ML20024B708
| ML20024B708 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 07/07/1983 |
| From: | Jabbour K, Singh A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024B704 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8307110260 | |
| Download: ML20024B708 (16) | |
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' UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COPMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY A2 LICENSING BOARD I
In the Matter of ll DUKE POWER COMPANY, ET AL.
l)lI Docket Nos. 50-413 50-414 (CatawbaNuclearStation, l
Units 1 and 2) ll AFFIDAVIT OF AMARJIT SINGH AND KAHTAN N. JABBCijR IN SUPPORT OF SUtMARY DISPOSITION OF PALMETTO ALLIANCE CONTENTION NO.16 1.
I, Amarjit Singh, am an employee of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
My present position is Mechanical Engineer, Auxiliary Systems Branch, Division of Systems Integration, within the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
I am responsible for the review and evaluation of new and spent fuel storage, spent fuel handling and the spent fuel pool cooling system for the Catawba Nuclear Power Plant. A copy of my professional qualification is attached.
I give this affidavit in support of sumary disposition of Palmetto Contention 16 in this proceeding and I certify that I have personal knowledge of the matters within my areas of respon-sibility set forth herein and that the statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
2.
I, Kahtan N. Jabbour am an employee of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission. My present position is Senior Project Manager, Licensing Branch No. 4, Division o.f Licensing. Within the Office of Nuclear Reactor i
Regulation, I am the Licensing Project Manager for the Catawba Nuclear i
n 8307110260 830708 PDR ADDCK 05000413 0
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Station. A copy of my professional qualifications is attached.
I give.
this affidavit in support of Summary Disposition on Palmetto Contention 16.
I certify that I have personal knowledge of the matters relating to limiting doses to personnel under 10 CFR Part 20 set forth herein and that the state-ments are true and correct to the ~oest of my knowledge.
3.
Palmetto Alliance Contention 16 in the proceeding states:
" Applicants have not demonstrated their ability to safely store irradiated fuel assemblies from other Duke nuclear facilities so as to provide reasonable assurance that those activities do not endcnger the health and safety of the public."
4.
By letter dated November 2,1982, from the applicants to the NRC staff, the applicants proposed to receive and store up to 300 spent fuel assem-blies per year from the Oconee and McGuire facilities in the Catawba l
spent fuel pool. This contention thus focuses on the ability of the applicants to safely implement their proposal.
5.
The staff has examined the potential interaction between the spent fuel assemblies from the Oconee and McGuire plants and the Catawba spent fuel storage facility. This affidavit addresses this interaction and concludes that there is reasonable assurance that the storing, cooling and handling l
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of irradiated fuel assemblies from Oconee and McGuire at Catawba will not endanger the health and safely of the public.
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i 6.
In order to evaluate the safety of the applicant's proposal for storage of Oconee and McGuire spent fuel at Catawba, the staff examined the following primary areas of interaction:
(1) the effect of storing Oconee
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and McGuire fuel on criticality, (2) the impact of such storage on the ability of the spent fuel pool cooling system to remove the decay heat, and maintain adequate levels of cooling water in the pool, and (3) the ability of the applicants to move spent fuel casks into and out of the spent fuel storage facility without causing damage either to the assemblies being moved or to assenblies in the spent fuel pool. The Staff also
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evaluated whether removal of spent fuel assemblies from the cask presented any safety concern.
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The spent fuel storage facility at each Catawba unit including the spent fuel storage racks and the spent fuel pool liner plate is analyzed and designed as a seismic Category I structure. Each facility is designed to provide underwater storage for 1,418 fuel assemblies.
1 CRITICALITY
- 8..The NRC acceptance criteria for the criticality aspects of fuel storage is that the neutron multiplication factor (K,ff) ir. the spent fuel pool shall be at a subcritical value of less than or equal to 0.95, including all uncertainties, under all conditions, throughout the life of the storage racks. The Staff's accsptance criterion is based on conformance to the
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4 requirements of General Design Criterion (GDC) 62 and the guidelines of Positions C.1 and C.4 of Regulatory Guide 1.13 as they relate to the prevention of criticality. This 0.95 acceptance criterion is based on the overall uncertainties associated with the calculational methods, and in our judgement provides sufficient margin \\to preclude criticality in fuel pools. There will b~e a technica~i specification imposed limiting the K,ff in the Catawba spent fuel pool to 0.95.
9.
