Text

Amend 179 to License DPR-65,revising TS Associated W/Sump Recirculation Actuation Signal
	ML20024J213
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	10/07/1994
From:	Mckee P; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20024J214	List: ML20024J213; ML20024J216;
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	NUDOCS 9410120178
	Download: ML20024J213 (11)
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 2056b0001

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NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-336 MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.179 License No. DPR-65 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee), dated July 1, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; i

D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common i

defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

9410120178 941007 PDR ADOCK 05000336 i

p PDR

9 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical i

Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment Nc. 179, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, to be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I

?

FMu Phillip. McKee, Director Project Directorate I-4 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

October 7, 1994 i

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 179 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65 i

DOCKET NO. 50-336 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.

The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert 3/4 3-13 3/4 3-13 3/4 3-16 3/4 3-16 1

3/4 3-17 3/4 3-17 3/4 3-18 3/4 3-18 3/4 3-23 3/4 3-23 3/4 3-25a B 3/4 3-2 8 3/4 3-2 B 3/4 3-2a i

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continu:d)

' ~

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM g

TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION E

4.

MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION EM a.

Manual MSI (Trip Buttons) 2 1

2 1,2,3,4 1

ra b.

Containment Pressure -

4 2

3 1, 2, 3 2

High c.

Steam Generator Pressure - Low 4

2 3

1,2,3(c) 2 5.

ENCLOSURE BUILDING FILTRATION (EBFAS)

Manual EBFAS (Trip 2

1 2

1, 2, 3, 4 1

a.

y Buttons) b.

Manual SIAS (Trip 2

1 2

1,2,3,4 1

Buttons) c.

Containment Pressure-High 4

2 3

1, 2, 3 2

d.

Pressurizer Pressure-Low 4

2 3

1,2,3(a) 2 6.

CONTAINMENT SUMP RECIRCULATION (SRAS)

E a.

Manual SRAS (Trip Buttons) 2 1

2 1, 2, 3, 4 1

w4 b.

Refueling Water Storage "w

Tank - Low 4

2 3

1, 2, 3 4

l Q

W

3 TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION (a) Trip function may be bypassed when pressurizer pressure is < 1750 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed when pressurizer pressure is 21750 psia.

(b) An SIAS signal is first necessary to enable CSAS logic.

(c) Trip function may be bypassed below 600 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed at or above 600 psia.

(d)

Each channel has two sensors, high radiation level on either sensor will initiate containment purge valve isolation.

(e) Trip may be bypassed during testing pursuant to Special Test Exception 3.10.3.

I ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

ACTION 2 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels and with the pressurizer pressure:

a.

< 1750 psia; immediately place the inoperable channel in the bypassed condition; restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing the pressurizer pressure above 1750 psia.

b.

21750 psia, operation may continue with the inoperable channel in the bypassed condition, provided the following conditions are satisfied:

1.

All functional units receiving an input from the bypassed channel are also placed in the bypassed condition.

2.

The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be removed from service for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided one of the inoperable channels is placed in the tripped condition.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-16 Amendment No. JJJ,179 0129

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ACTION 3 -

With one or more channels inoperable, operation may continue provided the containment purge valves are maintained closed.

ACTION 4 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels and with the pressurizer pressure:

a.

< 1750 psia: immediately place the inoperable channel in the bypassed condition; restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing the pressurizer pressure above 1750 psia, b.

1 1750 psia, operation may continue with the inoperable channel in the bypassed condition, provided the following condition is satisfied:

1.

The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be removed from service for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided RQIH of the inoperable channels are placed in the bypassed condition.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/43-17 Amendment No. 177, 179 01N

TABLE 3.3-4 25 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP VALUES sp ALLOWABLE E

FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT VALUES l.

SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS)

E a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

Not Applicable Not Applicable Q

b.

Containment Pressure - High 4.75 psig 1 5.20 psig c.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low 2 1600 psia 1 1592.5 psia 2.

CONTAlfetENT SPRAY (CSAS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

Not Applicable Not Applicable b.

Containment Pressure -- High-High 5 9.48 psig i 10.11 psig R

3.

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS) a.

Manual CIAS (Trip Buttons)

Not Applicable Not Applicable

[

4 E

b.

Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons)

Not Applicable Not Applicable c.

Containment Pressure - High s 4.75 psig 1 5.20 psig d.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low 2 1600 psia 2 1592.5 psia 4.

MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

Not Applicable Not Applicable f

b.

Containment Pressure - High s 4.75 psig s 5.20 psig I

c.

Steam Generator Pressure - Low 1 500 psia 1 492.5 psia.

E

.F M

, - -. ~ < - -

~

TABLE 4.3-2

.~

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS om

$P 0;

CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH g

CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED m

h 1.

SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

R N. A.

b.

Containment Pressure - High S

R M

1, 2, 3 c.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low S

R M

1, 2, 3 d.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

M(1) 1, 2, 3 2.

CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

R N.A.

b.

Containment Pressure--

High - High S

R M

1, 2, 3 c.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

M(1) 1, 2, 3 t*

3.

CONTAIPMENT ISOLATION (CIAS) a.

Manual CIAS (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

R N.A.

Y b.

Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

R N.A.

[3 c.

Containment Pressure - High S

R M

1, 2, 3 d.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low S

R M

1, 2, 3 e.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

M(1) 1, 2, 3 4.

MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

R N.A.

b.

Containment Pressure - High S

R M

1, 2, 3 c.

