ML20010E912
| ML20010E912 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 09/01/1981 |
| From: | Houston M Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Davidson D CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8109090097 | |
| Download: ML20010E912 (6) | |
Text
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Mr. Dalwyn R. Davidson
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u Vice President - Enoineerino Cleveland Electric Illtriinating Company 8 5 g,,T,"
Cleveland, Ohio 44101
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P. O. Box 5000
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Dear Mr. Davidson:
Subiect: Pequest for Additional Information - Auxiliary Systems In the perfomance of the Perry licensing review, the staff has identified concerns in regard to auxiliary systems. The information that we require is identified in the enclosure.
!!e request that you provide the infomation not later than October 16, 1091.
If veu reouire any clarification of this request, please contact ne at (301) 402-8503.
Sincerely,
". D. Houston, Pro. ject ? tanager Licensing Branch No. 2, DL
~ Division of Licensing
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Mr. Dclwyn R. Davidson Vice President, Engineering The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company P. O. Box 5000 Cleveland, Ohio 44101 cc: Gerald Charnoff, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
20036 Donald H. Hauser, Esq.
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company P. O. Box 5000 Cleveland, Ohio 44101 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector's Office Parmly at Center Road Perry, Ohio 44081 Donald T. Ezzone, Esq.
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 105 Main Street Lake County Administration Center Painesville, Ohio 44077 i
Tod J. Kenney 228 South College Apt. A Bowling Green, Ohio 43402 Daniel D. Wilt Wegman, Hesiler & Vanderberg 7301 Chippewa Road, Suite 102 Brecksville, Ohio 44141 Jeff Alexander 920 Wilimington Ave.
Dayton, Ohio 45420 l
Terry Lodge, Esq.
915 Spitzer Building Toledo, OH 43604 l
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ENCLOSURE Request for Additional Information Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Auxiliary Systems Branch 410.5 Section 3.6.2.3.5 of the FSAR indicates that analyses of flooding resulting (3.4.1) from high or moderate line failures have been performed.
For areas coa-taining !.igh or moderate pipes, present the results of these analyses on a room by room basis to demonstrate that the plant will be able to achieve o
safe shutdown considering the height to which the water would rise assuming the failure of one of the pertinent sump pumps.
-l 410. 6 Section 3.6.2.3.4 of the FSAR stated that compartment pressurization analyses.
(3.6.1) have been made for all compartments containing high-energy lines. Present t
the results of these analyses including the peak pressures and temperatures and blowdown duration, and state how the blowdown is terminated,for compart-ments outside containment. Verify that essential equipment located within the compartments are capable of operating in the environment resulting from high-energy line failures.
410. 7 Describe the means provided in the scram discharge system design to meet the (4.6) criteria enumerated in Section 4 of the Generic Safety Evaluation Report BWR Scram Discharge System, dated December 1,1980, and transmitted to you by NRC letter dated December 22, 1980.
i 41 0. 8 Describe the effects on tSe safety and operability of the control rod drive (4.6) hydraulic system assuming the drive / cooling water pressure control valve fails either closed or open.
410.
Describe the means provided in the control rod drive system design to meet (4.6) the criteria enumerated in Sections 4 and 8 of NUREG-0619, BWR Feedwater Nozzle and Control Rod Driven Return Line Nozzle Cracking and verify inat this design is in full compliance with those sections of the document.
., 410.10 With regard to the new fuel storage, section 9.1.1.3.1 of the FSAR indicated
( 9.1.1 )
that the new fuel storage arrangement will not exceed a k f0.95 assuming eff the new fuel storage area was dry or flooded with unborated water.
Veri fy that a k equal to or less than 0.98 will be maintained with new fuel of eff the highest anticipated reactivity assuming optimum moderation, for example, foam, spray, small droplets: or mist.
41 0.i1 Regarding the seismic design of the spent fuel storage areas in containment
( 9.1. 2 )
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and the intermediate building, 2
(1)
The FSAR does not indicate that the spent fuel pool liner plate was designed to seismic Category I requirements.
Discuss why a failure of the liner plate resulting from an SSE will not result in radio-active release from one of the following: mechanical damage to the spent fuel, significant loss of water from the pool which could uncover 4
the fuel, loss of ability to cool the fuel due to flow blockage caused by portions of the liner plate falling on top of the spent fuel, and damage to safety-related equipment as a result of the pool leakage.
(2) The FSAR does not discuss whether the gates used to separate the cusk pit, the spent fuel storage pool, the fuel transfer pool, and tne fuel storage and preparation pool and the gates used to separate the steam dryer storage pool, the fuel storage pool, and the fuel transfer pool were designed to seismic Category I requirements. Tihe J
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., seismic category of the gates should be, documented.
If the design does not meet seismic Category I requiretaents, discuss how a failure of the gates as a result of an SSE will not result in similar condi-tions as stated for the pool liner in part (1) of this question.
410.1?
Section 9.1.2.3.1 of the FSAR ir.dicates that the geometric configuration of the fuel stored in the GE racks assures that k does not exceed 0.95 eff under all normal and abnormal storage conditions; however, the list of condi-tions analyzed does not include a dropped assembly lying across the top of the rack array.
Verify that k does not exceed 0.95 for the condition eff of a dropped assembly lying across the top of the rack array.
410.13 With regard to the generic concern relating to the handling of heavy loads (9.1.4) near spent fuel, Enclosure 2 to the December 22, 1980 generic letter identi-fied interim measures. We will requires a commitment to implement these interim measures prior to the final implementation of NUREG-0612 guidelines and prior to the receipt of an operating license.
410. 14 In regard to the handling of loads over sWnt fuel in containment and the (9.1.4) in!.ennediate building, provide verification tha t the maximum potential kinetic energy capable of being developed by all objects handled above the spent fuel racks, if dropped from the height at which it is normally handled above the storage rack, does not exceed the kinetic energy of one fuel assembly and its associated handling tool.
410. 15 Provide process and instrumentation diagrams for the potable and sanitary (9.2.4) water system.which demonstrate that there are no connections to systems having a potential for containing radioactive material.
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.4-410.16 Regarding the service and instrument air supply, provide the service air
( 9. 3.1 )
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and the instrument air distribution drawings (D-302-242 and D-352-242) distribution drawings (D-302-243 and D-352-243) which are referenced in fi gure 9.3-1.
410.17 In order to assure continuous reliable functioning of compressed air operated j
( 9. 3.1 )
valves, provide a technical specificatien or procedure to require testing m
of the instrument air quality.
Describe the procedures to be followed to
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detect and correct degradation of the instrument air quality and the limits on degradation from the #451 standard MC-ll-1 which will be imposed on the air quality.
i 410. 18 Regarding the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System, (9.3.5)
(1) Your FSAR states that Figure 9.3-19 is a P&ID for the SLC system.
From our review, we conclude that figure 9.3-19 is not for the SLC system.
Provide a complete P&ID for the SLC system.
(2) Your discussion of the time that a redundant component of the SLC system may be out of operation, indicates that considerable time is available for restoring the SLC system.
Verify that your proposed r
technical specification for the SLC system comply with the standard GE-BWR t echnical specification which requires operability of the redundant train with 7 days.
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