ML20028B842
| ML20028B842 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/29/1982 |
| From: | Lentine F COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 5494N, NUDOCS 8212070065 | |
| Download: ML20028B842 (88) | |
Text
,
N Commonwealth Edison C ) one First National Plaza, Chicago. lilenois O
N,y] Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago Illinois 60690 November 29, 1982 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Of fice o f Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclea r Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Zion Station Units 1 and 2 Fire Protection NRC Docket No s.
50-295 and 50-304 References (a):
July 3 0, 1982, letter from F.
G.
Lentine to H. R. Denton.
(b):
August 10, 1982, letter from F.
G. Lentine to H. R. De n to n.
(c):
October 1, 1982, letter from F.
G.
Lentine to H. R. Denton.
I Dea r Mr. Denton :
Reference (a) provided Commonwealth E.dison's report on associated circuits related to Zion Station's post fire shutdown capability, which contained several requests for exemption from the provisions o f 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sectio n III.G. 2.a.
Following a series of conference calls and submittals of additional information, a meeting was held on November 4 and 5, 1982, with members of your staf f to discuss the exemption requests.
The Attachment to this letter provides revised versions of the exemption requests that document the information provided during that meeting.
Three (3) copies of this letter and the Attachment are l
provided f or your use.
l Please address questions regarding this matter to this office.
Ve ry truly yours,
/
Ob b SN W
,3 F. G.
Lentin e cys /{[g,yc Nuclea r Licensing Administrato r Im jo!
Attachment 5494N 82120700'5 821129 P DR ADr... 05000295 F
{1 INTRODUCTION This addendum describes the Fire Areas / Zones at Zion Station in which exemptions are requested to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a f or redundant components of saf e shutdown systems.
Six Fire Areas / Zones are discussed:
1.
Fire Zone 18.4A-0; Crib House Outer Room, Upper and Lower Level 2.
Fire Zone 18.48-0; Crib House Inner Room; floor elevation 594'-0" 3.
Fire Area 11.2-0; Auxiliary Building; floor elevation 560'-0" 4.
Fire Area 11.3-0; Auxiliary Building; floor elevation 579'-0" 5.
Fire Area 11.4-0; Auxiliary Building, floor elevation 592'-0" i
6.
Fire Area 11.5-0; Auxiliary Building, floor elevation 617'-0" The discussion for each Fire Area / Zone contains a section providing a general description of the area, followed by a section discussing the fire protection features in the area.
The system exemption request is followed by subsections discussion physical configuration, the intervening
- area and the adjacent ** area between redundant components of each system for which an exemption is requested.
()
l.
The electrical installation design is common to all Fire Areas /Zo. as and shut-down systems.
IEEE-383 qualified cable is installed in
~
solid bottom steel cable tray, conduit and enclosed steel risers.
Fire stops are placed in the cable trays and risers at all wall, floor and ceiling penetrations.
The area conclusion summarizes the justification for the exemptions requested in an area'.
The figure for each Fire Area / Zone presents the cable routing and other relevant information as a visual aid in evaluating the exemptions requested in each area.
- The intervening area is an area along the shortest path between the redundant components for which an exemption is requested.
4 The area is bcunded by a 20 foot distance on either side of the
()
shortest path or by any wall whose thickness is two feet or more.
The fire load in the intervening area includes the Btu equivalent of any combustibles between the redundant components.
The transient fire load is equivalent to a 55 gallon drum of oil (155,000 Btu / gallon 6
or 8.5 x 10 Btu).
- The adjacent area is an area, not including the above area, along the shortest path between the redundant components for which an exemption is requested.
The area is bounded by a 35 foot distance on either side of the shortest path or by any wall whose thickness is two feet or more. The fire load includes the Btu equivalent of any combustibles in the adjacent area.
()
1.1 Fire Areas
()
Fire Area 18.4A-0; Crib House Outer Room, Upper and Lower Levels, floor elevations 552'-3" and 594 '-0" respectively; Figures 18.4A-0 and 18.4B; Fire Protection SER Section 5.17.
1.2 General Description Within Fire Area:
The upper level area contains the crib house inner room, circulating water pumps and motors and other non-safety related I
i motors.
~
The upper level, at elevation 594'-0", has a minimum floor thickness of 24-inch thick structural reinforced concrete and exterior walls of 115/8-inch thick hollow concrete block.
The inner room has 3-hour fire rated interior walls, and 13-inch thick hollow concrete block exterior walls.
The lower level, at elevation 5,52'-3, has walls and floor of minimum 24-inch thick structural reinforced concrete.
i No interior walls subdivide the lower level.
Total floor area of the outer room lower level is approximately 3
7.0 x 10 sq. ft.
The volume of the outer room lower level 5
is approximately 12.8 x 10 cu. ft.
Total floor area of the outer room upper level is approximately 3
9.3 x 10 sq. ft.
The volume of the outer room upper level
(])
5 is approximately 2.3 x 10 cu. ft.
1-1 i
The ceiling height of the lower level is 39 feet 9-inches.
Concrete ceiling support beams run east-west and extend 24-inches below the ceiling.
Conduit and solid bottom cteel O\\2 cable trays containing IEEE-383 qualified cables are installed at least five feet below the ceiling.
1.3 Fire Protection Features:
In the event o.f a fire in this area, the following equipment is available:
a.
Three portable CO extinguishers are located at column / row:
2 l
i.
AA/ll3 in the southwest corner of the upper level, at the south door of the crib house, O)
L 11.
AA/101 in the northwest corner of the upper level, at the north door of the crib house, i
11.
AA/107 of the lower. level.
b.
There are four hose' stations in the area located at column / row:
I 1.
CC/lli of the upper level, 11.
CC/103 of the upper level, l
()
lii.
BB/109, approximately five feet f rom circulating water pump motor lA, upper level, 1-2
iv.
BB/105, approximately five feet from circulating water pump motor 2B, upper level, and
()
c.
Twelve smoke detectors are located in the lower level:
one centrally located over each of the six circulating water pump motors and one approximately 15 feet east of each circulating water pump motor along column AA.
1.4 System Within' Fire Area Where Licensee has Asked for Exemption Request:
A.1 System Exemption Requested:
In fire area 18.4A-0, an exemption is requested to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a, for the service
(
water pump power cables.
All six power cables are located in this fire zone and are not separated by three-hour fire barriers.
The operation of any two out of six service water pumps, through cross connecting headers in the crib house and auxiliary b'ilding, is required for shut-u down of both units.
For further discussion, see Section 3.7 of " Fire Protection Associated Cable Report, Zion 1 & 2, July 1982."
l A.2 Physical Configuration:
i There is a minimum horizontal separation of approximately 48 feet between the service water pump 1A, la and 1C
- O power feeds (cables 10624, 10625 and 10626) and service water pump 2B and 2C power feeds (cables 20625 and 20626).
1-3
Thoro is no communicating cable tray path between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 service water pump cables.
No service water pump power feeds are routed through the crib house outer room upper level.
A.3 Intervening Area:
The significant intervening combustibloc in the lower level are' cable insulation, and 63 gallons of lubricating oil in each of the circulating water pumps 2A, 2B, lA and 1B (located 30 feet below the cable trays).
The fire load in the intervening area is 15,000 Btu /ft plus the transient load.
The intervening area contains six smoke detectors.
O A.4 Adjacent Area:
The significant combustibles adjacent to the intervening area for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 service water pumps power cables are 63 gallons of lubricating oil in each of the circulating water pumps,1C and 2C, (located 30 feet vertical distance and 15 feet horizontal distance from the power cables).
The fire loading for these 2
adjacent combustibles is 7,000 Btu /ft 1.5 Conclusion for Area Exemptions:
O An exemption to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a is l
l requested in Fire Area 18.4A-0 Crib Ilouse Outer Room upper and lower levels, floor elevations 594'-0" and 552'-0".
j
(
1-4
The exemption request is for the service water system which has redundant components, but whose components are not separated by a three-hour rated fire barrier.
We believe that the in-depth fire protection features in this area are equivalent to the fire protection requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a and that the exemption is justified for the following reasons:
o Only IEEE-383 qualified cable is used in this area's solid bottom steel cable trays, conduit and enclosed risers with fire stops at floor penetration.
e Because service water pump power feeds are not routed through the crib house outer room upper level, a fire
()
in this portica would not ef fect the functional capability of the safe shutdown equipment.
e Cable trays are installed at least five feet below the beamed ceiling.
This precludes cable damage f rom unac-ceptable temperature and heat flux caused by either a floor level exposure fire or channelized hot gases at the ceiling.
I e
The major fire load in the lower level, namely the cir-culating water pump lubricating oil, is located at a minimum vertical distance of approximately 30 feet below and Ad' horizontal feet f rom any redundant cable tray.
()
- I 1-5 1
o Twelve smoke detectors provide redundant fire detection capability in the lower level.
O Therefore, it is not credible that any postulated fire in this area would reach proportions capable of preventing safe shutdown.
1.6 Fire Area:
Fire Zone 18.4B-0; Crib House Innet Room, floor elevation 594 '-0"; Figure 18.4B-0; Fire Protection SER Section 5.17.
1.7 General Description Within Fire Area:
The inner room in the crib house is the service water pump
()
enclosure room and is contained within the upper level of the crib house.
Three-inch to six-inch high concrete pads or steel channel bases are provided under all equipment.
All walls are 18-inches thick structural teinforced concrete and are three-hour fire rated wills.
There are 10 pneumatic operated louvers to the exterior at elevation 612'-0".
These i
openings are protected by an exterior one foot thick 6'-6" high reinforced concrete missile wall that is a part of the east wall and the adjacent roof slab at elevation 611'-6".
The roof, at elevation 616'-6",
is an 18-inch thick structural reinforced concrete roof slab with a UL Class "A"
roof covering.
A 4'-9" wide section of this slab overhangs and forms a missile O
shield protecting the louvers in the cast wall.
1-6
The floor of the room, at elevation 594'-0",
is a 24-inch thick structural reinforced concrete slab.
Total floor area C
is 4,400 square feet.
The volume of the inner room ~is approx-5 imately 1 x 10 cu. ft.
The ceiling is approximately 15 feet above the service water pump motors and 22 feet sin inches above the floor.
Ceiling supports are reinforced concrete crossing the ceiling east-west and extend down 18-inches from th'e ceiling.
Cable trays are installed at least 5 feet below the concrete ceiling support beams.
1.8 Fire Protection Features:
In the event of a fire in this area, the following equipment is available:
a.
Three portable CO extinguishers are located at column / row:
2 1.
CC/lll between service water pumps 1C and 1B ii.
CCC/106 east of service water pump 2A
)
lii.
CCC/103 between service water pumps 2B and 2C.
b.
Ten ionization detectors are located throughout this zone and provide a fire detection system that is sensitive to the diesel driven fire pump and its fuel oil day tank, motor control centers and cable tray crossings.
O An automatic CO fire suppression system is located 2
above the diesel driven fire pump.
This system alarms in the control room.
This is a controlled access area.
l 1-7
l.9 System Within Fire Area Where Licensee has Asked for Exemption Request:-
A.1 System Exemption Requested:
An exemption is requested in Fire Zone 18.4B-0 to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a, for redundant service water pumps and respective power cables which are not separated by three-hour fire barriers.
The operation of any two out of six service water pumps, thru cross connecting headers in the crib house and auxiliary building, is required for shutdown of both units.
For further discussion, see Section 3.7 of " Fire Protection Associated Cable Report, Zion 1 & 2, July 1982."
()
i A.2 Physical Configuration:
See Figure 18.4B-0 of Fire Zone 18.4B-0.
In Fire Zone 18.4B-0, the six service water pumps are arranged on 30 foot centers in a straight line f ashion (lC-1B-1 A-2 A-2B-2C ).
