ML20012D463
| ML20012D463 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1990 |
| From: | Frizzle C Maine Yankee |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-47, REF-GTECI-SY, TASK-A-47, TASK-OR CDF-90-28, GL-89-19, MN-90-31, NUDOCS 9003270370 | |
| Download: ML20012D463 (18) | |
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MaineYankeeL pAmt tiTcVET6if7 TOR MAINE $1NCE 194 r
' EDISON DRIVE
- AUGUSTA, MAINE 04336 * (207) 622-4868 March 19, 1990 MN-90-31 CDF-90-28
-UNITED STATES' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Attention: Document Control Desk.
. Washington, DC 20555
Reference:
(a)
License No. DPR-36 (Docket No. 50-309)
(b) USNRC Letter dated September 20, 1989 - Generic letter 89-19, Request for Action Related to Resolutions of Unresolved Safety 1
Issue A-47 " Safety Implication of Control Systems in LWR Nuclear Power Plants" Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)
(c) USNRC Letter to MYAPCo dated November 29, 1982 (d)gMYAPCoLettertoUSNRCdatedDecember 19, 1983 (e) MYAPCo Letter to USNRC dated June 6, 1986'
Subject:
Request for Action Related to Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-47 " Safety Implication of Control Systems in LWR Nuclear Power Plants"
-Gentlemen:
-NRC Generic Letter 89-19, Reference (b), requested that all PWR plants implement. recommendations to provide automatic steam generator overfill protection,-and that plant procedures and technical specifications. include provisions to verify periodically the operability of the overfill protection and ensure that' automatic overfill protection is available to mitigate main feedwater
-o'verfeed events during reactor operation'. The status of the requested implementation actions at Maine Yankee, consistent with their presentation in
' Enclosure 2 of Reference (b) for Combustion Engineering-Designed PWR Plants, is as follows:
Automatic. Steam Generator Overfill Protection Maine Yankee Status:
The Maine Yankee plant design incorporates a turbine trip on high steam generator level, originally installed for equipment protection (prevention of turbine water induction). This turbine trip occurs upon two-out-of-four 1
coincidence-of signals indicating a level greater than 89% narrow range in any steam generator. These signals are from meter relays which are in safety class
- steam generator water level reactor protective circuits. The high steam generator water level turbine trip contacts and the turbine trip circuits are control grade.
The turbine trip produces a reactor trip, closure of the main feedwater regulating
-valves, and a trip of the steam driven main feedwater pump (P2C). The turbine driven pump is normally running at power levels over fifty percent.
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MaineYankee UNITED STATES NVCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-Page 2 Attention:
Document Control Desk MN-90-31 s
1 Reference _(c) issued Amendment No. 68 to Reference (a) and, as part of the enclosed Safety Evaluation, requested Maine Yankee provide confirmation that flooding of the main steam line by feedwater due to a main feedwater regulating l-valve' failure would not cause a failure of the main steam lines.
In response,_
Maine Yankee, by Reference (d), stated a control grade trip of the motor driven main feedwater (MFW) pumps (P2A and P2B) on high steam generator level would be
- installed during the 1985 refueling outage. This installation was reported complete by Reference (e)'.
A design description of the entire system is enclosed as Attachment 1.
Plant Procedures Maine Yankee Status:
Maine Yankee has had_the required steam generator overfill protection system installed since 1985 and plant Emergency, Abnormal and Operating Procedures all presently reflect this -installation. High steam generator level checks for turbine trip are conducted each refueling outage.
The steam driven MFW pump trip I
switches are a Preventative Maintenance check which verifies set point each refueling outage. A similar check for the electrical MFW pumps does not presently exist. As a result, Maine Yankee intends to upgrade Instrumentation and Controls l
(I&C) Procedures to perform refueling interval sensor calibration set point L'
verification, and testing of the circuitry that initiates the electric MFW pump q
trips. This I&C procedure upgrade will be completed prior to the 1991. refueling outage (approximately September 1991).
