ML20023C509
| ML20023C509 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Satsop |
| Issue date: | 04/07/1983 |
| From: | Burdoin J, Dodds R, Haist D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20023C502 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-508-83-03, 50-508-83-3, NUDOCS 8305170390 | |
| Download: ML20023C509 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000508/1983003
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No.
50-508/83-03
Docket No.
50-508
Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System
P. O. Box 1223
Elma, Washington 98541
Facility Name: Washington Nuclear Project No. 3 (WNP-3)
Inspection at: WNP-3 Site (SATS0P)
Inspection conducted:
March 14-17, 1983
Inspectors:
A-
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II. P. HVist, Reactor Inspector
Dite' Signed
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3. F. ]!urdoinf Reactor Inspector
Dat'e Signed
Approved By:
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R. T. )fodds,' Chief, Reactor Projects
Dfits Signed
Sectida No. 1, Reactor Projects Branch No. 1
Summary:
Inspection during the period of March 14-17, 1983 (Report
No. 50-508/83-03)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by regional-based
inspectors of construction activities including: reactor vessel internals
installation and welding; electrical component and cable installation;
and licensee action on previously unresolved and follow-up items.
The inspection involved 60 inspection-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors
and 20 inspection-hours in-office by on NRC inspector.
Results: One deviation was identified (failure to qualify a weld
procedure in accordance with AWS D.1.1 requirements
paragraph 4).
8305170390 830408
PDR ADOCK 05000508
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
The inspectors interviewed various engineering, management,-inspection,
and construction personnel of the organizations listed below. Key
personnel, including those who attended the exit interview, are
identified below.
a.
Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS)
- 0.
E. Trapp, Project Quality Assurance Manager
- J. A. Puzauskas, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- M.
F. Keller, Project Engineer
- J. E. Werle, Project Engineering Manager
- D. S. Feldman, Plant Quality Assurance Manager
- D. R. Coody, Quality Assurance Engineer
- C.
Butros, Field Engineer
C.
Tewksbury, Quality Assurance Supervisor
b.
Ebasco Services, Inc. (Ebasco)
- A. M. Cutrona, Quality Assurance Manager
- W. K. Drinkard, Quality Assurance Engineer
- L.
A. Bast, Quality Assurance Engineering Supervisor
- J.
Ruimerman, Project Engineer
- J.
P. Sluka, Manager of Engineering
- K.J.
Giadrosich, Quality Assurance Engineer
J. D. May, Quality Assurance Engineer
- P. J. Massman, Quality Assurance Engineer
G. L. Harrison, Quality Assurance Records
M. J. Rackley, Project Startup Manager
H. D. Laford, Unit 3 Manager
R. E. Abel, Quality Assurance Engineer
M. R. Mooney, Lead Electrical Surveillance Inspector
V. J. Lovelace, Audit Supervisor
c.
Combustion Engineering (CE)
R. E. Claar, Quality Assurance Representative, CE Avery
L.
Lehman, Quality Assurance Site Representative
R.
Taisey, Field Engineering
R.
Hicks, Quality Assurance Inspector
E.
Shenk, Installation Manager
d.
Fischbach/ Moore (F/M)
B. G. Ashby, Project Quality Control Manager
L. A. Woolridge, Electrical Construction Superintendent
R. D. Brown, Quality Control Supervisor
E. G. Courtney, Quality Control Documents Supervisor
L. A. Beach, Cable Pulling Superintendent
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R. G. Frank, Cable Pulling Engineer
L. L. Bickar, Cable Yard Controller
J. R. Vrooman, Cable Yard Quality Control Inspector
N. H. Powell, Electrical Terminations Superintendent
e.
Peter Kiewit Sons Co. (PKS)
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F. Wisner, Project Quality Assurance Manager
E. Tosh, Quality Assurance Administration Manager
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S. W. Scott, Quality Control Manager
P. A. Smith, Assistant Quality Control Manager-
M. E. Loennig, Equipment Erection Engineer
- Denotes attendance at exit interview on March 17, 1983- .