For a worst case fire in the vicinity of the diesel driven fire pump, the two opposite end service water pumps (lC and 2C) will remain available.
The closest approach to this fire is the pump power feeds (cables r-k j) 10626 and 20626).
The distance between this worst case fire and the power feeds is approximately 70 feet.
1-8
There is no communicating cable tray points between cable 10626 and cable 20626.
()
IEEE-383 qualified cables in solid bottom steel cable trays are supported at least five feet below the ceiling beams and run parallel with these beams.
All risers are enclosed from floor to ceiling.
A.3 Intervening Area:
The only significant combustibles in the zone are cable insulation in cable trays and MCC's, one gallon of lubri-cating oil in each of the six service water pumps and two service water booster pumps, five gallons in the diesel driven fire pump and the 250 gallons of fuel O
oil in the curbed diesel oil tank.
The curbed volume will contain a diesel fuel oil fire.
The fire load in the intervening area is 12,900 Btu /ft plus the transient load.
l l
A.4 Adjacent Area:
Solid bottom cable trays and enclosed risers passing through this fire zone are provided with fire stops at all walls and floor penetrations.
Any adjacent combustibles l
are located outside three-hour fire barriers.
l CE) 1-9 1
1.10 Conclusion for Area Exemption
\\
O An exemption to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III'.G.2.a is requested in Fire Zone 18.4B-0, Crib Ilouse, Inner Room, floor elevation 594'-0".
The exemption request is for the service water system which has redundant components, but whose components are not separated by a three-hour rated fire barrier. -
We believe that the in-depth fire protection features in this area are equivalent to the fire protection requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a and that the exemption is justified for the following reasons:
(])
e Only IEEE-383 qualified cable is used in this area's solid bottom steel cable trays, conduits and enclosed rjsers.
e Cable trays are supported At least five feet below the beamed ceiling.
This precludes cable damage from unac-ceptable temperature and heat flux caused by either a floor level exposure fire of channelized hot gases at the ceiling.
e The zone is a large, open, uncongested area with low fire loading in the intervening area.
()
There is wide physical separation between the system e
componen ts.
1-10
e There is an independent automatic fire detection and 4
j CO suppression system around the diesel driven fire 2
pump will extinguish any possible local diesel.. associated fire before the fire could reach proportions affecting the shutdown capability of the service water system.
Therefore, it is not credible that any postulated fire in this area would reach proportions capable of preventing safe shutdown.
O l
l O
1-11
2.1 Fire Area:
)
Fire Area 11.2-0; Auxiliary Building, floor elevation 560'-0";
Figure 11.2-0; Fire Protection SER Section 5.13.
2.2 General Description of Fire Area:
The large area common to Units 1 and 2 is divided by shield walls into several closed rooms and passageway; between open spaces.
The rooms contain pumps, heat exchangers, various tanks and an enclosed elevator.
The passageways and open spaces contain component cooling pumps at G-H/23-17, component
~
cooling heat exchangers, solid bottom steel cable trays, enclosed risers, MCC's, three stairwells and an open hatchway.
The floor slab at elevation 560'-0" varies in thickness from 24-inches to 42-inches.
Total floor area is approximately 4
1 x 10 sq. ft.
The volume of the room is approximately 5
2 x 10 cu. ft.
All the auxiliary building perimeter walls l
are 36-inches thick, extend up to the ceiling and carry a three-hour fire rating.
l The ceiling height is approximately 19 feet.
Concrete ceiling support beams run east-west and extend 24-inches below the ceiling.
Conduit and solid bottom steel cable trays containing l
IEEE-383 qualified cables are installed at least five feet
[}
below the ceiling.
i l
l 2-1
u 2.3 Area Fire Protection Features:
i
()
In the event of a fire in this area, the following equipment is available:
a.
Six portable CO extinguishers located at column / row:
2 i.
K/23 outside the east wall of safety injection pump cubicle, Unit 1, ii.
H/19 on a structural column approximately five feet west of component cooling pump OA,
~
iii.
M/21 on outside west wall of RHR cubicle, O
iv.
M/23, approximately 10 feet west of MCC 1393A, v.
H/12, about 20 feet north of risers R509 and
- R512, vi.
G/23, about 10 feet south of component cooling pump OE; b.
There are three hose stations in this area located at l
column / row:
K/26 on the east wall of Unit 1 safety l
injection pump cubicle, N/20 on a structural column t
near riser R237, and H/14 on a structural column near C:)
risers R506, R509, and R512; 2-2
c.
There are 13 ionization detectors in this area, 11.2-0.
Six of the detectors are near the component cooling pumps, and two are in the waste gas compressor cubicles; d.
There are six thermal detectors, one over each of the component cooling pumps, with two at pump OC; e.
There is an automatic overlapping CO fire suppression 2
system installed over the five component cooling pumps; f.
This auxiliary building area is a limited access area; g.
Portable ventilation equipment is available in this area.
()
2.4 System Within Fire Area Where Licensee has Asked for Exemption Request:
l A.1 System Exemption Requested:'
i In Fire Area 11.2-0, an exemption is requested to 10 CFR 50, Appendix 4,Section III.G.2.a for redundant component cooling pumps and their power feeds which are in risers R17, R21, R506 and R509.
These component cooling pumps and the risers are not separated by three-hour fire barriers.
The operation of any two of the five component cooling pumps through a cross connecting I
()
l header to any two heat exchangers is required for safe 2-3 I
i 1
i shutdown of both units.
For further discussion, see I
Section 3.8 of " Fire Protection Associated Cable Report,
(
Zion 1 & 2, July 1982."
i i
i i
A.2 Physical Configuration:
See. Figure 11.2-0 for Fire Area 11.2-0.
In Fire Area 11.2-0, the five component cooling pumps are arranged OE-OD-OC-OB-OA in a straight line fashion
.approximately 11 feet apart except for pumps OB and OC which are eight feet apart.
Power feeds to component coolie:g pumps OA (cable 02301),
OB (cable 02300), OD (cable 02303), and OE (cable 02304)
[
will be routed in conduits f rom the pumps to risers R506, R509 at H/14 and R17, R21 at H/30, respectively.
These conduits will be wrapped in a three-hour fire barrier until they reach th,e risers.
The risers, R17 and R21, are separated by approximately 215 feet f rom risers R506 and R509.
There is no direct line of sight between these groups of risers, or between the risers and the component cooling pumps.
The three foot walls of the waste gas compressor cubicles at H/24-29 are between risers R17 and R21 and component cooling pumps.
The two foot six-inch walls of the cubicles for auxiliary building floor drain analysis tanks and pumps at H/15-17
(])
are between the component cooling pumps and risers R506 and R509.
There is no communicating cable tray path between these Unit 1 and Unit 2 risers.
2-4
A.3 Intervening Area:
The significant intervening combustibles between risers Rl7/R21 and R506/R509 are the grease lubrication in the waste gas compressors, the lubrication in the component cooling pumps and cable insulation.
The fire load in 2
the intervening area is 16,000 Btu /f t plus the transient load.
i l
1 The intervening area contains eleven ionization detectors and the six thermal detectors over the component cooling pumps.
There is an automatic CO fire suppression system 2
over the component cooling pumps.
There are also three portable CO fire extinguishers and two hose stations 2
({}
in the ~ intervening area.
A.4 Adjacent Area:
The only significant combustibles adjacent to the inter-vening area, between the risers, are cable insulation j
in cable trays.
The fire load for the adjacent area 2
is 11,000 Btu /ft B.1 System Exemption Requested:
l In Fire Area 11.2-0, an exemption is requested to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a for redundant
()
Unit 1 centrifugal charging pump unit cooler power feeds l
which are not separated by three-hour fire barriers.
i 2-5
The operation of either centrifugal charging pumps and q
~
)
its unit cooler is required for safe shutdown of each unit.
For further discussion, see Section 3.9 of " Fire Protection Associated Cable Report, Zion 1 & 2, July 1982."
B.2 Physical Configuration:
See Figure 11.2-0 of Fire Area 11.2-0.
Centrifugal charging pump 1B unit cooler power feed (cable 10076) and 1A unit cooler power feed (cable 42274) are separated by about 115 fee.t.
Because of intervening walls, there is no direct line of sight betweenithe
()
two closest points of approach which are cable risers R35 (cable 10076) at G/23 and R237 (cable 42274) at N/20.
s The line of sight between these risers is interrupted,' v q
J the three-hour fi're-rated walls 'of the enclosed elevator
~,
at N/21 and the Unit 1 RHR heat ~ exchanger cubicles at K-M/21.
There is.ars cohmunicating cable tray path between
\\
. n-risers R35 and R237. ' -
N, q
y 5
B.3 Intervening Area:
V s
\\
x The only significant ' intervening conbustibles between:
the power feeds.to Unit'l coolers lA and 1B are cable insulation.
Total fire. load ' in the' Unit l intervening L
area,is 25,000 Btu /ft h1us tlte^ transient load.
s,-
b %
2-6 a,
There is a portable CO fire extinguisher north of G/23 2
f3 and there are extinguishers at M/23 and M21.
The hose V
station at N/20 is near riser R237.
B.4 Adjacent Area:
The significant combustibles adjacent to the intervening area for the Unit 1 unit cooler power cables are cable insulation, motor control center, lubrication in the component cooling pumps, and grease lubrication in the waste gas compressors.
Fire loading for these adjacent 2
combustibles is 11,000 Btu /ft C.1 System Exemption Requested:
O In Fire Area 11.2-0, an exemption is requested to 10 CFR 50, Appendix 4,Section III.G.2.a for redundant Unit 2 centrifugal charging pump unit cooler power feeds which are not separated by'three-hour fire barriers.
The operation of either centrifugal charging pump and its unit cooler is required for safe shutdown of each unit.
For further discussion, see Section 5.9 of " Fire Protection Associated Cable Report, Zion 1 & 2, July l
l 1982."
C.2 Physical Configuration:
i
\\-)
Centrifugal charging pump 2B unit cooler power feed (cable 20076) and 2A unit cooler power feed (cable 32274) l 2-7
are separated by about 92 feet.
The two closest points of approach of these cables are riser R512 (cable 20076)
O at H/14 and MCC 2393A (cable 32274) at L/18.
There is no direct line of sight between these two points.
The line of sight between riser R512 and MCC 2393A is interrupted by three-hour fire rated walls of the cubicles containing the safety injection pumps a-K/14-17.
There is. no communicating cable tray path between R512 and MCC 2393A.
i C.3 Intervening Area:
r The only significant intervening combustibles between the power feeds to coolers 2A and 2B are cable insulation.
(])
The fire load in the Unit 2 intervening area is 13,000 2
Btu /ft plus the transient load.
There is an ionization detector and a fire hose station between R512 and MCC 2393A.-
C.4 Adjacent Area:
The only significant combustibles adjacent to the inter-vening area for Unit 2 unit cooler power cables are cable insulation, lubrication oil in the component cooling pumps, and motor control centers.
Total fire loading for these adjacent combustibles is 17,000 Btu /f t O
2-8
D.1 System Exemotion Requested:
(
In Fire Area 11.2-0, an exemption is requested to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a for redundant Unit 2 RHR pumps and their unit cooler power feeds.
The cables are not separated by thre' -hour fire barriers.
The operation of either RHR pump and its unit cooler is required for cold shutdown of Unit 2.
For further discussion, see Section 5.13 of " Fire Protection Associated Cable Report, Zion 1 & 2, July 1982."
D.2 Physical Configuration:
()
See Figure 11.2-0 of Fire Area 11.2-0.
Unit 2 RHR 2B pump power feed (cable 20504) is separated from 2A pump power feed (cable 32294) and its unit cooler power feed (cable 32266) by-about 120 feet.
