ML20010A592
| ML20010A592 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/08/1981 |
| From: | Barnes I, Roberds H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20010A582 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900747 NUDOCS 8108110584 | |
| Download: ML20010A592 (8) | |
Text
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l U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV Report No.
99900747/81-01 Program No. 51300 Company:
CTI - Nuclear Division of McDowell - Wellman Company P.O. Box 5768 Cleveland, Ohio 44101 Inspection Conducted:
March 10-13, 1981 Inspector:
b// [ /zf 4#
H. W. Rooerds, Contractor Inspector 0' ate Reactive Inspection Section Vendor Inspection Branch 4/PM/
Approved by: d I. Barnes, Chief Date Reactive Inspection Section Vendor Inspection Branch Summary Inspection on March 10-13, 1981 (99900747/81-01)
Areas Inspected:
Implementation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and other applicable codes and standards including:
10 CFR Part 21 report follow-up inspection relative to possible defective temperature. detection units; follow-up inspec-tions in regard to improper installation of differential pressure gauges, defective charcoal adsorber trays fabricated by Flanders Filters, separation of screens from frame on deep bed adsorber section, and inadequate drains for removal of fire protection system water from the cnarcoal adsorbers.
The inspection involved 20 inspector-hours on site by one NRC inspector.
Results:
In the five areas inspected, no apparent nonconformances or unresolved items were identified in four areas, with the following nonconformance identi-fied in the remaining area:
Nonconformance:
Follow-up inspection on inadequate charcoal adsorber drains for removal of fire protection system water.
Draires in standby gas treatment system charcoal adsorbers were not designed in accordance with Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 and Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Notice of Nonconfermance).
8108110504 810610 PDR GA999 EECMCWCT 99900747 ppg i
2 DETAIL SECTION A.
Persons Contacted
- 0. L. Kammerzell, Manager of Operations
- D. J. Beecher, Manager of Engineering
- R. F. Meier, Manager of Quality Assurance
- J. Cross, Quality Assurance Engineer
- Denote's those persons attending exit meeting.
B.
10 CFR Part 21 Report Follow-up Inspection 1.
Introduction On February 12, 1980, Edison Electronics notified CTI - Nuclear that examination of a failed temperature detection unit indicated that the failure could be attributed to the use of acid flux in the sealing of the detection unit.
Similar temperature controllers had been supplied to CTI - Nuclear.
Edison Electronics recommended that all units (P/N 377-02831) be returned to them for inspection, with repair or replacement, as necessary.
CTI - Nuclear evaluated and reported this discrepancy to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21 on May 3, 1980, 2.
Inspection Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to ascertain that the evalution, corrective action, and report of the deficiency or failure to comply were adequate and in conformance with the require-ments of 10 CFR Part 21 and associated procedures.
3.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accompli'shed by:
a.
Review of "10 CFR 21 Report Evaluation" of April 24, 1980.
b.
Review of Edison Electronics letter of February 12, 1980.
c.
Review of CTI - Nuclear Purchase Order No. 2462.
d.
Review of CTI - Nuclear letters to NRC, TVA and Bechtel Power Corporation of May 3,1980.
e.
Review of Edison Electronic Failure Analysis Report No. 62 of August 29, 1980.
4.
Findings i
3 a.
Within this area of the inspection, no nonconformances or unresolved items were identified.
b.
CTI - Nuclear notified P!A Hartsville and Bechtel Power Corporation in regard to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, i.e. those nuclear plants where the affected Edison Electronics components had been installed in the air handling and air filtration equipment, and requested that the electrical panels be removed and returned to them.
CTI - Nuclear returned all suspect temperature detection units to Edison Electronics for evaluation and testing for acid flux coniamination.
Of the 135 units returned 23 were tested for acid contamination, all with negative results.
All of the suspect units have been or will be replaced by new temperature controllers.
C.
Follow-up Inspection on Imoroper Installation of Differential Pressure Gages 1.
Introduction The differential pressure gauges on the air clean up units, which had been supplied by CTI - Nuclear for Bellefonte Nuclear Plants Units 1 and 2 were identified to have been improperly connected to the sample iines.
This discrepancy was reported by TVA in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) on August 29, 1980.
2.
Insoection Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to review the nature and scope of the reported discrepancies and determine if the problem I
had generic implications.
