ML20027D757
| ML20027D757 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley |
| Issue date: | 10/25/1982 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20027D756 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8211090047 | |
| Download: ML20027D757 (3) | |
Text
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I9 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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1 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION I
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.19 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 ALABAMA POWER COMPANY-i l
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2
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DOCKET NO. 50-364 Introduction
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By letter dated July 26, 1982, supplemented September ~
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AldamaPower 27, 1982, Company (APC0) proposed that License Condition 2.C.(19)(b) be modified to extend the time for completion of certain modifications to a later period i
commensurate with scheduled plant shutdown periods. The modifications, part I
of which would not be completed, relate to primary and backup circuit pro-l tection devices in the containment electrical penetration circuits (referred to as centainment evercurrent' protection devices [COPD]). Our SafetyiEval-i uation Report, Supplement No. 5, paragraph 7.11, dated March 1981, summarizes j
the NRC staff findings which resulted in incorporation of License Condition l
2.C.(19)(b) for Farley Unit 2.
At the time of licensing of Farley Unit 2 (March 31, 1981) the NRC staff and APC0 staff agreed that the modifications should be accomplished during the first refueling outage.
Discussion and Evaluation j
Modifications currently scheduled to be completed during the first refueling outage are as follows:
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(1) Mini-flow containment vent and purge valve modifications to i
replace the 18-inch purge valves with 8-inch valves (License i
Condition 2.C.(17) requirement).
i (2) Fire protection modifications to meet Appendix R (License Condition 2.C.(6) requirement).
(3) Environmental qualification modifications (License Condition 2.C.(18) requirement).
I (4) Auxiliary feedwater system modifications (License Condition 2.C.(21)(e) requirement).
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(5) Diesel generator lube oil system modifications (License Condition 2.C.(19)(c) requirement).
(6) Low pressure turbine rotor replacement (License Condition 2.C.(19)(d) requirement).
(7) Plant shieldings modifications (License Condition 2.C.(21)(c) requirement).
(8) Other work on Hot Shutdown Panel power supply, fire dampers and IEB 82-02 and IEB 81-03 inspections and work, if required.
The licensee has assessed the effort required to complete all these items.
Approximately 70,000 man hours are projected by APC0 to complete this work.
The licensee is scheduling completion of the items in accordance with his evaluation of the safety priorities and finds that he can complete all the items without affecting plant availability except for the last item (Containment Overcurrent Protection Devices) which will only be partially completed. An extension of time until the next refueling outage or until a cold shutdown of sufficient duration to complete the work on the COPD l
is requested.
Summary We find that the licensee has made a good faith effort to prepare for and to accomplish the numerous design changes discussed herein. Approximately one-half of the modifications to the containment electrical penetration circuits are scheduled to be completed during this refueling outage.
In addition, by letter of September 27,1982, APC0 has committed to perform surveillance on the circuits (10% of the total circuits) which will not be modified at this time and this 10% testing of protective devices will include at least one representative of each type of protective devices used in circuits yet to be modified. We feel that this action provides added assurance that the existing circuits with one protective device will function as designed.
In addition, the probability of a loss-of-coolant-accident, coupled with the short circuit of a penetration conductor and an independent failure of a protective device, occurring simultaneously is highly unlikely.
During the operation of similar reactors there have been no failures of containment integrity due to shorts of conductors in electrical containment penetration assemblies. There fore, we conclude that the extension in time requested by APC0 has been justified and is acceptable. We will modify License Condition 2.C.(19)(b) accordingly.
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- Environmental Consideration
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We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact.: Having made this determi-nation, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an. action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental. impact.and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact appraisal ~ need not.be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
Conclusion J
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, does not create the possibility of an accident of a type different from any evaluated previously, and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will 4
be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
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Date:
October 25, 1982 Primary Contributor:
4 E. A. Reeves i
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