQUESTED (805) 549 3:n .g331 -5 P 2, December 24, 1982 , .,y4
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D'OCKET NUMBER %.
Dr. Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman PROD. & UTIL FAC..
d U. S. Nuclear Pegulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ggy g
Dear Mr. Palladino:
Thank you for Mr. Denton's letter of July 21, 1982, in response to our concerns about the Pacific Gas and Electric Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant expressed in our letters of January 19, and February 18, 1982.
However, Mr. Denton's letter does not adequately address several important ;
issues. Thus, we address this letter to you. f f
The California Pagional Water Quality Control Board, Central. Coast Region, has jurisdiction over the discharge of pollutants from the Diablo Canyon facility into waters of the thited States. The Board has issued an NPDES permit pursuant to the Clean Water Act for the facility. ,Thus,, the Board _
is particularly concerned with these unanswered issues.
First, regarding our concern about radiation discharged into the atmosphere, Mr. Denton's letter states that in Supplement No. 6 of the SER, the ' dose fmm liquid effluents and presumably gaseous effluents released from the Diablo Canyon Powe'r Plant for a resident of the Diablo Canyon area who makes frequent use of the ocean shore and whose dietary habits include substantial amounts of fish and abalone is insignificant. The estimated dose .is less than .02% of the natural background. This Board raised the question of the removal of gaseous radioactive isotopes by the rain and/or~ ,
fog and the possibility of them entering the ocean or other waters in the vicinity. Mr. Denton advised U that the solubility of the isotopes is available in the International Critical Tables. This is not an answer to the original question. Has the NRC carried out the calculations to deter-mine the potential removal of the gaseous radioactive isotopes by this mechanism? What are the results of these calculations? If it has not been considered, we_ would like to know why' not.
Second, we still have several concerns regarding1he release of radioactive material to the Pacific Ocean. Mr. Denton's answer to our questions regarding the use of a dilution factor in calculating allowable radioactive releases is not very reassuring. It seems to us that the technology must 8DD 8301070268 821224 PDR ADOCK 05000275 ' .
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Dr. Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Page 2 December 24, 1982 exist to keep all radioactive material out of the cooling water discharge system. Closed cooling system pl' ants such as Fancho Seco in California must use a diffennt rad-treatment system, since discharge to a water body is not available. Is cost the only justification for not mquiring such a system at Diablo Canyon? Please define "as low as reasonably achievablo" in the context of comparing the Diablo Canyon rad waste tmatment system to that used at Rancho Seco.
Our third concem which the Board feels was not adequately addressed in .
Mr. Denton's response is the potential for a major release of radioactive waste to the Pacific Ocean as the result of an accident or other uncon-templated release at Diablo Canyon. The plants' immediate proximity to the Pacific Ocean underscores the need for a comprehensive evaluation of existing and potential safety systems relating to liquid pathways. We believe that ,
such an evaluation is critical.
In your review of earthquake safety and design errors at this facility, we again request that you make sure that all structures and piping which may asult in accidental or unauthorized discharge to the Pacific Ocean be -
thoroughly inspected and audited independently, and when necessary, brought up to standards which will prevent chemical or radioactive contamination of the ocean. I We urgently request that you further address the above stNted concerns as '
s'oon as possible as fuel may be leaded at the plant in early 1983. Protection of the public health and safety is the msponsibility of both of our agencies and cooperation between us on these issues of mutual concern can only benefit the public.
Sincerely, MARIT EVANS, CHAIRMAN ,
Central Coast Region California Regional Water Quality Control Board -
cc: Central Coast Region Board Members Mr. L. L. Mitchell, State Water Fasources Control Board, Sacramento Mr. Ed Anton, Technical Services Division, SWRCB, Sacramento Mr. Gary Grimm, Legal Counsel, SWRCB, Oakland Nuclear Pegulatory Commission, Walnut Creek ,'
Mr. David Williamson, Senior Counsel, Pacific Gas f, Electric Co. ,
, San Francisco I
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Mr. Kenneth R. Jones Executive Officer -
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California Regional Water Quality '
, Control Board - Central Coast Region . 1 1102 A Laurel Lane . -
San Luis Obispo, California 93401 ,
Dear Mr. Jones:
This is in response to your June 15, 1982 letter which has been referred to me for reply. I regmt any inconvenience caused by the delay in responding to your earlier letters of January 19 and February 18, 1982, which regrettably were not entered into our computer tracking system for such correspondence. In those letters you raised certain concerns in regard to the Diablo Canyon facility. Each of these concerns are addressed .
below.
Concern .
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"We have serious concerns over the amount of radiation and the considerable increase'in tritium over background levels you propose to allow PG&E to -
release to the Pacific Ocean." -
Response i ,
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Our evaluation of the. liquid radwaste treatment system at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, has been provided in Chapter 11 of our Safety Evaluation Report (~SER) dated October 16, 1974. In Supplement No. 6 ,
(July 14,1977) to the SER, we calculated the releases during normal operation ,
and anticipated operating occurrences to be'O.34 curies / year / unit, excluding tritium'and 710 curies / year / unit for tritium. These releases were detennined based on the operating experience of similar pressurized water reactors with more than 700 reactor years of use with similar radwaste. treatment systems and components. Based on our evaluation, we concluded that the system satisfied the "as low as is reasonably achievable" criteria of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 and was capable of meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Parts 50.34a and 50.36a. In addition, we reviewed the equipment and instrumentation provisions:
and determined that the system contained adequate control features to assure that concentration levels would be below the limits of Appendix B to 10. CFR Part 20, and that releases would be controlled and monitored according to the criteria in GDC 60 and 64 in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. The Technical Specifications for Diablo Canyon Station (NUREG-0817, September 1981) contain
. specifications to assure that these requirements are met. The largest estimates i h vouTv33L PM ___ _ _ _ _ __
Mr. Kenneth R. Jones
of dose from liquid effluents, including tritiurc, released from the station are for a resident of the Diablo Canyon area who makes frequent use of the ocean shore and whose dietary habits include substantial amounts of fish and .
abal.one. The estimates of the total dose to the thyroid of an individual are 0.02 millirem and less than 0.Q1 millirem to the total body and the other internal organs. These estimates of dose, based on reasonable dilution ~ -
factors of the liquid effluent for the ocean and on reasonable deposition rates..from the water to the beaches, are less than 0.02% of the dose from the natural radiation background and less than Q.04% of the reconsnended numerical dose limits. Since this evaluation was completed, there has been -
no change to the liquid radwaste system or the method of calculating the amount of radioactive materials in liquid releases to alter the conclusions reached in the SER.
