ML20023D586
| ML20023D586 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 03/25/1983 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20023D584 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-83-89 NUDOCS 8305240098 | |
| Download: ML20023D586 (36) | |
Text
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9 l.
Unfort unatcly, the installation of parts did not always match thcir location on the blueprints.
Sometimes one part was installed in a location where the blueprints called for another.
On one occasion, I warned a drafting engineer not to install a certain pipe because another part needed to go in that space.
He responded, "I don't care about anything I can't see."
Statement to NRC -
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this referred to a situation he encountered wherein a pipe hanger, or saddle, for a pipe which was about 30" in diameter had been installed and a drawing showed that another pipe was to be installed in that sane location.
He could not identify the piping system involved, its location, or the drafting engineer.
He also said that he did not know what was done to resolve the problem.
2.
Another aspect of design controls involves material-traceability.
Even if a pipe or hanger support fits in a certain location, you have to insure that the specific quality pipe or support called for in the design is actually installed.
Unfortunately, that was not always the case.
For instance, the metal in hanger supports is identified by a color code. When construction had the right size supports but not enough of the right color, they just repainted the color on the hanger.
I uncovered this practice on about 5% of my inspections.
Commonwealth Edison responded that the colors were wrong in the first place.
I question whether the same metal was installed as called for in the design.
Statement to NRC -
said be observed this condition in an area near the Unit I reactor.
3 Affidavit -
Other t imes the parts didn't even fit.
For instance, another worker described to me how on one occasion a pipe jumped out over a foot when it was removed during a. revision.
It turned out.that construction crews had to use a "portapower" Jack to wedge the pipe in when it was first installed, because it was.too large.
Statement to NRC -
Indicated he had no personal knowledge regarding this matter. He said he was informed about this by a worker named who lives in Illinois and who may now be employed at the Commonwealth Edison Byron Construction site.
.. said he had no other specific information but that
- could provide i n fo rma t i on.
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In some cases I saw equipment that was damaged during j
installation.
For example, I observed damaged gauges and electrical controls with bent arms or broken springs.
When I raised these problems with the foreman he expressed disinterest.
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Statement to NRC -
. said he did not know the purpose of the gauges or their location.
Could not identify his foreman except that he was called
" Angel".
He said that the welder who worked with him might be able to provide more information regarding this matter and some of the other natters contained in his statement.
He identified the welder as 5
Although I do not have first-hand knowledge, other employees alerted me to questions about the quality of the concrete.
They described how galoshes and timbers are imbedded in the concrete, which weakens its strength.
Statement to NRC -
. stated this information was given to him by a pipefitter, who lives at 6'.
All too often management would hire Mexican or other foreign welders off the street by obtaining t empora ry work permits.
These employees were not always qualified and f requently could not communicate well due to language barriers.
But they were very well paid and were totally at'the mercy of the company to keep their jobs.
As a result, they could not be counted on for thorough, professional work independent of pressures to speed production.
Statement to NRC -
.... stated he could not identify any welders who were not qualified.
He said he was not aware of any occasion in which' welding was performed by an individual who was not qualified to perform a given kind of weld.
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. 7 Affidavit -
Another reason for my doubts is the management attitude at LaSalle, which was heavy-handed toward workers who raised safety concerns.
There were weekly " rap" sessions, but they did not produce construction results.
Instead management officials harassed the workers who spoke out.
There were also utility spies among the construction workers.
On balance, employee
- morale was very low.
Most employees I spoke with had become apathetic.
They felt that their compliants would not make a difference except for themselves -- they might lose their jobs.
Statement to NRC -
said the above statement was based upon casual conversations with other workers during lunch breaks.
He said he was not aware of any acts or statements by any management personnel.that was
" heavy-handed" or harassing toward workers who raised safety concerns.
He sai he had no personal knowledge of utility spies among construction workers and did not know of any individual who had lost his job for making a complaint about safety.
8.
One of the most immediately distressing problems ignored by management involved worker safety.
For instance, many of the men do not know how to tie the proper knots for rope pulleys that hold heavy equipment.
