ML20012B711

Proposed Tech Specs Re Low Temp Overpressure Protection Sys

ML20012B711
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	03/02/1990
From:	BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20012B709	List: ML20012B708 ML20012B711
References
NUDOCS 9003160145
Download: ML20012B711 (14)

Text

. _ . . _ _ _ _ _

^

wi4k Tg o. hove. 25t:FF cud o.

ronim um becdop of go *F us cm oce. boor pmod w dk Tg

{ less h u or e9<d 4o  ?.4D9#,  :

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM i 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM '

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.9.1 The Reactor Coolant System (except the pressurizer) temperature and pressure sha'11 be limited in accordance with the limit lines shown on Figure 3.4-2 during heatup, cooldown, criticality, and inservice leak and ,

hydrostatic testing with:

7o -

a. A maximum heatup of MG'F in any one hour periodr

b. A maximum cooldown of 100'F in any one hour period with T"V9 above 250'F and a maximum cooldown of 20*F in any one hour period with T,yg below 250 F.

c. A maximum temperature change of 5'F in any one. hour period, during hydrostatic testing operations above system design pressure.

(- g i-APPLICABILITY: At all. times.

ACTION:

With any of the above limits exceeded, restore the temperature and/or pressure to within the limit within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the fracture toughness properties of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operations or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce the RCS T and pressure to less than 200 F and.50Cr psia, respectively..within tM9following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. 300 as , SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 8

4.4.9.1.1 The Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure shall be

[a-E M determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup, cooldown, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing go- operations.

Sk 4.4.9.1.2 The reactor vessel material irradiatinn surveillance speci-get mens shall be removed and examined, to determine changes in material E properties, at the intervals shown in Table 4.4-5. The results of these 88- examinations shall be used to update Figure 3.4-2.

o a.o.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-23

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

{

PRESSURIZER 7 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.9.2 The pressurizer temperature shall be limited to:

a. A maximum heatup of 100*F in any one hour period,

" ' ~ ~ ~

b. A maximum cooldown of 200*F in any one hour period, and ~ ~ ~ " " ~ ~

c. A maximum spray water temperature differential of 400*F. y APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

With the pressurizer temperature limits in excess of any of the above -

limits, restore the temperature to within the limits within 30 minutes;'

• perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the fracture toughness properties of the pressurizer; '

detemine that the pressurizer remains acceptable for continued operation t or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce the pressurizer pressure to less t' ann JNr psig within-the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. 300 SURVEILLANCE-REQUIREMENTS 4.4.9.2 The pressurizer temperatures shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup or-cooldown.

The spray water temperature differential shall be determined to be within the limit at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during auxiliary _ spray operation.

t CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-26

s *

( ,

\ REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM  !

O RPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS Sec. O k t M  ;

LIMITI CONDITION FOR OPERATION p l.5 j  ;

x  ; i 3.4.9.3 At least one of the folicwing overpressure protection syst s shall be OPE GLE:

a. Two p er operated relief valves (PORVs) ~

pith a ' lift etting j of 1 45 psig, or

. b. A reactor olant system vent of > 1.3 square i bes.  ;

APPLICABILITY: When th temperatureofoneormoreoftheRCS[.coldlegs is 1 275"F.

ACTION:

i With one PORY inoperatle, either re cre the inoperable.PORY to a.

OPERABLE status withinN days or . pressurize and vent the RCS ,

througha>1.3squarefghven*s)withinthenextShours; maintain tee RCS in a ven dc dition until both PORVs have f ,

been restored to OPERAELE s .us,

b. With both PORVs inoperabl , de ressuri:e and vent the RCS -

through a > 1.3 square .chvenfs)within8 hours;maintainthe RCS in a vented condi',on until b th PORVs have been rastered to OPERABLE status,

c. In the e snt eit er the PORVs or the S vent (s) are used to mitigate a RCS ressure transient, a Sp cial Report shall bs prepared and ubmitted to the Cor.nission ursuant to S;ccifica-tion 6.9.2 ithin 30 days. The report sha 't describe the cir-cumstance initiating the transient, the ef et of the PORVs er vent (s) n the transient and any corrective a tion necessary to prever recurrence.