Concern "He are concerned that you are allowing the volume of the cooling water discharge,to justify bypassing treatment levels that would he unacceptable at other ' nuclear facilities. Please re-examine your proposed permit.to reduce significantly the radiation releases to the Diablo Cove." , ~
Res ponse As' discus' sed above, all required design measures have been .taken to-process " -
contaminated liquid effluents within the Diablo Canyon facility to minimize the release of radioactive material to the Diablo Cove. The practice of diluting the treated contaminated effluents with the ocean water being -
discharged-from the condenser is applicable to the Diablo Canyon facility.
and its use is widespread in the operation of all nuclear power plants. All nuclear power plants are required to meet the same Federal Regulations and design objectives of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I. As. discussed above, the effects of these releases were found to be ins.ignificant.
u Concern i. ,
"Our second main concern is in regards to the 26,000 curies per year of radiation atmosphere." that you propose to allow Diablo Canyon to discharge into .the Res ponse In Supplement No. 6 to the SER, we calculated the releases during nonnal <
operation and anticipated operational occurrences to be 2,,600 curies / year / unit of noble gases, as shown in Table 11.2 on page 11-8. The 26,000 curie value you refer to is a factor of ten greater than what is expected to be released over a period of a year. Instantaneous release rates greater than 2,600 curies per year are pemitted to allow for anticipated fluctuations in release rates.
We do not expect the annual release rate to exceed 2,600 curies per unit per year.
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Mr. Kenneth R. Jones ..
The gaseous radwaste treatment system was, also evaluated .as in our respense to your first concern above. No new infomation is available that would cause.
us to change our previous conclusions reached in the SER.
- Concern . _ _ _ _
"Since there are many days per year of foggy weather at the site, we are concerned that a radioactive rain may develop contaminating water in the vicinity. We would appreciate any documentation that you have regarding radioactive isotope .
soluability in rain and/or fog. When questioned on this at our hearing, PG&E'-
officials stated that there are no operational restrictions concerning weather conditions imposed by the NRC. Why not? Is it necessary to release 26,000 curies of radiation per year?"
Response
In Supplement No. 6 to the SER, we have sh.own that during normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences the dose impact to an individual or the population due to releases of radioactive material in gaseous effluents will.
be .a fraction of the requirements of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50. In addition, the concentration of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents into the unrestricted area beyond the site boundary will be below the concentration limits 'of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 20, at all times. Si.nce the limiting -
conditions for operation are specified within the Technical Specifications l (NUREG-0817) in terms of a dose rate at any time, there is no need to address .
specific operational restrictions due to variable weather conditions. As stated above, we do not anticipate an annual average release of 26,000 ' curies per year.
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The solubility of various isotopes can be found in the following reference:
" International Critical Tables of Numerical Data, Physics, Chemistry and Technology", published for the National Research Council by the McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. ,
Concern "Our third concern is that the ocean monitoring program for radiation is not adequate. Additional monitoring stations are needed, especially in the Pismo Beach area. Also a broader spectrum of shellfish should be monitored, as should sediment in the area of the discharge."
Res ponse .
.- The radiological monitoring program required by Diablo Canyon Technical Specifications provides measurements of radiation and of radioactive materials in those exposure pathways and for those radionuclides, which lead to the highest potential radiation exposures of individuals resditing from the station operation. This monitoring program thereby supplements the radiological effluent monitoring program by verifying that the measurable concentrations of' l .
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Mr. Kenneth R. Jones l radioactive materials and levels of radiation are not higher than exhected on the basis of the effluent measurements and modeling of the environmental I exposure pathways. The initially specified monitoring program will be effective '
for"at least the first three years of consercial operation. Following this ~l I
period, program changes may be initiated based on operational experience.
Regarding sampling at the Pismo State Park beach area, this beach is approximately 15 miles from the site. Experience with ocean dilution currents indicates that radionuclides that may be released from the Diablo Cavon Nuclear Station will be undetectable and within natural background levels at the beach area. All .'
the models that we have used to estimate ocean concentration of radioactive effluents indicatie that nonitoring at this distance from the station would result in no statistically useful results. .
Fish and aquatic invertebrates are required to be sampled by Table 3.12-1 of
. the Technical Specifications at least once per 184 days. Since these organisms are,knwn to bioaccumulate radioactive materials, the b.i-yearly sampling period is considered appropriate. Because of the significant ocean dilution occurring near the plant, no radioactivity would he expected to be found in fish or shellfish resulting from the plant. -
," Sampling of bottom strata in the area of the dis. charge is not required by the~ Technical Specifications because the bottom is not sedimentary but rock ,
m and base gravel. -
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s.G "Another. serious concern is the potential for contamination of the Pacif'ic
.--. Ocean in..the event of an accident or uncontemplated release of radioactivity through ~a . liquid pathway. The design and construction errors discovered at the plantimay substantially increase the chances for such an event. Therefore, 3~ it is imperative that your Connission ensure prior to operation that time plant, as actually constructed, is safe in this regard, and that emergency plans include consideration of liquid releases. Independent audits are a vital link ',
in such assurance. We would like to request that a liquid pathway study he completied for Diablo Canon, including an evaluation of the consequences of a Class 9 accident. Design and construction review of Diablo Canycn must include specific evaluation of piping, pumps, valves, waste storage areas, turtine building, storage areas, etc." ,
.Res ponse ,.
The design and construction errors you refer to are, I presume, those errors associated with the seismic design of the Diablo Canyon Plants. As you may
. know, there is an on-going Independent Design Verification Program and the principal objective is to restore the plant such that its construction satisfies the approved seismic design criteria.
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Sampling of bottom strata in the area of the discharge is not required by the Technical gravel. Specifications because the bottom is not sedimentary but. rock and base i l
a4 Concern ._ _
Ariother s'erious concern is the potential for contamination of the Pacific Ocean in the quideventpatNay. of an accident or uncontemplated release of radioactivity through a 'li-The design and construction errors discovered at the plant tay 's'ub-stantially increase the chances for such an event. Therefore, it is imperative that your Commission ensure prior to operation that the plant, as actually con-structed, liquid releases.is safe in this regard, and that energency plans include consideration of Independent audits are a vital link in such assurance. We would like to request that a liquid pathway study be completed for Diablo Canyon, including an evaluation of the consequenses of a Class 9 accident. Design and constnJction review of Diablo Canyon must include specific evaluation of piping, pumps, valves, waste storage areas, turbine building, storage areas, etc.
Response _
The ' design and constnJction errors you refer to are, I presume, those errors associated with the seismic design of the Diablo canyon Plants. As you may know, there is'.an on-going Independent Design Verification Program- and the principal ob-hetive seismicisdesign to restore the plant such that its construction satisfies the approved criteria.
'7 With respect to your request to conduct a liquid pathway study and an evaluation of the consequences of adated ClassOctober 9 accident, these matters were previously considered
- ._ .as a result.of a petition
.1 24, 1979, filed by W. Andrew Baldwin g.
on behalf +of the Friends of the Earth, San Francisco, California. The Commission l concluded that the Diablo Canyon Plant did not fit in a category of nuclear plants with special circumstances that would warrant more extensive consideration of Cla ss 9 accidents. .
These special circumstances fall into three categories: (1) ".
high population density around the proposed site; i.e. above the trip points in the Standard Review Plan NUREG-0800 (formerly issued as HUREG-75/087) and Regulato'ry Guide, 4.7, General Site Suitability for Nuclear Power Stations (November 1974); (2) a novel reactor design (a type of power reactor other than a lip.ht water reactor); or (3) a combination of a unique design and a unique siting mode.
The enclosed infomation provides the bases for the above' cited Commission's Conclusion.
t I trust that the above infomation has been resoonsive to your concerns. '
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qg qp harold R. Denton, Director K fice of Huclear Reactor Regulation nmen D U
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Mr. Kenneth R. Jones .
