ML20010C478
| ML20010C478 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 08/14/1981 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NCR-1287, NRC-1287, NUDOCS 8108200119 | |
| Download: ML20010C478 (2) | |
Text
A TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORlT,y., _
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CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 374ol -
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400 Chestnut Street Tower II August 14,l19J'.: i7 AO-co, S
y M(hFns b -/ nLJ Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement
_3 1 g 1981 * -]l
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission y 'j\\, u.s q. ba y,,c o sse Region II - Suite 3100 s
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101 Marietta Street
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y Atlanta, Georgia 30303 cff
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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - STRUCTURAL TRACK FOR FUEL TRANSFER EQUIPMENT - NCR 1287 - FINAL REPORT The subject nonconformance was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector R. W. Wright on November 26, 1980, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e).
This was followed by our interim reports dated December 23, 1980 and May 6, 1981. Enclosed is our final report. We do not now consider 10 CFR Part 21 to be applicable to this nonconformance.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 0-(
Y
~
.I L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure cc:
Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Mr. James McFarland (Enclosare)
Senior Project Babcock & Wilcox Company P. O. Box 1260 cg y]
Lynchburg, Virginia 2h505 M
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/ /
8108200119 810814 DRADOCK05000g An Equal Opportunity Employer
7 44.
ENCLO3URE BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 STRUCTURAL TRACK FOR FUEL TRANSFER EQUIPMENT NCR 1287 FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency The Fuel Transfer System is used to transport fuel assemblies between the Reactor Building and the storage pool. Wolds on the system's track section structural support members do not conform to the AISC Code as specified in '
the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
Safety. Implications Failure of the structural supports for the fuel transfer equipment could have resulted in a fuel handling accident. This accident may have resulted in deformation of a fuel assembly and subsequently could have resulted in a release of radioisotopes inside the Auxiliary Building.
Corrective Action The rail supports for the Fuel Transfer System are to be used as is.
B&W calculations confirm that the welds, as constructed, are adequately sized for the loads imposed.
The welds were made usit.g current industry practices as a guide; inspection by TVA welding engineers revealed that the welds are sufficient to serve their design function despite the minor surface discrepancies detected by visual examination.
No overstressed welds were identified in a spot check of weld stresses performed by TVA.
In order to determine any action required to prevent recurrence and any generic implications of the cubject deficiency, TVA held a telephone conference with B&W on July 20, 1981. During this conference, B&W stated that the subject deficiency represented a simple misunderstanding and agreed to clarify the FSAR, and TVA emphasized the importance of the accuracy of information appearing in the FSAR.
In a letter to TVA dated July 27, 1981, B&W stated that Table 9.1.4-7 was originally meant to reference the AISC Code for design work, not to indicate a strict adherence to the code. B&W stated in that letter that when the AISC specification allowable stresses are used, the yield stress values for stainless steel base metal are obtained from Section III of the ASME B&PV Code, and the design stresses defined in the AISC specification as percentages of the yield stress are used. Permissible stresses for stainless steel weld calculations prepared in accordance wita the AISC Code are obtained from Table NF-3292.1 of ASME Section III Code. AISC is an industrywide standard that gives guidelines for methods, models, etc., and is a ready reference for any design consideration. AISC has tables of allowables which vary in accordance with material chat acteristics, shapes, and typos of stresses, i.e.,
tensile, shear, etc. B&W further stated that they will revise FSAR Table 9.1.4-7 to state that the AISC Code was used for determination of allowable stresses and stress techniques only.
In light of the B&W statements, it is TVA's position that no additional action to prevent recurrence is required at this time.
If, in the future, any similar deficiencies are identified, TVA will rec ta.. late the ntove position.