The staff did not perform any direct calculations of the reactivity of the spent fuel storage arrangement within the racks but a comparison was made to the designs of the spent fuel sterage racks in other plants. The comparison led to the estimate that the K,ff was 0.86 for the most reactive condition with a pool full of 3.5 weight percent U-235 fresh fuel stored in unborated water.
If a conservative estimate of 0.02 for uncertainties is added, there is still some margin to our acceptance criterion of 0.95.
The dominant characteristic of the Oconee and McGuire fuels with respect to evaluating their impact on criticality in the Catawba spent fuel pool is the U-235 enrichment. McGuire fuel has the same enrichment as Catawba; 4
i.e., 3.5 weight percent and Oconee fuel has a lower enrichment. There are no significant differences in the fuels from Catawba, McGuire and Oconee with respect to criticality. The applicants performed an analysis which showed that criticality will remain below 0.95 (the Staff acceptance criterion) for any configuration of fuel storage in the Catawba pool that
would involve fuel from McGuire and Oconee facilities. The fuel storage array is also adequate to maintain K,ff below 0.95 for the unlikely event of accidental dropping of a fuel assembly across the spent fuel racks. Space between storage locations is blocked to prevent insertion of fuel ir. other than designated positions. Therefore, the Staff concludes that in con-formance with the requirements of GDC 62,the possible storage.of..,
McGuire and Oconee fuel at Catawba does not adversely affect the Staff's estimates of the margin to criticality for the Catawba spent fuel pool, and that the margin to criticality is adequate for both nonnal and design basis accident conditions.
- 10. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling' System and Pool Makeup 1
The acceptance criteria for the spent fuel pool cooling system and pool makeup include conformance with the requirements of GDC 61 and 63 and the guidelines of Regulatory Guides 1.13, Positions C.1, C.2, C.6, and C.8, relating to the spent fuel pool cooling system's functional design and pool makeup capability.
The spent fuel pool cooling system is designed to remove the decay heat generated by the maximum number of spent fuel assemblies that are to be stored, plus a full-core offload. The total storage capacity of the pool at each unit of the Catawba plant is 1418 spent fuel assemblies. The design consists of two fuel pool cooling trains, each with a fuel pool L
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cooling pump and heat exchanger that are completely redundant. Under the j
6 normal operating conditions with Catawba fuel only, a heat load of 17.0 x 10 Btu /hr is generated and, only one train is required to maintain the pool l
water temperature at 125'F or less. This normal condition assumes one-third core (64 fuel. assemblies) with full irradiation and 7-day decay, one full core of open spaces and the remainder of the pool filled with fully irradiated fuel from previous yearly refuelings. The maximum increase in
' heat load due to storage of nonCatawba fuel is estimated to be less than 2%. This increased heat load is accomodated under the " normal" operating conditions by the spent fuel pool cooling system which is designed to main-l I
6 tain a pool water temperature below 140*F with a heat load of 20.6 X 10 Btu'/hr. These pool water temperatures are within' the staff's acceptance criterion of 140*F.
The. system is also designed to maintain the pool water temperature at less than 150*F with two cooling trains operating assuming maximum heat load of 39.'O X 106 Btu /hr. The maximum heat load assumes a full core discharge l
which consists of one-third core irradiated 11 days and decayed 7 days, one-third core irradiated two full cycles and decayed 7 days, and one-third core fully irradiated and decayed 25 days, and the remainder of the pool filled with fuel from previous yearly refuelings. This pool water temperature for the " maximum" heat load condition is also maintained when storing Oconee and McGuire spent fuel. As noted above, the " maximum" increase in heat loadedue toestoring Oconee and McGuire fuel is less than' s.
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i 2%. Thus the increased heat load under the " maximum" heat load condition l
1s accomodated by the spent fuel pool cooling system which is designed 6
to maintain a pool temperature below 150'F with a heat load of 42.7 x 10 Stu/hr. This pool water temperature thus meets the staff's acceptance t
criterion of 150*F.
- 11. Assuming the unlikely loss of both trains of the spent fuel pool cooling system, there is sufficient time and makeup capability available to provide adequate shielding and water volumes in the fuel pool. The applicants have performed an analysis of the consequences of failure of both cooling trains, i
assuming no makeup water is supplied and the maximum decay heat production rate.
Thi's analyils'showed that there are at least 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> before all water in the pool would evaporate and it will take 72 ' hours before the fuel assemblies are uncovered. This affords ample time under any foreseeable conditions to initiate makeup water replacement to maintain the water level in the pool.
