ML20027D425
| ML20027D425 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1982 |
| From: | Vanderbeek R EG&G, INC. |
| To: | NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20027D423 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-A-6425, TASK-06-07.A3, TASK-6-7.A3, TASK-RR EGG-EA-6048, NUDOCS 8211040277 | |
| Download: ML20027D425 (15) | |
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EGG-EA-6048 SEPTEMBER 1982 SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM, TOPIC VI-7.A.3 ECCS ACTUATION SYSTEM, HADDAM NECK R. VanderBeek Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Operated by the U.S. Department of Energy
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This is an informal report intended for use as a preliminary or working document Prepared for the U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Under DOE Contract flo. DE-AC07-76ID01570 g
FIN No. A6425 E G g G idaho Yh 821104O277 POR ADOCK 05000213 P
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SYSTEMATIC EVALUATICN PROGRAM TOPIC VI-7.A.3 ECCS ACTUATION SYSTEM HADDAM NECK Docket No. 50-213 September 1982 R. VanderSeek Reliability and Statistics Branch Engineering Analysis Division EG&G Idaho, Inc.
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.g ABSTRACT This SEP Technical Evaluation, for the Hadcan Neck Plant, i
reviews the sce;e and frecuency of periccic testi:g of the E.mergency Core Cooling System ar.c c:rcares the required testing against current licensing criteria.
FOREWCRD This recor is supplied as part of the " Electrical, Instru:rentation, anc Centrol Systems Support for the Systematic Evaluation Program (II)"
being cer.cucted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Cffice of Nuclear Reactor Regu'azion, Div'sion of Licensing, by EG&G Idao, Inc.,
Re'iability ar.d Statistics E-anch.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissien fundec tne work under the authorization E&R 20-I0-02-05, FIN No. A6425.
NRC FIN No. A6425--Electrical, Instrumentation and Control Systems Support for the Systematic Evaluation :rogram (II) if s
CCNTENTS ABSTRACT ii FCREWCRD ii 1.0 INTRCDUCTICN 1
2.0 CRITERIA 1
3.0 HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTICN SYSTEM 3
3.1 Desc-iption 3
3.2 Evaluation.
3 5
4.0 CHARGING SYSTEM 5
4.1 Description 4.2 Evaluation 5
5.0 LCW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTICN SYSTEM (CCRE DELUGE) 6 6
5.1 Description 5.2 Evaluation 7
6.0 SLMMARY 8
7.0 REFERENCES
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7 SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC VI-7.A.3 ECCS ACTUATION SYSTEM HADDAM NECK 1.0 INTRCDUCTION The cbjective of this review is to determine if all Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) components, including pumps and valves, are included in component and system tests, if the scope and frequency of periodic test-ing are identified, and if the test program meets current licensing cri-teria. The systems included in the ECOS are the High Pressure Safety Injection System, the Charging System, and the Low Pressure Safety Injec-tion (Core Deluge) System.1 2.0 CRITERIA General Design Criterion. 37 (GDC 37), " Testing of Emergency Core Cool-
)
ing Systems," requires that:
The ECCS shall be designed to permit appropriate periodic pressure and functicnal testing to assure the operability of the system as a whole and to verify, under conditions as close to design as practical, the performance of the full operational sequence that brings the system I
into operation, including operation of applicable portions of the protection system, the transfer between normal and emergency power sources, and the operation of the associated cooling water system.
Branch Technical Position ICSB 25, " Guidance for the Interpretation of GDC 37 for Testing the Operability of the Emergency Core Cooling System as a whole," states that:
All ECCS pumps should be included in the system test.
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f Regulatory Guide 1.22, " Periodic Testing of the Protection System Actuation Functions," states, in Section D.I.a, tnat:
The periccic tests should duplicate, as closely as practicable, the performance that is recuired of the actuation devices in the event of an accident.
Standard Review Dlan, Section 7.1, Aopendix E, " Guidance for Evaluation of Conformance to IEEE STD 279" states, in Section 11, that:
Periodic testinc should cuplicate, as closely as practical, the overall perfortance required of tne protection system.