There is no direct line of sight between the two closest points of approach which are risers R509 (cable 20504) at H/14 and R534 (cables 32294 and 32266) at N/19, due to the intervening three-hour rated fire walls.
These are the fire walls of cubicles for Unit 2 safety injection pumps at K/17-14 and containment spray pumps at M-N/19.
There is no communicating cable tray path between R534 and R509.
O 2-9
W
D.3 Intervening Area:
()
The only significant intervening combustibles are cable insulation.
The fire load in the intervening area is 25,000 Btu /ft plus the transient load.
D.4 Adjacent Area:
The only significant combustibles adjacent to the inter-vening area are cable insulation, the lubrication in the component cooling pumps, and motor control centers.
2 The fire load in the adjacent area is 8,000 Btu /f t E.1 System Exemption Recuested:
{}
In Fire Area 11.2-0, an exemption is requested to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a for MCC 1383A and MCC 1939A.
These MCC's. are not separated by a three-hour fire barrier.
The availability of Division 19 (MCC 1393A, B, and C) or Divisions 18 (MCC 1383A) and 17 (MCC 1372) are required for safe shutdown of Unit 1.
Division 17 (MCC 1372) is located in Fire Area 11.1-0.
For further discussion, see Section 3.1 and Table 3.1-1 of " Fire Protection Associated Cable Report, Zion 1 & 2, July 1982."
/~T
\\_)
2-10
E.2 Physical Configuration:
See Figure 11.2-0 of Fire Area 11.2-0.
The two closest points of approach of Divisions 18 and 19 a're MCC 1383A and MCC 1393A.
The minimum horizontal separation between MCC 1383A and MCC 1393A is approximately 56 feet.
There are no communicating cable trays between MCC 1383A and MCC 1393A.
E.3 Intervening Area:
()
The only significant intervening combustibles between MCC 1383A and MCC 1393A are cable insulation.
The fire load in the Unit 1 intervening area is 5,000 Btu /f t plus the transient load.
There are ionization detectors and a thermal detector near MCC 1383A.
Portable CO fire extinguishers are 2
located near MCC 1383A at G/23 and near MCC 1393A at M/23.
E.4 Adjacent Area:
l The only significant combustibles adjacent to the inter-()
vening area for the Divisions 18 and 19 MCC's are cable insulation, the lubrication in the component cooling l
pumps and the grease in the waste gas compressors.
The l
l 2-11
2 fire loading in the adjacent area is 11,000 Btu /ft Between these compressors and MCC 1383A are 3 foot thick concrete walls.
Each waste gas compressor has an ioni-zation de tector in its cubicle.
F.1 System Exemption Requested:
In Fire Area 11.2-0, an exemption is requested to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a for Divisions 27 and 28 MCC power feeds and Division 29 (MCC 2393A) which are not separated by a three-hour fire barrier.
The availability of Division 29 (MCC 2393A) or Divisions 28 (MCC 2383A) and 27 (MCC 2372) are required for safe shutdown of Unit 2.
MCC 2372 is located in Fire Area 11.1-0.
For further discussion, see Section 5.1 and
[}
Table 5.1-1 of " Fire Protection Associated Cable Report, Zion 1 & 2, July 1982."
F.2 Physical Configuration:
See Figure 11.2-0 of Fire Area 11.2-0.
Unit 2 MCC power cable feed to Division 27 MCC 2373 i
(cable 20968 in riser R512) and Division 28 MCC 2383A (cables 22956, 22957 and 22958 in riser R509) at G/13 l
are separated by approximately 90 feet f rom Division 29 l
MCC 2393A at M/18.
There is no direct line of sight l
()
for radiant heat transfer between the two closest points l
of approach.
The direct line of sight is inte rrupted r
i 5
2-12 t
by the three-hour rated fire walls of Unit 2 safety injection
()
pump cubicles at K/14-17.
There is no communicating cable tray path between RS12 and MCC 2393A.
F.3 Intervening Area:
The only significant intervening combustibles are cable insulation.
The fire load in the intervening area is 2
25,000 Btu /ft plus the transient load.
There are three ionization detectors and a fire hose station in the intervening area.
F.4 Adjacent Area:
The only significant combustibles adjacent to the inter-vening area are cable insulation, the lubrication in the component cooling pumps, and motor control centers.
2 The fire load in the adjacent area is 11,000 Btu /f t 2.5 Conclusion for Area Exemption:
An exemption to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a 10 requested in Fire Area 11.2-0, Auxiliary Building floor elevation 560'-0".
This exemption request is for six safe shutdown systems which have redundant components but whose
({}
components are not separated by a three-hour fire rated barrier.
2-13
Thece redundarit components are :
5 t'
V) 1.
Component cooling pumps OA, OB, OC, OD, and OE and power feeds in risers for pumps OA, OB, OD and OE.
2.
Power feeds in cable trays and risers for Unit 1 centrifugal charging pump unit coolers.
3.
Power feeds in cable trays and risers for Unit 2 centrifugal charging pump unit coolers.
4.
Power feeds in cable trays and risers for Unit 2 RHR pumps and their unit coolers.
O 5.
Division 19 MCC 1393A and Division 18 MCC 1383A.
6.
Power feeds in risers and cable trays and the Division 29 MCC 2393A.
We believe that the in-depth fire protection features in this area are equivalent to the fire protection requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a, and that the exemption is justified for the following reasons:
O IEEE-383 qualified cable is used in this area's solid bottom steel cable trays, conduit and enclosed risers.
O 2-14
Cable trays are installed at least five feet below the
(])
beamed ceiling.
This design feature precludes cable damage from unacceptable temperature and heat flux caused by either a floor level exposure fire or channelized hot gases at the ceiling.
The fire loading is low in the intervening area and adjacent area.
Ionization detectors, portable CO fire extinguisher 2
and fire hose stations are located throughout the area.
For the component cooling pumps in this fire area:
O 9
The'six thermal detectors and four ionization detectors provide redundant and diverse fire detection capability at the component cooling pumps.
The automatic overlapping CO suppression' system installed 2
over each component cooling pump will extinguish any fire in the immediate area of the component cooling pumps.
9 Power cables for the two end component cooling pumps of each unit will be routed into three-hour fire wrapped conduit to its enclosed risers.
~
2-15
u G Redundancy of system components allows the operation
()
of any two of the five component cooling pumps thru a cross connected header to any two heat exchangers to supply safe shutdown requirement of a unit.
The safe shutdown capability of the component cooling system is, therefore, assured.
For other systems in this fire area:
O Redundant system components have wide physical separation, 6 Intervening walls prevent direct line of sight for radiant heat transfer between redundant components.
O Therefore, it is not credible that lay postulated fire in this area would reach proportions capable of preventing shutdown.
l O
e O
e 2-16
3.1 Fire Area:
()
Fire Area 11.3-0; Auxiliary Building floor elevation 579'-0";
Figure 11.3-0; Fire Protection SER Section 5.12.
3.2 General Description of Fire Area:
The large area common to Units 1 and 2 is divided by shield walls into several closed rooms and passageways between open spaces.
The rooms contain heat exchangers, various tanks,
~
charging pumps, a drum storage area, and an enclosed elevator.
The passageways and open spaces contain Units 1 and 2 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps at G-H/24-16, Unit 1 Remote Shutdown Panels at J/24 and Unit 2 Remote Shutdown Panels at J/14-16,
()
solid bottom steel cable trays, enclosed risers, MCC's, three stairwells, and an open hatchway.
The floor slab at elevation 579'-0" varies in thickness from 24-inches to 36-inches.
Total floor area is approximately 4
2.1 x 10 sq. ft.
The volume of the room is approximately 5
2 x 10 cu. ft.
All the auxiliary building perimeter walls are 36-inches thick, extend up to the ceiling and carry a three-hour fire rating.
The ceiling height is approximately 11 feet.
Concrete ceiling support beams run east-west and extend 24-inches below the ceiling.
Conduit and solid bottom cable trays containing O
IEEE-383 qualified cables are installed at least four feet below the ceiling.
3-1 L
0 3.3 Fire Area Protection Features:
(~)
In the event of a fire in this area, the following equipment is available:
a.
Three portable CO fire extinguishers are located at 2
column / row:
i.
H/16, approximately 10 feet f rom motor driven AFW pump 2C, ii.
H/20, approximately 20 feet between turbine driven l
AFW pumps lA and 2A, O
111.
H/24, approximately four feet f rom motor driven AFW pump 1C.
b.
Three fire hose stations ar,e located in this area at colman/ row:
1.
H/16 near motor driven AFW pump 2C, ii.
N/20 near the elevator.
()
3-2 i
c.
Nine ionization detectors are located in this area:
()
two over the Unit 1 remote shutdown panels, three in the vicinity of the Unit 1 AFW pumps, one over each of the Unit 2 motor driven AFW pumps, three over the Unit 2 remote shutdown panels.
d.
Sixteen thermal detectors:
eight over Unit 1 AFW pumps and eight over Unit 2 AFW pumps.
e.
There is an automatic CO2 puff fire suppression system installed over the six AFW pumps.
f.
This auxiliary building area is a limited access area.
O g.
Portable ventilation is available in this area.
3.4 Systems Within Fire Area Where Licensee has Asked for Exemption Request:
A.1 System Exemption Requested:
In fire area 11.3-0, an exemption is requested to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a, for redundant Unit 1 centrifugal charging pumps and their unit cooler feeds which are not separated by three-hour fire barriers.
The operation of either centrifugal charging pump and its unit cooler is required for safe shutdown of each
)
unit.
For further discussion, see Section 3.9 of " Fire Protection Associated Cable Report, Zion 1 & 2, July 1982."
3-3
A.2 Physical Configuration:
Charging pump 1A power feed (cable 42295) crosses over charging pump 1B unit cooler power feed (cable 10076).
Cable 42295 will be routed in a three-hour fire wrapped conduit.
A minimum horizontal distance of approximately 17 feet separates the charging pump 1B unit cooler power feed (cable 10076) from the charging pump 1A unit cooler power feed (cable 42274).
However, between these feeds there is an intervening two foot thick concrete wall.
This is the east wall of the pipe chase cubicle.
All
~
cable tray penetrations of the pipe chase walls have fire stops.
O A.3 Intervening Area:
The only significant intervening combustibles between cables 10076 and 42274 are cable insulation.
The fire load in the intervening area is 15,000 Btu /f t plus the transient load.
The intervening area contains one ionization detector.
A.4 Adjacent Area:
l There are no significant combustibles adjacent to the
({}
intervening area between the power feeds.
3-4
m B.1 System Exemption Requested:
)
In Fire Area 11.3-0, an exemption is requested to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a for the service water pump power cables.
All six power cables are located in this fire area and are not separated by three-hour fire barriers.
The operation of any two out of six service water pumps, through cross connecting headers in the crib house and auxiliary building is required for.
safe shutdown of both units.
For further discussion, see Section 3.7 of " Fire Protection Associated Cable Report, Zion 1 & 2, July 1982."
B.2 Physical Configuration:
O A minimum horizontal distance of 147 feet separates the service water pump 1A, 1B and 1C power feeds (cable 10624 in riser R172, cable,10625 in riser R171, and cable 10626 in riser R170) from the service water pumps 2A, 2B and 2C power feeds (cable 20624 in riser R501, cable 20625 in riser R502, and cable 20626 in riser R504).
There is no direct line of sight between Unit 1 riser group and Unit 2 riser group.
Between these riser groups are the two foot thick concrete walls for the concen-trates holding tank cubicle and the four foot high T-(])
wall enclosures of AFW pumps lA and 2A.
There is no communicating cable tray between riser groups.
