ML20024B733
| ML20024B733 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 07/08/1983 |
| From: | Johnson G NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024B704 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8307110289 | |
| Download: ML20024B733 (8) | |
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1 July 8, 1983 e
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0ffilSSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of p)
Docket Nos. 50-413 50-414 (Catawba Nuclear Station, h
Units-1and2)
J NRC STAFF MOTION FOR SUPMARY DISPOSITION OF CESG CONTENTION 18 (PALMETTO 44)
I.
INTRODUCTION The NRC Staff moves the Licensing Board, pursuant to 10 CFR Section l
2.749 of the Comission's Rules of Practice, for sumary disposition in f
its favor of CESG Contention 18 (Palmetto 44). As originally proffered, CESG Contention 18 (Palmetto 44) stated:
The license should not issue because reactor degradation in the i
form of a much more rapid increase in reference temperature than had been anticipated has occurred at a number of PWR's including the Applicant's Oconee Unit 1.
Until and unless the NRC and the industry can avoid reactor embrittlement, Catawba should not be
, permitted to operate.
Though initially rejected, this contention was " admitted as clarified" in an Order of the Licensing Board, dated July _8,1982. The " clarified contention" states:
The Board appears to have misread this contention. Reactor l!
materials did indeed comply with 10 CFR Part 50; App. G requirements when tested.
Intervenors' concern is with the unanticipated " rapid increase in reference temperature" which has been found in essentially all reactor vessels examined of which
,1 Oconee and Robinson are merely two nearby examples. All of these reactor vessels were required to conform to essentially the same l
ASME codes. Perhaps it should be stated that the " reference B307110289 830700 PDR ADOCK 05000413 0
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temperature" is the nil ductility reference temperature below which the application of slifficient stress produces a glass-like brittle fracture rather than a chewing-gum-like ductile stretching. Taffy provides a common example of ductile stretching. Above the nil ductility temperature it " pulls" to an extraordinary degree liTthout
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breaking. Below the nil ductility temperature it breaks like peanut brittle in a fracture mode.
Premature reactor embrittlement increases hazard because ECCS water during a LOCA can chill a reactor vessel below an elevated nil ductility temperature under conditions of appreciabTe stress.
It is only prudent in light of what is clearly a common problem to anticipate and avoid these consequences at Catawba where no evidence exists that these reactors will behave any differently than other ASME Section III, Subsection NA Components. The Board should note the language in ASME Code, Subsection NA 1130 p. 3, (1971 ed.):
The Rules.....do not cover deterioration which may occur in service as a result of radiation effects, corrosion, erosion or instability of the materials.
It is this now somewhat illuminated blindspot which Intervenors seek to address.
4 The Staff has interpreted this contention as a claim, principally, that the NRC's projection of the amount of increase in reference temperature RTNDT, which results from neutron irradiation damage, is nonconservative, that the amount of reactor material degradation for the Catawba reactor vessels cannot be accurately measured, and, as a result, that there is l
not reasonable assurance that the Catawba reactor vessels can and will be operated within acceptable safety margins for material degradation.
As grounds for its motion, the Staff asserts that the attached affidavit of Barry J. Elliot, together with other papers filed in this l
l proceeding, demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be heard with respect to CESG Contention 18 (Palmetto 44) and that l
the Staff is entitled to a decision in its favor as a matter of law.
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II. DISCUSSION Commission Standards for Sumary Disposition The Comission's Rules of Practice provide that sumary disposition of any matter involved in an operating license proceeding shall be granted if the moving papers, together with the other papers filed in the proceeding, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a decision as a matter of law. 10 CFR 2.749(d). The use of sumary disposition has been encouraged by the Comission and the Appeal Board to avoid unnecessary hearings on contentions for which an intervenor has failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
E.g., Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8,13 NRC 452, 457 (1981); Houston Lighting and Power Company (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542, 550-551 (1980); and Northern States Pcwer Company (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1and2),ALAB-107,6AEC188,194(1973); aff'd, CLI-73-12, 6 AEC 241, 242 (1973); aff'd sub nom, BPI v. AEC, 502 F.2d 424 (D.C.
Cir.~1974). A material fact is one that may affect the outcome of the litigation. Mutual Fund Investors Inc. v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620, 624 (9th Cir.1977).
When a motion for sumary disposition is made and supported by affidavit, a party opposing the motion may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his answer but must set forth specific facts such as would be admissible in evidence that show the existence of a i
genuine issue of material fact. 10CFR2.749(b). All material facts set forth in the statement of material facts required to be served by
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e 4-the. moving party will be deemed.to be admitted unless controverted by the statement of material facts required to be served by the opposing party. 10CFR2.749(a). Any answers supporting or opposing a motion for sumary disposition must be served within twenty (20) days after service of the motion.
I d..
If no answer properly showing the existence of a
- genuine issue of material fact is filed, the decision sought by the moving party, if properly supported, shall be rendered.
III. CONCLUSION There being no genuine issue as to any material fact and inasmuch as decision in favor of the Staff's position is required as a matter of law, the Staff requests that CESG Contention 18 (Palmetto 44) be
' dismissed.
Resp ctfully submitted, bd geJ.J on CounseF for RC Staff Dated at Bethesdi, Maryland this,7dayof g, 1983 i
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COP 9tISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
I Docket Nos. 50-413 I
50-414 (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1and2)
- l 4
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THERE IS N0 GENUINE ISSUE TO BE HEARD 1.