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- 12. The spent fuel pool is equipped with water level and temperature alams which are indicated in the control room. When the level drops below that of nomal operation, the control room operator has the choice of several sources of providing makeup water, each of which has a flow rate which exceeds the evaporation rate from the pool. Normally, makeup will be provided from either the reactor makeup storage tank pr the refueling water l-storage tank. Assuming'neither of these is available, the safety-related
8 assured source of makeup is supplied from either train of the Nuclear Service Water System. Since there are a number of sources of makeup to the fuel pool and the level drops slowly enough to provide ample time for operator response, the fuel pool water level is not expected to drop to the top of the spent fuel storage racks.
13.
In addition to the above, the system piping is arranged so that failure of any pipe line cannot drain the spent fuel pool below the water level required for radiation shielding. A water level of ten feet or more above the top of the stored spent fuel assemblies is maintained to limit direct gamma dose, as stated in Section 9.1.3.1.3 of the FSAR.
Therefore, the staff concludes that assuming applicants implement their proposal for storing Oconee and McGuire spent fuel at Catawba, the spent fuel pool cooling systen including the makeup water is in conformance with i
the requirements of GDC 61 and 63 and is adequate to remove decay heat and maintain adequate levels of cooling water in the pool; consequently, I
there will be no fuel damage and no offsite dose affect.
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- 14. SPENT FUEL AND CASK HANDLING l
In order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads near the spent I
fuel pool, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve i
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a two phase objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy.
The first portion of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear I
Poweh Plants" is to assure that all load handling systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated such that their probability of failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed. The second portion of the staff's objective achieved l
through the guidelines is to ensure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (1) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small. Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.
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- 15. The approach used to develop the staff guidelines of minimizing the poten-tial for a load drop was based on defense in depth and is sumarized as follows:
o Provide sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to assure reliable operation of the handling system.
o Define safe load travel paths through procedures and operator training so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equip-ment.
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o Provide mechanical stops or electrical interlocks to prevent movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel or in proximity to equipment associated with redundant shutdown paths.
- 16. To be consistent with the staff's guidelines Duke Power Company provided a submittal, which is being evaluated by the staff. The staff will require that a condition be placed in the license requiring that before startup following the first refueling outage, the applicant shall comply with the guidelines of the first phase of the staff's objective in NUREG-0612. How-ever, the applicant has comitted to implement the measures in Paragraph 15 above before receiving an operating license. To meet the second phase objective for the safe cask handling and to meet the staff's acceptance criteria for spent fuel handling, including GDC 61 and the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.13, the applicant has provided a discussion applicable to handling of spent fuel casks from Oconee and McGuire in the Catawba SFSF.
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- 17. As ' stated in SER Section 9.1.5, the main hoist of the cask-handling crane which is used to lift the cask is prevented from traveling over the spent fuel pool by mechanical stops. The spent fuel cask is brought to the i
cask storage area along a prescribed path and enters the storage area 1
i without passing over the spent fuel pool or any safety-related equipment.
l The cask is not lifted to an elevation above any structural surface high enough to cause damage that could result in unacceptable radiological release should the cask be dropped. The walls that surround the cask-l l
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11 loading area rise to the same height as the pool and are structurally designed to withstand the impact force resulting from a falling cask.
Should the cask tip after falling on the guard walls surrounding the cask loading area, its center of gravity is such that it will not fall outside the cask loading area and will thus not affect the fuel in the spent fuel storage pool. Therefore, the staff concludes that, the requirements of GDC 61 and the guidelines of Regulatory Guide i
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-1.13 are met and there is reasonable assurance that the applicant can move spent fuel casks into and out of spent fuel storage facilities without causing damage either to the assemblies being moved or to the assemblies in the spent fuel pool.
- 18. The NRC requires that doses to personnel be maintained below the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. Additionally, the applicants have comitted to assure that Catawba will operate in a manner consistent with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 8.8, "Infomation Relevant to Ensuring that Occupatienal Radiation Exposures at Nuclear Power Stations will be as Low its Reasonably Achievable" Revision 3 June 1978. Any mishandling of the cask causing large personnel doses such as,among others, unshielded removal of the cask lid, would be inconsistent with this-commitment and result in violation of 10 CFR Section 20.101 requirements.
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- 19. On the basis of the above, the staff concludes, there is reasonable assurance-that the storage, cooling and handling or irradjated fuel assenblies from0 cones and j McGuire at Catawb's will be accomplished in a manner that does not endanger the health and safety of-the public.