Af ter I saw whole knots slip and thought about the safety hazard, I suggested a picture chart that showed how to tie the knots right.
Nothing happened.
On another occasion the exhaust and ventilation fans quit during heavy welding.
The room became hot and hazy. We are getting woozy from the fumes created by welding and grinding into metal and paint.
I reported the incident, but welding continued for hours before repairs were made.
Statement to NRC -
. stated he reported his concern about'the fumes to the. union steward.
He did not contact members of management or supervision..
He also stated he was aware that such matters did not fall under the jurisdiction of the NRC.
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4 9
I am also upset about the gross waste at LaSalle.
There is not excuse for some of the cost increases that the ratepayers are supposed to accept.
The same systems were revised and reinstalled up to five times.
One time while I was at LaSaile massive structural beans'had to be ripped out and replaced, because the originals were insufficient for the stress load.
Statement to NRC -
Same as above.
10.
While I was at LaSalle construction-crews installed parts in Unit il that'everyone knew were wrong.
We.
knew, because the NRC aircady had required revisions on the same parts in Unit 1.
Statement to NRC --
stated that he had heard this during general conversations with other workers whom he could not identify.
He said he~had not specific information to provide.
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1 1.
Statement to NRC -
I am not sure about the elevation level but it's at'the elevation icvel looking directly at the reactor.
Under the pedestal of Unit 1 there is a 55 gallon drum in the concrete.
The drum was used for scraps and was not renoved when they began pouring the concrete.
Proper time was not given for cicanup activities.
We were told to stop cleaning even if we were not finished.because the concrete had to be poured.
Everything was always rush, rush. I saw concrete poured over 2 x 4's, 4x8 scaffolding planks and'all kinds of various debris.
2.
Statement to NRC -
I have found elect ricians drunk while working and when I cleaned out cable trays I found beer cans and whiskey bottles.
I have seen electricians snorting cocaine.while on the job.
I have seen various items taken f rom the site.
I do not want to give specifics about the drug and alchohol use on the thef t of materials because I am afraid of reprisals against myself and my family.
3 Statement to NRC -
I believe I have seen falsification of documents.
I saw use white-out and white-out other contractor firm names and replace it with his own.
I do not know what the forms were or exactly what he was doing.
4.
Statement to NRC -
I have heard rumors in 1978 of metal pipes flaking under the Fab shop.
. foreman of the Foley Fab Shop can give nore specifics on this.
I believe.this pipe has something to do with the intake water from the screenhouse.
5 Statement to NRC -
In 1975 or early 1976 I saw a fire in the suppression pool area when scaffolding burned up.
I don't know if the down commers were installed yet and I have no knowledge if the concrete could have been damaged but I don't think so.
I believe who worked for Morrison could give more details on the fire because he was there.
6.
Stat ement to NRC -
In 1979 acts 'of sabotage were taking place at the plant.
No one was ever caught but someone was breaking gauges and putting flancable liquids like gasoline in fire extinguishers.
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2-7 Statement to NRC -
I have heard rumors that the Northeast side of reactor 2 -is settling.
I was told by k'alsh construction-engineers that i t has. settled 4-to 5 inches already.
8.
Statement to NRC -
l-have.also heard that. in the basement of auxiliary building the J -
line wall.is leaking water.
I believe this has.been happening for sometime.
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My most serious concern is similar to an issue raised s^.
o by the elect ricians a few weeks ago - - core-drilling
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1 of conc ret e reinforcement bars in the containment walls
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But I believe that my problem is mc.e serious.
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damage occurred in the pedestal that the reactor sits on Statement to NRC - Same as above.
2.
Walsh, the construction firm, installed the supports by boring holes into the primary containment wall and the pedestal itself on three dif ferent levels. Valsh drilled holes to install bolts on the plates that hold the supports.
They did this about 500 times on the containment wall and 500 times on the pedestal.
In the process, Walsh drilled holes up to three feet deep in the concrete.
These holes must have weakened the concrete.
Even worse, Walsh core drilled right through the reinforcement bars ("rebars") in the reactor pedestal and containment wall concrete.
I know these facts, because I personally observed the work.