CESGContention18(Palmetto 44)claimsthatasafetyhazard exists at Catawba because:
(1) the NRC's projection of the amount of increase in reference temperature RTNDT, which results from neutron irradiation damage, is nonconservative, and (2) the amount of reactor material degradation for the Catawba reactor vessels cannot be accurately measured. Affidavit, 1 2.
,2.
The Staff Safety Evaluation Report for Catawba projected the amount of increase in RT resulting from neutron irradiation damage NDT for the Catawba reactor vessels based on the method presented in Regulatory Guide 1.99, Rev.1 " Effects of Residual Elements on l
Predicted Radiation Damage to Reactor Vessel Material." Affidavit, 1 3.
l 3.
The Reg. Guide 1.99 projection method was considered conservative because the trend curves therein form an upper bound for the data which was available at the time of its issuance. Affidavit, 1 3.
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4.
The test results of the Oconee Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program indicated an actual increase in RT for the Oconee Capsule OC NDT 111-B and OC 11-A weld metals of 89'F and 104*F respectively.
Affidavit, 1 4.
5.
The methodology of Reg. Guide 1.99 produces a projected increase in RT of 170*F and 226*F, respectively, for the same capsule NDT materials. Affidavit, 1 4.
6.
Comparison of the projections using Reg. Guide 1.99 and the test results from Oconee shows that the actual increase in reference temperature has been well below that predicted, and therefore there has been no " unanticipated ' rapid increase in reference temperature'..."
at Oconee. Affidavit, 1 4.
7.
A Comission study statistically evaluating increase in RTNDT resulting from irradiation damage from all PWR reactor vessel surveillance materials (at 25 plants) yielded a range of fluence which the Catawba end-of-life fluence falls within, such that the study conclusions are l
valid for Catawba for the life of the plant. Affidavit, 1 5.
's.
The "Guthrie Formula" produced by the Comission study predicts, for the limiting Catawba Units I and 2 reactor vessel beltline materials, that the inside surface mean RT would increase by 62*F and NDT 61.5*F, respectively. Affidavit, 1 6.
9.
The Regulatory Guide 1.99 method predicts for the Catawba Units 1 and 2 materials that the increase in RT w uld be 58' and 94*F, NDT respectively, which results are within 4*F of the mean RTNDT, and within the 95% confidence interval (two standard deviations) of the "Guthrie Fonnula" results for Units 1 and 2, respectively. Affidavit, 1 6.
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- 10. The Staff considers the Reg. Guide and "Guthrie Fomula" projection methods to be both consistent and conservative for predicting the increase in RT which results from neutron irradiation damage.
- 11. Appendix H,10 CFR, Part 50 requires that all connercially operated reactor vessels have samples from their limiting materials placed in capsules which are then irradiated and subsequently withdrawn according to a schedule and tested to detemine the amount of reactor vessel material embrittlement resulting from neutron irradiation damage. Affidavit, 1 7.
- 12. The Staff has conservatively predicted that the end of service adjusted referenced temperature for the Catawba reactor vessels will not exceed 200*F, resulting in the capsule withdrawal schedule set forth in Section 7.6.2 of ASTM E 185, referenced in Section II.B.I. of Appendix H.
Affidavit, 1 7.
- 13. The results of these tests will be used to detemine the actual increase in RT for the Catawba reactor vessels. Affidavit, HDT 1 7.'
- 14. The combination of prediction methods previously discussed and Applicants' reactor vessel surveillance program will accurately detemine the amount of reactor material degradatien for the Catawba reactor vessel materials. Affiday'it, 1 7.
- 15. The Staff ensures safe operation of the reactor vessel during nonnal, anticipated upset and test conditions by requiring the vessel to be operated within the operating limits of Appendix G, 10 CFR Part 50, which, in turn, are based upon the RT for the limiting reactor NDT vessel material. Affidavit, 1 8.
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- 16. Since the Catawba reactor vessel materials will have their RT accurately detemined throughout the life of the plant, and the NDT Staff will use the higher of the RT values produced by comparison of NDT the projection methods and the surveillance program for calculating operating limit curves (augmented by a safety factor of 2) the reactor vessels can be safely operating during noma 1, anticipated upset and test conditions. Affidavit, 1 8.
- 17. The Staff ensures safe operation of the reactor vessel during faulted and emergency conditions by requiring the vessel RT to comply NDT with the screening criteria of Commission Report SECY-82-465,
" Pressurized Thermal Shock," which states that "the risk from PTS events for reactor vessels with RT values less than the proposed scrt.ening NDT criteria (270*F for axial welds and 300*F for circumferential welds) is acceptable." Affidavit, 1 9.
- 18. The Staff has calculated both the expected end-of-life embrittlement for the Catawba reactor vessels using Reg. Guide 1.99 and the "Guthrie Fomula," as well as the upper bound (95% confidence inte'rval)RT using the "Guthrie Formula." Affidavit, 1 10; Table I.
- 19. The upperbound 95% confidence RT f r Catawba Units 1 and 2 NDT reactor vessels are 162*F and 124.5'F, respectively; these values are well below the PTS screening criteria and indicate that the risk to the vessel during faulted and emergency conditions is acceptable.
Affidavit,1 10.
- 20. Since Appendix G vessel operating limits will be based upon accurate measurements of reactor material degradation and conservative methods of predicting such degradation, there is reasonable assurance that the Catawba reactor vessels can and will be operated well within acceptable safety margins for material degradation. Affidavit, 1 11.
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