ML20027C644
| ML20027C644 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/1982 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20027C639 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8210260547 | |
| Download: ML20027C644 (5) | |
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY JERSEY CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY DOCKET N0. 50-320 THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2 Introduction By letters dated April 19, 1982 and July 7,1982, (References 1 & 2) the licensee requested changes to the proposed Technical Specifications Appendix A, for Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2).
The proposed changes would allow for the separation of the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building Air Cleanup Exhaust Systems proposed Technical Specification (section 3.9.12).
Presently the requirements of proposed Technical Soecification section 3.9.12 do not reflect the actual design and operational features of the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building Air Cleanup Exhaust Systems and the changes would more clearly define which equipment needs to be operating to provide adequate ventilation capability for the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Buildings.
Summary The licensee has requested NRC staff approval to allow for the separation of the Fuel Handling Building Air Cleanup System and the Auxiliary Building Air Cleanup System Technical Specifications. The proposed changes wTild accurately reflect the existing air cleanup exhaust systems design and require corrective action if air flow should deviate from the allowable flowrate during normal operation.
In addition to the above, the changes would suspend the movement of liquid and gaseous radioactive wastes if the air cleanup exhaust system in the building is inoperable.
8210260547 820924
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PDR ADOCK 05000320 P
PDR Eval uation By Order of the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, dated February 11, 1980, a new set of formal license requirements was imposed to reflect the post accident condition of the TMI-2 facility.
The order required in section 3.9.12 the Fuel Handling and Auxiliary Building air cleanup systems to be operable with exhaust ventilation flow routed through HEPA filters during system operation.
The air exhaust systems for both the Fuel Handling Building and Auxiliary Building were designed in a manner such that normal flow out of these buildings would bypass the exhaust filters unless airborne contamination levels reached a pre-determined level, then flow would be routed through the air cleanup exhaust filter systems prior to release. As a result of the March 28, 1979 accident and the February 11, 1980 order, all exhaust air flow from the Fuel Handling and Auxiliary Buildings must be filtered prior to release to the environment, to minimize the release of airborne contaminants.
The design of the existing air cleanup exhaust system is such that redundancy in the system does not exist when flow is routed through the exhaust filter units.
The exhaust filter units for the Fuel Handling and Auxiliary Building air exhaust systems consist of two parallel exhaust filter trains, sized such that each train passes 50% of the required exhaust flow.
Since each filter train for both the Fuel Handling and Auxiliary air exhaust system is designed for only 50% of the required air exhaust flow,it is possible that a number of anticipated and unanticipated operational occurrences can cause a reduction in the specified flow requirement.
To address this design feature the licensee proposed an
. action statement based on time and air flow.
According to the action statement, when any condition arises that reduces air flow, operator actions will be taken to restore the required flow within four hours.
However, during such off normal flow conditions, air flow out of the affected building continues to be filtered and the public health and safety is not compromised, In the event that corrective actions by the licensee fail to restore the Fuel Handling or Auxiliary Building air cleanup exhaust system to operation within the specified time period, all movements of liquid and gaseous radioactive waste in the affected building must be stopped until the inoperable air cleanup exhaust system is restored to operation.
This requirement is imposed to reduce the possibility of uncontrolled releases of radioactive material into the affected building and the environment.
Since processed water which contains trace quantities of radioactive materials is being reused throughout the plant in a number of recovery operations, including required makeup to the reactor coolant system, clear criteria are needed to define radioactive liquids.
At the request of the NRC staff, criteria were developed by the licensee and reviewed and approved by the NRC staff to define when liquids should be classified as radioactive.
The criteria are based on not exceediag defined measurable levels of radioactivity.
Reference 2 lists each isotope and its associated maximum concentration.
The staff based its approval on measured concentrations in processed water being less than 10 CFR Part 20, Table I concentrations which l
define the maximum concentration in liquid for a restricted area.
The staff used the above bases because the primary impact of any uncontrolled releases of radioactive material as described above would be on plant personnel,
4-Environmental Considerations We have determined that the change does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact.
Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the change involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.5 (d)(4),
that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this change.
Concl usion Based upon our review of the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building Air Ciganup System (Reference 3) and the change request and amendment to the change request (References 1 & 2), the staff finds that the modification of proposed Technical Specification section 3.9.12 is acceptable.
We have also concluded, base'd on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered, does not involve a significant increase in the possibility of an accident or mal-function of a different type than evaluated previously and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, it does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the implementation of this change will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Raferencas I
- 1) GPU Nuclear letter from R.C. Arnold to B.J. Snyder, Director, TMI Program Office, April 19, 1982.
- 2) GPU Nuclear letter from R.C. Arnold to B.J. Snyder, Director, TMI Program Office, July 7,1982.
- 3) Final Safety Analysis Report, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station-Unit 2, April 4, 1974 f
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