05000324/LER-1981-065-01, /01T-0:on 810827,HPCI Steam Line Area Differential Temp Switch E51-dTS-N604D Found Inoperable & Trouble Ticket Initiated.Hpci Not Isolated Until 5-h Later.Caused by Failure to Perform Adequate & Timely Review of Ticket

/01T-0:on 810827,HPCI Steam Line Area Differential Temp Switch E51-dTS-N604D Found Inoperable & Trouble Ticket Initiated.Hpci Not Isolated Until 5-h Later.Caused by Failure to Perform Adequate & Timely Review of Ticket

ML20010G976
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	09/10/1981
From:	Poulk R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20010G973	List: 05000324/LER-1981-065, Forwards LER 81-065/01T-0 05000324/LER-1981-065-01, /01T-0:on 810827,HPCI Steam Line Area Differential Temp Switch E51-dTS-N604D Found Inoperable & Trouble Ticket Initiated.Hpci Not Isolated Until 5-h Later.Caused by Failure to Perform Adequate & Timely Review of Ticket
References
LER-81-065-01T, LER-81-65-1T, NUDOCS 8109220733
Download: ML20010G976 (2)

LER-1981-065, /01T-0:on 810827,HPCI Steam Line Area Differential Temp Switch E51-dTS-N604D Found Inoperable & Trouble Ticket Initiated.Hpci Not Isolated Until 5-h Later.Caused by Failure to Perform Adequate & Timely Review of Ticket

Event date:
Report date:
3241981065R01 - NRC Website

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NRC FORM 366 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (L77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: l l

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60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES O'o l o ] 2 l l Fhile performing a periodic test on the HPCI steam line area differential temperature l IO l3 l l switch E51-dTS-N604D, it was determined that this instrument was inoperable and a l

l o l 4 l l trouble ticket was initiated to correct the problem. Technical specifications allow j l O i s l l this instrument to be inoperable for repairs or surveillance testing for up to twc l

l ours before requiring that HPCI be isolated and declared inoperable; however, HPCI l

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NAME OF PREPARER PHONE:

P LER 2-81-65 ATTACHMENT Facility: BSEP Unit No. 2 Date: 8-27-81 While performing surveillance testing on the HPCI and RCIC steam line temperature switches, it was discovered that the HPCI steam line area differential temperature switch E51-dTS-N604D could not be calibrated. At 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />, a trouble ticket to have the instrument repaired was written by-the technician performing the calibration and taken to the Shift Foreman to have it assigned a number. The Shift i; eman assigned a number to the trouble ticket and set it aside to be reviawed later. The-technician did not inform the operator that an unusual problem associated with the surveillance existed or that the testing was secured unt il the instrument was repaired; however, he did leave the instrument in test to indicate that HPCI was out of service until the temperature instrument could be repaired and the surveillance testing completed.

At 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> during shift turnover, the oncoming Shift Foreman noted that HPCI was in test and assumed that the surveillance testing was still in progress. At approximately 1915 hours0.0222 days <br />0.532 hours <br />0.00317 weeks <br />7.286575e-4 months <br />, while reviewing and processing the trouble tickets not processed by the day shift, the Shift Foreman found the trouble ticket on E51-dTS-N604D. Following a review of technical specifications, the HPCI system was isolated and declared inoperable.

An investigation of these events was performed to detnrmine the cause or causes for exceeding both the two-hour action statement for surveillance testing and the two-hour action statement for instrument repair. During this investigation, the following deficiencies were noted:

1) no mechanisu is available for ensuring that the two-hour surveillance time requirement is met, 2) testing

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interrupted due to problems should be brought to the attention of the Shift Foreman, 3) trouble tickets should be more closely examined when received by the Shift Foreman, 4) components should not be left in test when testing is not in progress. This investigation and the deficiencies noted to date are still being reviewed. Following this review, a supplemental report will be issued detailing the corrective action taken to prevent future occurrences of this nature.

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