ML20010C437
| ML20010C437 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 08/14/1981 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8108200079 | |
| Download: ML20010C437 (2) | |
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHO
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7 August 14, 198 4 g,: 0 0 BLRD-50-438/81-20 BLRD-50-439/81-21 F r /7..
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Mr. -James P. O'Reilly, Director 7-v Office of Inspection and Enforcement -
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Region II - Suite 3100 A
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. Atlanta, Georgia 30303
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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - CRANE VALVES - WELDING CONCERN -
BLRD-50-438/81-20, BLRD-50-439/81 REVISED FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector J. Crlenjak on February 20, 1981, in accorde.lce with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 3-R1, This was follored by car final-report dated March 20, 1981. As discussed with B. R. Crowley by telephone on July 20, 1981, enclosed is our revised final report.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY t
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L}.M. Mill,Hanagei-Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure cc:
Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director (Enclosu'.*e)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear ' Regulatory Connission Washington, DC 20555 4
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8108200079 810814 PDR hDOCK 05000438 6
PDR nn Equal Opportunity Employer
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' ENCLOSURE L BELLEF04TE NUCLEAR PLANT ~ UNITS 1 AND 2 CRANE VALVES'- WELDING CONCERN BLRD-50-438/81-20, BLRD-50-439/81-21 l10 CFR 50.55(e)
= REVISED FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency l
The 8-inch main _ steam atmospheric dump valves (total' of four) were manufactured by Crane Company, Warrington, Pennsylvania. These valves are AS.NE III Class 2 valves -located outside congainment. The valve bodies and support pads were welded without 200 F minimum required preheat as required by ASME III for safety-related valves.
In addition, four lots of weld wire that were used during manufacturing had not _ been qualified. This deficiency was found at the vendor's facility ano the valves have not-been delivered to TVA.
Crnne Company
'did not follow approved procedures before welding the' valves.
Safety Implications The use of unqualified welding material and lack of preheat may have resulted in welds of indeterminate properties. Failure of the valves may compromise the integrity of the main steam system which would adversely affect plant safety.
Corrective Action All four valves will be postweld heat treated. Postweld heat treatment is an acceptable method in lieu of the preheat treatment originally specified. Applicable Crane Company procedures have been revised to include requirements for postweld heat treatment of valves.
Material from two lots of weld wire are availabla for qualification.
Material from a third lot of weld wire is not available. Therefore, a sample of this material was removed from the valve and will be qualified.by impact testing. The removal area will be repaired before postreld heat treatment of that valve. The fourth lot of weld wire cannot be qualified.
It was used in the circumferential weld of one valve only. This weld material will be removed and the seam will be rowelded before postweld heat treatment of the valve.
L All repairs will be completed and inspected per applicable criteria before delivery to TVA. Crane Company has been instructed to follow the required preheat procedures in all future work.
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