With respect to your request to conduct a liquid pattway study and aN evaluation of the consequences of a Class 9 accident, these matters were previously considered as a result of a petition dated October 24, 1979, filed by W. Andrew Bal&in on beh_alf of the Friends of the Earth, San Francisco, Califomia. A copy of the Directors Decision is attadied for your information. Under current -
Comission regulation, Diablo Canyon would be excluded from being reviewed for Class 9 consequences because it falls in a category of plants for which the Final Environmental Statement has already been issued.
I trust that the above information has been responsive to your concerns.
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Sincerely,
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Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
As stated
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
' OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION j l
Harold R. Denkm, Director In the Matters of ,
Docket No. 5M28 CP i 1
5H29 CP
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ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE E530 CP ,
COMPAM' (Palo Verde Nuclear ,
Generating Station, Unita 1, 2, and 3)
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC Docket No. 50-275 CP COMPANY N CP (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power -
Plant, Units 1 and 2)
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL Docket No. 56312 OL UTILITY DISTRICT (Rancho Seco Nuclear 4 8' " ~
Generating Station, Unit 1)
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The Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation denies a request under 10 l CFR 2.206 that the Commission prepare supplemental environmental impact statements to consider the impact of "Cass 9" accidents at three '.,
power reactor sites. , ,
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NEPA: SEVERE ACCIDENT CONSIDERATIONS RULES OF PRAC11CE: REOPENING OF PROCEEDINGS l As provided in the C-% ion's June 1980 " Statement of Intesim '
Policy," the StaK will not take action to reopen past NEPA revwws in
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. response to a petition under 10 CFR 2.206 in the ah=-a= cf some "special circumstances."
RULES OF PRACTICE: SHOW CAUSE PROCEEDING Where an issue is pendtng before one of the Ce l=a='s adjudicatory .
panels, the Staff will not take action under 10 CFR 2.206 to instiamse another pr-d:ag to consider the same issue.
NRC: ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBIIJTIES -
The Committion is empowered to revise its past policies in an evolutionary process as it gains experience in the application of the laws which it is charged to administer. A change in policy to allow broader consideration of accidents in future NEPA reviews does not invalidate the fmdings in past reviews, particularly in view of judicial approval of the Commission's past practices.
DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 .
By petition dated October 24,1979, W. Andrew Baldwin cm behalfof the Friends of the Earth (FOE), San Francisco, Califorma, respnestect that the
- Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation take action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 to require preparation of supplemental environmental impact; state- "
ments on Class 9 accidents at the Diablo Canyon, Palo Verde, and Rancho
,- Seco nuclear plants. Notice of receipt of the FOE's petition was pubbsbed in the Federal Regisser,44 FR 70241 (December 6,1979). Counsel for the
n .. Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD), the hcensec orthe Rancho M Seco Nuclear Generating Station, submitted on December 2I,1979, a
,n response. opposing the FOE's petition. Arnona Public Service C~ap=ay responded to the petition on February 27,1980.
The petition requests relief with respect to power reactors under vanous 3 -
stages of construction or operation licensed to three primary U-- r at three different sites. The Arnona Public Services C~ap=ay hokis construc- . e tion permits authonzmg construction of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating
/ Station, Units 1,2, arid 3, located at the Winterburg site in Anzona. Tbc Pacific Gas and Electric Ccapany is constructing the Diablo Canyon 920 -
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Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2, at its site in California, and has applied for operating licenses for those two units. De Sacramento Municipal
- Utility District is authorized by the Co==: bn to operase the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1, also located in California. .
- De FOE asks that the C-=i- ion prepare =Wtal envirna=-nt=1 impact statements on each of these facilities for the following reasons: .
1.
The environmental impact statements ====rily discuss consideri-ation of Class 9 accidents, based on early estimates of reactoraccidents probabilities and on the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400, which has 1
' since been repudiated by the Commission; and 2.
The accident at Three Mile Island, which the NRC concedes .
constituted a Class 9 accident, emphasized the need to evaluate the possible impact of a serious (Class 9) accadent and to prepare to meet the possible consequences.
, For the reasons stated in this decmon, the FOE's petition is d--i d L
COMMISSION POLICY ON ACCIDE!TT CONSIDERATIONS The term " Class 9 accident"was employed in a Commission rut-- Liag 1 .
which had been proposed in December 1971:
l "Cansideration of
! Accidents in Implementation of the National Ense z== ' 1 Pohey Act of .
1969," 36 FR 22851 (1971). The proposed rulemakmg would have added an l Annex to Appendix D of 10 CFR Part 50 to set forth the
- ====*r in which various categories of accidents should be taken into =a r=mt in the environmental review for a nuclear power plant. Sface the FOE's petition ..
was filed, the Commission has withdrawn the proposed Annex and'has ~
provided in its place new interim guidance for the treatment ofaccident risk considerations in NEPA reviews. See'" Nuclear Power Plant Acculent ,
Considerations under the National Environmental Policy Act or1969," 45 FR 40101 (June 13,1980). This decision has been made in light of the Comnussion's new interim policy. It is useful, however, to briefly review the 7_ now withdrawn Annex and other events leading to the F T b an's new interim policy.
In the proposed Annex, the Commmion divided a thocertical sg-um of accidents into classes ranging in severity from "trmal"(Cass 1) to "very '
serious" (Class 9). Each class of accidents, except cl. ,= 1 and 9, was required to be analyzed in evnironmental reports and statements. Accord-i ing to the Annex, Class I accidents need not be considered hae===* of their trivial consequences. Accidents within Classes 2 through 8 which were .
"found to have significant adverse environmental efTects shall be evaluated as to probability, or freq'uency of occurrence, to permit estunates to be, made of environmental risk or cost arising from a%'= of the given i~
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class.". 36 FR 22852 (1971). With re5ard to " Class 9" accidents, the proposed Annex stated:
"The occurences in Class 9 involve sequences or r-'=1=s-d successive failee amore severe than those pasadated for the design bass for protecave systeams and -
sagineered safety features. Their consequences could be severe. However, the probabihty of their occurnace is so smaD that their sovsrr====t-s risk is .
extremely low. Defense in depth (mul:.iple physical bemers), quality assuranee for dessa, manufacture, and operation, comunued survedlance and testag, and
. conservative design are aB eppind to prcmde and maintain the respared high of assurance that potential acadents in this class are, and will reunaan, sciently remote in probability that the envtrodmental risk is extremely low." 36 -
FR 22862 (1971).
Accordingly, the Annex did not require M--% of Class 9 accidents in environmental reports and statements.
Although the Annex was never formally =Aapted by the th=t**%. the Co .. .. i. noted upon publication that the Annex would be useful as
" interim guidance" until the Ca==;=4n took further action on the Annex.
36 FR 22851 (1971). Upon promulgation of 10 CFR Part $1 in 1974, the Commi== ion stated that the adoption of Part 51 did not afect the proposed Annex, which was "still under consideration by the Cc= '-%-n " 39 FR 26279 (1974). The staff consistently applied the proposed Annex from 1971 to 1979 as not requiring the consideration of Class 9 ==y= a in its environmental statements. Reliance on the Annex has been upheld by .
decisions of the Com== ion's adjudicatory panels and by federal courts.'