3-5
B.3 Intervening Area:
The only significant intervening combustibles between risers R170, R171, R172 and R501, R502 and R504 are four gallons of lubricating oil in each of the motor driven AFW pumps and three gallons in each of the turbine driven AFW pumps and cable insulation.
The fire load in the intervening area is 4,600 Btu /f t plus the transient load.
The intervening area contains four ionization detectors, sixteen thermal detectors and three portable CO EIE*
2 extinguishers.
(])
B.4 Adjacent Area:
The only significant combustibles adjacent to the inter-vening area between the risers are cable insulation in cable trays.
The fire load for the adjacent area 2
is 3,100 Btu /ft C.1 System Exemption Requested:
l In Fire Area 11.3-0, an exemption is requested to 10 i
CFR 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2.a for redundant l
Unit 2 centrifugal charging pump and unit cooler power feeds which are not separated by three-hour fire barriers.
()
The operation of either centrifugal charging pump and i
its unit cooler is required for safe shutdown of each l
3-6 l
unit.
For further discussion, see Section 5.9 of " Fire Protection Associated Cable Report, Zion 1 & 2, July 1982."
C.2 Physical Configuration:
The charging pump 2A power feed (cable 32274) will be routed from fire zone 11.3A-2 into the Unit 2 pipe chase in a three-hour fire wrapped conduit.
A minimum horizontal distance of approximately 31 feet separates cable 32274, in the pipe chase, from the charging pump 2B power feed (cable 20076) and the charging pump 2B unit cooler power feed (cable 20680).
There is also an intervening two foot thick concrete wall between cable 32274 and the two
()
cables 20076 and 20680.
These walls form the northeast corner of the pipe chase cubicle.
All cable trays pene-trating these pipe chase walls have fire stops.
C.3 Intervening Area:
The only significant intervening combustibles between cable 20076 and cables 20680 and 32274 are cable insulation.
2 The fire load in the intervening area is 3,000 Btu /ft plus the transient load.
The intervening area contains three ionization detectors, one CO fire extinguisher and one hose station.
2 3-7
C.4 Adjacent Area:
The only significant combustibles adjacent to the inter-vening area for the Unit 2 charging pump power cables are cable insulation, four gallons of lubricating oil in each motor driven AFW pump and three gallons in the turbine driven AFW pump.
Fire loading for these adjacent 2
combustibles is 8,000 Btu /ft D.1 System Exemption Requested:
In Fire Area 11.3-0, an exemption is requested to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a for redundant Unit 2 residual heat removal pump power feeds which
({}
are not separated by three-hour fire barriers.
The operation of either residual heat removal pump and its unit cooler is required for cold shutdown for each unit.
For further discussion, see Section 5.13 of " Fire Protection Associated Cable Report, Zion 1 & 2, July 1982."
D.2 Physical Configuration:
A minimum horizontal distance of approximately 150 feet separates the residual heat removal pump 2A power feed (cable 32294 in riser R534) from the residual heat removal pump 2B power feed (cable 20504 in riser R509).
There
()
is no direct line of sight between risers R534 and R509 3-8
due to the intervening three-hour fire walls of the
()
centrifugal charging pump cubicles and the two foot thick concrete walls of the pipe chase cubicle.
All cable trays that penetrate these walls have fire stops.
D.3 Intervening Area:
The only significant intervening combustibles between risers R534 and R509 are cable insulation.
The fire 2
load in the intervening area is 10,000 Btu /f t plus
~
the transient load.
The intervening area contains three ionization detectors, O
one portable CO fire extinguisher and two fire hose 2
stations.
D.4 Adjacent Area:
The significant combustibles adjacent to the intervening area for the Unit 2 RHR pump power feeds are cable insula-tion and four gallons of lubricating oil in each motor driven AFW pump and the three gallons in the turbine driven AFW pump.
The fire loading for these adjacent 2
combustibles is 5,000 Btu /ft
(:)
3-9
3.5 Conclusion for Area Exemption:
An exemption to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a is requested in Fire Area 11.3-0; Auxiliary Building floor elevation 579'-0".
This exemption request is for four safe shutdown systems which have redundant components, but whose components are not separated by a three-hour rated barrier.
i These redundant components are :
1.
Power cables in risers for six service water pumps.
2.
Power cables in cable trays and risers for Unit 1 centrifugal charging pump and their unit coolers.
O 3.
Power cables in cable trays and risers for Unit 2 centrifugal charging pump and their unit coolers.
4.
Power cables in risers for Unit 2 RHR pumps and their unit coolers.
We believe that the in-depth fire protection features in this area are equivalent to the fire protection requirements i
of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a and that the exemption is justified for the following reasons:
e Only IEEE-383 qualified cable is used in this area's solid bottom steel cable trays, conduit and enclosed risers.
3-10
e Cable trays are supported at least four feet below the beamed ceiling.
This precludes cable damage f rom unac-O ceptable temperature and heat flux caused by either a floor level exposure fire or channelized hot gar, s at the ceiling.
e Fire stops installed at all wall, ceiling and floor penetrations, e
Low fire loading in intervening areas.
e Intervening two foot thick walls in this area prevent direct line of sight for radiant heat transfer between redundant components of the centrifugal charging system
()
and service water system.
e Wide physical separation and two foot thick intervening walls between RHR risers.
e Area wide redundant fire detection system using ionization de tec tor s.
- e Automatic CO2 puff fire suppression system, installed over the AFW pumps, will extinguish any fire in the immediate area of the AFW pumps.
o Portable CO fire extinguishers and hose stations are 2
(
installed in this area.
t l
3-11 l
_.. _ - _. _. _. _.. _ _ =
e Therefore, it is not credible that any postulated fire in this area would reach proportions capable of preventing safe shutdown.
O f
9 I
j e
l l
I i
e' I
?
O 9
9 t
i l
l i
i
)
l l.
l f
I d
i lO i
3-12 i
4.1 Fire Area:
Fire Area'11.4-0; Auxiliary Building, floor elevation 592'-0";
Figure 11.4-0; Fire Protection SER Section 5.11.
I 4.2 General Description of Fire Area:
The large area common to Units 1 and 2 is divided by shield or fire walls into several closed rooms and passageways.
The rooms contain heat exchangers, drum radwaste storage
~
1 areas, valve operating equipment, boric acid evaporation equipment, an enclosed elevator and two enclosed stairwells with two-hour fire rated walls.
The passageways contain boric acid tanks and associated equipnent, various other tanks,
()
removable hatches, solid bottom steel cable trays, enclosed risers, MCC's, three stairwells, and an open hatchway.
The floor slab at elevation 592'-0" varies in thickness from 13-inches to 36-inches.
Total floor area is approximately 4
2.2 x 10 sq. ft.
The volume of the room is approximately 5
5.5 x 10 cu. ft.
All the auxiliary building perimeter walls are 36-inches thick, extend up to the ceiling and carry a three-hour fire rating.
The ceiling height is approximately 25 feet.
Steel ceiling support beams run east-west and extend 6 to 45-inches below the ceiling.
Conduit and solid bottom cable trays are installed at least five feet below the ceiling.
4-1
4.3 Fire Protection Features:
c
()
In the event of a fire in this area, the following equipment is available:
a.
Thirteen portable CO fire extinguishers are located 2
at column / row:
e i.
L/29 in the vermiculite and cement mixing room, ii.
L/27 just outside the vermiculite and cement mixing room, iii.
J/25 near the liquid-waste control panel, O
iv.
J/22 over the covered hatches, v.
L/20 six near the UL-approved flammable liquid storage cabinets, vi.
H/17 outside the primary sample room, vii.
N/22 & N/20 two in the vicinity of the elevator.
b.
Four fire hose stations are located in this area at column / row:
O i.
L/28 4-2
ii.
N/20
()
iii.
H/13 iv.
L/25 c.
Seventeen ionization detectors are located in this area at column / row:
i.
K/25
- 11. ~ H/I7-24 six over monitor and boric acid tanks iii.
H/17 O
iv.
L-H/16, L-H/13, L-H/ll v.
M/21 across from the elevator
~
d.
This area is equipped with a sprinkler system protecting the charcoal absorber bank at column / row L/25, which is surrounded by a partial concrete wall.
The sprinkler system is initiated by temperature detectors located in the charcoal absorber bank.
e.
This auxiliary building area is a limited access area.
O f.
Portable ventilation equipment is available in this area.
4-3
4.4 System Within Fire Area where Licensee has Asked for Exemption
(}
Request:
A.1 System Exemption Requested:
In Fire Area 11.4-0, an exemption is requested to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a for redundant Unit 1 cen'trifugal charging pump power feeds which are not separated by three-hour fire barriers.
The operation of either centrifugal charging pump and its unit cooler l's required for safe shutdown of each unit.
For further discussion, see Section 3.9 of " Fire Protection Associated Cable Report, Zion 1 & 2, July 1982."
O A.2 Physical Configuration:
The minimum horizontal separation between charging pump 1A power feed (cable 42295) and charging pump 1B power feed (cable 10680 is riser R197) is 35 feet.
There is a steel 21,600 gallon water tank (monitor tank) be tween the two power feeds.
In addition, cable 42295 is routed in conduit and there is no communicating cable tray path between the power cable and the riser.
A.3 Intervening Area:
The only significant intervening combustible is the transient fire load.
4-4
The intervening area contains one ionization detector.
()
A.4 Adjacent Area:
The only significant combustibles adjacent to the inter-vening area are cable insulation in cable trays.
The fire load for the adjacent area is 4,800 Btu /f t2, B.1 System Exemption Requested:
In Fire Area 11.4-0, an exemption is requested to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a for redundant Unit 2 centrifugal charging pump power feeds.
These cables are not separated by three-hour fire barriers.
O The operation of either centrifugal charging pump and its unit cooler is required for safe shutdown of each unit.
For further discussion, see Section 5.9 of " Fire Protection Associated Cable Report, Zion 1 & 2, July 1982."
B.2 Physical Configuration:
A minimum horizontal distance of 158 feet separates charging pump 2A power feed (cable 32295 in riser R536) from charging pump 2B power feed (cable 20680 in riser R513).
There is no direct line of sight between risers R536 and R513.
Between these risers are the two foot thick concrete walls of the boric acid evaporator cubicle and the three-hour fire walls of the seal water heat 4-5
.c n.
-N s 4, s
y.
a v $g
%\\t
\\
exchanger and letdown heat' exchange cubicle's.
There 4
~
is no communicating cable. tray path bedwe'en the two risers.
s s
g x.,
n m
[w B.3 Intervening Area:
1
=
1 6
?
\\
s L
ss The significant intervening-combusdib2'c's between risers s
(
RS36 and R513 are cabfe',insu]ation.
The fire load in s
. t.
~
,.g the intervening area _is19,003: Bte/ft plus the transient 1
,4 s
load.
c g:
s s ' l A, 1.
. n, N
.:x,
s 1
i The intervening area contair'd< six,ionizati'on detectore
['
% >+
\\
and seven portable CO fire extinguirhers.
t 2
i Ls O
B.4 Adsecene meem
'N
':, N The only significant combustibles adjacent to' the inte$-
vening arca are cable insulation in cable trays and metal UL rated flamtsable li' uid storage cabinets near M/21 q
.J
\\
1 containing flammable liguld.e, estimated to be equivalent >
s to four 55 gallon: drums of lubr}.cating cil. ' The fire 2
load for the adjacent area is 25,000 Etu/f t s
t
\\s C.1 System Exemption Requested:
\\ i t
y In Fire Area 11.4-0, an exemption is requested VM 10-CFR 50, Appendix,R,Section III.G. 2.a for thd'servic:e g
O water pump power cables.
All six poaer cables are located 4-6
i, in this fire zone and are not separated by three-hour
, o fire barriers.