Statement to NRC - Same as above.
3 Affidavit -
This is not the only problem with the pedestal concrete and the containment.
They were honeycombed with various size holes and large voids.
One hole in the reactor pedestal was so large I couldn't reach the end with my arm.
The NRC said it was all right to just patch the holes with grout, but that leaves a weaker bond than if the con-crete were solid.
Statement to NRC -
This is on the 673 level of Unit 1.
I watch them as they attempted to repair the hole. The hole turned out to be a void which I estimate to have gone at 1 cast 1/3 way around the pedestal.
The Valsh Construction Company pours the concrete and the Foreman, and his crew saw and knew about the void.
The void was repaired with grout.
I don't know if other voids were ever checked for.
The Valsh Construction time cards will show the names of the crew who worked on this.
4.
'Many times I have overheard a quality control-inspector tell construction _that something was done wrong and that he would be back.
Soon the inspector would come back and say the defect was OK af ter all. ~ Quality Control should be run by an outside firm that does not have a conflict of interest.
I Statement to NRCJ-I have no, specifics on this.
I refer to quality control inspection in general.
Quality Control should be run by an outside firm.
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.. 5 Affidavit -
Many of the Sargent & Lundy engineers could not communicate about problems, because they could not spcak enolish.
For example, a large port ion of the-engineers who worked for Sargent & Lundy, the architect, could not speak english.
Similarly, there are many legal Mexican aliens' at the plant.
Besides not speaking english, they do not pay taxes. 'But Americans were always the first to be laid off.
Statement to NRC -
A Sargent c'Lundy foreman named
'would be the person to contact for further specifics.
6.
I am upset about how much we are paying for LaSalle, because the waste has been gross.
Sometimes it seems to be deliberate.
For instance, there are two units under construction at LaSalle.
There were pipe hangers installed in Unit I and the NRC ordered revisions.
But Unit 11 is installing the same hangers the old, wrong way.
The work will have to be ripped out and done over.
i Statement to NRC - Same as above.
7 Affidavit -
NRC inspectors periodically tour the plant, but they do not accomplish much.
Employees try to relate problems to the inspectors, but the NRC men are demeaning. They laugh and reject our complaints, saying we do not understand the problems, in my
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opinion, their explanations do not always make sense.
The NRC Resident inspector, had another problem.
He is a : uge man and has troubic just walking up the stairs.
I do not know if he could' squeeze in all the places he needs to look.
Statement to NRC -
When employees try to relate problems to the NRC inspectors' the NRC inspectors are demeaning. -They laugh and reject our complaints, saying,
we do not understand the problems.
I do not have any specifics or examples'of this.
I believe that'the NRC Resident inspector, is too big of a man to possibly get into certain areas of:the plant that he may need to inspect.
I am not aware o' any specific incidents where he wasn't able to do his job and I don't have any.
further details about
ALLEGAT IONS - LASALLE 1.
Probably the most serious construction deficiencies that I personally observed occurred during a Feb rua ry-Ma r ch 14, 1980 stretch that I worked at LaSalle.
The, flaws involved the concrete in the r y-containment wall and the reactor pedestal.
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personally saw holes at least a foot to /wenty inches deep being drilled into the containment at the 710 foot elevation.
in the process, many of the reinforcement bars were severed.
l personally saw c
a half dozen rebars severed on each of the two or three occasions during the first few days of core drilling.
I saw rebars severed all over the plant during core drilling.
Statement to NRC - Same as above.
2.
.... about 25 feet above the suppression pool, or one-third up the east side of the reactor pedestal (y
on Unit 1.
Removing the panel revealed a giant void in the concrete, so large that a man could f
climb right in and lie down.
I couldn't believe it.
F Construction crews patched up the hole with grout, but the banding is not as strong as if the concrete were soli d to start with.
More important, I wondered how many other spots on the gedestal were_ honeycombed,with holes.
The const ruction crews did not remove AFT the steel plates to check.
Statement to NRC - Same as above.
- 3 Affidavit -
1 have seen enough cases of shoddy concrete work
. Most of the time the poor work was because of pressure to rush the job.