L d. Th provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are,not app 1' cable.

1 l

( /

CALVERT. CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-26a Amendmint 'b. -

l '

EACTORCOOLANTShSTEN OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.9.3 The following overpressure protection requirements shall be met:

a. One of the following three overpressure protection systems shall be in place:

1. Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) with a lift setting $ 422.7 psia or

2. A single PORV with a lift setting of s 422.7 psia and a reactor coolant system vent of 11.3 square inches, or

3. A reactor coolant system (RCS) vent 2 2.6 square inches.

b. Two high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps # shall be disabled by either removing (racking out) their motor circuit breakers from the electrical power supply circuit, or by locking shut their discharge valves.

c. The HPSI loop motor operated valves (MOVs)# shall be prevented from automatically aligning HPSI pump flow to the RCS.

d. No more than one high pressure safety injection pump with suction aligned to the Refueling Water Tank may be used to-inject flow into the RCS and when used, it must be under manual control and one of the following restrictions shall apply:

1. The total high pressure safety injection flow shall be limited to s 350 gpm OR

2. A reactor coolant system vent of 12.6 square inches shall exist. ,

APPLICABILITY: When the temperature of any RCS cold leg is 1 3190 F and-an RCS vent s 8 square inches exists. '

ACTION:

a. With one PORV inoperable, either restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 5 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through a 2 1.3 square inch vent (s) within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both PORVs have been restored to OPERABLE status,

b. With both PORVs inoperable, depressurize a?d vent the RCS through a 1 2.6 square inch vent (s) within 46 hours5.324074e-4 days <br />0.0128 hours <br />7.60582e-5 weeks <br />1.7503e-5 months <br />; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until either one OPERABLE PORV and a vent of 21.3 square inches has been established or both PORVs have been restored to OPERABLE status.

CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 1 3/4 4-26a Amendment No. #

f-i REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

c. In the event either the PORVs or the RCS vent (s) are used to mitigate a RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to S>ecification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe tie circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or vent (s) on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence,

d. With less than two HPSI pumps # disabled, place at least two

, HPSI pump handswitches in pull to lock within fifteen minutes And disable two HPSI pumps within the next four hours,

e. With one or more HPSI loop MOVs# not prevented from automatically aligning a HPSI > ump to the RCS, either shut and disable the affected MOV wit 11n four hours or isolate the t affected HPSI header flowpath within the next four hours, And implement the action requirements of Specifications 3.1.2.1, 3.1.2.3, and 3.5.3, as applicable.

f. With HPSI flow exceeding 350 gpm while suction is aligned to the RWT and an RCS vent of < 2.6 square inches exists,

1. immediately take action to reduce flow to less than 350 gpm.

2. Verify the excessive flow condition did not raise pressure I above the maximum allowable pressure for the given RCS J temperature of Figure 3.4-2b.

3. If the pressure limit was exceeded, taken action in accordance with Specification 3.4.9.1.

g. The provisions of specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. ,

P 9

EXCEPT when required for manual use or testing in accordance with approved procedures.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-26b Amwdema No.M

i RE ACTOR COOLANT SYSTE!1 ,

('

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.4.9.3.1 Each PORY shall. be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Performance'of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the PCRV actuation channel, but excludir.g valve operation, within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORY is required OPERABLE. ,

b. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBPATTON on the PORY actuation channel at least once per 18 months.

c. Verifying the PORY isolation valve is open at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> when the PORV is being used for overpressure. protection.

d. Testing in accord _ance with the inservice test requirements for ASME Category C valves pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

. 4.4.9.3.2 The RCS vent (s) shall be verified'to be open at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />

• when the vent (s) is being used for overpressure protection.