The operation of any two out of six
~
()
service water pumps, through cross connecting headers in the crib house and auxiliary building, is required for safe shutdown of both units.
For further discus-sion,'see Section 3.7 of " Fire Protection Associated Cable Report, Zion 1 & 2, July 1982."
C.2 Physical Configuration:
1 A minimum horizontal distance of 147 feet separates the service water pumps lA, 1B and 1C power feeds (cable
~
10624 in riser R172, cable 10625 in riser R171 and cable 10626 in riser 170) from service water pumps 2A, 2B fg and 2C power feeds (cable 20624 in riser R501, cable V
20625 in riser R502, and cable 20626 in riser R504).
There is no direct line of sight hetween the Unit 1 riser group and the Unit 2 riser group. Between the riser groups are two two-hour rated fire walls for the enclosed stairwell, four 21,600 gallon steel monitor tanks, two boric acid tanks and two concrete walls each one 'foat four-inches thick of the primary sample room.
There is no communicating cable tray path between these two riser groups.
C.3 Intervening Area:
[])
The only sigt kficant intervening combustibles between rise'rs are cable insulation.
The fire load in the inte r-2 vening area is 2,000 Btu /ft plus the transient load.
4-7
The intervening area contains eight ionization detectors and one portable CO fire extinguisher.
~
2 1
C.4 Adjacent Area:
The only significant combustibles adjacent to the inter-vening area cable insulation in cable trays.
The fire load for the adjacent area is 9,100 Btu /ft D.1 System Exemption Requested:
In Fire Area 11.4-0, an exemption is requested to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a for redundant Unit 2 residual heat removal pump power feeds which
()
are not separated by three-hour fire barriers.
The operation of any one of two residual heat removal pumps and its unit cooler is required for cold shutdown of each unit.
For further discussion, see Section 5.13 of " Fire Protection Associated Cable Report, Zion 1 & 2, July 1982."
D.2 Physical Configuration:
l A minimum horizontal distance of 158 feet separates l
residual heat removal pump 2A power feed (cable 32294 1
in riser R535) from residual heat removal pump 2B power feed (cable 20504 in riser R510).
There is no direct O
line, of sight between risers R535 and RS10 due to the 4-8 L_
two foot thick concrete walls of the boric acid evaporator cubicle and the three-hour rated fire walls of the seal water heat exchanger and letdown heat exchanger cubicles.
There is no communicating cable tray path between the two risers.
D.3 Intervening Area:
The only significant intervening combustibles between risers RS31 and R510 are cable insulation load.
The fire load in the intervening area is 9,000 Btu /f t plus the transient load.
()
The intervening area contains six ionization detectors and seven portable CO fire extinguishers.
2 D.4 Adjacent Area:
The only significant combustibles adjacent to the inter-vening area are cable insulation in cable trays and metal UL rated flammable liquid storage cabinets near M/21 containing flammable liquids, estimated to be equivalent to four 55 gallon drums of lubricating oil.
The fire 2
load for the adjacent area is 25,000 Btu /f t O
4-9
E.1 System Exemption Requested:
i In Fire Area 11.4-0, an exemption is requested to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a for the Unit 2 motor -driven AFW pump power feeds and the power feeds for the steam isolation valve for this turbine driven AFW pump.
These power feeds are not separated by three-hour fire barriers.
The operation of any one of the three AFW pumps is required for safe shutdown of the unit.
For further discussion, see Section 5.10 of " Fire Protection Associated Cable Report, Zion 1 & 2, July 1982."
E.2 Physical Configuration:
A minimum horizontal distance of approximately 158 feet separates Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump 2B power feed (cable 20083 in riser R538) from AFW pump 2C power feed (cable 2008I in riser R510) and 2MOV-MS0006 valve feed (cable 20098 in riser R513).
2MOV-MS0006 is a normally 1
open steam line isolation valve to the turbine driven AFW pump 2A.
There is no direct line of sight between these risers due to the two foot thick concrete walls l
t of the boric acid evaporator cubicle and the three-hour fire walls of the seal water heat exchanger and letdown heat exchanger cubicles.
There is no communicating cable tray path between these risers.
l l
l 4-10
E.3 Intervening Area:
~
()
The only significant intervening combustibles between riser RS38 and risers R513 and R510 are cable insulation.
2 The fire load in the intervening area is 9,000 Btu /ft The intervening area contains six ionization detectors and seven' portable CO fire extinguishers.
2 E.4 Adjacent Area:
The only significant combustibles adjacent to the inter-vening area are cable insulation in cable trays and metal UL Lated flammable liquid storage cabinets near M/21 containing flammable liquids, estimated to be equivalent to four 55 gallon drums of lubricating oil.
The fire load for the adjacent area is 25,000 Btu /f t F.1 System Exemption Recuested:
In Fire Area 11.4-0, an exemption is requested to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a for redundant l
auxiliary feedwater flow signal cab'.es which are not separated by three-hour fire barriers.
The operation I
of any one of four feedwater flow channels is required for safe shutdown of the unit.
For further discussion, see Section 4.1 of " Fire Protection Associated Cable
(
Report, Zion 1 & 2, July 1982.."
4-11
F.2 Physical Configuration:
()
For a worst case fire in the vicinity of signal cables 35910 (flow transmitter 2FW25), 35911 (flow transmitter (2FWO4) and 35875 (flow transmitter 2FWO3) at H/16-14, there is a minimum horizontal separation of approxmiately 48 feet between these cables and signal cable 35874 (flow transmitter 2FWO2).
Cables 35910, 35911 and 35875 are separated from cable 35874 (in conduit) by the 2'-0" concrete walls of the boric acid evaporator cubicle and the three-hour fire rated walls of the seal water heat exchanger and letdown heat exchanger cubicle.
There is no communicating cable tray path between cables 35910, 35911 and 35875, and cable 35874.
O F.3 Intervening Area:
The only significant combustibles are cable insulation.
2 The fire load in the interv ning area is 7,700 Btu /f t plus a transient load.
The intervening area contains five ionization detectors and seven portable CO fire extinguishers.
2 F.4 Adjacent Area:
The only significant combustibles adjacent to the inter-(
vening area are cable insulation and metal UL flammable I
4-12
liquid storage cabinets near M/21, containing flammable
(])
liquids estimated to be equivalent to four 55 gallon drums of lubricating oil.
The fire load for the adjacent 2
area is 25,500 Btu /ft 4.5 Conclusion for Area Exemption:
An exemption to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.h is requested in Fire Area 11.4-0 Auxiliary Building floor elevation 592'-0".
This exemption request is for six safe shutdown systems which have redundant components but whose components are not separated by a three-hour rated barrier.
These redundant components are:
1.
Power cables in risers for the six service water pumps.
2.
Power cables in conduit and risers for Unit 1 centrifugal l
charging pumps.
I 3.
Power cables in risers for Unit 2 centrifugal charging pumps.
4.
Power cables in risers for Unit 2 RHR pumps.
5.
Power cables in risers for Unit 2 AFW pump power feed and steam isolation valve for turbine driven AFW pump 2A.
4-13
6.
Auxiliary feedwater flow signal cable-in conduit and w
cable tray.
~
We believe that the in-depth fire protection features in this area are equivalent to the fire protection requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a and that the exemption is justified for the following reasons:
o Only IEEE-383 qualified cable is used in this area's solid bottom steel cable trays, conduit and enclosed risers.
e Cable trays and conduit are installed at least five feet below the beamed ceiling.
This precludes cable
()
damage from unacceptable temperatures and heat flux from either a floor level exposure fire or channelized hot gases in the ceiling.
No communicating cable tray' path exists between redundant e
components.
e The area wide ionization detectors provide early warning.
e Portable CO fire extinguishers and fire hose stations 2
are located throughout the area.
The fire loading is low in the intervening and adjacent e
<-\\-)'
area.between redundant components.
4-14
~
o Intervening walls prevent direct line of sight for radiant
~
O heat treaster betweea reduaaeae co eonents.
Therefore, it is not credible that any postulated fire in this area would reach proportions capable of preventing safe shutdown.
1 9
1 1
!O i
o j
i I
l l
l O
4-15
5.1 Fire !,ea:
)
Fire Area 11.5-0; Auxiliary Building; floor elevation 617'-0";
Figure 11.5-0; Fire Protection SER Section 5.10.
5.2 General Description of Fire Area:
This floor of the Auxiliary Building is area common to Units 1 and 2.
It is divided by shield walls into several closed rooms and passageways.
The rooms contain. laundry facilities, radwaste facilities, air-conditioning equipment, purge systems, volume control tanks, an enclosed elevator and two enclosed stairwells with two-hour fire rated walls.
The radiation
()
protection office, radiological laboratories, and counting rooms are also located in this area.
The passageways contain component cooling surge tanks, 480 volt switchgear, one stair-well, and several covered hatches.
The floor slab at elevation 617'-0" varies in thickness f rom j
6-inches to 45-inches.
Total floor area is approximately 4
2 x 10 sq. ft.
The volume of the room is approximately 5
5 x 10 cu. ft.
All the auxiliary building perimeter walls are 36-inches thick, extend up to the ceiling and carry a l
three-hour fire rating.
5-1
The ceiling height is approximately 25 feet.
The ceiling is structural reinforced concrete and varies in thickness O
~
from 6-inches to 48-inches.
Steel ceiling support beams run east-west and extend 6-inches to 48-inches below the c alling.
Condtlit and solid bottom cable trays are installed at least five feet below the ceiling.
5.3 Fire Protection Features:
a.
Fif teen portable CO fire extinguishers are located 2
at column / row:
i.
K/28 O
11.
x/26 111.
K/23 iv.
H/23 v.
G/20-21.
t vi.
J/19 vii.
H/17 viii.
G/15 O
5-2
ix; H/14 x.
L/18 i
t xi.
M/21 s
xii.
R/17-23 d
b.
Four fire hose stations are located in this area at column / row:
i 1.
L/26 ii.
H/20 l
O 111.
H/14 iv.
N/20 i
c.
Thirty-one ionization detectors are located in this area at column / row:
e 1.
K/25 11.
L-G/ll-14 111.
L/15-20 O
iv.
N/17-22 5-3
)
d.
This auxiliary building area is a limited access area.
O e.
Portable ventilation equipment is available in this area.
5.4 System Within Fire Area where Licensee has Asked for Exemption Request:
A.1 System Exemption Requested:
In Fire Area 11.5-0, an exemption is requested to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a for redundant Unit 1 centrifugal charging pump power feeds which are not separated by three-hour fire barriers.
The operation
()
of either centrifugal charging pump and its unit cooler is required for safe shutdown of each unit.
For further dis cuss ion, see Sect" ion 3.9 of " Fire Protection Associated Cable Report, Zion 1 & 2, July 1982."
i A.2 Physical Configuration:
i The minimum horizontal separation,between charging pump 1A power feed (cable 42295) and charging pump la power feed (cable 10680 in riser R197) is 28 feet.
- However, the intervening 8-inch masonary walls of the radiation protection office walls and two-hour fire rated walls of the enclosed stairwell, Fire Area 3.1B-1, are between the power feeds.
As indicated on Figure 11.5-0, cable 42295 5-4 l-
is routed in conduit in an area between the east wall
()
of the radiation protection office and a three-hour fire wall from G/23 to G/25.
There is no communicating cable tray path between the two charging pump power cables.
A.3 Intervening Area:
The only significant intervening combustibles between.
charging pump 1A power feed (cable 42295) and charging pump 1B power feed (cable 10680 in riser R197) are cable insulation.
The fire load in the intervening area is 1,500 Btu /ft plus the transient load.