Also ascertain if corrective actions had been initiated and steps to preclude recurrence of the identified deficiency had been taken.
l 3.
Method of Accomolishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Review of TVA Cont act No. 77K36-820258-1 and 2N4M-129.
j b.
Review of TVA Documents NCR 1237 and QCR 4542.
l c.
Review of CTI - Nuclear Intra-Company Communications, " Instrument l
Tubing Problem on TVA WA 20121 through 20128," dated January 15, 1981.
d.
Review of CTI - Nuclear letter to TVA dated January 27, 1981.
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4 e.
Interviews with cognizant personnel.
4.
Findings a.
Within this area of the inspection, no nonconformane.es or unresolved items were identified.
b.
CTI - Nuclear personnel met with TVA representatives on January 14, 1981 to examine and discuss the problem with the differential pressure indicators.
CTI - Nuclear agreed with TVA's finding that 44 differential pressure indicators were improperly connected.
Agreement was reached to remove the affected panels, retube and reconnect the differential pressure indicators, with TVA to perform the necessary rework at the job site.
CTI - Nuclear informed the NRC inspector that the discrepancy, if present in other units, would be readily detected when the system was tested, in that the gauge would not indicate a positive pressure reading.
They believed the problem was a result of:
(1) the drawings not clearly defining direction of air flow in the system; and (2) the high and low pressure ports on the differential pressure indicators not being identified.
To pre-vent a recurrence of this deficiency, the drawings have been revised to clearly define the location of the high and low pressure and direction of air flow, Region IV, Vendor Inspection Branch, considers that adequate steps to preclude recurrence have been taken by CTI - Nuclear in regard to the identified deficiency.
The NRC inspector could not ascertain; however, if a similar problem existed in other equipment to that identified, in that evaluation or inspection of other air cleanup units had not been accomplished.
D.
Follow-up Insoection on Defective Charcoal Adsorber Trays Fabricated by Flanders Filters 1.
Introduction Charcoal adsorber trays (fabricated by Flanders Filters, Inc.), which had been purchased for the control building emergency air clean up system, the auxiliary building gas treatment system, and the containment purge air clean up system at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, were found to be defective during testing of the filter systems.
The trays were observed to have leaked charcoal between the perforated screen and the frame, as the result of an improper pop riveted joint.
TVA reported this deficiency in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) on November 16, 1979, with a final report being made on December 14, 1979.
2.
Insoection Objectives i
5 The objectives of this area of the inspection were to review the nature and scope of the reported discrepancy and determine if the problem had generic implications.
Also, to ascertain if corrective actions had been initiated and steps to preclude recurrence of the identified daficiency had been taken.
3.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Review of CTI - Nuclear letter to Region II Office of Inspection and Enforcement dated December 5, 1979.
b.
Review of Flanders Filters Inc. letter to Region II Office of Inspection
.d Enforcement, dated December 5, 1979.
c.
Review of CTI - Nuclear Inspection Report dated January 11, 1980.
d.
Interview with cognizant personnel.
4.
Findings a.
Within this area of the inspection, no nonconformances o.r unresolved items were identified.
b.
CTI - Nuclear purchased drawer type carbon adsorber trays from Flanders Filters Inc. for Browns Ferry, Watts Bar and Sequoyah.
As a result of an inspection conducted by Flanders Filter Inc. and CTI - Nuclear personnel, it was determined that the loss of carbon was a result of the trays manufactured for Sequoyah not being fastened at the end of the beds.
Those trays manufactured for Browns Ferry and Watts Bar were observed to be either welded or riveted at the end of the beds and were not considered to be defective.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued IE Bulletin No. 80-03 on Feoruary 6, 1980 relative to this deficiency.
Ninety-four DT-10 type carbon adsorber filter trays were returned from Sequoyah to Flanders Filters Inc. for repair or replacement.
These carbon adsorber filter trays were purchased prior to 1974 and were the only trays purchased from Flanders Filters Inc. by CTI - Nuclear.
E.
Follow-un Inspection on Separation of Screens from Frame on Deep Bed Adsorcer Sections 1.
Introduction Screens which hold charcoal in deep bed adsorber sections were identi-fied at Phipps Bend and Hartsville Nuclear Plants to be separated from their frames due to improper spot welds.
