ML20010E539
| ML20010E539 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 08/05/1981 |
| From: | Phyllis Clark JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| GL-81-04, GL-81-4, NUDOCS 8109040235 | |
| Download: ML20010E539 (5) | |
Text
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+ e Jersey Central Power & Light Company 74
. Iga 7 ENU Madison Avenue at Punchbowl Road w.m '
Mornstown New Jersey 07960 201 539-611' b
D August 5, 1981
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Director W
3 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Dear Sir:
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Subject:
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station d
Docket No. 50-219 Emergency Procedures and Training for Station Blackout Events (Generic Letter 81-04)
As requested in the subject letter, an assessment of our existing or planned facility procedures and trainmJ programs with respect to the iteras listed in the subject letter is as follcws. Each response is listed in the same order as the inquiry given in the subject letter.
Itan A
'Ihe at.tions necessary and equignent available to maintain the rector coolant inventory and heat renoval with only DC power available, including consideration of the unavailability of auxiliary systens such as ventilation and component cooling.
Response
In the event of a station blackout with only DC power available, reactor coolant inventory and Im ctor heat removal would be accanplished utilizing the core spray systan and the isolaticn condensers, respectively. A connection between the core spray systen and the station diesel driven fire pumps allows for the addition of water to the reactor by manually operating valves in the core spray systan. Heat renoval fran the reactor is acomplished through the isolation condensers utilizing the diesel driven fire pumps to add makeup water to the shell side of the condensers. Reactor water circulates via natural circulation through the core regicn and the tube side of the isolation condensers. None of the equignent mentioned above requires any auxiliary AC powered systens or canponents. Existing procedures adequately address these evolutions and an operator review, which is documented, of these procedures is required on a yearly basis. Additionally, each licensed operator attends sirculator training once per year.
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/0 8109040235 810805 PDR ADOCK 05000219 F
pop Jersey Central Power & Light Company is a Me'.ber of the General Pubic Utihties System
Director Page 2 August 5, 1981
Response
(Continued)
'Ihe 1980 program for this training was revised to include a total loss of electrical power with failure or the diesel generators control manipulation.
During this simulation, the operator had no AC electrical power available and was required to rely on other cooling e chanisms. In sumnary, no further action is demed necessary for this its.
Item b The estimated time available to restore AC power and its basis.
Response
With regard to mair 2 nance of adequate reactor coolant inventory and heat sink, the estimated time available to restore AC power is based on the reactor being isolated, no break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and utilization of the isolation condenser as the heat sink with the fire protection syst s providing makeup to the shell side. 'Ihe plant could be maintained in a safe candition without AC pot.er on the order of days or weeks since fuel to the diesel driven fire pumps could be made up manually and the water source to these pumps is essentially limitless.
There are other considerations related to safe shutdoun which are not addressed by Generic Ictter 81-04. These additional concerns are as follows:
1.
"ith the loss of AC powcr, the heat sink for the primany containment is lost. Since calculational methcds to determine the anount of containment temperature rise and rate have not been utilized to date to determine if a legitimate concern exists related to containment and systms affected by containment taperature, no estimate is available at this time as to the time the plant can be without AC power with regard to containment tmperature. Currently, we are evaluating the need for further study in this area.
2.
License limits exist for the control of the spent fuel pool water taperature below 1250F. With the loss of AC power, moling capability for the spent fuel pool is lost. 'Ihe tine to reach the maximtri tenperature of 2120F was determined to be 9 to 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> as subnir.ted in Amendment 78, Addendum No. 2 to Supplanent No.1 Furthermore, other information presented indicated a capability of the fuel pool to withstand the nnximum tmperature gradient across the floor slab for a period of 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />. 'Iherefore, a limitation of 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> without AC power woul6 be conservatim. An emergency procedure for providing operator instructions in the event of a loss of spent fuel pool cooling does not exist. ' Itis procedure will be drafted consistent with our schedule for emergency procedure changes as a result of Itan I.C.1, NUREG 0737.
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Director Page 3 August 5, 1981 Item c The actions for restoring offsite AC power in the event of a loss of the grid,
Response
Actions for restoring offsite AC power in the event of a loss of the grid are contained within the " Jersey Central Power & Light Black Start Plan".
We actions necessary to restore the grid are carried out by Jersey Central Systems Operations personnel. Training is conducted by periodic drills, nonthly, utilizing the plan as a guideline for simulating the restoration of the grid. The plan is in the process of review ccnsidering other options that may be available due to modifications taking place on the 230 KV system.