The test should confirm cperacility of both the autcmatic and manual circuitry. The capability should be proviced to permit testing during power operation. When this capability can only be achieved by overlapping tests, the test scheme must be sucn that the tests do, in fact, overlap frcm one test segment to another.*
Regulatory Guide 1.22 states, in Section D.4, that:
Wnere actuated ecuipment is not tested during reactor operation, it should be shown that:
1.
There is no practical system design that would permit operation of the actuated equipment without adversely affecting the safety or cperability of the plant.
2.
The probability that the protection system will fail to initiate the operation of the actuated equipment is, and can be maintained, accectably low without testing the actuated equipment during reactor oceration.
3.
The actuated eouipment can be routinely tested when the reactor is snut down.#
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3.0 HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM 3.1 Descriotion The High Pressure Safety Injection System is designed to automatically actuate the injection of borated water from the refueling water storage tank into the foyr reactor coolant, loops.
Operation of the High Pressure Safety Injection System is initiated automatically by an actuation signal generated as a result of two out of three low pressurizer pressure signals. The system may also be actuated manually from the main control room. To prevent automatic operation while the reactor is cold and depressurized, the actuation signal is blocked manually when reactor coolant system pressure is below 1,700 psig.
The signal is unblocked automaticall,v whan reactor coolant system pressure rises above 1,700 psig.
The safety injection signal starts all pue s and actuates all valves in the High Pressure Injection System. Within 10 seconds after the initiation sign:1 is generated, the two safety injection pumps can deliver borated refueling water at fuil rated flow to a header, supplying four independent injection lines, one to the cold leg of each loop.
3.2 Evaluation The Haddam Neck Tecr.nical Specifications require testing and I
i surveillance for the High Pressure Injection System as follows:
I a.
Testing and Surveillance During Refueling Shutdown 1.
During each refueling shutdown, a test signal is applied to initiate a loss of normal AC power to each of the Emergency Power Systems while ; coincident signal initiates the opera-tion of the High Pressure Safety Injection System.
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2.
Verification is made that the diesel generator and its associated pumps have started in the proper secuence and that the high pressure safety injection pumps attain a required discharge head of 1400 psig. The test is con-sidered satisfactory by the licensee if the control board indication and visual observations indicate all* components have operated and sequenced properly.
b.
Testing and Surveillance During Reactor Operation 1.
Each of the high pressure safety injection pumps are individually test run in recirculation on a monthly basis.
2.
All safety injection valves are ycled under "no flow" con-ditions during cold shutdown conditions.
3.
If one of the high pressure safety injection pumps is out of service, the remaining pump shall be tested within two hours and at subsequent intervals of not greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
4.
During normal operating periods, manual tests are conducted to demonstrate ocerability. The tests are performed on the same time intervals as described in Sections 3.2.b.1, 3.2.b.2, and 3.2.b.3.6 The High Pressure Safety Injection System is not tested from the auto-j l
matic and manual actuation devices through to the establishment of flow through the safety injection header during reactor operation, as specified by Standard Review Plan Section 7.1, Appendix B, Section 11. Because actua-tion of the High Pressure Safety Injection System would result in the injection of borated water into the reactor, hampering operation, compliance for testing tne system during reactor operation is deemed impractical. The present testing of the High Pressure Safety Injection System does conform to the testing criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.22 and GDC 37.
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4.0 CHARGING SYSTEM l
4.1 Description I
The Charging System is designed to automatically actuate the injection of borated water from the refueling water storage tank into the reactor coolant system.
Operation of the Cnarging System is initiated automatically wnen the High Pressure Safety Injection System is actuated and offsite power is available. Upon receiving the initiating signal the suction of the two centrifugal charging pumps is automatically transferred from the Volume Control Tank to the Refueling Water Storage Tank and borated water is delivered through the charging lines to the cold leg of loop 2.
The charging pump may be manually started on emergency power if offsite power is not available.
Injection of borated water will continue until the concition for recirculation flow is established, at which time the operator will terminate the injection of borated water and begin recirculation flow.
4.2 Evaluation The Haddam Neck Technical Specifications require testing and surveillance of the Charging System as follows:
a.
