ML20010C699
| ML20010C699 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 08/11/1981 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8108200324 | |
| Download: ML20010C699 (2) | |
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P TENNE.SSE-E NALLEY AUTHORITY
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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director lid 1 91981 * ~/
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuolear RegtC Ttory Commission p] u,e nsasarcutatons il Region II - Suite 3100-fs sj
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101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303
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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - PIE HANGER DOCUMENTATION ERROR -
BLRD-50-438/81-15, BLRD-50-439/81 FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector R. W. Wright on January 28, 1981, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 1350. This was followed by our first interim report dated Februt.ry 27, 1981. Enclosed is our final report.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with D. ' L. LambeM, at FTS 657-2581.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY k
L. M. Mills, Man'iger Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure cc:
Mr. Victor'Stello, Jr., Director (Enclosure)
Offica.of Inspection and Enforcement U.S.-Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Q37 5
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ENCLOSURE BELLEFONTE -NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 PIPE HANGER DOCUMENTATION ERROR BLRD-50-438/81-15, BLRD-50-439/81-15
FINAL REPORT Description of Condition -
Pipe hangers had been attached to electrical cable tray supports. The cable tray supports are qualified to Seismic Category I.
Because there is no allowance in the seismic analyses for the attachment of pipe hangers to these supports, the seismic analysis of the cable tray supports was suspect.
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In addition, TVA identified a potential procedure problem in that 2
these pipe hangers had been attacMed to electrical cable tray supports without firal approval by TVA's Division of Engineering Design (EN DES). This occurrence is entirely in keeping with the process established between the EN DES and Construction (CONST) project managers. This process al:.ows for pipe runs to be installed upon receipt of an " interim" approval from an onsite representative of the EN DES project manager. A " final" approval by the EN DES project mar.ager had not yet been received by CONST because the relevant drawings had yet to be reviewed.
Safety Implications The procedure of issuing " interim" and " final" approval could have increased the possibility that inadequate or interfering pipe hangers could have been installed. Had the defective pipe hangers been subjected to loading situations not evaluated by EN DES, it is possible that the hangers, cable tray supports or the equipment they support could have been damaged during a seismic event. Had the equipment been safety related, the safety of operations of the plant may have been affected.
Corrective Action CONST vas informed that final approval by the EN DES project manager had to be received before they could attach pipe hangers to other systems supports. The interim approved hangers on this NCR were reviewed by EN DES and approved or disapproved on a case-by-case basis. The EN DES project manager transmitted this information to CONST for impleaantation. All supports will ree -ive EN DES final approval before final.-inspection in order to man.;ain seismiu qualification.
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