I Additionally, the Main Feed chapter in the Systems Training Manual requires upgrading to -include a better discussion of the steam generator overfill event and the MFW pump' trips that could ensue. The upgraded training manual will be issued by April-30,_1990.
Technical Soecifications Maine Yankee Status:
_ Table 4.1-2 of Maine Yankee Technical Specifications presently specifies Feedwater Trip System Surveillance Tests. The I&C procedure upgrade discussed above will be consistent with this requirement. Additionally, Maine Yankee has decided that the steam generator overfill protection system should be a Quality Assurance Required.(QAR) System to provide the process controls necessary to assure continued compliance with Reference (b) requirements.
This quality standards and controls upgrade will be completed prior to the 1991 refueling outage (approximately September 1991).
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, Page 3 4
- Attention:- : Document Control. Desk MN-90-31 Hiah-Pressure-Iniection Pumo-Discharae Pressure Maine Yankee Status:
As Maine Yankee has high-pressure-injection pumps with discharge pressures.
greater than 1275 psi, reassessment of emergency procedures and operator training
.p ograms is not required.
r Desians for Overfill Protection Maine' Yankee Status:
The Maine Yankee overfill protection scheme utilizes both safety and non-safety grade equipment in its design. The design is not totally separate and
_ independent from the MFW control system with respect to power supplies, location and routing. The system does use two-out-of-four initiating 1.ogic from steam generator water level sensors.
Specifically:
a..
Power supplies for the feedwater control system (feedwater runback) logic and the feedwater pump trip logic are common-for a portion of the control logic.
- b. -
Logic for both the feedwater control system main feedwater control valve closure and-the main feedwater pump trips is located within the main control board.
Both the main control board and the feedwater control cabinets reside within the main control room which is forced ventilated.
c.
Significant amounts of wiring are common to both the feedwater control system main feedwater control valve interlock and the main feedwater pump trip' interlocks for the Maine Yankee Steam Generator overfill protection scheme.
Feedwater control valve cables, Main Turbine auto stop trip and emergency trip cables, main feedwater pump P2A and P2B breaker. trip signal cables, etc., all pass through the cable vault. -
'The existing Maine-Yankee steam generator overfill protection system is proposed as an acceptable alternative to the recommended system design. The basis for this recommendation are summarized as follows:
a.
Although the power supplies for the backup main feedwater pump trip logic and the feedwater control system main feedwater control valve closure logic are, in part, common, a single power supply failure cannot result in the loss of both features. The main feedwater control valve closure logic is designed to " fail safe" where a common power supply exists, and would therefore provide a partial trip for main feedwater flow upon a failure of a single power supply.
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Page 4 Attention:
Document. Control Desk MN-90-31 b.
A portion of the main feedwater control valve closure logic resides in i
separate cabinets from equipment implementing the main feed pump trip-1
. logic. - A portion of the logic for both. main feedwater control. valve closure and main feed pump trips is common in the inain control board.
Neither control cabinets nor main control boards use active (forced) ventilation.- Ventilation / air conditionin3 is provided by redundant Main Control Room HVAC equipment as described in the Maine Yankee FSAR, section 9.13.2.6.
c.
Although portions of the. logic equipment and interconnecting wiring are common in the main control board and interconnecting cables are common in the cable vault, cable routing is in accordance with Maine Yankee FSAR Section 8.3.7.5, and fire susceptibility for.the Maine Yankee plant design is in accordance with Maine Yankee FSAR Section 8.3.7.6.
Adequate fire detection / suppression exists.for these areas as follows:
Main Control Room 1.
Manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, 365 days per year 2.
Automatic detection (smoke) 3.
Control Room operators are fire brigade members and are in the immediate area Cable Vault 1.
Automatic detection (smoke) 2.
automatic C0* injection 3.
Manual delugo capability Should the NRC decide the existing system is not adequate, a plant backfit would be required.
This would necessitate disruption of plant operations for construction and involve considerable dollar and manpower cost.
We do not believe i
the incremental safety. gain, if any, would justify the considerable effort necessary.
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7 MaineYankee i.
. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Page 5 7a Attention: Document Control Desk MN-90-31 We trust this information is satisfactory.
Please contact us should you have any questions in this matter.
Very truly yours,
,,47 Charles D. Frizzle L
President CDF:SJJ Enclosure c:
Mr. William T. Russell Mr. Eric J. Leeds Mr. Cornelius Holden STATE OF MAINE Then personally appeared before me, Charles D. Frizzle, who being duly sworn i
did state that he is President of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, that he is duly authorized to execute and file the foregoing response in the name and on i
behalf of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, and that the statements therein are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Y Y -f o H
Nota /y Public l.
BARBARA J. PADAVANA MYCO SSo XPIRIS W,1996 L
l
,CDF9028.LTR
ATTACHMENT l-Steam Generator Overfill Protection System Description This attachment provides a brief but comprehensive description of the Steam Generator Overfill System logic, power configuration, failure mode, redundancy and equipment interfaces.
' The Maine Yankee Steam Generator Overfill Protection System provides two mechanisms to terminate main feedwater flow. Mechanism one is the trip of the main feedwater control valves when a main turbine trip occurs. A main turbine trip occurs due to a high steam generator water level trip.
Note: Termination of bypass feedwater flow is not considered necessary because of the long time it takes to overfill (see NUREG-1217, Section 3.1.4, Paragraph 1). This _is reinforced by NUREG-1218, Section 3.4.(1).
O Mechanism two is a trip of the main feedwater pumps on a high steam generator water level signal'. Motor-driven-feed pumps P2A and P2B are tripped directly by the high water level. -Steam-driven feed pump P2C is tripped on a high steam generator water level trip via a main turbine trip. Motor-driven feed pumps P2A or P2B are used below approximately-50% power and steam-driven feed pump P2C is typically used above 50% power.
1.
The following discusses the two mechanisms to terminate main feedwater flow in more detail' (Refer to the Steam Generator Overfill Protection Scheme drawing at the end of this attachment):
Each of the three steam generators is instrumented with four (4) level transmitters. These level transmitters each feed its respective Level Indicating Alarm (LIA).- The alarm feature of the level indicator produces a high level trip contact output to its respective matrix relay and energizes that matrix relay on a high level condition. The matrix relay outputs are combined to form a two out of four logic so that a high level condition on any two out of four channels on any steam generator will produce a trip output.
Redundant two-out-of-four logic outputs from each steam generator are sent to relays LIA SGX1 and LIA SGX2, LIA SGX1 and LIA SGX2 energize to trip (actuate).
Upon the energization of either LIA SGXI or LIA SGX2, the following events will take place:
(a) P2A will trip if its breaker control power is available' (Note:
P2A trip logic is any one out of two, meaning LIA SGX1 g LIA SGX2 will trip P2A and defeat closing of its breaker as long as breaker control power is available.) Without breaker control power available, the breaker trip coil will not be energized and the pump will remain running.
(b) P2B will trip if its breaker control power is available (Note:
P2B trip logic is any one out of two, meaning LIA SGX1 E LIA SGX2 will trip P2B and defeat closing of its breaker as long as breaker control power is available. ) Without breaker control power available, the breaker trip coil will not be energized and the pump will remain running.
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(c)' Solenoid 20 AST will be energized,' opening the-auto stop oil header to its sump resulting in a mechanical EHC header dump'and a turbine trip.
In addition, the decrease in auto stop oil pressure will produce a trip of 63-3 AST and 63-4 AST pressure switches to produce an energization of 20 ET, producing a second mechanism to trip the turbine via the EHC header dump.
(Note: Solenoid 20 AST trip logic is any one out of two, meaning LIA SGX1 E LIA SGX2 will trip (energize) 20 AST as long as control power is available.
This control scheme has a powor monitor alarm (74 AST) to the Main Control Room).
(d) Solenoid 20 ET will be energized, opening the EHC Trip Header and tripping the main turbine.