Construction shortcuts have be ' h been going on for years.
In 1974 construction crews 4)s # '
poured concrete for. the screenhouse.
The concrete hardened much faster than it was supposed to, however.
It should take three to four days to harden, but you could walk on this concrete in a half hour.
There was chloride added to it to speed up the process.
Statement to NRC - Same ~as above.
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4.
I repeatedly saw the results of sloppy concrete pours -
holes and honeycombs in the concrete.
Often the reason was because the areas were not cleaned out properly before the pours. ' I f i rst notice the problem in 1974 e
at the outer containment walls.
We were supposed to cican out accumulated debris so the concrete could fill up a clean surface area.
The debris incl uded wi res,
paper cups, soda pop cans, beer cans, and even timber like two-by-fours.
Unfortunately, construction crews had installed the rebars and ties for the walls before the jfhe area was cleaned out.
As a result, we could not reach all the debris.
You couldn't even slide your hand in to reach the debris.
Even worse, the crews poured the concrete before done cleaning the area and the junk just stayed we were there.
I personally saw hundreds of items left behind.
I observed this practice on about 1/4 of the outer containment wall and generally on the concrete floors.
The saw the type of problem in 1975 at the J-line wall that separates the reactors f rom the auxiliary building.
Statement to NRC - Sam: as above.
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5 Affidavit -
I can point out one section of the outer containment ** ),;J wall poured in 1974 that site site about four p-inches off-whack.
In 1978 i saw another example when the excess pressure blew cut a section of the turbine wall separating the turbine from radwaste.
S t a t enien t to NRC - Same as above.
6.
Before a pour, concrete has to be " vibrated" to get s
out the ai r bubbles and be bondabic.
I observed the bukb process in 1975 or 1976.
But construction was in such a hurry that the bubbles were not all removed.
That M
may be another reason for the honeycombing in the concrete.
Statement to NRC - Same as above.
-3 7
Similar to the concrete miseries, I do not tiust the mortar work at LaSalle.
Sometimes the problem was that the mortar was not used.
The walls are constructed N'
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with high-density blocks five to six feet thick.
The of blocks have metal inside.
All the blocks are supposed c#
to be packed together with mortar.
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crews would pack the outer twd or tbree blocks with mortar and just shove the rest in without any binding.
Statement to NRC - Same as above.
8.
Even when mortar was used, it was shoddy quality.
There was too much sand in the mortar.
Sometimes you could take a nall and write in it.
There was so much sand that the bricklayers couldn't pound the blocks down.
I witnessed the abuse during 1976-78, when I dS'^
worked mixing the r.ortar, and later as a foreman and 1
v 1' steward in the same area.
You are supposed to mix 7 shovels of sand with each bag of mortar and some water.
That is how I mixed it when I worked alone.
But around a third of the time my superintendent was present and ordered me to add extra sand.
I'd estimate about three to four bags of sand were involved for each bag, which meant up to 50%
more sand than there should have been.
All that mortar is suspect.
There were nortar tests, but the superintendent always knew when the tests were scheduled and let me do it right then.
Walgren, the cont ractor, finally left the site.
Statement to NRC - Same as above.
9 Affidavit -
Another LaSalle worker told me.
in 1978 there I
was a reactor pressure test that literally blew the k3P roof off.
I believe the plant should have to pass this ny"k test before operations begin.
The accident also ripped,g{.
out the bolts for some of the piping.
Instead of doing the holes over, they just redrilled the old holes and nade them bigger.
Statement to NRC - Same as above.
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. 4 10.
Over a half dozen workers have died at the plant,
,,Js due to getting hit with steel that fell, or falling g,. l*
due to unsafe hand railings or holes in the floor.
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p Management just did not ca,re about the hazards.
Y' Statement to NRC - Same as above, 11.
Management always knew two days in advance of NRC inspections and had us clean up the plant superficially.
That was good enough.
The NRC never took initiatives
"", p-to talk to us workers, in fact, during all my years
- 'T at LaSalle I had never heard of any resident inspector named Roger Walker. We always wondered why the NRC didn't come when the utility didn't know in advance.