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IU5iTAN N. JABBOUR
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SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me IU this O" day of July,1983.
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l IC a c-o f c. ? Y..3cdv*v x 47 Notary Public
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ANARJIT SINGH, P.E.
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH DIVISION OF SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 0FFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION I an a Mechanical Engineer in the Auxiliary Systems Branch in the Division of Systaas Integration, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. 5. Nuclear Regulatory Consiission. In this position I perform technical reviews and evaluations of the functional capability of auxiliary systems and components i
pursuant to the construction and operation of reactors.
I received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Nuclear Engineering from Catholic University of America in 1976. Since 1976. I have taken courses on PWR and BWR technology. I have completed 12 credits in Master of Science in Engineering degree program at Catholic University of America. I have been a registered Professional Engineer in the State of Wisconsin since 1980. (19779)
My experience includes 10 years with the Department of Energy, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Chesapeake Division and Department of Environmental Services as Environmental Engineer engaged in diversified engineering work including: fossil power plants, facility surveys, engineering studies, contract administration, project engineering, water and waste water treatment plants.
I joined the Auxiliary Systems Branch in August,1981. Since that time.
I have prepared safety evaluation inputs for Vermont Yankee's safety shutdown review, fuel storage reviews of San Onofre Unit 1, Oyster Creek and Lacrosse, auxiliary feedwater reviews of Calvert Cliff's and Ginna, tornado generated l
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'T e missiles reviews of Haddam Neck and San Onofre Unit 1. interna missiles review of Haddam Neck and control of heavy loads reviews Nuclear Units 1 and 2. Indian point Units 2 and 3 and Beaver Valle Additionally input to safety evaluation report for Catawba Nuclear St I have responsibility for the review of the following nuclear power pl f
f new and spent fuel storage, spent fuel cooling system; auxiliary systems:
spent fuel handling; service water system; reactor auxiliary coolin r
system; domineralized water makeup system; ultimate heat sin I
I storage facilities; compressed air system; standby liquid control sys HVAC system for control room area, spent fuel pool area, auxiliar radwaste area, and ECCS areas; main steam supply system and water system.
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PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS DR. KAHTAN N. JABBOUR LICENSING BRANCH NO. 4 DIVISION OF LICENSING OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION I am a Senior Project Manager in the Division of Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. I am responsible for managing and coordinating licensing activities with respect to Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2.
I have served in the position of Project Manager since April 1980.
This position provides for managing and coordinating the safety and environmental reviews of applications for licenses to operate or construct light water nuclear power plants.
I assumed responsibility for Catawba Station, Units 1 and 2, when the application for operating licenses was updated in March 1981. Another nuclear plant for which I
~ have previously served in this capacity is Beaver Valley Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, which was in the post-construction pennit stage.
Between January 1976 and Aoril 1980, I held the position of a Principal Mechanical Engineer in the Systematic Evaluation Prograra (SEP), and in the Engineering Branch, Division of Operating Reactors,
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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The SEP position provided for the f
safety review of 11 older nuclear facilities. The engineering position provided for the review of mechanical issues related to operating facilities.
Between September 1973 and December 1975, I held the position of a Senior Mechanical Engineer in the Mecha:ical Engineering Branch, Division of Technical Review, Office of Regulation, USAEC. During this 6
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period I participated in the review and evaluation of over 15 construction pemit and operating license applications.
I participated on a continuing basis in the review and planning activities for
~ Comission and industry sponsored programs for seismic qualification of mechanical and electrical equipment and in the development of design criteria for incorporation into the Nuclear Component Code sponsored by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
From June 1969 to September 1973 I was employed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in the Structural Dynamics Section of the Mechanical Division.
In this opacity I was responsible for the dynamic analysis and structural integrity of spacecraft systems and components during vibration qualification testing which simulate space flight conditions. My duties also included review, evaluation and direction of contractor efforts in the area of dynamic analysis and testing. I participated in the establishment of structural analysis criteria for spacecraft systems and components.
I received a B.S. degree in Engineering from St. Joseph French University in Beirut, Lebanon.
I also received a Master Degree and a Ph.D. in Structural Mechanics from Purdue University in Lafayette, Indiana. After graduating, I worked as a Senior Structural Engineer with Knoerle and Associates in Baltimore, MD, in the structural analysis of bridges and buildings, and in computer programing.
I have written several papers in the area of structural dynamics and stress analysis.
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