The trip of the EHC header is independent of the auto stop oil header, thus a trip of 20 ET will not result in a loss of auto stop oil header pressure (Note:
Solenoid 20 ET trip logic is any one out of two meaning LIA SGXI E LIA SGX2 will trip (energize) 20
+
ET as long as control power is available. This control scheme has a power monitor alarm (74 ET) to the Main Control Room).
Thus far in the discussion, a high steam generator water level trip on any two out of four channels on any steam generator produced an actuation of LIA SGX1 and LIA SGX2.
Either LIA SGX1 or LIA SGX2 produced a trip of P2A, P28, and a main turbine trip via 20 ET or 20 AST. The trip (energization) of 20 AST continues the tripping sequence.
Upon energization of 20 AST, the auto stop oil pressure is dropped by routing oil to the auto stop oil sump. This, in turn, drops auto stop oil pressure to less than or equal to 45 PSIG, actuating the following pressure switches:
63-3 AST 63-4 AST PS-1209A PS-12098 PS-1210A PS-1210B PS-1209A, PS-12098, and PS-1210A _and PS-1210B produce a trip of P2C.
The logic for the P2C trip is one-out-of-two-taken-twice configured in a redundant manner.
In other words, two sets of contacts from each pressure switch feed identical one-out-of-two-taken-twice logic.
Only one of the "one-out-of-two-taken-twice" logic sets is required to trip P2C.
Pressure Switches 63-3 AST and 63-4 AST are tripped upon auto stop oil pressure less than or equal to 45 PSIG. Upon a trip of 63-3 AST, relay 63 AST 3Y de-energizes. Upon a trip of 63-4 AST, relay 63-4 AST 4Y de-energizes.
Relays 63 AST 3Y and 63 AST 4Y contacts combine to form a two-out-of-two trip logic.
In other words, both relays must de-energize to initiate a feedwater isolation via the feedwater Control System.
Operation of a single relay (63 AST 3Y g 63 AST 4Y) will only produce a half trip. Note that the 63 AST 3Y and 63 AST 4Y are de-energized to actuate (fail safe).
Thus a loss of power to the respective relay will produce a half trip in the two-out-of-two logic scheme.
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U)on satisfying the-two-out-of-two logic from 63 AST 3Y and 63 AST 4Y, t1e Feedwater Control System logic is actuated.
Each loop control system K5 relay is actuated (energized) and subsequently energizes and seals' in Relays K2 and K3, Actuation of the K2 relay will close the respective loop main feedwater control valve by interrupting the 4-20 milliamp output'(sets output to O milliamp via open circuit) control signal. This O milliamp (open circuit) output sets less than a 0% open demand output to the' main feedwater control valve. Actuation of Relay K3 interrupts the normal control signal to the respective loop bypass feedwater control ' valve. Actuation of Relay K3 interrupts the normal' y
control signal to the respective loop by) ass feedwater control valve and switches in the trip set controller whic) positions the bypass valve to 33% open.
In addition, a flashing indicator for.each respective loop on the main control board is actuated. To assume control of the bypass:
valve with a-turbine trip signal present, the operator must reset the respective loop K3 relay via a pushbutton on the main ' control board.
A reset of the turbine trip will clear the K2, K3, and K5 logic and restore normal operation of the main and bypass feedwater control valves.
Both the main and the bypass feedwater control valves are pneumatic valves that close on a loss of air.
2.
The power distribution analog instrument loop arrangement for Steam Generators 1, 2, and 3 along with the remaining logic for feedwater pump trips and main feedwater isolations are depicted on the Steam Generator Overfill Protection Scheme drawing' at the end of this attachment.
(a) With regard to the analog loop power supplies, the Level Transmitter (LT), and the LIAs, a single failure will neither cause nor prevent a trip due to the two-out-of-four logic network for each respective Steam Generator.
Matrix relays are powered as follows. These relays energize to actuate.