Maybe the investigators would have found rore problems.
Statement to NRC - Same as above.
12.
It is not too late to repair the damage, hoaever.
If L-I the NRC wants help on a plant tour, I would be glad b#'
to point out holes in the concrete, areas were concrete was poured over debris, and areas where blocks were laid without mortar.
Statement to NRC - Same as above.
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Affidavit Trom personal observation I can confirm that several years ago around 1000 holes were core-drilled into the containnent wall and the reactor vessel pedestal around the 694 foot elevation of Unit I at the LaSalle plant.
Construction crews core-drilled right through the rei nfor cenent bars.
Statement to NRC
,Same as above.
2.
. There were internal voids in the concrete of the pedestal itself.
When the jackhammers chipped into the concrete, the voids caused the jackhanners to jump.
The jackhammers took off and both cut through reinforcement bars and increased the honeycombing aircady inside the concrete.
There was sone repair work done to the damage in the pedestal.
Construction used grout to patch up the concrete holes they had stumbled into or created.
But the bonding isn't as strong, and there may have been many other volds in spots where they weren't core-drilling.
Worst of all, when i left they had not repaired or replaced the reinforcement bars they cut through.
Statement to NRC -
! saw internal voids in the concrete of the pedestal itself.
Jackhammerr were used to chip into the concrete.
When the jackhammer hit a void it caused the jackhanmer to jump cutting through rebar and increasing honeycombing which was already inside the concrete.
There was some repai r work done to the pedestal using grout to patch up the concrete holes.
I belicve there may have been many other voids where there weren't core drilling but I have no first hand knowledge and I am unable to give further specifics. When 1 Icft I don't believe that the rebars which had been cut were repaired or replaced.
3 Affidavit -
I personally observed another excmple at the 761 foot elevation of Unit 11.
Construction crews had to install supports to hold up the control rod casings.
Fitters from Reactor Controls, Inc. ("RCl") were core-drilling eight to ten inches down into the concrete floor, which I estimated was about 18 inches thick.
The fitters were not taking the time to check for and detect the reinforcement bars, however.
As a result, the fitters were hitting the bars.
I saw the core bits pulling out chunks of steel f rom the floor reinforcement bars.
Again, the supports were installed without replacing the reinforcement bars. This occurred-in Unit 11.
Statement to NRC - Same as.above.
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Reinforcement bars may have been broken tbroughout 4.
Affidavit the plant.
The construction crews routinely did not use metal detectors to locate the rebars.
They would just start drilling.
The quality control inspectors did not seem to care.
Quality cont rol was more like a joke at LaSalle than anything else.
Staternent to NRC -
Construction crews routinely did not use metal detectors to locate rebar and I believe reber may have been broken throughout the plant.
Quality Control inspectors did not seem to care.
5 Affidavit -
None Statement to NRC -
I have a friend who does not wish to come forward at this time who told me that records for tork wrench calibrations were falsified.
The paperwork will show that the calibrations were done when in fact they were not.
This person has been threatened that if he _ tells what he knois he'll regret it.
I can give no more information about the tork wrench falsifications.
I will contact this person to see If he will come forward or give further information.
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t Analysis:
The Af fidavit speaks to these separate concerns, each of which is addressed separately:
Allegation:
/. 7 NRC inspectors periodically tour the plant, but they do not accomplish much.
It is difficult to speak to such a concern as it is vague, and does not specify which portions of the overall inspection program (which encompassed hours by inspectors since 19
) are being questioned.
It is not difficult to envision an individual who is not familiar with the inspection program questioning the effectiveness of inspectors. The inspection program is conducted by inspectors who are experts in various speciality areas (welding, operations, quality assurance, civil engineering, etc.).
It is reasonable to assume that an operations inspector would not recognize a technical problem in the area of, say, structural steel welding.
The NRC does, hnwever, adhere to a strict policy which requires that potential problems identified by an inspector, or received as allegations or complaints, but which are outside his area of expertise, be passed on to regional management for evaluation, assignment as required to appropriate experts and resolution.