In September 1979, the Commmion ==-:-=:+d in Ojuore poner Syssems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants), CLI-79-9,10 NRC 257 (1979),
that it intended to complete the rulemakmg begun by the Annex and to re-eramme the Cm..b:on's policy regarding accident considerations.2 The "
Ccmmission requested additionally that the staff: .
"1. Prcmde us with its reco==-adations on how the interim gedance of the Annex might be M8i-d on an interun basis and until the rule making ce this sobr' et is ==p1-'-i to renect development since 1971 and to accord more fuDy with current staffpolicy in this area; and
'Ser enwr cw me ofMere ps or Sysseau (Flasang Nucinar Power Plants), C13-79 9.10 NRC 257,259 an. 5 and 6 (1979) med ALAB-489. 8 NRC IM,210 a. 52 (1978).
81a OfMare passer Sysasser, the e-- doisrauned that considerenen of a Cass 9 aandant in the envronmaatal review for floating anclear power plaats was appropnase.10 ',,
NRC at 260 61. The r=- did not use the prosseding to remotve the genanc issue of - -
- somederation of Cass 9 sacadsota at land-based reaciers, but aseed that "1s)nch a gemenc action is more property amd straco gly does through ; ^ ^=: i - "
.-- in which aB inisressed persons unay p,ertumpana." M at 262. Ser mise fishfic Seveer Cosymmmy of0Mahsais (Black Fox Station. Units I and 2), CtJ.eS4, Docket Non. 50 556 and 50 557, at 434. 835 (March 21,1900).
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In the inserim, pending compieno orthe rule makmg on this subject, bring to our attention, any andmdual cases in wtuck it behoves the environmensal consequences of Class 9 aamdents abould be amendered." 10 NRC 26243. See ,
ehe PuMic Servoer C_ , _^ ', of?_'M sapes nose 2, at 34.
A la response to the Com=>e= tan's first request, the staff sent to the '
, Comm>=non reconunendations on mecident considerations under NEPA in -
SECY-80131, dated March II,1980. On May 16,1980, the C-+ .
" issued a statement of interim policy in which it withdrew the proposed Annex and += p--M the rut--=kia: that began in 1971 with the '
publication of the proposed Annex. " Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969," 45 '~
FR 40101 (June 13,1980). The Commission also provided guid==e ,an accident considerations in on-going NEPA reviews in 13": proceedings where a Final Environmental Statement has not yet been issued. Under the -
Comnussion's new guidance, environmental impact statements for co-going
- and future NEPA reviews will give consideration to a broader spectrum of accidents including severe accidents that may have been designated "Cass 9" under the Annex. For the consideration of environmental risks, or impacu, attributable to accidents at a facility, the Cadon gave the following guidance:
"In the analysis and *=~im of such risks, .yy.--ately equal attention shan
- be given to the probability of occurrence of reta== and to the probabeTay or occurrence of the environmental consequences of thcee r 1--_--__
" Events or acodent sequences that lead to releases shallinclude but not be femised to those that can be expected to occur. In. plant accident to a e-g- of releases shall be A- -4 and shall inc! uences that can lead seqiasaces thes can result in inadequate coohng of reactor fuel and to melting of the reactor core
- 45 FR at 40103.
With respect to plants for which Final Environmental Statements haN -
been issued, the Commiteion stated in its new interim policy that: '
"It is expected that these revised treatments willlead to conclumens the environtcental risks of accidents anular to those that would be reached a conunuation of current practices, parncularly for cases involvin stances where Class,9 risks have been conadered by the staff Ibus, this 'gspecial change ciressm-in policy is not to be construed as any lack of confidence in conclusions
-the environmental risks of acadents expressed in any y.mhaly '
Sente-meats, nor, absent a showing of sunilar special circumstances, as a basis for opening, reopening or - p-~%g any previous or on. going pr= - -q_s
.e ar" - ._c.
Gilanalry and Drndford disagree with the inclusion of the presubeg two aantences. They feel that they are absolutely incomassent with an awah=ad=4 ruepprumnal of the fonner, erroneous pounce on Qass 9 needents. 45 Fed. Re5. at 40103.
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"However, it is also the intent of the Commismos that the seas take ansps ao identify additiceal cases that niight warrant early consideration of other additional feansres or other acnoms to prevent or to estigste the - -- - ' - - of annous accidents. Cases for such commderation are thoes for whacA a Final Environmental Statement has already been issued at the Construenon Permst .
stage but for which the Operating License review
- has not yetsite relevant reached.
featurna,In carrying out this d.rective, the staff should
=ted with accident risk in companson to such including population damsity, = lants. Staff should also conader the likehbood features at presently operating p that substantive changes in plant design features wtuch may compensate thirther . -
for adverse site features may be more easily incorporated in plaats when construenos has not yet y.., _ - 4 very far.
- The staff has reviewed information concerning the Diablo Canyosi, Palo
~ -
Verde and Rancho Seco plants to deternune whether "special circuan- -
stances" exist which wculd warrant "opemng, rviS or expanding any previous or on-going pra~aAng" concermng these facilities. .
. II. STAFF'S REVIEW FOR SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES A, the Cmi== ion noted in its new statement ofinterim policy, the staff has identified in the past special circumstances which would warrant more extensive consideration of Class 9 accidents.The special circumstances fell within three categories: (1) high population density around the proposed site, i.e., above the trip points in the Standard Review Plan (NUREG 74-087, September 1975) and Regulatory Guide, 4.7, General Site Suitabifisy Criteria for Nuclea Power Statiortr (November 1974); (2) a novel reactor design (a type of power reactor other than a light water reactor); or (3) a ,
combination of a unique design and a unique siting mode.*
8Sar 45 FR 40102 (June 13,1900); habhc Sersect Bertric and Gas Csaysw (Salem Naciemr Generating Station. Unit 2), DD-8017. Docket No. 50 311. " Director's Denial of Request endar 10 CFR 2.206." at 33 m. 21 (April 16,1900). la the first esiegory fel! the Perryasan aise, .
for which the staff performed an informal amassment in the early site review of the suistive differeness in Class 9 he ceasequenous among the sharnative sites. The Chach Riwar . ,
Drander Reacier, a liquid assal cooled fast breeder reacier which is differums fross the more l
, souventional light waisr resesor, feB within the caisgory of novel reactor design, and the samfr .
.. included a discussion in the final envuoneestal staisinant (NUREG.0139. February 1977) of - ,
its consideration of C3 ass 9 accidents.
d~ The floating nuclear power plants represented the third estesory of specina circumsaances a
. ;; - combination of unique design and a unique siting mode. Because the plants amould be mounted on a floating berge. there would be no soil structure to retard the reisese and dispersal of activity beneath the plant following a core melt accident as wesad be the case for land. based plants. The staff concluded that the most esposure likefy to the population frorn the liquid pathway for a ficating nocicar plant is significantly greater than for a land. based piant. -
In view of the Commission's intention in Offshort power Systemr. sapre note 1. shat the
,- staff bring to the Commission's attention Individual cases in which the staff believes
. ..im..T.a.tal consequences of Class 9 socidents should be considered, abe staff reviewed (FOOTNOTE COh~rtNUED ON NEXT PAGE )
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la Public Service C=p.j of Oklahoma the r%"& noted in ' .
