ML20024E949
| ML20024E949 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 08/23/1983 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024E948 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8309070472 | |
| Download: ML20024E949 (3) | |
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NUCL EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j~
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WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555
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4 SAFETYEVALUATiONBYTHEOFFICEOFNUCLEARRhACTORREGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 89 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. DPR-32 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-280 Introduction By letter dated August 5,1983, as supplemented on August 9 and August 16, 1983, Virginia Electric and Power Company (the licensee) requested an amend-ment to Operating License No. DPR-32 for the Surry Power Station, Unit No.1.
The proposed change would revise Technical Specification 4.17.A to provide an extension of 21 days to.the visual inspection interval for inaccessible snubbers.
Discussion Surry Unit No. I was shut down-for refueling in February 1983 and started up from the refueling on June 16, 1983. When Surry l was shut down in February, a visual inspection was performed of the inaccessible snubbers between February 7 and February 24. Five snubbers were found to be inoperable which meant that the next inspection interval would be 62 days t 25%. The l
licensee then performed inspe::tions on May 5, May 16, May 26 and June 15, l
1983, at which time no snubbers were found to be inoperable.
Since these inspections were the instances the snubbers were declared operable, the 62 l-days ! 25% interval began at each inspection with the subsequent inspection becoming a new reference point. Thus, the licensee counts the 62 days t 25%
from June 15, 1983.
Unit 1 has operated since June 15, 1983, except for a one reactor trip with a down time of short duration. However, Unit 2 was shut down in June for refueling with an anticipated startup on August 20, 1983.
It was expected that Unit 2 would be back to power prior to the time the Surry 1 snubber l-inspection was required on August 31, 1983.
On August 1, 1983, the licensee was-informed by a contracted offsite facility that. additional large bore snubber overhaul and testing was required for Unit 2 snubbers. The licensee informed the NRC by telephone and in its application, as supplemented, that due to the the unanticipated additional snubber testing and overhaul, as well as. extensive turbine bearing work, the Unit 2 refueling outage had slipped past.the original scheduled date. Therefore, the licensee requested the extension of the snubber interval for Unit 1 in order not to have both units shut ^down at one time.
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8309070472 830823 PDR ADOCK 05000200 P
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Evaluation
- This proposed change falls into the category of an emergency change since failure of the NRC to take action would result in Unit 1 shutting down on.
August 31, 1983. Although the licensee had planned to shut down Unit 1 to perform the snubber inspection, the delay in Unit 2 startup would result in both Units 1 and 2 down at the same tima and the-licensee would like to avoid this situation.
The licensee's letter dated August 16, 1983, states that it was notified on August 1, 1983, of a failure of a Surry 2 large bore snubber. This failure resulted in a need for additional testing and overhaul of the snubbers. The NRC project manager was informed on August 2, 1983, of the need for the amendment and an application for amendment was submitted on August 5,1983.
We have reviewed the facts concerning this request and conclude that the licensee has made a timely submittal, that a shutdown would be required without NRC action, and that action by the licensee could not preclude this situation.
The action requested by the licensee is a 21 day extension in the 62 days t 9.5% inspection interval until September 21, 1983. Although the licensee found five inoperable snubbers in the February inspection, no inoperable snubbers were found in four subsequent inspections.
In accordance with the VEPCO Snubber Program all of the inaccessible snubbers.were declared operable at each of the four inspections in May and June.
We have reviewed the information submitted by the licensee and conclude that a 21 day extension is acceptable. The basis for our conclusion is that the four inspections'are indications that the snubbers are in good condition.
In retrospect the licensee possibly could have repaired or replaced the five snubbers in February and at that time declared them operable.
Had the licensee been able to declare the snubbers operable upon completion of this earlier inspection. The current inspection-interval possibly could have been increased to 124 days t 25% which would have eliminated the need for the rr 1uested extension l
to avoid shutdown..However, since the licensee has taken a cons vative approach to the inspection frequency, the current interval is 62 days t ' 4 and an extension is required to prevent a shutdown at a time Surry Unit 2 is dr.w. also.
In addition, it is very unlikely that in 21 days an event would occur which required the use of the snubbers.
Environmental Consideration We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent l
. types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we i
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'have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insig-l-
nificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 l
CFR 551.5(d)(4), that =an environmental impact statement, or negative declar.
ation and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection
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, Final No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination
.The State was informed by telephone of our proposed no significant hazards consideration determination August 17, 1983. The State contact had no comments on the proposed determination. The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards by providing certain examples (48 FR14870).
Example (iii) of the category of.significant hazards consideration involves a significant relaxation in limiting conditions for operation not accompanied by compensatory changes, conditions, or actions that maintain a commensurate level of safety (such as allowing a plant to operate at full power during a period in which one or more safety systems are not operable). This change appears to fall 'into the category of example (iii) because the change involves.a relaxation of a limiting condition for operation.
However, we conclude that an extension of 21 days will not have significant impact on the ability of the inaccessible snubbers to respond and perform satisfactorily during a seismic event or under accident conditions and, it was determined just prior to startup on June 15, 1983, that there were no inoperable snubbers.
It is, therefore, very unlikely that any snubbers have become inoperable in the operating time since June 15, 1983. Based on our review of the licensee's submittals as described herein, we have made a final determination that the
-licensee's amendment request does not involve a significant hazards consideration.
Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by-operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated:
August 23, 1983 l
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