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In the period of January,1980 to December,1981 (chosen for an example) inspections were conducted which resulted in noncompliances with NRC requirements being identified. The regional average fo" a plant is inspections and noncompliances - (The increased number of inspections is a result of increased program activity as the station approached fuel load).
The inspection history, however, indicates' that the NRC program is effective as implemented at the LaSalle County Station.
/k J[,. _ Allegation:
NRC inspectors are not responsive to concerns expressed by site craf t personnel. NRC inspectors of ten treat individuals attempting to lodge complaints in a demeaning f ashion, and the inspector's explanations of conditions often do not make sense.
As with item 1 above, it is dif ficult to speak to this complaint without specific names, times, dates, or places. Table I tabulates the results of a survey of inspectors who have been heavily involved in inspecting the LaSalle Station. These results do not corroborate the complaint.
Additionally, approximately inspections, or portions of inspections between January,1978 and December,1981 were conducted in reaction to allegations received by the NRC.
The charge that inspector's responses to complaints of ten do not make sense cannot be answered objectively without knowing in what respect this is the case. The explanation has been offered that individuals who are
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not f amiliar with the regulatory process are of ten perplexed by the limits inherent to the regulatory process. Stated simply, the NRC is empowered to initiate corrective or punitive measures commensurate with events or conditions which 1) present a threat to public health and safety, and/or
- 2) fail to fulfitt the minimum requirements of one or more regulations.
It is not uncommon for individuals to register complaints which 1) address situations which are not within the NRC's jurisdiction (such as labor disputes), or 2) request the NRC to pursue or endorse one of two or more optional solutions to a situation, any one of which would be acceptable under the existing regulations.
In both cases, the NRC would be over-reaching its authority to intervene. However, in cases where the regulations of other regulatory agencies or laws may be being violated.
The NRC passes concerns on to the organization responsible for enforcing them.
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The NRC resident inspector (name withheld) is a huge man and has trouble just walking up the stairs.
I do not know if he could squeeze in all the places he needs to look.
The inspector in question has been routinely evaluated by at least three NRC managers who observed his work in the past two years. His physical and technical performance consistently excells among inspectors. He was one of two resident inspectors assigned to the site, which is normal practice for the state of completion of LaSalle County (the past tense is used because the inspector has recently been promoted to the regional office). Had his physical size interfered with the conduct of his duties, which they apparently dic' not, the second resident or regional inspectors (who are available for support inspections at any Region III site) would have been used to complete the activity.
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Conclusion:
The NRC concludes that no substantive issues are identified by these allegations. No further fol'lowup is planned.
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NRC inspectors periodically tour the plant, but they do not accomplir h inut!..
Er':ployees t ry to relate problems to the insprctoit, Imt l.e Nr.C men are demeaning.
They laug.1 and reject our complaints, saying we do not understand the problems.
In my opinion, their explanations do not always make sense.
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The NRC Resident inspector,.,
.., had another problem.
He is a huge man and has trouble just walking up the stairs.
I do not know if he could squeeze in all the places he needs to look.
Statement to NRC -
When employees try to relate problems to the NRC inspectors the NRC inspectors are demeaning.
They laugh and reject our complaints, saying.
we do not understand the problems.
I do not have any specifics or examples of this.
I believe that the NRC ites'ident inspector, is too big of a man to possibly get into certain areas of the plant that he may need to inspect.
I am not aware of any specific incidents where he wasn't able to do his job and I don't have any further details about f
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STA F F l':.i.T I N G Region 111
" arch 29, 1982 Present:
Keppler, Davis, Roy, Marabit o, Axelson, Boyd, Creed, Gr eger, Halls, Hayes, Hunt er, Koch, Konklin, McCormick, Mallet t, Maxson, Meenan, Noreldus, Paperiello, Pappas, Pear son, Schumacher, Shafer, Spessard, Sreniawski, Streeter, Tambling, Williams Keppler - Last Thursday the Illinois Attorney General submit t ed a pet it ion to the NRC asking that the NRC st op act ion on issuing licenses for the LaSalle station and hold up fuel loading pending an investigation into allegations relative to cutting holes in reinforcement steel in the various safety related structures af the f acility and pending a relook at the structual acceptability of the off-gas building at the site.