At the ocmpletion of the revision to the plan, further training of plant operations personnel will take place to acquaint then with the responsibilities of system operations personnel should a station blackout event occur.
Item d j
% e actions for restoring offsite AC power when its loss is due to postulated onsite equipTent failures.
Response
In reviewing the station procedures pertaining to restoring AC power when its loss is due to postulated onsite equignent failures, it was determined that sane deficiencies do exist. Wese are as follows:
1.
Ioss of onsite power for reasons other than less of the 230 KV systen is not adequately addressed in the station procedures. Additional steps should be provided to give the operator the option to backfeed the main transformer (s) after rc~oving the links from the 24 KV bus from the l
generattar, if this is focnd to be a viable option.
2.
Procedures do not address a double failure; for example, loss of both lA and 1B buses or loss of 1C and 1D buses. These would all look like a loss of offsite power.
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3.
No procedures exist which address the simultaneous loss of canpanion unit substations; for example, lA2 and 1B2. This would appear as a loss of offsite power to the unit subs and the motor control centers l
which they feed.
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Improvements can be made to existing procedures to provide the operator with solutions to onsite equignent failures which appear as loss of offsite j
oower at their particular locations. % ese improvements will be made consistent with our schedule of revisions to emergency procedures as a i
result of NUREG 0737, Item I.C.l.
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Director Page 4 August 5, 1981 Its e The actions necessary to restore mergency onsite AC power. The actions required to restart diesel generators should include consideration of loading sequence and the unavailability of AC power.
Response
A review of the procedures addressing the restoration of the diesel generators as an mergency onsite AC power source and additionally the training lesson plan for the diesel generator system was conducted. V.le diesel generator operating procedure adequately addresses the options available to the operator to restore emergency onsite AC power and the actions by which the operator would execute them.
Improvemnts can be made to the existing procedures by utilizing the information available in the training lesson plan with regard to automatic loading sequences with different combinations of events.
'Ihis will take place within the six nonth requirement for procedure revision per the subject letter.
Furthernere, the restoration of energency onsite power considsring the unavailability of AC power is also addressed in the procedure for diesel generator operation. Operations persorael are periodically trained in diesel generator operation including a u lkthrough of tin manual operation of the diesel generators in our equignent operator training program.
Item f 03nsideration of the availability of arergency W. a g, and any actions required to provide such lighting, in equignent was where operator or maintenance actions may be necessary.
Response
Tae existing procedures address those conponents which would have to be operated should a station blackout event occur. Emergency lighting will be provided on each elevation of the reactor building where components need to be operated or nonitored. 'Ihis is being accmplished in conjunction with our fire protection plan and will be cmpleted by Novmber 17, 1981.
Additionally, portable emergency lighting is available as proaosed in our fire protection plan. Incation and use of portable energency lighting is covered in the fire brigade training conducted for operations personnel.
Its g Precautions to prevent equipnent damage during the return to normal operating conditions following restoration of AC power. For example, the limitations and operating sequence requirarents which must be followed to restart the reactor coolant pumps following an extended loss of seal injection water should be considered in the recove_"y procedures.
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Director Page 5 August 5, 1981
Response
Present procedures adequately address the prerequisites required to prevent equipment damage during the return to normal operating conditions. This is based on the review of several system operating procedures. The requirements that preclude equipment damage during return to normal operating conditions are contained in the prerequisite' precautions and limitations sections of the applicable procedures. Even 7r not specifically addressed in each procedure, the requirement for f; t! ng and venting systems, re-establishing cooling water flow to components relviring it, etc., are items which would normally have to be met to star'
,cems after regaining AC power. The re-start of systems following a station blackout will be factored into the an-nual review of operating procedures. Training in the use of each of these procedures is conducted during operator license training.
Addressing the deficiencies as noted in the previous reviews of each of the NRC concerns would provide for improved capabilities for the plent to cope with station blackout events.
This submittal represents the results of our review with regard to Generic Letter 81-04 and specifies those actions which are being taken as a result of this review. Should you have any additional questions, please contact Mr. Michael Laggart at (609) 693-6932.
Very truly yours, s
Zh PhilipR./flark Vice Prendent - Nuclear Jersey Central Power 6. Light Executive Vice President -
GPU Nuclear Signed and sworned to before me this gM
_ day of 67y m, d 1981.
6W / /,
/? Y f_w Notary Public PHYLLIS A. KABIS b
NOTARY PUB 6ic OF NEW JER$EY, My Commission 1 spires Ave.14,1984 cc: NRC Resident Inspector Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, N. J.
08731
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