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.. addition to these three criteria that proximity of a plant to a "v==-=da or natural hazard" might also 1.y. t "the type of =:--, :: _;.' case that might warrant additional -:+4Wation." The results of the staf!'a rswiew for -
"special circumstances" follow.
Diablo Canyos <
1 As described in Section 4 of the Safety Evaluation Report
- and.Section 1.3 of the Final Safety Analysis Reports the Nuclear Steam SupplySyssem for each unit of the Diablo Canyon plant is a Westinghouse pressurized '
water reactor using a four-loop coolant system. The reactor design is basically similar to that of several other Westinghbuse reacsor slesigns ~
l (Trojan, Zion I and 2, and D.C. Cook plants). The Diablo Canyon plant is, therefore, a typical light water reactor facility and the design is not novel.
The Disblo Canyon plant is located in a remote, undeveloped and relatively uninhabited region of San Luis Obispo County. Within le miles -
of the plant, the 1970 resident population density was about 20 persman per square mile. Within radii of 20 and 30 miles, the densities were 55 and 40 residents per square mile, zwGely. The population densities were -
projected to approximately double by the year 2000. Thus remaming well within the guidelices of Regulatory Guide 4.7 and 10 CFR Para 100.
Therefore, population distribution near the plant is not an ===><==1 circumstance warranting reopening or expanding prMay on Diablo
- . Canyon.
The Diablo Canyon plant also does not represent a " combinations of a '
- unique design and a unique siting mode." The Diablo Canyon site-is located adjacent to the Pacific Ocean, which is the only surface water- body l which could be affected by liquid releases from a Class 9 accident.* Giround water near the site is limited to the streambed of Diablo Canyon Creek, an intermittent stream which empties into the ocean. The sandstone besitoc(
- underlying station foundation if, at most, parually saturated (i.e., no swater -
- 8(PO(7TNOTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE)
~.these categories of special circumstances for purposes of responding to two other poetitieme
- undo 10 CFR 2.206 which requested consideration of Class 9 accidents. Publie .Servery .
t
- Electrie and Gas Company, supra. and Public Serwer Company of New Henapsker lg tSeabrook Station. Units I and 2). DD.80 6. Docket Nos. 50 443 and 50 444. *Derector's
- -- Decesson under 10 CFR 2.206* (Februsq,1,I.1980).
- Safety Evaluation Report for Diab 6o Canyos 5 aGoa. Units I and 2 (October 1977).
8 Final Safety Analysis Report for the Diab 6o Canyon Station. Uniu I and 2.
- The stafT uses the term " Class 9 accident" in the 'ensmag discuseon only for the '
purposes of evaluatin5. as provided in the Co=====an's new interim pobicy, ,
whether "special etrcumstances" that would warrant i-:-W or expandiing
.' proceedings exist for plans which were reviewed under the now withdrawn Annex.
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table) for a w Jderable vertica! 9 =~ lts low permeability, combmed
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with the lack of a near surface water table, would preclude lateral
., movement of contaminated water from the station toward the ocean at more than an extremely slow rate. As a mimmum, many years would be available to interdict any such flow. Derefore, there are no unusual hydrogeologic features of the site which would warrant consideration of the
.. environmental consequences of a Class 9 accident.
The staff analyzed the site characteristics and other nearby features to assure the pt,tential for impaarment of safety related portions of stataca ^
facilities due to natural or man made hazards occumng nearby.The Safety - -
Evaluation Report states the staff conclusion tha transportation, or military facilities in the area,t of the therehave site which are no industrial, potential to adversely affect plant safety systems. The staff review .
specifically ensures that station design is adequate to accommodate other natural characteristics of the site environs. The staff review has not ,
identified any unusual circumstances with respect to external hazards that would warrant reopening or expandmg proceedags on Diablo Canyon.
Briefly stated, none of the "special circumstances" which would warrant reopening or expanding proceedings is present for the Diablo Canyon plant. An additional factor would weigh in favor of not considering special regulatory action under 10 CFR 2.206. Following the occurrence of the Three Mile Island accident, the Joint Intervenors filed on May 9,1979, a motion with the Atomic Safety and I icensmg Board currently sitting in the i case to reopen the record for further consideration of" Class 9" accidents at l Diablo Canyon. On May 24, the NRC staff proposed that the Board defer -
l implications for Diablo Canyon. On May 24, the NRC staff proposed that the Board defer ruling on the motion pending completion of the staff report on TMI and its specific implications for Diablo Canyon. On June 5, the Board agreed to defer its ruling. The staff report has not been completed -
and ' consequently the Board has not yet ruled on the motion to reopen
- 9 -
record for further consideration of " Class 9". accidents. In view of the . .
pendency of the proceedings before the Licensing Board, the staff believes that it would be inappropriate to institute another proceedmg at the FOE s request.'
Palo Verde .
The Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, currently under construc-tion, will have three Combustion Engineering, Inc. " system 80" type pressurized water reactors to provide steam for the turbogenerator system.
' This view is consistent with the Commisseen's decision in Conschdered Edison Co. (Indian b
- Point Station. LJnits 13). CLI 75-s. 2 NRC 173." 117 (1973). The staff also noses the
. Commission has ordered that no new operating licenses may be issued esapt after sciion of the Commission itself.
- Interim, Statement of Policy and Procedure." M Fed. Aeg. 58559 ,
(Ociober 10.1979).
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circulating pressurued water in two closed loops contaming two pumps in ,
each loop. He reactors are described in detail in the Safety Evalution 1 ' .
I
. Report for this station (NUREG 75-098, issued on October 10,1975) and in <
the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report. Reactors of similar design were , l
., used in the Perkins and Cherokee plants. The Palo Verde reactors may, _
therefore, be considered typical light water reactors not of a novel design.
The desert area in the i==adiate vicinity of the Palo, Verde site is very' sparsely inhabited. The 1970 population densities within radii of 10,20, and
. 30 miles were 6, 7, and 7 residents per square mile, respectively. The ,
corr-eding projected densities in the year 2000 were 18,23,21 residents per square mile, respectively. These population densities are well within the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 4.7 and 10 CFR Part 100. Therefore, population distribution near the plant is not a "special circumstance " x x The Palo Verde plant is located in an arid region which had been ,
irrigated before 1975. Return flows from this irrigation percolated through the upper granular soils and perched on, top of thick zone of relatively impermeable material. His perch water mound is slowly spreading laterally '
and downward. If this water were contammated by severe accident, it ,
would migrate slowly downward through the aqtiitard to the regional aquifer about 200 feet below the surface. The staff estimated that it would take about 5000 years for the contanunated liquid to reach water wells 2 .
miles south of the station. Due to this slow rate of groundwater movement; there would be less than average difficulty in interdicting any radioactivity
. releases from a Class 9 accident by the groundwater pathway, should such !
action be necessary. In view of the above considerations, there is not, in the i case of the Palo Verde Station, a " combination of unit [ue design and unique :- 9 l. -
siting mode." . .
'The staff analyzed the site characteristics and other nearby features to assess the potential for impairment of safety-related portions of station facilities due to natural or man-made hazards. He Safety Evaluation !