The Attorney General also recormended that a hearing be initiat ed and that the State be made a part to the hearing. Concurrent with this is the fact that a lot of progress has been made on the closecut of outstanding issues at the plant and the utility expects to be ready by Friday to request a license to lead fuel.
I just got off the phone with Mr. Denton.
They way we are going to proceed is as f ollows:
We plan to meet Friday with the utility t.o review the st at us of the project to determine whether or not the plant is ready for an operating license.
Concurrent with that the NRC plans to rnove in the direction of responding t o the Illinois At t orney General t elling him that we plan to go ahead and issue a license and that the invest igat ion into his charges wil] be Cene and ccepleted prior to let t ing the reactor operat e.
In oider to get into a position to respond to the Illinois At t orney General, Mr. Dcnt on is going to require certain informat ion be provided by Ccc.an.ecalth Edison Company and Sargent and Lundy as t o why they f eel they have control of the issues that have been a]Ieged to be quest ionabic.
Mr. Dent on will not issue a license until he responds to the Illinois Attorney General.
With respect to the investigation of the allegations the invest igation into the cut t ing of reinforcement steel will be done by Region III with assistance f rom NRR.
The investinaion into the alleged problems with the of f-gas building vill be done by someone other than Region 111 The reason is that Region III was alleged to have known about this problem and had not done anything bout this problem earlier.
Status of the Zion L
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STAFF MEETING Region Ill April 19, 1982 Present: Keppler, Davis, Roy, Strasma, Marabi to, Menczer, Axel son, Boyd, Carroll, Creed, Greger, Hall s, Hawksins, Hayes, Hind, Hunt er, Jackiv, Knop, Koch, Little, McCormick, McMillen, Mallett, Maxson, Meenan, Korelius, Paperiello, Pappas, Pearson, Prescott, S chun.a cher,
Shafer, Spessard, Sreniawski, Streeter, Tambling, Warnick Keppler/Thisweek ^
and 1 will he in l
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I LaSalle received a low power license -- license to load fuel which will take approxicately 12 days.
The investigation into the Illinois Attorney General's allegations is to be complet ed before the reactor is authorized t o go crit ical.
7 Ginna steam generator prob 3cm --
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t SI AF F *.:.r.I15 G Region 111 "ay 3, 1982 Tresent: 1:cppler, Davis, St r asna, Menczer, Axelson, Cario11, Creed, Greter, lialls, liind, Jackiv, 1:och, Little, McMill en, "all et t,
"u. son,
eenan, Mi]1 er, Tappas, Tearson, Tr escot t, S c h or...che r, Si.af er,
Spessard, Sreniavski, St reet et, Tamb)ing, ranniet, Wiedtran, V i l l i at-s Keppler 1 vould ]H e t o veicome [
to our st af f.
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.t anch Chief of the-
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The next couple of weeks are going t o bc_ quit e busy.
We vill be i
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0 At La Salle new allegations surf aced last week that vere bi onght forth by the Coverr. rent Account ability Troject (GAT) -- the t.ame gi oup t hat precipit at ed the allegat ions at Zi:m.er a year and a half ago.
T1.cy brought f orth four af fidavit s of verker s alleging poor qual 5 ty work in the car 3 y const t uct ion phases of the pioject -- concr et e work, cut t ing of r ebar, const ruct ion deat hs.
I am conceined that this -ay he another t ip of an iceburg.
The Chaii nan t.:.de it abundantly i1(ar to me during his visit last veck ihat he < >.pect s a fisst class invest irat ion d/9
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Last Friday the!
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STAFT ?:EET]NG Region JII July 6, 1982 Tresent:
Keppl er, Davi s, Roy, Strast a, Marabi t o, Mene wr, Axelson, Carroll, Creed, Danielson, Greger, Hind, Hunt er, Jactiv, Knop, Koch, Konklin, McCormick, Mc? illen, Maxson, Meenan, Miller, Norelius, Faperiello, Pr escot t, Schumacher, Shafer, Sper.ard, Sieniawski, Street er, Tambling, Warnick, Wiedc.can, Holt, Tcses Walker o,,.
