ML20024B240
| ML20024B240 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1979 |
| From: | Stello V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | Arnold R METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024B241 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-GB GPU-2316, NUDOCS 8307070477 | |
| Download: ML20024B240 (4) | |
See also: IR 05000320/1979010
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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W A S M No To N. D. C. 20555
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Dc:ket Nos. 50-289
and 50-320
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Me r:politan Edisen C ::any
ATTh:
Mr. R. C. Arnelc
Sr. Vice Presicen:
252 Cr rry Hill Rea:
e
,
sarsi::any, New Jersey
0705:
Ge.-leme.:
SU5 JECT:
INVESTIGATION REDORT NUMEER SC-320/79-10
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This refers to tne investigation concu::ed by tne Special Investiga:icn Team
fr:m tne NRC's Office of Inspe::icn ana Enforcement of activities autneri:e:
y 5?.C License Num:er OPR-73 and specifically of your activities pre:ecing.
curino anc immeoiateiv folio.inc :ne nuclear a::icent tnat oc:urrec at tne
Tnres' Mile Islano Nuclear Pcwer'sta-icn. Uni: Num:er 2. on Mar:n 25. 1979.
Be:ause of
ne similari y of Units 1 and 2 anc cc==cnality of management
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re :-: units , c:rre::ive a:-icn
tagen in res:ense :: this le- e
an: its
er: :sures mus
ce e:ually a::iica:ie :: J.-its 1 L 2.
Fur ner,
ne NE~ 5:a
-il; =0nsicer tne effectiveness of acticns taxen in response to :nis corres-
concence in ceveloping its position on readiness for restart before tne Atemi:
Safety and Licensing Board constituted to consicer the restart of Unit 1.
Cecies of tnis corresponcence anc your resocnse will be furnisne: to tnis
Boar:.
Areas examined durino this investication are described in the Office of
Inscection and Enforcement Investigation Report Number 50-320/79-10, published
also as NUREG-0600.
Numerous potential items of noncompliance were identifiec
cu-ing tne investigation ano are cescribec in the report.
As a result of
ac:i-icnal NRC review anc because of mitigating circumstances, not 'all of the
potential items identified in the report were cited in Appendix A.
Baset :n the results of this investication anc additional consideratien of tne
cotential items of nonccmpliance identified in Investigation Reper: Num:er
50-320/79-10, it appears that certain of your activities were not cencucted in
fu'.) ccm:liance with NRC receirements as set forth in tne Notice of Violation,
en:!: sed as Apoendix A.
The nature anc nuccer of the significant allegec
items of noncomoliance found during the investigation cemenstrate serious
-eineesses in your management controls.
,e have ioentified six allecec violations, the ecst severe of the NR"
.
3: ::::liance categ: ries, f:ur cf wri:n c:ntri ute: to tne seve-ity O' 15
8307070477 791031
DR ADOCK 05000289
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- Mett:politan Edison Cc=pany
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a::i:e.; on March 23, 1979.
We believe the course of the ac:icent woulc na,e
tein alterec, if not prevented entirely, nac compliance with NRC recuirements
- sin a:nieved.
.
Tress concomplian:es demonstrate serious weaknesses in your acility to maintain
an e'fective health physics program, control maintenance activities, develop
review procecures, adhere to approved procecures and concu:t your audit
an:
a:-ivities.
.
Fa'iurs to follo pre:edural recuirements fer operation with the eiertroca-#:
e'iif valve and safety valve cisenarge line tem:erature witnin your pre:e:ura:
re:uirements hac a significant icca: on tne course of tne ac:icent on Mar:r
2E. '.979.
Following this procedure woulc nave resul e: in closure of
ns
- 10:< valve wnicn would nave isolate: :ne relief valve an: crevente
tna
a::i:s- .
Fur ner=:rs, tnis eleva e: ar:sra urs conci:icn na: ces- i.-
ex's en:s for several contns anc a::z ently ::n:i-icne y:ur c:ers-ing sta "
su:n tna; tne aancreality on Maren 25 was coscure: or rationalize: awa.s
resulting in delayed closure of the isolation valve until after fuel camags
na: c: curred.
This failure is consicerec to ce one of tne more significant
issues.
Otner examoies of failure to follow procedures, cite: in
Ap:encix A, that occurrec prior to and curing the at:icent reveal weaknesses
in c:ntrols which are mandatory for safe nuclear power plant operation.
ru:ia: to nuclear safety is tne ceter=ina.ier ey your review of cr:cecures
zn: a::r:vai autneri y tnat ocers-icns icantific: in :ne ::ers-in; =re:ecuras
a e in a:::rcance witn tne fa:ility teen ::ai soecifica:icas.
Your Fian.
~ oe t-ions Review C mittee reviewe: an: v:u cia : manacs
au n:r; s: i
I; vti;iance protecure wnich : lace: vaivsi in a ::n:'-ic.; :na
resu'.ta:
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smer;en:y feecwater nea:er isolation.
Fur:ner, on tnree occasions icentifie:
in :nis investigation, the header was isolate .
The training of the coerating
staff snould have mace this condition apparent to them.
Tnis concition,
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lea:'n; to temocrary defeat of emergency feeowater, snould have been immeciately
identifiec on the first occasion of isolation and a revision of procecures
sneu'.d have been initiated.