2.
Construction Status
The licensee reported that Unit 3 construction was 72 percent complete on-
March 1, 1983. The WPPSS Executive Board directed immediate
implementation of a four-day work week for all supply system and
contractor personnel at Unit 3 on February 25, 1983. This action was
taken in order to extend construction funds until summer of 1983.
It is
expected that an appeal on Initiative 394 as well as litigation
associsted with the termination of Supply System projects WNP-4/5 will be
sufficiently resolved by July 1983 to permit the Licensee to sell bonds
and resume full construction at WNP-3.
Currently, Supply System
perscnnel and crafts are working four days a week. Ebasco and contractor
salaried personnel are continuing to work five days a week.
3.
Site Tour
The inspectors conducted a tour of Unit 3 on March 14, 1983, to observe
completed work, work in progress, and storage and maintenance of
safety-related equipment.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Licensee Action on Previously Unresolved and Follow-up Items
a.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-508/83-02/02)-Ebasco Deviation From
AWS Joint Qualification Provisions
The inspector had previously examined a project change proposal
which modified the mounting details of the upper main steam
restraint assemblies. The project change proposal involved the use
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of a non prequalified AWS D.1.1 joint without the weld procedure
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qualification tests required by Section 5.2 of AWS D.1.1.
The
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Engineer relieved the construction contractor of the AWS joint
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qualification requirements based on a judgment that the
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code-required macroscopic examination would not produce any relevant
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information.
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The WNP-3 Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 3.8.3.2.1.(c)
specifies that the design, fabrication, erection and inspection and
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testing of the steel internal structures of the pipe rupture
restraints complies with the AWS Structural Welding Code DI.1-79.
Paragraph 2.6.2 of this code specifies that joints may depart from
the details of prequalified joints only if the contractor submits to
the Engineer his proposed joints and joint welding procedures and at
his own expense demonstrates their adequacy in accordance with the
requirementr: of Section 5.2.
Section 5.2 states that, except for
prequalifico joints, " welding procedures which are to be employed in
executing contract work under this code shall be qualified prior of
use, to the satisfaction of the Engineer, by tests as prescribed in
Part B of this section." Contrary to the above commitments, a weld
joint which does not meet the AWS Dl.1 prequalified joint
requirements was authorized for use on the upper main steam pipe
rupture restraints without prior qualification in accordance .with
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Section 5.2 by Project Change Proposal No. 35Q-14386. A Safety
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Analysis Report deviation notice has not been initiated to describe
this deviation from the AWS Structural Welding Code. This is an
apparent deviation.
(50-508/83-03/01)
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b.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-508/82-26/01) - Cleanliness Controls
for Core Internals Work
The inspector had previously questioned whether the controls
established for access and cleanliness were consistent and workable,
and whether these controls were being satisfactorily implemented.
The installation contractor, Combustion Engineering has recently
revised the applicable procedure, No. AS-P-019, " Housekeeping and
Cleanliness Procedure," to designate the entire reactor cavity area
Zone III and now applies personnel and material accountability
controls at the entrance to the cavity. The Zone level and
applicable restrictions are conspicuously posted and enforced.
Machined surfaces, such as the reactor vessel flange are protected
and the reactor cavity area cleanliness has improved. This item is
considered closed.
c.
(Closed) Follow-up Item (50-508/83-01/01) - Quality of CE Ring
Forgings for Core Internals Components
The inspector had previously expressed concern over apparent forging
laps which appeared in the lower ring forging of the core support-
barrel during performance of the flexure weld. Specifically, the
inspector questioned whether the apparent laps were an isolated
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instance which could not affect the other three forged rings in the
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reactor internals.
Combustion Engineering responded to these and other concerns by
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researching the origin of the ring forging and by performing
nondestructive volumetric examinations of the core support barrel
ring forging. CE also performed an evaluation of the identified.
indications for 10 CFR 50.55(e) reportability.
The forging used for the WNP-3 flexure membrane was supplied by
Standard Steel.