Steam Generator Pressure - Low S

R M

1, 2, 3 d.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

M(1) 1, 2, 3 l

k 5.

ENCLOSURE BUILDING FILTRATION (EBFAS) a.

Manual EBFAS (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

R N.A.

j I

b.

Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

R N.A.

S c.

Containment Pressure - High S

R M

1, 2, 3 d.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low S

R M

1, 2, 3

.E e.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

M(1) 1, 2, 3 M

1

~

l 1

M s

v-

--v

INSTRUNENTATION ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEN SENSOR CABINET POWER SUPPLY DRAWERS LIMITING ColWITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2.2 The engineered safety feature actuation system Sensor Cabinets (RCO2A1, RC0282, RC02C3 & RCO2D4) Power Supply Drawers shall be' OPERABLE and energized from the normal power source with the backup power source available.

The normal and backup power sources for each sensor cabinet is detailed in Table 3.3-5a:

CABINET NORMAL POWER BACKUP POWER RC02A1 VA-10 VA-40 RC02B2 VA-20 VA-30 RC02C3 VA-30 VA-20 RCO2D4 VA-40 VA-10 Table 3.3-Sa APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 ACTION:

With any of the Sensor Cabinet Power Supply Drawers inoperable, or either the normal or backup power source not available as delineated in Table 3.3-5a, restore the inoperable Sensor Cabinet Power Supply Drawer to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.3.2.2.1 The engineered safety feature actuation system Sensor Cabinet Power Supply Drawers shall be determined OPERABLE once per shift by visual inspection of the power supply drawer indicating lamps.

4.3.2.2.2 Verify the operability of the Sensor Cabinet Power Supply auctioneering circuit at least one per 18 months.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/43-25a Amendment No.179 0131

INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 AND 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF)

INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) 1 The maximum allowable trip value for these monitors corresponds to calculated concentrations at the site boundary eich would not exceed the concentrations listed in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table II. Exposure for a year to the concentrations in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B.

Table corresponds to a total body dose to an individual of 500 mrem which is well below the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 for an individual at any point on the exclusion area boundary for two hours.

Determination of the monitor's trip value in counts per minute, which is the actual instrument response, involves several factors including:

1) the atmospheric dispersion (x/Q), 2) isotopic composition of the sample, 3) sample flow rate, 4) sample collection efficiency, 5) counting efficiency,,and 6)*the background radiation level at the detector.

The x/Q of 5.8 x 10 sec/m is the highest annual average x/Q estimated for the site boundary (0.48 miles in the NE sector) for vent releases from the contJnment and 7.5 x 10 sec/m* is the highest annual average x/Q estimated for an off-site location (3 miles in the NNE sector) for releases from the Unit I stack.

This calculation also assumes that the isotopic composition is xenon-133 for gaseous radioactivity and cesium-137 for particulate radioactivity (Half Lives greater than 8 days).

The upper limit of 5 x 10' cpm is approximately 90 percent of full instrument i

scale.

SRAS Locie Modification Action Statement 4 of Table 3.3-3, which applies only to the SRAS logic, specifies that during surveillance testing the second inoperable channel must also be placed in the bypassed condition. For the SRAS logic, placing the second i

inoperable channel in the tripped ccndition (as in Action Statement 2) could result in the false generation of a SRAS signal due to an additional failure j

which causes a trip signal in either of the remaining channels at the onset of i

a LOCA.

The false generation of the SRAS signal leads to unacceptable consequences for LOCA mitigation.

With Action Statement 4, during the two-hour period when two channels are i

bypassed, no additional failure can result in the false generation of the SRAS signal. However, an additional failure that prevents a trip of either of the two remaining channels may prevent the generation of a true SRAS signal while in this Action Statement.

If no SRAS is generated at the appropriate time, operating proceduresinstruct the operator to ensure that the SRAS actuation occurs when the refueling water storage tank level decreases.

Due to the limited period of vulnerability, and the existence of operator requirements to manually initiate an SRAS if an automatic initiation does not occur, this risk is considered acceptable.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-2 Amendment No. #7 179 0145

\\

BASES (Continued)

Sensor Cabinet Power Sucoly Auctioneerina The auctioneering circuit of the ESFAS sensor cabinets ensures that two sensor cabinets do not de-energize upon loss of a D.C. bus, thereby resulting in the false generation of an SRAS.

Power so"rce VA-10 provides normal power to sensor cabinet A and backup power to sensor cabinet D.

VA-40 provides normal power to sensor cabinet D and backup power to cabinet A.

Power sources VA-20 and VA-30 and sensor cabinets B and C are similarly arranged.

If the normal or backup power source for an ESFAS Sensor Cabinet is lost, two sensor cabinets would be supplied from the same power source, but would still be operating with no subsequent trip signals present. However, any additional failure associated with this power source would result in the loss of the two sensor cabinets, consequently gene:ating a false SRAS.

The 48-hour Action Statement ensures that the probability of a Action Statement and an additional failure of the remaining power source, while in this Action Statement is sufficiently small.

3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring channels ensures that 1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual channels and 2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded.

The spent fuel storage area monitors provide a signal to direct the ventilation exhaust from the spent fuel storage area through a filter train when the dose rate exceeds the setpoint.

The filter train is provided to reduce the particulate and iodine radioactivity released to the atmosphere.

Should an accident involving spent fuel occur, the 100 mR/hr actuation setpoint would be sufficient to limit any consequentes at the exclusion area boundary to those evaluated in the NRC Safety Evaluation, Section 15 (May 1974).

4 NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-2a Amendment No. M. 179 0145

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