Testing and Surveillance During Refueling Shutdown 1.
During each refueling shutdown, a test signal is applied to initiate a loss of normal AC power to each of the emergency power systems while a coincicent signal initiates the opera-tion of the Charging System.
2.
Verification is made that the diesel generator and its associated pumps have started in the proper sequence and that the charging pumps attain a required discharge head of 2150 psig. The tast is considered satisfactory by the 5
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1 licensee if control board indication and visual observations indicate all components have operated and sequenced properly.
b.
Testing and Surveillance During Reactor Operation 1.
Eac,h of the charging, pumps are individually tes'ted on a monthly basis.
2.
All valves associated with the Charging System, except the valves on the discharge side of the charging line to loop 2 cold leg, are cycled under "no flow" conditions on a monthly basis. The valves on the discharge side of the charging line to loop 2 cold leg are cycled on a quarterly basis.6 3.
During normal operating periods, a manual test is conducted to demonstrate operability. The test is performed on a time interval in accordance with sections 4.2.b.1 and 4.2.b.2 above using written procedures.6 The Charging System is not tested from tne automatic actuation devices
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through to the establishment of flow to loop 2 line during reactor operation, as specified by Standard Review Plan Section 7.1, Appendix B, Section 11. Because actuation of the Charging System would result in the injection of borated water into the reactor, hampering operation, compliance for testing the system during reactor operation is deemed impractical. The present testing of the charging system does conform to the testing criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.22 and GDC 37.
5.
LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM (CORE DELUGE) 5.1 Descriotion The Core Deluge System is designed to inject large quantities of borated water directly into the reactor vessel if reactor coolant pressure drops substantially as a result of a loss of coolant incident. The water, 6
pumoed into the reactor vessel through four spare control rod mechanism housings and internal piping, is discharged directly over the reactor core.
The Core Deluge System is a completely independent backup system for core cooling, used in the event of large reactor coolant system ruptures.
The system's path of access, mode of cooling water delivery, and cesign characteristics are such as to assu.re core cladcing immersion' in steam and cascading water so that core damage and metal water reactio'ns are minimized.
Performance of tne Core Deluge System is based on operation of one of two low pressure safety injection pumps with or without normal auxiliary power sources. The residual heat removal pumps can also be used to provide water via the core deluge after reactor coolant system pressure is reduced to below 145 psig and also as a containment spray for post-incident containment pressure control if desired.
Operation of the Core Deluge System is initiated automatically by an actuation signal generated as a result of two out of three low pressurizer pressure signals. The system may also be actuated manually from the main control room.
To prevent autcmatic operation while the reactor is cold and depressurized, the actuation signal is biccked manually when reactor cool-ant system pressure is below 1',700 psig. The signal is, unblocked auto-l matically when reactor coolant system pressure rises above 1,700 psig.
1 5.2 Evaluation i
The Haddam Neck Technical Specifications require testing and I
surveillance of the Low Pressure Safety Injectior. System (Core Deluge) as follows:
a.
Testing and Surveillance During Refueling Shutdown 1.
During each refueling shutdcwn, a test signal is applied v initiate a loss of normal AC power to each of the emergency power systems while a coincident signal initiates the opera-tion of the Low Pressure Safety Injection System.
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Verification is made that the diesel generator and its associated pumps have started in the proper sequence and that the low pressure safety injection pumps attain a required discharge head of 295 psig. The test is considered satisfactory by the licensee if control board indication and visual observations,1ndicate all components havb operated and sequenced properly.
b.
Testing and Surveillance During Reactor Operation 1.
Each of the low pressure safety injection pumps are individually test run on recirculation on a monthly basis.
2.
All low pressure safety injection valves are cycled under "no flow" conditions during cold shutdown conditions.6 3.
If one of the low pressure safety injection pumps is out of service, the remaining pump shall be tested within two hours and at subsequent intervals of not greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
4.