The plant staff performing this operation should
have Deen imoued with the philosophy of not proceeding with operations that
cefeat safety systems, but of stopping operations, revising procedures, and
creceecing with reviews to properly authorize the correct procedural actions.
ae aisc identified inadecuacies in your training of personnel wne were
oesignated to fill emergency job categories as defined in your Emergency Plan.
Furtner, your retraining program for radiation protection and chemistry
e sonnel failed to include the required topics.
Training anc retratning are
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essential for the continued proficiency of tne staff anc nuclear safety.
Du-ing the course of tne accident there was a significant decarture fro.?
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P0rmal health physics procedures and practices.
It is recognized that in the
interest of overall safety during an accident of this magnituce tnere may be
. stances justifying decarture frc
stringent health pnysics crac-ices.
- i.e-tnEless, we believe that insufficient measures were ta<en to contre'
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nealtn :nysics actions and decisions curint tne course of tne accioen .
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Re::~:s were missing for maintenance for emergency feedsater isolation valves
'n Janue y 1975.
Tne control of equipment for purposes of maintenance is
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esse.tial for continuec safe operation of a nuclear power plant.
Records
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srs in; the status of su:n ecuipment are an essential ingredient for safety.
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Jith:ut this status documentation, the continuity of the work is lost, and
more icportant, the aparators and maintenance crew are unable to tell that
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nuclear safety nas been established, the equipment maintenance may be performed,
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-he ecJipment has been testec 'and properly returned to service.
These
an:
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- rin:iples of equipment control also apply to surveillance testing.
We aisc
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fcun , altnougn tne reasons are not fully understood, that tne isciation
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.aives i-
nis system were closec at the time of tne ac:icen on Mar:h 28.
1979.
A;3in, a failure cf management control for ecuipment anc surveillance
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tes 'n; is e.icent.
i
ica nave c:mmitted to a QA/Q
inspe:: ion program wnien in:iuces coservation of
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- ers-i:1s an: fun :ional tes-ing.
Our investigation coulc find ne information
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to in:ica e :nat a QA/QC inspection program ever existed at your facility for
he cose vation of coerations and functional . testing.
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These ca ters and otner noneccoliances taken together leave little ocu:
tha
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your management controls for the operation of tne Three Mile Islan: facilities
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are 'nace uate.
Each of tnese inacecuacies must be rescive .
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cf the seriousness cf these alleged noncom:liances anc in view of tne
si;. 'ficance and nature cf our insce: tion fincings, we propose to imoose civil
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- e a'- t et.
Tne total civii penalties fc
all items citec in A :acnment A are
3725.C- .
Tne Atomic Ener;y A:: limits :ne :: ei civil cena!:y wi nin any
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tr:rt. :sy perio: to 525,0:C.
Limi-ing tne cenalties for :ncse items citec
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fr:- 0:::cer 1978 until .*. arch 1979 to 525,000 for each tnirty cay cerioc,
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esu'ts in suotraction of 5570,000.
Therefore, a total penalty of S155,000 is
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Orc :se:.
A:pendix B of this letter is the Notice of Propose: Imposition of
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i i' Fenalties.
.~n ceter..ining the amount of the penalties assigned the staff took into account
- ne severi .y and duration of the noncompliance, including the relationship of
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- ne ' tees ef noncocoliance to the accident itself and the relationship of the
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n::m-liance to otner items of noncompliance.
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he influence cf NRC on your actions during the adcident anc preceding it has
als bee evaluated by this office both in determining noncompliance and in
- ne sena'.ty assessed.
The Presidential Commission, the special NRC investiga-
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-ion anc c ner investigative bodies are examining further the role of the NRC
as will as tne activities of other organizations in connection with the accicent
at inree Mile Island.
The finding and recommendation of these otner investiga-
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.icn3 will be evaluated in cetermining whether any further action is appropriate.
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Ycu are re uired to rescenc :: this letter; in preparing your response you
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sn uic folios tne instru:: ions in Accencices A anc B.
In accition, your
res; nse snould accress tne steps taken to assure tnat your activities are in
- :'ian:e witn all Commission recuirements since the noncomoliances described
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'e A::en:ix A, wnien are linitec to tne scoce of our investigation, inoicate
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.Me,tro:clitan Edison Company
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failures of your overall management control.
In this regard we expect that
you will conduct a comprenensive audit. of all administrative and management
contr :s to establish needed actions to assure full compliance.
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Your w-itten reply to this letter and Notice of Violation and the findings of.
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cur centinuing inspections of your activities and further consideration of these
matters may lead to further enforcement action, such as additional civil penalties
er orcers te suspend, modify or revoke'the license.
Among other things, additional
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enforcement a: tion is under review with1 regard to the reportability of several
items cf information following the onset of the accident, including specifically
sne ca'.culated dese rate of 10-40 R/hr in Goldsboro, the elevated in-core therm -
ceco:e inoications and the pressure spike in the containment vessel.
Further, we
na.e alreacy susoenced the license to coerate Unit 2.
The public will be informec
cf ary or:cesal to operate Unit 2, and any proposal to operate Unit 2 would be
sucje:t to a nearing.
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In a::ctdance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,
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Title 10, Code of Feceral Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosures
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will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.
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Sincerely,
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Victor Sielio, Sr.
Director
Office of Inspection
and Enforcement
Enciosures:
1.
Apcendix A
2.
Apcendix B
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