Standard Steel supplied 9 flexure membrane forgings
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for System 80 reactor vessel internals. Each of these forgings were
of a different heat. All of.the other forgings used in the WNP-3
reactor vessel internals were supplied by Terut-Siderius. An
analytical study was conducted to review the significance of
observed indications and potential structural anomalies, if found.
CE also reviewed the manufacturing and engineering requirements to
verify the adequacy of the WNP-3 core support barrel-lower forging
design and fabrication. The results of this review indicate that:
(1) the forging design and fabrication requirements are conservative
with respect to the indications observed, as well as other'
postulated scenarios such as the potential for indication
propagation, and; (2) that the item is'not reportable under 10 CFR
50.55(e).
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Ultrasonic examinations were performed on the WNP-3 forging using a
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calibration block made from a Standard Steel-supplied forging for a
TVA plant. The calibration block was a full scale sample which
exactly simulated the WNP-3 forging. A series of calibration holes
were machined into the calibration block and on January 21, 1983,
the flexure membrane was subjected to a 3-directional shear wave
-examination: axially, both upward and downward, and
circumferential1y, one direction clockwise. The flexure membrane
was also subjected to a 2-directional straight beam-axially upward
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and radially outward. The total forged mass was also subjected to a
2-directional straight-beam radially inward and axially upward.
This examination was performed at 1/2 the originally required design
maximum indication size and at double sensitivity. The examination
disclosed no reportable. indications.
The inspector examined the ultrasonic examination procedure and
calibration block used to perform the examinations. The technique
appeared to result in a adequate examination of the WNP-3 ring
forging and flexure membrane. The investigations by CE appear to
adequately demonstrate that these indications are an isolated
incident on the WNP-3 core internals. The information provided by
CE will be transmitted to the NRC Region IV, Vendor Inspection
Branch for information. This item is considered closed.
5.
Electrical Component and Cable Installation Fischbach-Moore
a.
Observation of Work
The inspector examined receiving inspection, identification,
storage, handling, installation, and quality control inspection
activities for the following electrical components to determine
completeness and conformance with the contractor's applicable
installation and quality control inspection procedures:
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- Battery Racks (Train A)
125V DC Switchgear (Train B)
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Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor B
HPSI Pump Motor A
Containment Spray Valves (2CS-V-S079-SAR and 2CS-V-S080-SBR)
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>The; installation of cables started in December 1982, with less than
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.10 percent of the cables pulled to-date. The inspection of
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,' . control ~, installation, termination, and quality control inspection
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activities for completeness and conformance with applicable
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. installation and' quality control inspection procedures.
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_No items'of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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b.
Review of Quality; Records
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The quality records for installation of 120 Volt instrument and
control cables were examined for completeness and conformance with
applicable installation and quality procedures. The specific
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activities, examined were receipt inspection, storage, handling,
installation, termination, and identification from receipt through
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installation and termination.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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6.
Reactor Vessel Internals-Combustion Engineering
a.
Review of Quality Assurance Implementing Procedures
The inspector reviewed the following quality assurance implem'nting
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procedures for conformance with the contractor's quality assurance
field manual, the FSAR, the ASME B&PV Code Section III, and industry
standards:
Procedure No.
Title
IG-8973-RCE-400
Reactor Vessel Internals Instruction
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Manual
SPS-652500
Site Process Sheet - Install and Weld
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Flow Baffle
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AS-P-019
Housekeeping and Cleanliness Procedure
AS-P-012
Filler Metal Control Procedure
SPS-650100
Removal of Tie Rods
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SPS-650600
Site Process Sheet-Remachine Tie Rod
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Holes
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DWP-VI-35-43.43-1
Detailed Welding Procedure
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DWP-RP-35-4
Detailed Welding Procedure
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GTA-43.43-2G-1
Procedure Qualification Record
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'SMA-43.43-1G-2(s)
Procedure Qualification Record
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<The inspector noted, during observation of work and examination of
weld filler metal controls, that the contractor is using portable
filler metal ovens to maintain hydrogen control in covered
ele'ctrodes but does not periodically check the adequacy of the
protable oven temperature control nor calibrate the thermometers
attached to the portable ovens. Following identification of this
item,'the portable filler metal oven in use was checked with a
calibrated thermocouple and found to be adequately controlling
. filler metal temperature above 250 degrees, farenheit. The
contractor has initiated a revision to procedure No. AS-P-012 to
require weekly temperature checks.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
b.