Steam Generator Matrix Relav Supply 1
1213AX Batt. I 1
1213BX Batt. 2 1
1213CX Batt. 3 1
1213DX Batt. 4 2
1223AX Batt. 1 2
1223BX Batt. 2 2
1223CX Batt. 3 1
2 1223DX Batt. 4 3
1233AX Batt. 1 3
1233BX Batt. 2 3
1233CX Batt. 3 3
1233DX Batt. 4 l
A failure of a matrix relay or the battery feed to the respective group of relays will neither cause nor prevent a trip due to the two-out-of-four logic network for each respective steam generator.
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1 (b)- Relay / solenoid power supplies and relay / solenoid action to trip
_(energize, de-energize) are summarized as follows:
Device Power Source Action to Trio Device Tvoe LIA-SGX2 Batt. 3, DP-BU Energize Relay CKT.21 LIA-SGXI Batt. 1, DP-P Energize Relay CKT 5 20 AST Batt. 1, DP-P Energize Solenoid -
CKT 5 20 ET Batt. 3, DP-BU Energize Solenoid CKT 21 63 AST 3Y Batt. 3, DP-BU De-energize-Relay CKT 21 63 AST 4Y-Batt. 1, DP-P De-energize Relay CKT 5 l
K5 (FWC LPI)
VB1 or VB2 Energize (ISOL MFW)
Relay K2 (FWC LP1)
VB1 or VB2 Energize Relay K3 (FWC_LP1)-
VB1 or VB2 Energize (ISOL MFW)
Relay K5 (FWC LP2)
VB2 or VB3 Energize (ISOL MFW)
Relay l..
K2-(FWC LP2)
VB2 or VB3 Energize Relay K3 (FWC LP2)
VB2 or VB3 Energize (ISOL MFW)
Relay K5 (FWC LP3)
VB3 or VB4 Energize (ISOL MFW)
Relay K2 (FWC LP3)
VB3 or VB4 Energize Relay K3 (FWC LP3)
VB3 or VB4 Energize (ISOL MFW)
' Relay L-(c) Pump Trip Power Supplies and Action to Trip Pumps L
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Control-EMEg Power Source Action to' Trio Notes P2A
.Batt. 1, CKT 20 Energize Trip Coil; Loss-of control power source with or without trip L
signal will not 1'
trip pump.
P2B Batt. 3, CKT 20 Energize Trip Coil loss of control power source with or without trip signal will not trip pump.
P2C Batt. 3,: DP-BU, Energize Trip Coils Loss of control CKT 28 power will result in a trip of P2C via power fail trip solenoids in pump control logic.
(d)
Devices Sharing a Common Power Supply and a Common Circuit from the Power Supply-Note:
Failure of either one of these power supplies will result in a Control Room annunciation.
Power Power Supolv Supolv CKT Device Function Batt. 1, DP-P 5
LIA SGX1 Trip P2A.-P2B Energize 20 AST Energize 20 ET 20 AST Trip Auto Stop 011 (Main Turb Trip) 63-4 AST Trip Input to 63 AST'4Y 63 AST 4Y 1/2 Trip to Isolate MFW Batt. 3, DP-BU 21 LIA SGX2 Trip P2A, P2B Energize 20 AST Energize 20 ET 20 ET Trip EHC 011 (Main Turb Trip) 63-3 AST Trip Input to 63 AST 3Y 63 AST 3Y 1/2 Trip to Isolate MFW CDF9028.LTR 5
3.