During normal operating periods, a manual test is conducted to demonstrate operability. The test is performed in accordance with Sections 5.2.b.1, 5.2.b.2, and 5.2.b.3 above and with written procedures.6 The Low Pressure Safety Injection System is not tested from the manual and automatic actuation devices through to the establishment of flow to the discharge lines during reactor operation as specified by Standard Review Plan Section 7.1, Appendix B, Section 11. Other than the exception above the present testing of the Low Pressure Safety Injection System does con-form to the testing criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.22 and GDC 37.
6.0
SUMMARY
The following has been determined pertaining to the testing and test-ability of the Haddam Neck ECCS:
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1.
Because system testing from manual or automatic devices to establishment of flow during reactor operation cannot be accomplished due to system design pressure, and since such testing would cause injection of borated water into the reactor, testing of the High Pressure Safety Injection and Charging 7
l Systems curing reactor operation is deemed impractical.
2.
The present testing of the ECCS conforms to the current testing criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.22 and GDC 37.
It is left to the NRC Staff to determine whether operating experience at Haddam Neck establisnes that noncompliance to Standard Review Plan Section 7.2, Appendix B, Section 11, assures a low probability of system failure.
7.0 REFERENCES
1.
Hsddan Neck Plant Facility Description anc Safety Analysis (;SAR),
Revisec through April 1,1977, Volume 1, Section 5.2.7, Emergency Core l
Cooling System.
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2.
General Design Criterion 37,'" Testing of Emergency, Core Cooling Sys-tem," of Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," 10 CFR Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utili-ration Facilities.
3.
Branch Technical Position ICSS 25, " Guidance for the Interpretation of GCC 37 for Testing the Operability of the Emergency Core Cooling Sys-tem as a Whole."
4 Regulatory Guide 1.22, Periodic Testing of the Protection System Actuation Functions.
5.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Standard Review Plan, Section 7.1, Appendix B, " Guidance for Evaluation of Conformance to IEEE STD 279."
6.
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Comoany letter, W. G. Counsil to NRC, D. M. Crutchfield, "Hadcam Neck Plant SEP Topic VI-7.A.3 ECCS Actuation System," cated April 14, 1982.
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SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC VI-7.A.3 HADDAM NECK TOPIC:
VI-7.A.3, ECCS ACTilATION SYSTEM I.
INTRODUCTION The ECCS actuation system was Fe' viewed with respect to the testability of operability and performance of individual active components of the system and of the entire system as a whole under conditions as close to the design condition as practical.
The purpose of the reviews was to assure that all ECCS components (e.g., valves and pumps) are included in the component and system test and to assure that the scope of the periodic testing is adequate and meets the requirements of GDC 37. The technical specifications were also audited for large differences between the present test requirements and those in the Standard Technical Specifications.
II.
REVIEW CRITERIA The current licensing criteria are identified in Section 2 of EGSG Report EGG-EA-6048, "ECCS Actuation System."
III.
RELATED SAFETY T0 PICS AND INTERFACES The scope of review for this topic was limited to avoid duplication of effort since some aspects of the review were performed under related topics. The related topics and the subject matter ar'e identified below.
Each of the related topic reports contain the acceptance criteria and review guidance for its subject matter.
Topic VI-3 Containment Pressure and Heat Removal Capability Topic VI-4 Containment Isolation System Topic VI-7 Emergency Core Cooling System Topic VI-7.C ECCS Single Failure Criterion and Requirements for Locking Out Power to Valves Including Independence of Interlocks on ECCS Valves Topic VI-9 Main Steam Isolation Topic VI-10. A Testing of Reactor Trip System and Engineered Safety Features, Including Response Time Testing Only Topic VI-10.A is dependent on the present topic information for completion.
Response time testing is addressed in Topic VI-10.A.
IV.
REVIEW GUIDELINES l
The review guidelines are presented in Sections 3 and 4 of Report EGG-EA-6048.
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EVALUATION Report EGG-EA-6048 describes the extent to which the ECCS actuation system is tested, except for the question of response time testing.
In summary, i
the safety systems meet the review criteria.
VI.
CONCLUSION Based upon our ' review of our c6ntractor's evaluation, the staff concludes that Haddam Neck conforms to current licensing criteria.
Operating experience sustains the technical evaluation prepared by our contractor.
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