ML20028B703

Interim Deficiency Rept Re Itt Grinnell Category II Planner for Category I Work.Initially Reported on 821026.Evaluation of Effects of Flooding Due to Failure in Progress.Final Rept Expected by 830114

ML20028B703
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	11/24/1982
From:	Manno S NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:	Starostecki R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, 9M2-13-130, NUDOCS 8212030166
Download: ML20028B703 (2)

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M V NIAGARA

- RuMOHAWK NEAGARA In0 HAWK POWER CORPORAT10N/300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE. N.Y.13202/ TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511 November 24, 1982 9M2-13,130 Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1 Division of Project and Resident Programs 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Re: Nine Mile Point - Unit 2 Docket No. 50-410

Dear Mr. Starostecki:

Enclosed is an interim 30-day report in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) for the potentially reportable deficiency concerning ITT Grinnell (ITT-G) Category II planner for Category I work. This condition was reported via telephone to H. Kister of your staff on October 26, 1982, as a potentially reportable deficiency.

Very truly yours, NIAGARA M0 HAWK POWER CORPORATON Vice President Nuclear Construction xc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Mr. R. D. Schulz, Resident Inspector

' F212030166 821124 DR ADOCK 05000

$6*'

9M2-13,130 NIAGARA M0 HAWK POWER CORPORATION Nine Mile Point - Unit 2 Docket No. 50-410 Interim Report for a Potentially Reportable Deficiency Under 10CFR50.55(e) Regarding ITT Grinnell Category II Planner for Category I Work Description of the Deficiency Two 2-in. QA Category I, ASME III, Class 3, lines (2-SWP-002-803-3[B] and 2-SWP-002-802-3[A-)) in the service water system were identified on a planner that was incorrectly designated QA Category II by ITT Grinnell engineers. The planner had been issued to the field, but work had not been started.

Analysis of Safety Implications Our initial evaluation indicates that even if the two 2-in. lines in question were assumed to have failed, the reduction in flow would not have jeopardized the safety function of the service water system. The evaluation of the effect of flooding due to the failure of these lines on other safety-related components is in progress.

The matter is still under investigation, and a final report will be submitted by January 14, 1983.

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