O A.4 Adjacent Area:
There are no significant combustibles adjacent to the intervening area between th'e risers.
i 5.5 Conclusion for Area Exemption:
l l
~
l An exemption to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R,'Section III.G.2.a is requested in Fire Area 11.5-0 Auxiliary Building floor elevation 617'-0".
This exemption request is for the redundant I
s l
centrifugal charging pump power feeds which are not separated by a three-hour rated barrier.
O 5-5 i
We believe that the in-depth fire protection features in
()
this area are equivalent to the fire protection requirements of 10 CPR 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2.a and that the i
exemption is justified for the following reasons:
e Only IEEE-383 qualified cable is used in this area's solid bottom steel cable trays, conduit and enclosed
- risers, o
Cable trays are installed at least 5 feet below the beamed ceiling.
This precludes cable damage f rom unac-ceptable temperature and heat flux caused by either a floor level exposure fire or channelized hot gases at the ceiling.
e Two intervening 2-hour fire rated walls in this area prevent direct line of sight for radiant heat transfer between redundant component's of the centrifugal charging system.
e The low fire loading in the intervening area.
e Therefore, it is not credible that any postulated fire in this area would reach proportions capable of preventing safe shutdown.
9 O
5-6
b LEGEND go.o-of 'tWP1CATE6 FIIGi 20HE IWicATES WdffcAL CABLE ltl6Er.
O IMFICATES CABLE IN CONPLIIT O INPICATES CABLE f.00TEP IN CA.TEAY IMPICATE$ SMOKE PETECTOlt O
INPicATes Ars ExTimusuer UMtTI
,e I
L _
_1 L
I 1
i O
E I
is.'
y O
N n
ior.t4
-io<,a ior,to-O O
h"
]
i O
"2 O
O O
g v
29'- f 20'-(
30' i Oii
(
5 CRIB HOUSE PLAN EL.552'rl '
ZION STATION UNIT 142 COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS NO NOTES YFik g
r__
UNIT 2.
a.
.e I
w L
I rA-O Lux.1s zos24 -
n ux.1s e O
O O
O g
30'-4 26'- 4"
~
29 '- 7
FIG. MO. 18.4 A-O
LEGEND
~.- %
1l0.0 01 INDICATE 6 FIRE ZONE.
A INDICATES 10NIZ ATlON DETECTOR.
O INDICATES FIRE E% TIN 6ul56E.R.
c22221 INDICATES CABLE ROUTED IN CA TRAY.
M* INolCATES cal 5LE, IN CONDUIT.
CEs3 INDICATES VERTICAL CABLE. AtSE.R INDICATE 5 CO: surrteuxwe UHn1 i
5 INDICATES FIRE HOSE STATION I
L I
L l
I I
u r
ua 7
i u
a Cle;u aTim i
i
- (e)
(e)
(e)
<ee
~~, s I
a g
'A 30 05 I
A 1gg Klot 10G16 e cl0G15 10614
- F1
/
\\NN s
.?
A SEMvicE. WATER O
Q 8006TER POMP *0A" O
o
?? a A
a
?*-
if a v
v v
r TOR DRIVEN lD MO service MTER FIRE PUMP OA g
B0OSTER POMP '06" (OFP006)
(INNI p
g a
w (00T1 u
r t r,
- ~
30-4 29'-7 '
2e'. 4" fd 8
(
CRIB HOUSE INNER & OUTERM PLAN EL. 594'-O" ZION STATION UNIT 142 COMMONWEALTH EDISON 'CO.
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS NO.
NOTES 1.
PH0Vt0E0 Fon FIRE AREA 16.45-0 100FM50-pmsT., FIRE 4 DIX R exsm
-Q BETWEEM UHITro e
UNIT 2 1
a u
u et 4 TEE PLMF MOTORS
~
l 1
l 1
- ((+)j
((+))
((+))
EW. It00H) n-
)
9 E
r o
E ll "NK5)ot Ngg a
% -K1)O4 g
c 20614 20625 +
- 10626 A
P N L KE111#4t M curg
/
j f
EE*td Q
G A d sw 2A 23 0
2C 4&O ir emw) e o
r-r m
4A-0 2 EDOM) r, r
r, r
~
30'.4" 26'-4 29-7" B
FIG. NO.18.48-0
LEGEND 110.0-01lblCATE9 FIRE ZONE.
(
A INDICATES 10HlZATl0H DETECTOR.
O INDICATEG; FIRE EXTEUlGHER.
J
' c28
- INDICATES CADLE RouTEDlu CA. TRAY.
2.G - O' i
l'1 -(s*
i b:ss INDICATE 9 CABLE IN COND0lT.
p.
=
EC IMDtCATE9 VERTICAL CADLE RibER.
M INDICATES CON 00tT WITH SHR Fife WRAR i
h INDICAT86 co '3usvtE% ION
[
- - HOLD cu o
O INDICATES COLUMN W
INDICATErs FIRE WOSE STATION I
Mc4M94--
Op L i
O tupscArms Tumo4AL. psTscrot II 2E-1 o
- o
-6 w& w a
ON
-f '
IMtio,l%\\1,
- c0M1NHMmMT l
IMI6 7 WDt N4f ELEY.
,4 l
f
'41 i
A
'd
$229 N
32274%
sue-h storwmE TAWK
<ll E
_?
i
~
N 22'-9
~
22'-3'
~29'-O' IG'-O'
_ g-J
-g II.2C-l 8
=
i OL
- 6 g
i 11.28-l l POLL 6HlW6 LAUNDM ll.2A-1 l "O.
DO4tMEMUT.ER' DAAlW TAMKS I
$p4pg "A
N_ cuSICLE
~9 gA 55UY IMAC110W NMP Ol6KLES G--
L.-
j
(,
~
_l
.os s =p a - 0 M......._.
\\
' 'th*'
7 A
~ ~ ~ - -
~ _ _::: :. ::._.~ _ ::
\\
/
_4 m---
j
... _ ~ := = =. - = = = n = r y
bd h
CCL _
gy OH 1
LL iI
-O
- t y
d A
A
& I OM lj'kh M
Itta--.
=*
a saut r
s
>1 h
y gI cutscLE s
s tim 4TE aan consPREmen cus.sc.LES
. (gg COMP 0HENT L 1001 yif
~-
n-
AUXILIARY BLDG.
f N
- T*
PLAN-ELEVATION 566-O
U NIT 1 &2 ZION STATION COMMONWEALTH EDISON.CO.
p CHIC AGO, ILLINOIS
'_ [1-Gs _
2G'- O' NO.
NOTES PgtDg,nfueosTg f it.2-0 i
r.x so UP Tuin -
blCLES
- E2GG, m Mcc2599s I
[
g]_
\\
II.2E-2 I
't4M i
i kN l-[ >422M m
V~2---CONTAINMEMT SPIW httST pump cualct.E f
s22% --
A
[, emx REFUELlW6 r,,.1,.2 y~.,-
L A
l_
b b
'- b' b>' b [ NOR P
IG'- O' 2 9'-O' 22 '
22-
~
ll.2C-Z g/ Cg j
=
fJ w
u
- g q
II.2k2 l 11.2 5 - 2 CEINE /#
swETY WMDION PUMP CUSKLE i um CHENKE F-q lCU5'CLES
[
Q cosicLE l
@Q
_q
~
l.2-0l g
i NWN 019 00 m-i 0
_.----,- L-8 M El-e a
y ff
-sn?!l22*es R
~
=** M a g,yg-usM' t
t w=
c,wo CNLES STORAGE i
- @ooLING PUMP 9 acc hiu2 9HED m
m w
-[2fM"'*
FIG. HO.11.2-0 1
h LEGEND ig1RDICATE9 FIRE ZOME INDICATE 9 IOWlZATION DETECTOR 16'-O' 11' 6' O
INDICATES FIRE EXTlHGul9HER h.
N INDICATES CABLE ROUTED lW CA. TRAY SIuplCATES CABLE IN CONDUlT hc I
3 RIDEATES VERTICAL CABLE Ribe I
HOLD 1 454DICATES CONDUITlulTH SHR. FIRE WlGW,?
l cygj 182 notCATE9 Cdk DUPPRES910H Ij
- fcg, O
inoicATED CotowW
/
W IND6CATE9 FIRE HQ9E STATiced O
luo6 CATES THERMAL DETECTOR 9
'g
~
esp REMOTE SUTPOWN FAMEL
?
l j
'S 7 rih i
-}
w
?
REFUELtHG EL.
c_
g ulATER R2M-N STORAGE.
hn
)[19241 L --H lu.Sc-1 M
RE610U tu^*E o
s m4e h
CublCLE
" g C H A rtal d IF M49 42295
-s REM M 10ceo,'
ill.9A-1 h ii E
I Q
1 OERVICE AREA l
g
-A C
L L,-
BPARE 0
C 42215' CUBICLE i
?
I64.2A-0]
IFErMd
-42ZTl Re;.
r. il-m ~
~
~
r t
IllDD-i i
.T STORAGE g
WY Q Cg M INTECTION M
AREA 99 n
~y'g l
[ ILt-0 ]
-a h
lgo6 4,m h
-5 I
+
4
- RitER, O
<4
=su e
hNQ c626 n(
llLS-01 h%
"hh
- R19ER,
[ - 441
@F s, s, 3
42295
_j RillP QRrl2
' 0% IN 10 Rill INTO BOX RtSER es, up s
~
22.'. 3" _
2 2'- S' 29'0"
_ i v. o"_
21'- 9' 21'- 9'
,,7 G
~~
AUXILIARY BLDG O
i pSETWEEN PLAN-ELEVATIO N 579'- O uuiTs ZION STATION-UNIT 1&F iT V t t,'. o "
N CHIC AGO, ILLINOIS COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
1 NO.
NOTES l
1.
FEdersP Foet Pts AEEA ft.1-0 TAHK 4
{
WWMrfl[ma
{LE9 c
\\
meER sLES g
I
'32294 r
i
,lHR10ER i
i-9-/1 1
hi R5%
7'32235IH
[
- El*>ER
("
'322M lH REFUELim 3
,Rl9ER litt-o 1 tilATER BTORAGE i
q TAMR AL HEAT I
2M41 H
E (l
CUBICLE
'GEMTRlFUGAL CHARGIM CUBlCLES 23243
[
[fNMP CU61CLE9 1) 0
=5
'223 e
,3 4y j h
E
~
OPARE p
&g gu y,;g,nga,gEMiM.
Of 322,TI 7_' _
. w m s j._)
p 922 i' Y-M2%
ill3B-3
,[
5-m g,
' hMP Y-
- f,
~~
AREA 20Mb EN E509 g3 It I
20016 h
>i
+j g
L-N Reit ga
_3 w
q m
E,oi i-MM U
zany i
2=, 4 -\\
(NORTH zw.
m v
AN NMP> i e amm x
i x.
_'CONCEMTRATE'> HOLDING l R504 j \\
'20(e2(, iN
\\
'AHn0H CATioH tam CueictE nieEn oEnin.