44.9*.3.3 All h.3k , pec.:,vec softig i,up.chea pur.sps , acg4 4 '

about OPERABLE pump , skdi be, duww:, bad totptm.bk c1 lerd ONCe pe- 12 hoved b3 9eri%.uc3 %cd h twoh:c c.seco A bno.kers h cwt, bew Mecced bm 4hese- CAccbted pou><.r soppi c.t ecuh or b3 m ski $ + heir- disc.hnrge vedves cat locAtd s ub h Au bmht.,

opwW3 ferped of N. hsc3 6 . pmvw, sck 69 ubop d

ime Movs shan E ces&d cbsaud cd neceA ce pu-L'E houch.

l J l

l 'Excep: wnen the vent pathway M pr:v u:d M th r+eiv: J.f h is locked, I

sealet, or otherwise se:ured in the open position, tnen verify these d v:1;;; open at least once per 31 days.

veut pdkwcgs I

i CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-25)/c, AnendmentNo.p

l

• EALTOR COOLANT $YSTEM COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

) (.

.SHUTOOWN r

,L!MITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION '

3.4.1.3 a. At least two of the coolant loops listed below shall be OPERABLE:

1. Reactor Coolant Loop #il (#21)'and its associated steam generator and at least one associated' reactor coolant pump,

2. Reactor Coolant Loop #12 (#22) and its associated steam generator and at least one associated reactor coolant pump,

3. Shutdown Cooling Loop #11 (#21)*,

4. Shutdown Cooling Loop #12 (#22)*.

b. At least one of the above coolant loops shall ,be in operation **.

. Appt.ICABIL ITY : MODES 4"*# and 5"*f.

ACTION:

a. With less than the above required coolant loops OPERABLE, r- initiate corrective action to return the required coolant Icops to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in COLD SHUT 00WN within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, l

b. With no ecolant loop in operation, s'u' spend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant-System and initiate corrective action to return the recuired coolant loop to operation within one hour.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The required shutdown cooling loop (s), if not in operation, shall be 4.4.l.3.1, OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying :orrect breaker alignme j determined and indicated power availability for pumps and snutcown cooling loop valves.

3 3 *ine normal or emergency power source may be inoperacle in MCDE 5.

l "All reactor coolant pumps and shutdown cooling pumps may se de-energi:ed for up to I hour provided (1) no operations are permitted tnat woul: cause dilution of the reactor coolant system bcron3concentration, and (2) tore outlet temperature is maintained at least 10 F w sa w adon teg ers w e.

3i l v "*A reactor coolant pump shall not be startedhitg One or more of the RCS

! t5 cold leg tamceratures less nan or ecual to 07 F unless (1) tne pressurizer

!3

.::t.  ::'.:: is less than "C0 ; A i; ';;; er

(, , ture of each steam genera br is less : nan f 2) th;

• • rsecondary - water tempera-n- ;c;;wres sj + 1GD eF

urf::: G n ; n c.;tr" e- t) above e:: ;f :ne RCS cM: '

temperature /.

3.10.5.

1. 5ee Special

CAL'/ERT CL FE5 Test Exceptio( N I"A M

'JNIT 1 lCAL-l:27CL:F'~ T' ' T - f Amendmen: No. 5E 3/4 a-2a

'2:n:::e 't,

. _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ ~

I fL J.3I5

} '.4.1 [*d. A'.I . COPS A%C C* C' AMI CI ECL . C'.

The plant is designed to operate with both reactor coolant loops and ,

associated reactor coolant pumps in operation, and maintain DNBR above 1.1@

during all normal operations and anticipated transients. 1 A single reactor coolant loop with its steam generator filled above the low level trip setpoint provides sufficient heat removal capability for core >

cooling while in MODES 2 and 3; however, single failure considerations require plant shutdown if component.r,epairs and/or corrective actions cannot be made within the allowable out-of-service time.

In MODES 4 and 5, a single reactor coolant loop or shutdown cooling loop '

provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single  ;

failure considerations require that at least two loops be OPERABLE. Thus, if the reactor coolant loops are not OPERABLE, this specification requires two shutdown cooling loops to be OPERABLE.

The operation of one Reactor Co'olant Pump or one shutdown cooling pump

~ provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce

. gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reductions  ;

will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.  :

b .

