ML20028A832

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Forwards Response to Reactor Sys Branch 820212 Request for Addl Info Re Operating Procedures Following Electrical Sys Single Failure.Response Will Be Included in Amend 48 to OL Application.Svc List Encl
ML20028A832
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/22/1982
From: Devincentis J
PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO.
To: Knighton G
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
SBN-379, NUDOCS 8211290112
Download: ML20028A832 (3)


Text

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suom sum IPUBLIC SERVICE

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06.xis Office:

Companyof New HempeNee 1671 Worcester Road Framinoham, Massachusetts 01701 (617) - 872 - 8100 November 22, 1982 SBN-379 T.F. B7 1.2 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention:

Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing

References:

(a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 (b) USNRC Letter, dated February 12, 1982, " Request for Additional Information," F. J. Miraglia to W. C. Tallman (c) PSNH Letter, dated March 12, 1982, " Response to 440 Series RAIs; (Reactor Systems Branch)," J. DeVincentis to F. J. Miraglia

Subject:

Revised Response to RAI 440.18; (Reactor Systems Branch)

Dear Sir:

We have enclosed a revised response to the subject Request for Additional Information (RAI) which was forwarded in Reference (b).

The original response to RAI 440.18 was submitted in Reference (c).

The enclosed response will be included in CL Application Amendment 48.

Very truly yours, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY

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J. DeVincentis Project Manager ALIs'f s f f30d(

8211290112 821122 PDR ADOCK 05000443 A

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ASLB SERVICE LIST Philip Ahrens, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of the Attorney General Augusta, ME 04333 Representative Beverly Hollingworth Coastal Chamber of Commerec 209 Winnacunnet Road Hampton, NH 03842 William S. Jordan, III, Esquire Harmon & Weiss 1725 I Street, N.W.

Suite 506 Washington, DC 20006 E. Tupper Kinder, Esquire Assistant Attorney General office of the Attorney General 208 State House Annex Concord, Nil 03301 Robert A. Backus, Esquire 116 Lowell Street P.O. Box 516 Manchester, NH 03105 Edward J. McDermott, Esquire Sanders and McDermott Professional Association 408 Lafayette Road Hampton, NH 03842 I

Jo Ann Shotwell, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Bureau Department of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Boston, M A 02108

4 o-440.18 Following electrical system single failure, you state that limited action outside the control room is necessary to open the suction isolation valves for initiation of RHR cooling. What actions are necessary and where must they be performed? Provide the

. procedures which the operators will need to use. following a postulated failure such as discussed above.

Provide details on the alarms and indications which would inform the operators that an SDC suction line isolation valve has closed while the plant is in shutdown cooling. Is there any common failure which would result in both valves being closed while in shutdown cooling?

RESPONSE

See response to RAI 440.24 for initiation of RHR cooling on electrical system single failure. Procedures will be developed three months prior to fuel load.

Valve position indication is provided on the main control board for both the open and closed positions for the RHR suction line isolation valves and RHR recirculation valves. On loss of suction, the RHR system would go into a recirculation mode, thus protc: ting the operating RHR pump. We will add alarms that will actuate if either suction valve for an operating RHR pump is not.

fully open and if the flow through the RHR pump is below the minimum expected. Indication of reduced flow and pump amperage is also provided in the control room for the operator to observe during normal system surveillance.

A failure in the pressure interlock logic circuit could cause one valve to close in each suction line (the circuit is designed to fail to the isolated condition to protect the low pressure piping).

If the suction valves close due to a power failure in the logic circuit, the valves can be re-opened at the remote shutdown location. This operation can be performed expeditiously, less than 10 minutes, since the controls for remote shutdown l

bypass all interlocks. Temporary circuit modifications are not required. FSAR Section 5.4.7.2.f will be revised.

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