2i -,'
2i.9' l
is.o" 29:o" 22.3-2 z'. 3-i OM;T 2
' l' T
2 FIG. NO.11. 3-O
LEGEND M4NDICATEO FIRE ZONE S
IMDiCATE9 10HlZAT10H DETECTOR UHIT I O
INDICATE 9 FIRE EXT 1HGUISHER "2h IMDiCATE9 CABLE ROUTED IN CA. TRAY hINDICATES CABLEIM CONDulT I
Z lHDICATE9 VEltilCAL CA.R19ER ntt IHDICATES COWxitT ullTH SHR. FIRE ultN PEWINEEALil h
INDICATE 9 C0gSUPPREbe10H "o
[]
INDICATES COLUMH
-E E
e INDICATE 9 FIRE HOSE STAT 10H O
INDICATED TERMAL DETECTORO 7
b
.N g:
=<
REFUEllHG m
r_
UMTER sttS4 id-STORAGE I
e4EE OM ff
-TAWK o
/
I I A_
o
( / SEALWATER HEAT,
EXCH. CualcLE "ss l
VERMICULITE AND s
-N T CEMENT MIXIHG ROOM LETDOLUM HEAT EXCH.cu61cLC,
lit.4A-l l i
2 e
e N
g i
o BORIC
'h AR e
J-CUBICLE 3
K
- -{-y e
RApuneTE i
iI.4-0 I e
_. 2 11 1. 4 - o 1 f--
l
-4 EMAPORATOR DEUM l
AREA pig RIS1 N
106 60 IN RiBER l
CUINCtf RMi t
1
^
10625 tHRitER
- a a
IOM4 IM Ri9ER 42235m C0HC
' E'.Y.\\
IND Rn1 i
7i x
A j MolltTOR MONITOR MONITolt u MC n
Y TJ N
10426 IN Ri9ER j a
, TANK Roe g,.
?.2 t' 22'-t' 19'- O' IG'- O' 2 G'-O' IT-G' L
~~
AUXILIARY BLDG.
PLAN-ELEVATION 592'- O" Z ION STATION-U NIT 1& 2-N D'*""
U" COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
D i
UNIT 1 C HICAGO, ILLINOIS I'
NO.
NOTES f
1.
PROVIDED FOR FIRE AREA 11.4-0 y
10cFR50- APPENDIX R FIRE EXEMPTIOM REQUEST.
LEE Arum M
L
--fwDp.
4' 2000S IN RISER
- Mi ggSS
~
32295 INIQWE lK REF'JEl.ING I
L WTER E555 l
STORAGE g
l l
TAHK x
' SEAL WATER HEAT \\
l'E**
f.XcH.cu6tcLE.
4
'LETDOWH HEAT INf((g[jyAltB lit.4A-2 ]
,ExcH. c.usicLE v'
'w' d
i i
a i
BORIC ACID EVAP.
A
< ~mt, CUBICLE A Q&
' WM'*
\\
s 1
EKit6 d
'toso4,1D064 R901 1:
'20G24 IN
, N DY g
I 06251 se t
---O a
a PRIMARY R
R ESIS 111.4 - 0 1 SAMPLE R50f.
NITot 600C 60mc ROOM R581
- R 504 g
ACIP AciF N'
=
NK- ) TANK ' 1hNIC
- 20026 lb.lD-11 (7
/
l j-4' e
2l-9" 2 1'- 9 : _
_19 -0*_
29 '- O "
21'-38 Y822-Sj i
1 i
t FIG. NO.11. 4-O
LEGEND T0 @ lHDICATES FIRE ZONE r q1 1HDICATE9 IOHlZATION DETECTOR O
luDEATE9 FIRE EXT 1HGUltHER UNIT 1 th 2221T INDICATEe CA. ROUTED lH CA. TRAY L22213 1HDiCATE9 CABLE lH CoHDUIT
~
i_,
e E INDICATE 6 VERTICAL CA.Rl9ER
@ IHmCATE6 COND.10lTH $HR.fitE IURAP IMDiCATE9 CO SUPPRESS 10H 2
O iHDicATE9 C0tuMu
=
m INDICATES FIRE H06E 9 TAT 10N f- :
O INDICATE 6 TERMAL DETECTOR 9
/.
/
gu I11. 5 - 0 1 ELEV.
_=
r_
SUPPLY &
EVHAtFJT OM TV/
cuelcLE
_}.
9Y9 TEM h -
coma.
e-;
fuK a a I
i N
llL56-1 l-s 4
?
e
~
'l h,0HTAM1 HATED lll'6-0 I LAUNDRY Room f,LOTHES HAMPER
-e
~h 4
gry_g,1
~
- a
---uV
~~
)
e DEcou HA6K ROOM Room "e
EVA TOR RAmuASTE Ill.5-0 1 j
CUBICLE ENAPORATOR M
CUblCLE ER M
114.4C-0}---{ L
,._ggy)
,_73 5'
~
4-I CONFEREHCE y
SPENT goog 1
REblH
\\
=
m p
5TORAGE k-o ECON RAD 0NTICE U
J y
GUBlCLE., 5 h
RCluTY l',,
g
! m{ F td 2<
S 422951R BOX et, UP M
J 22'- 3" 2 2'- 3'
' _ _d-O' IG'-O'
'8 8
2G i 11'-G" l_
21
--e e
e
@e
AUXILI ARY BLDG.
PLAN-ELEVATION 617'- O" bETWEEM UNITS Z lO N STATIO N-U NIT 1 & 2__,
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
C HICAGO,lLLINOIS NO.
NO TES s
n L
PROVIDED FOR FIRE AREA 11.5-0 locFR50- APPENDIX R FIRE EYEMPTiOH REQUEST.
"O
-b
[
~
N O
O
~b o
'\\
- g
=
b SUPPLY v.
EXHAu9T
/
~
BYSTEM
=
CUblCLE
\\
l RUME COWTROL l
I l
--IlL5B-2l O
l__
O A1R C0HDm0H\\HG EQUlPMEMT ROOM 4
r\\
b t
=
1 I
I COUNTlHG
-)
N ROOM HOT LABORAT@
d
), 3
)
e 4
a enomG AREA f
)D1.ADORATORY K
,g g
l f
IILOA-0]
l l
I I
-3 2 i' - 9' 21-s" n'- e' '
22'-d' 2 2'- d' 8
60 1
FIG. NO.11. 5-O
1 LEGEND ird INPICATES Fife 20HE i
>T*
INPICATES VECTCAL CABLE ltl6EE O lWFICATES cat %E IN CONPulT O INPicATE$ CABLE lCOUTEP IN CA.TEAY O
invicATes mom PETecTc*.
O INPicATe9 FIEE EXTIN(eUWWEC i
i l
UMIT t I
g I
e a
i a
- 16..
l 1
O.
N
& 10614
% io626 10619 -
- e O
O v
~
.d i
-1 f
g CNM fl0Z 2 01 O
O d
g u
PL 29'. f ze' t so'. 4"
~S
CRIB HOUSE PLAN EL. 552'-3' ZION STATION UNIT 142 COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
CHICA GO, ILLINOIS NO NOTES 1.
rROVIPEP pig 4A-O uma r-Q BETWEEN UNITS t
UHtT ?.
[
I l
~
I I
(A-O t
20G14 ~
- Zocis e
+ -zocts i
i g
O j
l 1 rwi lewz
_1rw O
O g
l 1
30'-4' 26 4' 29 '. 7
\\
FIG. Mo. 18.4 A-0
LEGEND NDO401 INotCATES FIRE ZONE.
A INDICATES 10NIZ ATION DIETECTOR.
O INDICATES FIRE E% TIM 6016HER zzz2z INDICATES CABLE ROUTED IN CA TRAY.
c M* INDICATES cal 5LE. IN conduit INDICATES VERTICAL CABl.E RISER INDICATES C0: 'AJr7E**d I
m INDICATES FIRE ASE STATION I
I I
L I
L
_3 u_,
u CIEICtlLATIW6 '
~
2 L)
L(+))
L)
T Y
(OUTI
~
l
]
A Q
xio2./'"A A
.10616 +
cl0G15 10614 +
pe p.T FIRE i
g
\\
/
\\ (OFPoo )
'd SERVICE WATER O.
l O SG06TER PUMP *0A O
F a
A a
?.*-
/
if a
E N__/
N_/
v MOTOR DRIVEN l6 SERVICE VETER FIRE Puv? OA l
G BOMTER PUMP '06' (OFPoool (INNE p
o l
'Ei s
IB.-
I i
l (00TEI
- n r,
r, i
~
19 '-7' 26'- 4" 30'-4 8
0 r
l
l CRID HOUSE INNER & OUTER ROOM i
PLAN EL. 594'-O' l
ZION STATION UNIT 142 COMMONWEALTH EDISON ~CO.
r CHICAGO, ILLINOIS N O.
NOTES
~
1.
PROVIDED FOR RRE AREA IS45,-0
-Q BETWEEH UNITo>
X l
RE.
S.'
e UNIT 2 J.
" l I
I I
_1 I
LJ LJ GL 4TER PtMF MOTots W(+)
((+))
(h)'
Elt. itooM) l I
i 2
r II II 5 ~r.sjot Ag qq
=
a g --- 2061+
20625 m e20626 g
NL IDETAINIM CUlf6 d
4
\\
/
I. g rism. ai.
ruaraux.
o r
Q O
G A d 2x
=
a 2c 4&O e emw) e o
r l
M-0 t IlboM)
- 7 rm r,
r 30'-4~
26'-4' 29'7" 9
FIG. NO.18.46-0
)
LEGEND i
110.0-0TihDICATE9 FIRE ZONE.
A IHDiCATE*.; 10HlIATl0H DETECTOR.
(
O INDICATES FIRE E'XTlNCaUt%ER.
ctr22 INDICATES CADLE ROUTEDlu CA. TRAY.
' O' I
M -G' b NDICATE9 CABLE IN C0HDutT.
-]
=
(:E2Q INDICATE 9 VERTLCAL CABLE RibER.
M INotcATES CON 00tT WITH 5HrL File WRAR i
INDICATE 6 C0 W% ION C
=
O INDICATES COLUMM
-p e4 m
INDicATEta FIRE. HOSE. STATION I
9 O
INeicATas Tsaan4AL psTscToit L
IL2E-1 1
-o
-f w.c, smc-A ON
-f-letG, tetT
- cc581NNMu*if l
455 p rAvruMr ELEY.
~
229 1 04 3227 js8aIC
@u e
j
,t,,.,
b~-
- t
@ ' e" 8 ' s' 8 ' o' 8
' O' 0
22-22-T;-
- IG -
E'a
_g u.2c-i m
g, e
3 pousutus uuuoM
[U.2A-1 ]
11.2B-l DEMlWLAAulERi DRAIM TAMK5 l-
- spAgg, AREA N
A
,,, CUBICLE
-g 55U1 lu&C110M putW Ol6ELES b *N, 1,,,g ozio2.
}-
~
2
~
u 7
1
.O
_ _ _-_1 _ _ _ _1_ _ JJ._ _
~& gas - --
n
- ==n ru= =:an = = r
/
m m
d
- Wei g
re s
tu i
_a j g<
J_
y s
nu- -.
shead s
a
\\ <g 1
a ss'luis.
r g'
cutscLE
- 'ctScy'"
, q" coMeouswT g4 L'ioolk pe
s AUXILIARY BLDG.
i.88 WEE *lLW'T5 PLAN-ELEVATION 560'
_O" ZION STATION UNIT 1 &2 COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
j CHICAGO, ILLINOIS t
s 8
n_s 2G'- 0 NO.
NOTES 4
1.
P, g @ g,{ g g g gli.14 us k uauw.
i up Ta - -
oc me.,
I
\\
. M lll.2E-2] A j
l$
=cc w[gzw qr--
c4agAggTjew
~
sit 14 -
A
'11
>: L.......