Equipment Locations - the following summarizes equipment locations by_ panel:
Device Location LT-1213A, B, C, D Containment - Steam Generator 1 Level LT-1223A, B, C, D Containment - Steam Generator 2 Level LT-1233A, B, C, D Containment - Steam Generator 3 Level LIA-1213A, B, C, D MCB Section A - Steam Generator Level Indicating Alarms LIA-1223A, B, C, D MCB'Section A - Steam Generator Level Indicting Alarms LIA-1233A,'B, C, D MCB Section B - Steam Generator Level Indicating Alarms Relay 1213AX MCB Section A*
Relay 1213BX MCB Section B*
Relay 1213CX MCB Section B*
Relay 1213DX MCB Section A*
Relay 1223AX MCB Section A*
Relay 1223BX MCB Section B*
Relay 1223CX MCB Section B*
Relay 1223DX MCB Section A*
Relay 1233AX MCB Section A*
Relay.1233BX MCB Section B*
Relay 1233CX MCB Section B*
Relay 1233DX MCB Section A*
LIA SGXI MCB Section B*
LIA SGX2 MCB Section B*
63 AST 3Y MCB Section A*
63 AST 4Y MCB Section A*
FWC LPl-K5 FWC LPl Cabinet, Main Control Room FWC LP1-K2 FWC LPI Cabinet, Main Control Room CDF9028.LTR 6
9 Device location FWC LPl-K3 FWC LP1 Cabinet, Main Control Room FWC LP2-K5 FWC LP2 Cabinet, Main Control Room FWC LP2-K2-FWC LP2 Cabinet, Main Control Room FWC LP2-K3 FWC LP2 Cabinet, Main Control Room FWC LP3-K5 FWC LP3 Cabinet, Main Control Room FWC LP3-K2 FWC LP3 Cabinet, Main Control Room FWC LP3-K3 FWC LP3 Cabinet, Main Control Room 20 AST Turbine Building - Solenoid on Auto Stop Oil-System 1
20 ET Turbine Building - Solenoid on EHC Oil System 63-3 AST Turbine Building - Pressure Switch on Auto Stop 011 System 63-4 AST Turbine Building - Pressure Switch on Auto Stop Oil System PS 1209A Turbine Building - Pressure Switch on Auto Stop 011 System PS 1209B Turbine Building - Pressure Switch on Auto Stop 011 System PS 1210A Turbine Building - Pressure Switch on Auto Stop 011 System PS 1210B Turbine Building - Pressure Switch on Auto Stop 011 System P2A Breaker 6900 V Switchgear, Bus 1 P2B Breaker 6900 V Switchgear, Bus 2 P2C Trip Logic Turbine Building - Local at Skid or Local MFP Turbine Panel (Note:
Steam Generator Low Pressure Trip Logic Comes from MCB Section B)
~*See " Device Locations" drawings included in this Attachment Sheets 1 through 4.
CDF9028.LTR 7
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- w 4r The'following summarizes alarm information available to the-operator for the SG Overfill Protection System hardware
- (a)l Loss of Cont'rol Power to Matrix Relays, Battery Sources.1, 2, 3, and 4 j
(ESK-7A) - Annunciator (b); Steam Generator High Level Alarm from Each Matrix Relay (ESK-7A) -
. Annunciator (c) 4.3 Loss of AST Control Power (ESK-9E) - Annunciator.
e (d)
Loss of ET Control Power (ESD-9C) - Annunciator (e) Turbine Auto Stop 011 Actuated (ESK-9E) - Computer PT 3854 (f) Turbine EHC Actuated (ESK-9C) - Computer PT 3855
-(g)
P2A Auto Trip - Annunciator (h)
P2B Auto Trip - Annunciator (i) Turbine-Driven Feed Pump Trip - Annunciator (j)
Loss of Auto Stop 011 Half Trip Annunciator (k) Turbine Trip Override - Flashing Indicators on the Main Control Board CDF9028.LTR 8
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1 STEAM GENERATOR OVERF1 S.G.HIGH LEVEL STEAM GENERATOR #1 STEAM GENERATOR #2 ICL LT LT LT LT LT LT LT LT DWG 'S
