05000324/LER-1981-082-03, /03L-0:on 810804,suppression Pool Level Discovered Exceeding Specs Following Reactor Scram W/Hpci & Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Sys auto-initiated on Low Reactor Water Level.Caused by Min Flow Valve 2-E41-F012 Failed Open

From kanterella
(Redirected from ML20010E939)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
/03L-0:on 810804,suppression Pool Level Discovered Exceeding Specs Following Reactor Scram W/Hpci & Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Sys auto-initiated on Low Reactor Water Level.Caused by Min Flow Valve 2-E41-F012 Failed Open
ML20010E939
Person / Time
Site: Brunswick 
Issue date: 08/31/1981
From: Pastva M
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20010E934 List:
References
LER-81-082-03L, LER-81-82-3L, NUDOCS 8109090161
Download: ML20010E939 (2)


LER-1981-082, /03L-0:on 810804,suppression Pool Level Discovered Exceeding Specs Following Reactor Scram W/Hpci & Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Sys auto-initiated on Low Reactor Water Level.Caused by Min Flow Valve 2-E41-F012 Failed Open
Event date:
Report date:
3241981082R03 - NRC Website

text

NQC Ff*M 1366 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATC RY COMMISSION '

(

(7-77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: l l

l l

l l

l (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 1 6

l0 l1] l Nl Cl B l E l Pl 2 l@l 0 l 0 l - l 0 l 0 l 0 l 0 l 0 l-l 0 l 0 l@l 4 l1 l1 l1 l 1 l@l l

l@

7 U 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBEtt 25 26 LICENSE TYPE JO 57 CAT 68 CON'T I0III

$";RC l L j@] O l 5 l 0 l - l 0 l 3 ] 2 l 4 @l 018 l 0 l4 l 811 l@l018 l3 l1 l 8 l1 l@

60 61 DOCK ET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 14 75 REPORT DATE 80 5'

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES h auto-initi. ed on low reactor l I o l 2 l IFo110 wing a reactor scram in which IIPCI and RCIC Systems l water level, it was discovered that suppression pool level had exceeded specifications l 1o l3l I o l 4 l 1(-27.0") with the highest recorded value being - 26.5".

This event did not affect the l l o I s l l health and safety of the public.

I l o 16 I l I

l 10171 [

l 0 la l l Technical Specifications 3.6.2.1, 6.9.1.9b l

SYSTEM

CAUSE

CAUSE COMP.

ALVE CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE Sl F]@ W@ l A lh l Vl Al Ll Vl 0l Plh lB lh Wh 10101 i

7 8

5 10 11 12 13 18 19 20 SEQUENTI AL OCCURRE NCE REPORT REVISION

_ EVENT YEAR REPORT NO.

CODE TYPE NO.

O =LF R RO l 8111 l-l 1018121 1.-l 1013l l tl

[_J l0 l

=

21 42 23 2*

26 27 28 29 30 31 32 TAK N ACT O ON PL ANT 1

HOURS 22 S8 IT D FOF d

B.

SUPPLIE MAN FACTUfER W@l B lh Wh IZlh

,l0l0l0l0l {@

lY l@

lAl@

l L l 2 l 0 l 0 l@

33 34 35 36 J/

40 41 42 43 44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS l i j o l l Reactor wat er f rom an opened safety-relief valve and water f rom the condensate storage l [i [i ; l tank via a failed open IIPCI System minimum flow valve, 2-E41-F012, caused the level to l gbe exceeded. Within 25 minutes of discovery, both valves were closed and the level wasl

,,;3y [ returned to normal. The F012 valve was inoperable due to burned windings in the valve l g,i,,y [ operator motor.

l 7

8 9 80 ST S

% POWE R OTHER STATUS blSC V RY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION W @ l0l0l0l@l NA l

lAl@l Operator surveillance l

i s

'o "a

CObT lv,1 RE LE ASE D OF RELE ASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELE ASE l1 lc l W @ l Zl@l

_j l

NA l

NA 7

8 9 10 t1 44 45 80 PE RSONNE L E XPOSUH ES NUMB E R TYPE DESCHiPTION -

[ i l 7 l l 0 l 0 l 0 l@l Z l@l NA l

Pi nsONd'iN;u' jus DESCniofiONh Nuvsen li lR I 10 l 0 l o lhl NA l

7 8 9 11 12 80 LOSS OF OH DAMAGE TO F ACILIEY TYPE DESCHIPilON NA l

lZlhl I 9 7

H

'J 10 80 8109090161 810831 NRC USE ONLY Puin iu v Y PDR ADOCK 05000324

(_N_j g

PDR NA l

l l l l l l l l l l l l l :7 155UE D@lDESLHiPTION 7 0 7

51 9

to 68 69

80. ;;

M. J. Pastva, Jr.

(919)457-9521 o

NAME OF PREPARER PHONE:

F

e.

p LER ATTACHMENT - RO # 2-81-82 Facility: BSEP Unit No. 2 Event Date: 8-4-81 Following the discovery that the suppression pool level was out of specification, special surveillance of all ECCS Systems' minimum ficw valves was performed to determine the source of the inleakage to the suppression pool. It was discovered that the HPCI System minimum flow valve, 2-E41-F012, had failed in the open position due to a failure of the valve operator motor. An inspection of the motor revealed burned windings that failed due to out of adjustment valve opsn position limit switches.

As designed, the motor incorporates limits switches in the valve open position to prevent motor overtorquing. The switches apparently became out of adjustment and allowed the valve motor to burn up while attempting to drive the disk into its open seat. Following the receipt of a rewound motor, the valve operator to F012 will be repaired and returned to service.