Report states the staffs conclusion that there were no off-site hazards !
which required special consideration in the design of the proposed Palo l Verde facilities, except the military aircraft training flights operating out of l l Luke Air Force Base. De staffhas analyzed the existing Air Force program !
for such flights, the Air Force arrangements for notification of the applicant ! ,
of changes in flight routes or traming programs at Luke Air Force Base as i they may relate to the Palo Verde station, the probability of arrenft icupacts l on the station facilities, and experience from other sites. Sup6 0,ent No.1
- to the Safety Evaluation Report states th' e staff conclu*#A t' a ecsting arrangements are acceptable. De staff review hra i o ice t Med any ,
esual circumstances with respect to external hazA.$ M > w) garrant 6
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cpecial h%6ons of Class 9 acddants. These matters would be given further consideration by the stafTin the event that there is a (A M change in cixumstances The aircraft impact issue and other safety
- consider:6ons will be namined again during operating license review. .
In sum, then, there are no unusual circuartances which would warrant
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reopening the conuruction permit p -:= % for Palo Verde. The staff ' -
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' notes, however, that the final environmental statement for the Palo Verde '
operating licenses will be subject to the more extensive accident analysis i
prescribed by the Commission's new interim policy.
Ramebo Seco The Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station consists of a single .
I Babcock and Wilcox pressurized water reactor with a net electrical power capacity of 913 Mw. Heated pressurned water is circulated from the reactor to two steam generators which provide steam to drive a Westinghouse turbine generator. The reactor design is generally similar to that of other Babcock and Wilcox reactors such as are used at the Davis-Besse, Arkansas 1, ladian Point 1, Oconee 13, Crystal River 3, and Three Mile Island plants.
Fc1!owing the March 28,1979, accident at Three Mile Island, Unit 2, the NRC has placed a number of special requirements on all operating reacsors, particularly Babcock and Wil:ox reactors, to mimmur the probability oran accident of the Three Mile Is?and type. Pursuant to its Order of May 7, 1979,48 FR 27779, the Commission impored requirements on the Rancho Seco facility which involve changes in reactor design, in operator training and in operating procedures. A hearing, to which FOE was a partyJFOEu -
has since withdawn) is currently being conducted on the Order. In' addition, the Rancho Seco fs.cility is subject to an Order,45 FR 2447 ~
(January 11. 1980), imposing the short-term " Lessons Learned" require-ments described in NUREG.0578. The Rancho Seco plant is currently undergoing stafTreview to assure that its design and operation satisfy these requisements. (I'he Diablo Canyon and Palo Verde units will also have o meet similar requirements and undergo stafT review.) When the required changes in reactor design, operator trammg and operating procedures have s
been carried out and approved, the.stafT believes that there wiD be ,
reasonable assurance that the Rancho Seco facility can be safely operated. '
In view of these required changes and general aimdarity of Babcock and
/ Wilcox design to that of other prmmued water reactors, the Rancho Seco design is not considered ' novel, but rather typical for a land-based pressurized wahr reactor. -
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.. The Rancho Seco v cmity is sparsely populated with 1970 population .
densities of 19 residents per square mile within a radius of 10 miles and 95 -
residents per square mile within 20 miles. However, the cities of Sacramento
, and Stockton, about 25 miles away, raise the 1970 population density to
.. about 320 residents per square mile within a radius of 30 miles. In 1972, the Sacramento County Planning Comnussion estimated a population increase '
, ,, rate of 5.2% per year, as reported in the FES. At this high rate ofincrease, ,
the population in the year 2000 would quadruple that in 1970,-=": the population density guidelines for a 30. mile radius in, Regulatory Guide 4.7. .
However, the FES also reports that the California Department of Finance predicted growth rates of 1.3% per year and 1.8% per year for Sacrasmento . .
and San Joaquin Counties, the most populous counties near Rancho Seco.
These growth rates resulted in population densities well within the guidelines for the year 2000. In reviewmg the FOE *s petition, the staff -
investigated population growth data from the Sacramento County Pla==ing Commmsion for the years 1975 and 1979 for the populous counties around Rancho Seco. These factual data through the year 1979 indicate that a snore reahstic growth rate estimate is less than 3% per year. On this basis, the projected population in the year 2000 within 30 miles will remain within the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 4.7 and 10 CFR Part 100. Consequently,
, population distribution would not warrant re. opening proceedings on the j Rancho Seco facility.
The Rancho Seco Station is located on gently rolling terrain 'about 25 -
miles southeast of Sacramento. Water bodies in the vicinity are sanall streams which are normally dry except during periods of high rainfallThe
. . intermittent flow characteristics of these streams indicate that they are not -
fed by groundwater. l.iquid releases from a Class 9 accident would mi EF ate slowly downward and southwestward into the groundwater. Using ===er. 9 --
. vative assumptions, the staff estimates that it would take tens of years for .
contaminated groundwater to migrate to the nearest well which is located at .
the site boundary. Due to this slow rate of groundwater movement, the seafr
- . concludes that there are no unusual features or special circumstances with regard to the roundwater contammation interdiction characteristics orthis
, ' site that would disGnguish it from other land-based light water reactor sites I -
to the extent that, under the present Comrmssion policy, warsants
. rwgdag environmental pr~ edings on Rancho Seco. The Rancho Seco Station does not represent a " combination of unique design and unique ,
siting mode.** '
'The staff analyzed the site characteristics and other nearby features to
, assess the potential for impairment of safety-related portions of the station.
facilities due to natural or man-made hazards. The Safety Evaluation Report states the staff conclusion that the nature and remoteness of O
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industrial, transportation and military facilities in the region of the site preclude their posing a hazard to the safety features of the station. The stafr also concluded that the station design is acceptable in relation to the ,
l geologic, seismic, and foundation conditions of the site. The staff review has j
not, therefore, identified any unusual circumstances with respect to external '
hazards. Tbc staff would conduct further ======ments and actions in th event of significant changes in these circumstances.
In summary, there are no special or unusual circumstances surroundag the Rancho Seco Station which would warrant re-opening environmental proceedangs on the facility.
The staff has proposed a further detailed NRC study of the hydrologic features of all reactor sites, according to the task action plans described in -
Draft NUREG-0660. De liquid pathway interdiction study is designated Task Action III.D.2. De brief discussions given above, based on currently available data, indicate that there is small likelihood of any hydrologie problems at Diablo Canyon, Palo Verde and Rancho Seco. In the event C.at significant possible impacts are identified in the more thorough study, methods of interdiction and mitigation will be specified. A number of mitigation methods are available, including pumping and construction of slurry walls.
Ill. .