This deficiency was reported by TVA to Region II, Office of Inspection and Enforcement on May 8, 1980.
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2.
Inspection Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to review the nature and scope of the reported discrepancy and determine if the problem had generic implications.
Also, ascertain if corrective actions had been initiated and steps to preclude recurrence of the identified deficiency had been taken.
3.
Method of Accomolishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Review of TVA Quality Control Investigation Report No. 20605.06.
b.
Review of CTI - Nuclear Intra-Company Communication, "Adsorber Screen Spot Welds on W.A. 60208."
c.
Review of Welding Procedure CWP No. 3500, " Resistance Spot Welding Machine Welding P-8 to P-8."
d.
Review of Welding Procedure CWP No. 0035, " Resistance Spot Welding Manual P-8 to P-8."
e.
Review of Welding Procedure CWP No. 0300 " Gas Tungsten Arc Welding P-8 to P-8."
f.
Review of CTI - Nuclear Drawing No. D 30693.
g.
Interviews with cognizant personnel.
4.
Findings a.
Within this area of the inspection, no nonconformances or unresolved items were identified.
b.
After site inspection of available equipment, CTI - Nuclear maintained that the Filtrad (R) Carbon Adsorbers supplied to the Phipps Bend and Hartsville Nuclear Plants met TVA's technical and contractual requirements.
This position was taken as a result of not identifying either broken spot welds, or 3e. u*ation of screens from their frames.
Review of correspondence by the NRC inspector did indicate, however, that a lack of control in cosmetic grinding had resulted in partial removal of spot welds.
An engineering analysis was performed to support the adequacy of the as-built fabrications and the results forwarded to TVA on October 14, 1980, in Design Report No. 60208-C-1.
reply had been received from TVA as of the date of this inspection.
It was also verified that
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additional controls on cosmetic grinding had been requested from the CTI - Nuclear manufacturing facility.
Review for implementation of these measures was determined to be impracticable, as a result of the closure of the manufactur-ing facility shortly after the request and the sub-contract-ing of all remaining fabrication.
F.
Follow-up Inspection on Inadequate Charcoal Adsorber Drains for Removal of Fire Protection System Water 1.
Intrcduction The drains provided in the standby gas treatment system charcoal adsorbers have been identified to be too small to remove fire protection system water without backup, if the fire protection water system is operated continuously.
This discrepancy was discovered as a result of the review of CTI - Nuclear's drawings by GE and was reported to TVA.
These systems were supplied to Hartsville and Phipps Bend nuclear power stations.
2.
Insoection Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to review the scope of the reported discrepancy and determine if the problem had generic implications.
Also, ascertain if corrective action had been taken to correct the reported deficiency.
I 3.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Review of CTI - Nuclear Drawing No. D30680, revision B.
b.
Interviews with cognizant perse huel.
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4.
Findings l
l a.
Nonconformances See Notica of Nonconformance.
b.
Unresolved Items None.
c.
A meeting was held on April 14 at CTI - Nuclear with TVA personnel to discuss the identified SGTS drain design deficiency with no definite decision or agreement on cor-rective actions being reached.
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8 The charcoal adsorber water deluge system was designed by CTI - Nuclear to saturate the charcoal bed in 2.5 minutes at 50 psig of water pressure.
Drains were sized for limited system operation consistent with the saturation criteria and not for continued maximum deluge conditions after extinguishing of a fire.
CTI - Nuclear identified that the customer purchase specification had not providdd any information on available site water supply for completing the system.
Without this information, it was maintained that design of an adequate drain system could not be readily accomplished.
It would thus appear that the identified problem relates primarily to control of design interfaces.
G.
Exit Meeting A post inspection meeting was held on March 12, 1981, with the management representatives denoted in paragraph A. above.
The NRC inspectnr informed managemen+ of the scope and findings of the inspection.
Management informed the NRC inspect <;r that they were going to complete the present contract in an orderly fashinn and would then disband CTI - Nuclear, with a target date of June, 1982.
CTI - Nuclear has sub-contracted all air filtration systems to Bahnson Air Qua'ity Control Division, Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
Contracts for air receiver and water receiver tanks for Hartsville A (Units 1 and 2), Hartsville B (Units 1 and 2) and Phipps Bend Units 1 and 2 have been sub-contracted to the Babcock and Wilcox Company, Barberton, Ohio.
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