ML20011A106
| ML20011A106 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 09/29/1981 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8110070266 | |
| Download: ML20011A106 (2) | |
Text
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TENNESSEE ' VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 2 *401 400 Chestnut Stree,t Tower II ft
- :., t September 29, 1981 BLRD-50-438/81-42 1
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k BLRD-50-439/81-44
)Gh0k.D OCT 6 198 ?
91A ocw Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director u.sqb,s,su pD.
Office of Inspection and Enforcement s;-
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission J /j..,[i; \\q' Region II - Suite 3100 M/
101 Marietta Street
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Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
ENONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT ALTERNATE ANALYSIS DESIGN CRITERIA - BLRD-50-438/81-42, BLRD-50-439/81 FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector H. Y.
Crlenjak on May 29, 1981, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR BLN BLP 8112. This was followed by our first intecia report dated ' June 29,
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1981. Enclosed is iur final report.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.
Very truly yours, l
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY d2D'3 h s s
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M M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety o
Enclosra e Mr. Victar Stallo, Director (Enclosure) cc:
Office o:.' Inspection and Enforcement b)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission L
Washington, DC 20555 f
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8110070266 010929 PDR ADOCK 05000 S
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ENCLOSURE BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT ALTERNATE ANALYSIS DESIGN CRITERIA 10 CFR 50.55(e)
BLRD-50-43.8181-42, BLRD-50-439/81-44 FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency Bellefonte design personnel have failed to conform to criteria as defined in CEB 76-11, "Alternste Criteiia for Pipe Analysis and Supports." These-engineers did not consistently' apply the spacing requirements for the High Pressure Fice Protection System OIPFPS) axial pipe supports as defined in CEB 76-11. Further investigation of this problem showed no indication that this nonconformance is applicable to other TVA nuclear plad.s. The apparent cause is design oversight.
Safety Implications The sei.9mic pipe support systems that do not meet the axial requirements of CEB 76-H ere not essential for safe shutdown of the plant. However, failure of tne pipe supports and the related failure of the piping system could result in physical damage to a system essential to the safe shutdown of the plant Corrective Action TVA has identified the areas of the HPFPS piping that were affected by-the subject deficieny. This piping was reanalyzed by rigorous analysis, checking the piping stresses and the support loads. Some supports were added to sections of the piping. These modifications were made to correct for overstress in the piping. In order to prevent recurrence, TVA has instructed those individuals involved in alternate analysis calculations that all the requirements of the alterna'te analysis criteria must be strictly followed.
O TVA is continuing its routine review of piping and supports which were designed in accordance with CEB 76-11. Any deficiency discovered in the future will be processed in accoroance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
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