Observation of Work and Work Activities
The inspector examined work activities which included installation
of the flow baffle, remachining of tie rod holes in the upper guide
structure, and marking the core shroud for minor grinding to meet
core envelope requirements. Attributes examined in connection with
flow baffle activities included: verification of site process sheet
preparation and sign-off; completion of preliminary measurements
prior to initiation of welding; qualification of weld procedure
specifications and welders; verification of base materials for
welding; weld filler metal control; verification of proper back
gouging and satisfactory liquid penetrant examination of root
passes; welding and interpass cleaning technique; interpass
temperature control; and control on grinding operations. Attributes
examined in connection with remachining on the upper guide structure
included verification of site process sheet preparation and signoff
and machining of one tie rod hole in preparation for threading.
The inspector identified a linear indication in excess of one inch
long on a portion of a flow baffle flange. The contractor examined
the documentation which accompanied the flow baffle from the factory
but was unable to determine if the indication was previously
identified. The contractor has initiated a deviation notice and is
continuing to investigate the circumstances behind the linear
indication. This item will be examined in the future. Follow-up
Item (50-508/83-03/02).
The inspector questioned the need for and prior authorization for
grinding operations which encroached into the flow baffle base
material adjacent to the attachment welds. Although the applicable
site process sheet did not authorize the grinding during the root
pass back gouging, it appears that engineering and quality assurance
personnel discussed the necessity for cutting into base metal due to
the limited access and unavailability of grinding tools which could
be used to back gouge the weld without disturbing the adjacent base
material.
It appears the contractor quality assurance personnel are
now aware of the need to authorize such operations, in writing,
prior to commencement. The base metal areas requiring repair have
been identified on a deviation notice and a repair welding procedure
exists.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
c.
Review of Quality Records
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The inspector reviewed the following quality records for_ conformance
with the contractor's field quality assurance manual and
implementing procedures, the ASME B&PV Code Section III, and
industry standards:
- Site Process Sheet No. 652500 (partially completed) for
installation of flow baffle
- Site Process Sheet No. 650600 (partially completed) for
remachining tie rod holes
Nondestructive examination reports for flow baffle root pass
Welder qualification records for welder Nos. BM-03 and BM-06
ENiCrFe 3-1/8 inch weld filler metal (inconel) material
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certifications
No items of noncompliance of deviations were identified
d.
Surveillance: Activities
The inspector examined reports of twelve surveillances of reactor
internals activities by Ebasco during the December through January
time period. Activities examined by Ebasco included welder
qualification, flexure welding, use of site traveller,_ weld
inspection, tool and gage calibration, optical training, weld
repairs'on core barrel forging, liquid penetrant examination, and
receiving inspection.
Generally, the surveillance reports examined and the findings
identified indicate a substantial improvement in the quality of the
Ebasco survei.llance program. The surveillance reports clearly
delineate the activity examined, the requirements to be adhered to
during the activity-and the acceptance standards, and the findings
of the surveillance. The reports demonstrate adequate preparation
by the surveillance inspector prior to the surveillance. The
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scheduling of surveillance activities appears to have substantially
improved. The six month and four week construction schedules are
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considered when scheduling surveillance activities as are the
findings of the quality assurance audit group, the quality assurance
engineering group, and the NRC.
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7.
Management Meeting
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The inspectors met with the licensee and management personnel denoted in
paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on March 17, 1983. The
inspectors discussed the scope and findings of the inspection. The
findings were acknowledged by the licensee.
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