317 The restrictions on startin with one or more RCS cold legs <[4M F are provided to prevent R transients, caused by energy additions from the secondary system, which could exceed the licits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The RCS will be protected against overpressure transients. and will not exceed the limits of Appendix G by either (1) restricting the water volume in the pressurijze and thereby

( providing a volume for the primary coolant to expand into W (2) by restrict-t ing starting of the RCPs to wheg the gecondary water temperature of each

!- steam generator is less than 46 F f34 F 9 enured h a ;urfe:c :entet-inte-~t) above the :::ler,t 3 -tm er: tere 9 th:Jenter ;;;;:1.

3/4.4.2 Rr+cnto,,1sA,)feo.,pn,ke, SAFETY VALVES

~

j3 ,

The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being

• l pressurized above its Safety Li it of 2750 psia. Each safety valve is designed l

to relieve approximately 3 x 105 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve l setpoint. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve.

any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating shutdown cooling loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS over-pressurization. .

1

.(

lg During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2750 psia. The combined relief capacity of these valves is sufficient to l

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 Amendment No. M , E3,ff,82 L B 3/4 4-1

_ l -.

\

l REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS

_ _ . . FLOW PATHS - SHUTDOWN 1

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths and one associated heat tracing circuit shall be OPERABLE:

a. A flow path from the boric acid storage tank via either a boric acid pump or a gravity feed connection and charging i pump to the Reactor Coolant System if only the boric acid I storage tank in specification 3.1.2.7a is OPERABLE, or i b.

The flow path a charging pumpfrom or a the highrefueling water injection pressure safety tank viapump either *to the Reactor Coolant system if only the refueling water tank in Specification 3.1.2.7b is OPERABLE.  ;

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

! With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE, suspend all operations ,

involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one injection path is restored to OPERABLE status.

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l 4.1.2.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demon-

strated OPERABLE.

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the temperature of the heat traced portion of the flow path is above the temperature limit line shown on Figure 3.1-1 when a flow path from the  ;

concentrated boric acid tanks is used,

b. At least once per 31 days be verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

W. DJhua Tav3 6 3SoF,w h OPECNEE hicjk, PmS50% ScM iupboa pnp will bt. plead Pvil - % - Loc k cwd w , tt yg ggyg avh,rocchecdg. Movved uu., en W. higk. pm3x se&g ivuk oo p u r g t w il bt. ccucioch.c\t o ctcc.exhc2 wdk, ctpprovtd CALVflTCLIFFS-UNIT 1 3/4 1-8 procedvee uccler &. rchkom, oQ T cu6cdnov 4 3,4 9. 3. c\ .

REACTIVITY CONTR_0L SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMP - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.3 At least one charging pump or one high pressure safety injection pump *in the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity  !

changes until at least one of the required pumps is restored to OPERABLE  ;

status.

i SUWEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I 4.1.2.3 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

• LDheu L Tav3 ._ Ssu F , h OPERABLE h.gk p%z safe.g

[ igubu pp w i lt 6 piau.a w Pu n t - % - L ock cmd w t \\ " A s hr4 a.ubma-hedig. mamud vut of & k<sk pru e t- '

sddb '~d"b" Pomp W'll be. cowdot4<3 tu acwrdnua wd' appwa procuAveu oud er h n:c b c h at of Spa C,cdoo .

3 4 9. 3. d.

1' CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-10 1

h l'

e

i

[ E.MERGINCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS , l ECCS SUBSYSTEitS - T,yg < 300',F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

a. One# OPERABLE high-pressure safety injection pump, and l

b. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water tank on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction to the contain- ,

ment sump on a Recirculation Actuation Signal.

APPLICABILITY : MODES 3* and 4.

ACTION _:  ;

a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within i hour or be in COLD SHUT 00WN i

within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />.

b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable l Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.

4-E.2 ) All high-pressure safety injection pumps, except the abo l required OPERAst:. gug, 9=11 be demonstrp* mere or the P.CS colda q .. east once per 12 nours whenever the temoer=*"rw ..

legs is < 275'e i ng that tne motor circuit treesei. "

. rom their electrical power supply circuits. ,

"Witn pressurl:er pressure < 1750 psia.