OTHER CONSIDERATION GfVEN TO SEVERE , '
ACCIDENTS
- The FOE emphasizes in its petition the need "to prepare so meet the .
possible consequences" of a serious accident at reactor sites. The staff believes that the Commission is taking positive measures to prevent severe ~
accidents and to mitigate their consequences. The Commission noted a number of these measures in its new statement orinterim policy on accident ,
considerations. Among these measures taken or under consideration by the Commission and the stafTare:
A proposed rule issued for public comment,44 FR 75167 (December 19, 1979),
which would significantly revise requirements in 10 CFR Part 50 plannmg at nuclear power plants.
for.T .sj l
Recommendations of the Siting Policy Task Force (see NUREG4E25, August, 1979) with respect to possible changes in the reactor siting policy and criteria act
- forth in 10 CFR Part 100. One goal of the recommendations is to considerin siting ,
the risk assocated with accidents beyond' the design basis (ie. , Class 9) by establishing population density and distribution critena. -
%ycr.ed " Action Plans" (see Draft NUREG.0660, December 1979) for imple-menting recommendations made by bodies that have investigated the Three Mile Island accident. Among other matters these plans incorporate m=*ad=tions .
for rulemaking related to degraded core cooling'and core melt ama '=
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imposition of additional roquarements on ting reassors, eg, the short-earm ,
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1: ic-ed'* ia = = H=tions. See I-21.assons Lantned Task Forcs i{
Status and Short-term Reco===-adations," NURECMS78 (1979), and l '. s in 45 FR 2427-2455 (January 11,1980). It-Orders 1-As the Commmion stated in its new interim policy, "It is the
~
Co.. .." J. .'s policy and intent to devote NRC's major resources to matters which the C==i==bn believes will take existing and future ;.
nuclear power plants safer, and to prevent a recurrence of the kind of ace'. dent that occurred at Three Mile Island." 45 FR at 40104. I' IV. CONCLUSION The stafT has concluded that no "special circumstances" exist winch j would warrant reopening environmental pi==%=< for the Diablo I I
Canyon, Palo Verde, and Rancho Seco nuclear plants. In the stafrs view, the "special circumstances" standard under the C==i==b='s new interim j policy is appropriate for judging whether past NEPA reviews should be j '
[
reopened. An admim<trative agency is empowered to revise its policies in an evolutionary process as it gains experience in tl r application of the laws j
8 which the agency is charged to admmitter. See NLh3 v. J. Weingarsen, Inc.,
420 U.S. 251,265-67 (1975); cf Vermont Yankee Nuclear Poner Corporarwn -
- v. Natural Resources Defense Council,435 U.S. 519 (1978). Thus, a change in
- policy to allow broader consideration of accidents in future NEPA reviews does not invalidate the ftadings in past reviews under the Annex, -
particularly in light ofjudicial approval of the C==ie= ion's past psactice.
See note I supra. By establishing a "special circumstances" standard for.
reopening completed environmental reviews, the Comm= ion has recog-nized that it may be appropriate to supplement a past environmental review ;
under certam circumstances in view of the transformation in policy which . I the Commission is undertaking. The staff does not believe, however, that j such "special circumstances" are present in the three instant cases. In all j events, NEPA does not require an agency to reopen the envirmnental record unless new information or circumstances would clearly mandate a ;
change in result. Greene County Planning Board v. FPC,559 F.2d 1227,1233 l (2d Cir.1976), cert. denie4 434 U.S.1086 (1978). '
With respect to the Comnussion's " repudiation" of WASH-1400 as a .,
basis for FOE's request that supplemental environmental statements be !
- issued, the staff notes that WASH-1400 published in draft form in 1974 did not form the bases for the 1971 Annex's conclusion that the probability of -
occurrence of Class 9 accidents was too low'to warrant their siteWe -
consideration under NEPA. See 45 FR at 40102; renaryhoua Powr and Light Company (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Uniis 1 and 2), LBP 79-29,10 NRC 586, 589 (1979). The Comnussion's policy statement on 7 M1 .
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. WASH-1400 in light of the critique of the study by the Risk A-t -
Review Group does not provide, therefore, a basis for reopening the -
environmental record for the three plants at issue.
Finally, the staff again notes that the es===== bas taken several
- actions by ra"=Wg and by order to assure that adequate snessures are
- taken to prevent serious =ecirl-ts,like the one at Three Mile Island, and to mitigate the consequences of serious accidents. In view of the foregoing, the petition of the FOEis denied. .
A copy of this decision will also be filed with the Secretary for the' Co==i==ian's review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Commis-sion's regulations. As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), this decision will constitute the final action of the C&=Mn twenty (20) days after the date-ofissuance, unless the Commission on its own motion institutes the review' of this decmon within that time.
Harold R. Denton. Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i
Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 19th day of June 1980 -
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. . 1 Cite as 13 NRC 1122 (1981) LSP-81-17
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before .A' ' ' Mve Judges:
John F. Wolf, Chairrnan
/ Mr. Glenn O. Bright .
Dr. Jerry R. Kline ~'
in the Matter of Docket Nos. 50 275 OL 50 323-OL (Low Power Test)
Proceeding
/ .
PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC -
COMPANY (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos.1 and 2)
June 119,1981 The Licensing Board denies intervenors' motion to reopen the mecord for '
consideration of"Cass 9" accidents at Diablo Canyon on the groumd that . .
no special circumstances exist to warrant such consideration.
. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING JOINT INTERVEINORS
~1 MOTION TO REOPEN ENVIRONMENTAL RECORD FOR
. =- CONSIDERATION OF CLASS NINE ACCIDENT Following the occurrence of the Three Mile Island accident, Joint Intervenors filed on May 9, ~1979 a motion with the Board to reopen the<
On May for record further consideration of"Cass 9" accidents at Diablo Canyon. .,
24,1979, the Staff proposed that the Board defer ruhng on the
- motion pending completion of the Staff report on TMI and its specific implications to this case. On June 5,1979, the Board agreed to the Stafrs proposal. The Boards now finds that it has sufficient informasion to rule on the motion.
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In November 1980, the Cn==i=;on published NUREG 0737, "Garifi-cation of TMI Action Plan Requ2rements " which sets forth those items,of the total TMI.related actions contained in the Staf!'s TMI Action Plain, ~
NUREO-0660, which have been approved by the C==;~;on for imple-mentation by licensees of operating reactors and Appl %ts for operating licenses. The Board has also received guidance from the C= l=N laying
- ' out the procedures to be used in our application of NUREG-0Z37 in our. -
licensing process (CLI-80 42, D-=W 18,1980, and CLI-81-5, dated -
April 1,1981). We have carefuDy reviewed these d~~=-ats, and fmd that none of the requirements therein impact the C==;=;on's interim policy on accident considerations. We therefore proceed with our analysis of the .
Diablo Canyon situation. '
On May 16,1980, the Commission issued a statement ofinterim policy which provided guidance on consideration of Cass 9 accide::t analysis with respect to plants for which Final. Environmental Statements Imad been issued. This guidance stated that in these cases consideration of Cass 9 accidents need not be addressed absent a showing of special circumstances.
The Commmion noted t' hat in the past the Staff has identified sucih special -
circumstances as falhng within three categories: (1) high pospulation density around the site; (2) a novel reactor design; or (3) a combinarsion ofa unique design and a unique siting mode. Diablo Canyon does not. fall into .
any of these categories (cf. DD-80-22,11 NRC 919 (1980)).
s.-
The Commmion had earlier noted that in addition et these three criteria
' that proximity of a plant to a " man-made or natural hazard" might also
. f,- represent "the type of exceptional case that might warrant additional consideration" (Public Service Company of Oklahoma (Black For Station, 2 . ,, .
Units 1 and 2), CLI-80 8, at 434 435 (March 21,1980)). In isyew to this T guidance, the Board believed that the known reismicity of the State of California might constitute such a natural hazard.