. j-With respect to the budget,
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1,aSa3 3e was discussed briefly by Mr. DeYoung -- he merely r.:ade the st at ement that the investigation is t aking 3cnger than had been orir.inally anticipated as rest investigat ions do -- I gave him a rundown on the st at us of the invest icat jon.
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~1 Jie_ppler - Commissioner Asselst ine vill be in Region III on Thursday -. he vill address the Region III staf f and then vill be going t o the 1.aSa31e County St at ion.
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Mr. Cur::nings vill' be in the office today.
He. is toing to look int o the' concern that the Region' razy.be whit ewashing the LaSalle Invest igat ion.
That run.or has st art ed around the halls upstairs -- when I irnaediately heard it 1:ca13ed.
Mr. Cu=ningsf and suggest ed that he corne out-here t o per sona3 3y int erview the 4
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Af fidavit -
Before a pour, concrete has to be " vibrated" to get out the air bubbles and be bondable.
I observed the process.in 1975 or 1976. But construction was in such a hurry that the bubbles were not all removed.
That may be another reason for the honeycombing in the t
concrete.
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Statement to NRC
,Same as above.
I Proposed Resnlution.
3 Review procedures to verify that requirements, exist
- For vibrating concrete l
- Verification by QC i
Review NRC inspection reports to see if we observed vibration pro' cess l
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l Find out what areas were poured in 1975 8 1976 - safety related i
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Look at core samples and concrete surf aces for indication of lack of vibrating i
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(SHODDYCONCRETEWORK-SCRE'ENH0_U_S1]
I have seen enough cases of shoddy concrete work.... Most of the time the poor work was because of pressure to rush the job.
Construction shortcuts have been going on for years.
In 1974 construction crews poured concrete for the screenhouse. The concrete hardened much faster than it was supposed to, however, it should take three to four days to harden, but you could walk on this concrete in a half hour.' There was chloride added to" it to speed up the process.
Statement to NRC - Same 'as above.
Proposed Resolution Address FSAR Requirement - Table 3.2-1 Consider intake water tunnel under screenhouse - is it part of structure Verify no safety related equipment in scr,eenhouse.
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(VII tock Wall - Mortar Quality l.
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Af fidavit -
Similar to the concrete miseries, I do. not trust the
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mortar work at LaSalle.
Sometimes the problem was that the mortar was not used.
The walls are constructed with I
high-density blocks five to six feet thick. The blocks 1
have metal inside. All the blocks are supposed to be t
packed. together with mortar. The construction crews would pack the outer two or three blocks with mortar I
and just shove the rest in without any binding.
Statement to NRC - Same as above.
2.
Even when mortar was used, it was shoddy quality.
'l There was to much sand in the mortar.
Sometimes you could take a nait and write in it.
There was so much I
sand that the bricklayers co* ldn't pound the blocks
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I witnessed the abuse during 1976-78, when I worked mixing the mortar, and later as a foreman and k
steward in the same area.
You are supposed to mix 7 shovels of sand with eac'h l
oag of mortar and some ' water. That is how I mixed it 1
when I worked alone. But around a third of the time i
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f my su6erintendent was present and ordered me to add extra sand.
I'd estimate about three to four bags of i
sand were involved for each b'ag, which meant up to 50%
more sand'than there should have been.
All that mortar is suspect. There were mortar tests, but the superintendent always knew when the tests were scheduled and let me do,it right then. Walgren, the contractor,
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finally lef t the site.
Statement to NRC - Same as above.
Proposed Resolution.
Review design specifications for block wall - seismic requirements, safety
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related (?)
f Address startup test shielding test that will be conducted i
Review our inspection of masonary walls per IEB 80-11 1
Review records, procedures and interview people (including bricklayers) i Review procedures, records and interview people regarding mortar quality
- Take 25 samples (cylinders)
Find out what mortar work was done in 1976-78
--- -Consider taking chip (mortar) samples for independent testing s
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