-(

Y A maximum of one high-oressure safety injection pump snall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS colo legs is < .3H"F. ,

T hG6 m 2.mencmenth.b CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT i mRTm.:rn - ..:T szam ~ m + w==a.s propen.ui b3 t iuoc t- aw14 ttqueth chkd Febeveg 14,1990 d i W - .

v .% %W

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

{

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4 .. .

4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the following valves are in the indicated positions with power to the valve operators removed:

Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position

1. MOV-659 1. Mini-flow Isolation 1. Open .

t

2. MOV-660 2. Mini-flow Isolation 2. Open

3. CV-306 3. Low Pressure SI- 3. Open ',

Flow Control

b. At least once per 31 days by: 1

1. Verifying that upon a Recirculation Actuation Test Signal, the containment sump isolation valves open.

(

2.

Verifying)that automatic in the eachflowvalve path(manual, that is not power operated locked, sealed, or or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position. ,, _,,- , . , , _ . ,,_ _

c. By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment ,

which could be transported to the containment sump and cause '

restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed: ,

1. For all accessible areas of the containment prior to

, establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and l

2. Of the areas affected within containment at the com-pletion of containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.

d. Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> prior to increasing the RCS pressure above 1750 psia by verifying, via local indication at the valve, that CV-306 is open.

4 00he_veutr flew hhv3 suk> h RCS sc m g g n d , h k ,g k, p u ece sc&Ag wd"M ~ Pump dw\\ eeercule Rcs wcde (suc%y f% (

Ra.rr i<,oicM h or- A coobi: c70 Lco 3. w. 9,3 shat 9pq -

6 f W RCS cc\ck \cs +emHve.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT r 15 L_. 319 oF' 3/4 5-4

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES ',

The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving baskets l located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility of l corrosion cracking of certain metal components during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA. The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised to E 7.0. The requirement to . 1 dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of RWT water provides assurance that the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post LOCA temperatures.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. The surveillance require-ment for flow balance testing provides assurance that proper ECCS flows will be l maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:

(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system )'

is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses. .

Minimum HPSI flow requirementsgre based upon small break LOCA calculations which credit charging pump flow following an SIAS. Surveillance testing includes allowances for instrumintation and system leakage uncerteinties. (  ;,

The 470 ppm requirement for mi mum HPSI flow from the three lowest flow I

legs includes instrument uncer' ainties but not system check valve leakage. 4 I The OPERABILITY of the chargin i pumps and the associated flow paths is

! assured by the Boration System Specification 3/4.1.2. Specification of safety -

injection pump total developed head ensures pump perfomance is consistent with  :

s fe g a g assumptio s. 4 , p9 i 3/4.5.4 REFUELI TANK (RWT) l t

t l The OPERABILITY of the RWT as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event ,

of a LOCA. The limits on RWT minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to pemit recircula-tion cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain suberitical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWT and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly.

These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical character-istics.

l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. M. AW,117 I l

-_.s__.2u__._o2f_._________ O' '

___[ _ _ . . _ . _ . . ., . _ . - , . , _ _ , , _ , . . . . _ , . . , , , _ - - , . , , . _ _ , _ , . , . . ,

i

.o- Jo: rO 1 I

4 j At temperatures below 319 0 F, llPSI flow is limited to less than or equal to 350 gpm except in response to excessive reactor coolant leakage. This provides overpressure protection in the low temperature region. An analysis has been performed which shows i this flow rate is more than adequate to meet safety analysis assumptions. HPSI's are not required- to auto-start when the RCS is in the MPT enable condition. The Safety '

Injection Tanks provide immediate injection of borated water into the core in the event of an accident, allowing adequate time for an operator to take action to start a IIPSI.

Surveillance testing of HPSI pumps is required to ensure pump operability. Some  !

surveillance testing requires that the HPSI pumps deliver flow to the RCS. To allow this testing to be done without increasing the potential for overpressurir.ation of the ,

RCS, either the RWT must be isolated or the llPSI pump flow must be limited to less than or equal to 350 gpm or an adequate vent must be provided I

F r

b E

k 9

f