1 The Board conducted exhaustive hearmgs on the effects ofeei==ie-forces 7 on the Diablo Canyon plants from December,1978 through February, s ,
1979. In our Partial Initial Decision issued September 27,1979, we found
-/ : that 2:
=.. "
l the evidence demonstrates that all structures, systems and compo. *
" nents of the Diablo plant necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public will remain fuszetsonal and within applicable stress and deformation limits when subjected to the effects of the operating basis earthquake in , combination with normal operating loads." '
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- 1 record to receive new evidence not avail e
time they issued their decision. After conducung Board at the a thorou h i g n<lepth review of both the new evidence andsmgthe eviden 644, June 16,1981). We must, ao therefo
- Canyon is located in a region of known scismicity, the sustaining a " class nine" accident is no greater than for any c cr.
r.
Thus no special circumstances exist, and the record motion to reo forOnconsideration ofclass the 19th day ofJune,1981 itis nine accidents is denied ORDERED .
that the motion to reopen the record for consideration of l accidentsis denied. c ass nine FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING IOGt.D .
John F. Wolf, en _
Issued at Bethesda, Maryland E -
- this 19th day of June,1981
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STA*K o7 C ALIGINEA -.- Rt5ou2C15 AGENCY .., s EOMUNO C. tiowN JR. Cowner CALIFORNIA REGIONAL WATER QUALITY CONTROL BOARD-CENTRAL C0AST REGION 1102 A LAUREL *tANe CERTIFIED MAIL MID SAN Lul5 o813Po, CAltFoRNIA 93401 RETUPS RECEIPT P2 QUESTED (803) SJ M f47 s June 15, 1982 Commissioners of the .
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Dr. Nunzio J. Palladino Chairran Dr. John Ahearne ,
Dr. Victor Gilinsky Mr. Thomas M. Roberts Mr. James K. Asselstine Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Commissioners:
The Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board has requested that I send the enclosed copies of letters previously mailed to your Commission. As of this date, we have received neither a response nor an acknowledgment from your agency. These letters, dated January 19, 1982, and February 18, 1982, reflect the concerns of our Board Members regarding PGSE's Diablo Canyon Power Plant.
Very truly o ,
KENNETH ONES ,
Executive Officer KRJ:emt Enclosures - 2 cc: !!rs. Marit P. Evans, Chairman, Central Coast Region, CR'JQC3 Mr. John V. Stahl, Vice-Chairman, Central Coast Region, CP5QCB Dr. Linda K. Phillips , Board tienber, Central Coast Region, CRWQC3 Mr. L. L.14itchell, State Water Resources Control Board, Sacramento Mr. Ed Anton, Technical Services Division, SWRC3, Sacramento Mr. Gary Grimm, Legal Counsel, SUP.C3, Oakland Nuclear Regulatory Con: mission, Walnut Creek Mr. D,2vid Williamson, Senior Cot:ncel, Pacific Gac 6 Electric Co. , I San Francisco POL
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CAtlFORNIA REGIONAL WATER QUAUTY CONTROL BOARD-. r4 CENTRAL COASI REGION ,
Sg 1107 A LAUREL LANE SAN LUIS CR4sPo.*cAtiponNsA 9340)
(305) s494147 January 19, 1982 Nuclear Regulatory Comission *
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. Washington D. C. , 20555
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Dear Cormnissioners:
L - ,.:
. g The California Reg onal i Water Quality Control Board has just completed over - 'N ELQ hours of hearings on Diablo Canyon. As part of these hearings we received * :.
s;. ,
diation '?
testimony and cross--enmined PGEE and expert witnesses regarding
.. ._... impacts of Diablo Canyon of water quality. Tne Board has requested me to ,;
con =:unicate to you our concerns. ,
, y; We have serious concerns over the amount of radiation and the considerable increase in tritium over background levels you propose to allow PGEE to release to the Pacific Ocean.
' We are concerned that you are allowing the volume of the ' cooling water discharge to justify bypassing treatment levels that would be unacceptable at other nuclear facilities. Please re-examine your proposed permit to .
reduce significantly the radiation releases to Diablo. Cove. . _
Our second main concern is in regards to the 26,000 curies per year of radiation that you propose to allow Diablo Canyon to discharge into the atmosphere. Since there are many days per year of foggy weather at the site, we are concerned that a radioactive rain may develop contaminating water in the vicinity. We would appreciate any docunentation that you ,
, have regarding radioactive isotope soluability in rain and/or fog. When questioned on this at our hearing, PGSE officials stated that there are n'o operational restricticus concerning weather conditions icposed by the NRC.
Why not? Is it necessary to release 26,000 curies of radiation per year? ' . '
Our ' third concern is that the ocean monitcring program for radiatio ~a is
. not adequate. Additional monitoring stations are needed, especially in the Pismo Beach area.' Also a broader spectrum of shellfish should be -
monitored, as should sediment in the area of the discharge. .
We would like to request that a liquid pathway study be completed by .
Diablo Canyon, including an evaluation of the consequences of a Class 9 accident. Desige and construction review of Diablo Canyon must include spe-cific evaluation of piping, sumps, valves, waste storage areas, turbine -
building storage areas, etc.
We would appreciate your consideration of our letter, and an early response.
Very truly yours, l 0 W %5:j36 ,
P.ARIT P. EVA!!
Chairman Q/5 G7>_M-
CSbf0RMA REGIONAL WATER r TLITY CONTR01. BOARD- e n
,CEliTRAL COAST REGION
" " 93s j . 'l102 A LAU2EL LANE SAN Luis ostsPo.'CALIFo2N6A 9340s l
(sc5) 5494147 February 18, 1982 N .,- .
Commissioners '
Nuclear Pagulatory Commission . _
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Washington', D.C. 20556 'r ._
Dear Cors:
rissioners:. .{
The California Fagional Water Quality Control Board sent you'a. letter on .
January 19, 1982, expressing our concerns about the Diablo Canyon Nuclear
- - Power Plant. . ,
9 Several sentences were inadvertently omitted from the~ letter. A recent .
accident at Ginna ec:phasizes their it.:portance. The sixth par,agraph in' that letter should read: .
"Another serious concern is the potential for contamination of the Pacific Ocean in the event of an accident or uncon-templated release of radioactivity through a liquid pathway.
The design and construction errors discovered at the plant may substantially increase the chances for such an event. -
Therefore, it is imperative that your Coriission ensure prior to operation that the plant, as actually constructed, is safe in this regard, and that emergency plans include consideration of liquid releases. Independent audits a:e .
a vital link in such assurance. We would like to request ,
that a liquid pathway study be completed for Diablo Canyon, including an evaluation of the consequences of a Class 9 .
accident. Design a.nd construction review of Diablo Canyon must include specific evaluation of piping, su=ps, valves, vaste storage areas, turbine building, storage areas, etc." '.
.Very truly yours, MARIT P. EVANS (Mrs.) . .
Chairman LKP:emt cc: All Central Coast Region Board Members Mr. L. L. Mitchell, State Water Ecsources Control Board, Sacraranto Mr. Ed Anton, Technical Servicca Division, SWRCS, Sacramento Mr. Gary Grimm, Legal Counsel, SURCB Nuclear Pegulatory Commission, Walnut Creek tie. David Williamson, Senior Counsel, Pacific Gas F. Electric, San Francisc c POR g M&&50p* p