REfuGLlWG 3
Tui '"%N
[ii.20-21.9_.3m i
D h
]ugC'g
- to'-o' -
2 '3'- o' 22'- s'
_ 22'- 3'
/
II.2C-2 J
=
i f
II.2A-2 II.26-2 i
ICLE / #
SWETY INECTIOW PUMP CLENCLE couoEso$
C CMEWICAL.
cusiCLES p-q g
g i
~
pq
_q cu6icti I
l.2-0]
g i
01900 g NMN r- %
R ;;:; M m k J B v '" '
s
~
y NHI n$1,'22956 S
gaLgf I"
I N"
r-32210 RADWACs N
l CUBICLES STORAGE i
!C00 LING PUMP 9 M
,9HED gec mm
-[2%i"'*
=
FIG. NO.11.2-0
J k.EGEND ig IHtMCATED FIRE ZOME g 'fMDICATE9 l0WiZATION DETECTOR 26'o' 11-6' i
l O
IHoeCATES FIRE EXTl%UlBHER h,
'N1 MD6 CATES CA61.E ROUTED IW CA. TRAY SIND6 CATES CABl.E IN COWDulT hc 3 MDICATES VERTICAL CABLE RibER f
~
0 r
H upRDICATES CG4DUlflillTH DWt. FIRE WRAP l
i h
NDICATE9 CDs 9UPPRE9910H I
I O
MD6 CATES COLUMW j
M EXC
{
/
W IND6 CATES FIRE HOSE STATund
~
I O
IND6CATE9 THERMAL DETECTOR 9 k
L ter REMOTE SUWOWN FAMEt, "o
S i
r Rew
@-h
-}
?
REFUEll%
i2vi-g tilATER N
STORAGE.
'l TAHK lii.Sc-1 N 92&l PIPE RESIDU
\\
19248 MSE O
CUblCLE gp CHArdlN(
Me e5 REM M
- 10GBO, Ill 3A-l h h
'\\
g,
[-
f
_1
_L I
BERVICE AREA l
, Lr-g
' O
.ma h BPARE
/l
[M.2A-0]
IN.E
-422TI d
A_
y w. n ~
.5.
U "
l11.95-l i D6 P
DRUM i
7 r
=
IN@T)
STOMGE y
y pq m H
i a
AREA 99 y l
I 11. 3 - 0 ]
Riol a "llg ( 1]
a OW
-t losu m' y
I
.--t reser Ant rt MP>
M IN' M%I
- e i
4
- RibER, O
l KAyg MA W e626 W 111.$-o 1 l
[a-R41 RieER ge su
\\' f %
I RlW g6,
. oe 2cr zes-zu 2, - e-2i.e- _
UNIT i 9 i
O AUXILIARY BLDG gtEDUEEN PLAN-ELEVATIO N 579'-O M
ZION STATION-UNIT 1& 2-it:6' f ts'. o" COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS NO.
NOTES l
l 1.
I'EoleNP For PitE AREA tt.3-0 K
-t
{
1004
\\
\\
- NER,
\\
!CLE3 I
I I
dI
'92294 r-i s
-.g'32235IH ry%
l
-ELDER
'32214 IN REFUELIM
,R19ER
[ 11. 3 - 0 1 LUATER OTORAGE
's y
TAMK AL HEAT 23Z41 CUBICLE I
'CEMTRlFUGAL CHARGl%
- CUBICLED 2324S PUMP CU61CLE9
_l r
g) lil.tC-2l 32Z14 WARE
'AHloH CATioH DEHiM.
CUDICLE 32296
- N G
l,llE?M'e h
,L-
/
,TAHK CUBICLE 4
s o -
_ y _j p
l~'
n g216 1\\l.bb-3 l-
~~
s g
'M IN TER g9 AREA M M,'
N' 5 600 20Mb K509
- 4~
whl 20016
- [<E L
i
[
p__
-e
-.s lill.3-01
[
,lh eg.
I lL5tt g3 E$
' "' M (NORTH n
g"NN q
20629 _( h Y
h I
wree i e n-x i
TT x__
_' CONCENTRATES HOLDING
\\
'2(Ni,2G IN
\\
'AW10H CATION l
R50
,TAE CUBICLE
,R19ER DEMIN.
21'- 9' 21'. 9 '
16'- 0" 29 0" 22.' 3" -
2 2'. 3"
_ UNIT 2
' f
^'
LEGEND
'lE1M9tcATEe FIRE ZONE 5
INDICATEb 10HlZAT10H DETECTOR UNIT I O
INDICATE 9 FIRE EXTlHGUiSHER t222T INDICATES CABLE ROUTEDIRCA. TRAY 1
1 hlHDICATES CABLEIN CONDOIT I
Z IMDICATE9 VERTICAL CA.RitER
' M IMDICATES CONDulT WITH DHR. FIRE WtN PEMiWerg h
lHDEATE9 C0zSUPPREbe10H
-o 0
iHDicATEe c0LUMH
-A b
M INDICATE 9 FIRE HOBE STATION O
lHDICATED TERMAL DETECTORb b
.'b g
-R REFUEllHG a
r_
N WATER 9194 id-BTORAGE I
1096E '
ff
-TAWK o
/
I Ii
( / SEALWATEE HEAT,
111.4B-11 i
EXCH. Ct181cLE l
"o l
VERMICULITE AHD LETDOWN HEAT'
)
N T CEMENT MIXIHG Ro0M EXCH.cu8icLE,
lit.4A-l 1 o
a e
I
'g N
o BORIC
_e
'h AP.
CUBICLE J
f a
OK 3
q y c
l11.4-0 1,
._2-Ill.4 -0 1 D
i i
-4 E% PORATOR pgug AREA pga RIS1 g
106 60 IN RIBER cutHcts Ril2-.
,e
^
10629 IMRibER
- --e a
10M4 IR RibER 422351H C0Hi l
W E'\\
i
\\
W W*
R111
=
i M014tTOR l
MONITOR ll MONITolt g M<
i l
t 10 ll u
19-O'
_ IG'- 0".
2G'-O' IT-G' i 8
I
"\\ 11'-9' 22'-t'
AUXILIARY BLDG.
PLAN-ELEVATION 592'- O" 2
-QDETWEEN UNIT 9 COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
g UNIT 1 C HICAGO,lLLINOIS NO.
NOTES r
L PROVIDED FOR FIRE AREA 11.4-0 10CFR50- APPENDIX R FIRE l
.Edl AEIEA W
n g
-fg g M
4, 2000S klH RitER
~
g 556 g'mn
- 410 H E I
IK REFUEllHG WATER 2555 I
9TORAGE TANK l
l 4
' SEAL WATER HEAT \\
,,m EXcM.cuSICLE.
i s
n---
I M *S T R. C A tl e
" LETDOWN HEAT r---
FACILITY llMM ExcH. c.usicLE s
v'
~
'h d
e
'l
]
o a i
BORIC f'
ACID i
- A EVAP.
a
- w. mis CUBICLE sj b MIS i
- itKitt, d
i i
a,.
[
'20G24 IN 9N OM ROOL g
ce251 k D
a a
a i
PRIMARY
,R19ER E5m 1 11. 4 - 0 l E8C -
N 00M R581 kNITot g{l
__R 504 ACIP N'-
U D "A ci r <
-=.l 20e2 l
4 '.
---f-\\
7 ts.e-z i
?
- _.Y
'-3
g c,i 2.9 '- 08 22-3" 8
l 21'-95 21'- su 22
-O FIG. NO.11. 4-O
1 l
LEGEND
,.0.0-01 INDICATES FIRE ZONE rq t
& 4HNCATE910HlZAT10H DETECTOR O
54DtCATES FIRE EXTlHC U19HER UMITI UN 2:2h IMDicATEe CA. ROUTED IN CA. TRAY
% INDICATEb CABLE INC0HDUIT
~
i_,
R INDICATE 6 VERTICAL CA.RibER
@ IMDeCATE9 COND.ullTH SWR. FIRE WRAP INDICATE 9 CO2 SUPPRE% ION O
iHDiCATEe C0tuMH u
m IMDiCATEb FIRE H0tE STATION l=
0 INDICATE 6 TERMAL DETECTOR 9
/.
g __,
/
111. 5 - 0 1 ELEV
_3 L
SUPPLY &
EYHAU91 OM
\\V[
CUBlCLE 9'ibTEM
-}.
h VOLUME cana.
-oy JAMK I
i N
[11. 5 6 - 1 l - s 1
+
OL 3
'CONTAMlHATED ll15-0 l l
LAUNDRY Room f,LOTHES HAMPER l
e
~h gry_g.i l
,=
__4 DECOM HA9K t
ILIASTE J
ROOM ROOM
/
-e EVAPORATOR RAMDASTE Ill.5-0 l CUB 1CLE EMAPORATOR CU61CLE I
ER l
l IM.40-01--f L
&._'g g,3 pT l
H 2_
gggge n
SPENT ROOM s
m REblH
\\
=
5 W
l i
STMG*}s k
4 mcitgy RAD oth lGE
')
l g
CuBiCte l
,! mg F s
,cf i s 2
o
. ~. --
.r l
V
-42295 IN BOX et, UP O J 2 2'- 3" c'- o' IG'-O'
'3 8
0 2G i ll'- G "
i_ 21 22' +f l
-e e
e
@e@
AUXILI ARY BLDG.
f PLAN-ELEVATION 617'- O
A UMITS Z IO N STATIO N-U NIT 1 & 2 ft COMMONWEALTH EDISON.CO.
/
C HlCAGO,lLLINOIS NO.
N O TES 0
u L
PRovlDED FOR FIRE AREA 11.5-0 locFR50- APPENDIX R FIRE EYEMPTION REQUEST.
"O
-A b
i o
,o f
~b A
_?
N SUPPLY ac i
EXHAU9T
/
l eySTEM M
V01.UME C0KTR01.
TAM (
1 l
Hil.55-21
,d-i_
AIR CORDITIOHlHG EQUIPMEMT ROOM a
a a
-A I
[HTlHG p0M HOT LABORATOR1
'd I
l d
.
- m._
d LNG AREA h, a
a a
l I
q3.lB-Zl TE K
g 0
III.BA-01 g
l
.I I
l l'
21 - 9' 27'-9" 17'- 9' _"
22'- 3' 1
22-3" 8
D FIG. NO.11. 5-O l
AUXILI ARY BLDG.
PLAN-ELEVATION 617'- O" EH UNITS Z lO N STATIO N-U NIT 1 & 2 COMMONWEALTH EDISQN_CO, C HICAGO,lLLINOIS NO.
N O TES 0
n L
PROVIDED FOR FIRE AREA 11.5-0 10CFR50 - APPENDIX R FIRE EYEMPTION REQUEST.
O
- b-e
.o O k
~h
~
A
\\
,9 N
BUPPLY sc i
EXHAU9T
/
b BYSTEM M
VOLUME 1
l CONTROL kl
_7
-lit.56-2l i
.d.
i_
AIR C0HDm0HtHG EQUIPMENT ROOM
/\\
I 71HG A
M gay LAgogA70sn d
l l
(,
a 6
m._
UMN l
l d'S.IB-21 8
p#
- Ill.BA-o I a
j l
I I
l 2i-e' 21-s" n'- s' '
22'-v 22-v i
i 9
8 FIG. NO.11. 5-O
AUXILI ARY BLDG.
PLAN-ELEVATION 617'- O
,ETWEEH UNITS Z IO N STATIO N-U NIT 1 & 2 COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
C HICAGO,lLL!NOIS NO.
NO TES 0
n L
PROVIDED FOR FIRE AREA 11.5-0
~
10CFR50- APPENDlX R FIRE EYEMPTION REQUEST.
O
-A
- b
~
l--
"o f
~b O
o g
^-
N N
SUPPLY d, EXHAU9T
/
eVSTEM
\\V[
CUBICLE gygg COWTROL TAM I
-11L55-21 0
1.
,d.
O AIR C0HDIT10HtHG EQUIPMENT ROOM A
I COUHTlHG 4
ROOM 1
HOT LABORAT@
d N 3 4
g de r43IB-21 3 m7, p
- [lI.5A-0 l a
j l
I I
2i-e' 21-s" n'- s' '
22'- d' i
22-3' 5
_3 FIG. NO.11. 5-O