- 1213A 1213B 1213C 1213D 1223A 1223B 1223C 1223D X13 X14 X15 X16 X42 X43 X44 X45 VB1 VB2 VB3 VB4 VB1 VB2 VB3 VB4 ESK//A LIA LIA LIA LIA LIA LIA LlA LIA 3CL 1213A 1213B 1213C 1213D 1223A 1223B 1223C 1223D OWO5' H I--
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db BATT 1 BATT 2 BATT 3 B ATT 4 BATT 1 BATT 2 BATT 3 BATT 4 B
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1*23AX l'23BX 1223CX 12230X i
MATRIX 1 13AX 1 13BX 1213CX 12130X RELAYS 1
1 11 11 11 1
11 11 TT TT
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- TT TT TT TT 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 TT TT TT TT TT TT TT TT ESK TA a
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LOGIC LOGIC LOGIC LOGIC LOGIC 0
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,,D ENERG12E TO TRIP SGX2 SGX1 ENERG12E TO TR ESK 9C ESK-9E 4
BATT 1 ggy I#*
1 OUT OF 2 TRIP LOGIC
~~
P2A ESK-5C P2A AND P2B CONTINUE CKT 20 TO OPERATE ON LOSS OF BREAKER CONTROL POWER BW 3 ANY 1 OUT OF 2 I
TRIP LOGIC P2B ESK-5C d'
'S 45 PS)
CKT 20 P2C WILL TRIP L OW AUT O ST OP - - - - - - - - - - - -
VIA 20 TPF (ColLS OIL PRESSURE BATT 3 l
l ESK 9AB - PS1209A REDUNDANT 1 OUT OF 2 P E IS PS1209B TAKEN TWICE ESK-9AB PS1210A P
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[t 100 T PS 1 DP/BU OR PS 1210B vlTH TWO CKT 28 LOGIC MATRICES)
ESK 9AB
- ~ ~ -
lLL PROTECTION SCHEME
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I FEEDWATER CONTROL STE AM GENERATOR #3 i
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l BATT 1,
,BATT 3.DP BU.CKT 21 LT LT LT LT PRESS.SW. CONTACT PRESS.SW. CONTACT 1235A 1233B 1233C 12330 l DP P 63 4 OPENS $ 45 PS) ON 63 3 OPENS 5 4b PSI ON AST 0 10P OIL X43 X43 X44 X45
~.J ICKT 5AST g0yTOP0)L VB1 VB2 VB3 VB4 l
-+- TO OTHER REL AYS A
-+- TO OTHER RELATS A g
g gj, (3g BATT 3.DP-BU.CKT 21 3
3 3
3 B AT T 1 RELAY 63 AST 4Y RELAY 63 AST 4Y 63 l
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AST tTT 1 BATT 2 BATT 3 BATT 4
$ DP P 3V 4Y ESK 9E ESK 9C olCKT a
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d 1 35AX 1 33BX 1233CX 1233DX d.
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11 11 11 11 2n TT TT
- TT TT (mf h,"i,S[3 TAN 80AST4Y
.~I "STM. DUMP Z
PERMISSIVE I
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-8
-- V'31 OR VB2
- 1VB3 OR VB4 l
@l FEEDWATf.R F EEDW ATER F5 CONTPOL cc l K5 CONTROL
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=l K7 K3 K2 '
K3 l
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H CLOLE SET CLOSE SET MfvRV BYPASS I
l MFWRV ggypggg LOOP 3k o
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- T. 5 l
l L OOP 1 ygy LOOP 3 LOOP 1 VB2 OR V93 lp l
l BATT 1 l l
bI l' K5 C
L QP 2 e _lENERC17E TO TRIP MAIN TURP.I APICirl'l]Ill{
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l TRi CKT 5 Also Available On Aperture Card g
[Q,33 BATT 3 U
"VLV LOOP 2 LOOP 2 ENERG17E TO TRIP MAIN TURB.l e
2 R] A-SGX1 LEGEND:
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$R [1$Y ((3 SG ESK 9C MANUAL RESET TO ENABLE BYPASS VALVE
@=FOLLOVING TURB. TRIP l
OP P CKT.21 1
l TSI = TRIP SET INPUT TO PRESET LOOP BYPASS l
VALVE.
d=0THER REL AYS ARE FOR RPS. TRIP 86-BU.
l ACB DB-1 S.PCV-1112 HYDRAULIC LINK l
YO (TURB AUTO STOP OILI
- =ENERG12E TO TRIP BATT. =125 VDC BATTERY BACKED SOURCE "X" =DC LOOP POWER SUPPLY MYP 90-0301 90032.70&70 O,
ATTACHMENT 1 051 :l 53. 521MY P900301. DON :
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