ML20010A526
| ML20010A526 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1981 |
| From: | Linder F DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.K.3.21, TASK-2.K.3.25, TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-TM LAC-7684, NUDOCS 8108110509 | |
| Download: ML20010A526 (14) | |
Text
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o-s D DA/RYLAND h
[k COOPERAT/VE
- PO BOX 817
- 26*S EAST AV SOUTH = LA CROSSE. wtSCONSIN S4601 (608) 788 4000 July 22, 1981 In reply, please refer to LAC-7684 DOCKET NO. 50-409 U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Mr. Darrell G.
Eisenhut, Director fh(9, Division of Licensing g
qN,,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation H
rg*ggIb Division of Operating Reactors
,)
Washington, D.
C.
20555 Tsu n 1 0 ggg,, --
y,s, g*g'gY
SUBJECT:
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE (DPC)
LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (DPC)
(*
PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-4
- 1
. //
s POST TMI REQUIREMENTS
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ITEMS III.D.3.4, II.K.3.25 and II.K.3.21
REFERENCES:
(1)
NUREG-0737, NRC Letter, Eisenhut to All Operating Reactors, dated October 21, 1980.
(2)
DPC Letter, Linder to Eisenhut, LAC-7668, dated July 15, 1981.
(3)
DPC Letter, Linder to Denton, LAC-6979, dated June 12, 1980.
(4)
DPC Letter, Linder to Eisenhut, LAC-7564, dated May 21, 1981.
Gentlemen:
Your letter (Reference 1), Item III.D.3.4,' requested information on Control Room habitability.
Reference 1 required that a review of'the Control Room be performed to the criteria of Sections 2.2.1 -
2.2.2, 2.2.3 and 6.4 of the Standard Review Plan.
An evaluation to Sectio": 2.2.1 - 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 has been performed as part of SEP Topic II.l.C,
" Potential Hazards Due to Nearby Industrial Transpor-tation and Military Facilities" (Reference 2).
Of the hazardous materials identified in the Safety Evaluation Report, only two could present significant cirborne concentrations in the Control Room.
These were ammonia and hydrochloric acid.
Detectors will be pur-chased for these two chemicals and automatic closure of the air in-let dampers will result on high concentration of either material.
Sulfuric acid, ammonia, and liquid caustic soda are stored on the Dairyland Power Cooperative site for use of LACBWR or the adjacent coal-fired plant.
Only ammonia is potentially dangerous to the Control Room, for which a detector will be installed.
No chlorine OW 3 8108110509 810722-
//
__)
Mr. Darrell G.
Eisenhut, Director LAC-7684 Division of Licensing e aly 22, 1981 is stored onsite.
Four MSA masks are stored at the Control Room door and five additional masks are stored nearby.
Each has a bottled air supply good for 20-30 minutes.
Seven spare bottles are located with the masks, including four adjacent to the CR door.
A minimum of 12 one-hour capacity bottles are also maintained onsite.
The a d j a c e r.t coal-fired unit has a supply of breathing air and the bottle supplier can deliver additional bottles within two hours.
The planned installation of ammonia and hydrochloric acid detectors with capabilities for sending automatic closure signals to the Control Room air inlet damper, together with the availability of MSA masks, should provide adequate protection to Control Room per-sonnel fron toxic chemicals.
A shielding design review was completed for LACBWR by Nuclear Energy Services, Inc.
The results of this study were previously submitted to the NRC in Reference 3.
The LACBWR Operating Manual, Volume 1,
Section 3.4,
" Evacuation Procedure" advises operators to not spend any more time in the southeast portion of the Control Room than absolutely necessary.
A drawing of the Control Room showing dose rates calculated at 30 minutes after a LOCA accompanies the procedure.
If the procedure is adhered to, Control Room personnel should not receive more than the 5 rem dose guideline for the duration of the postulated accident.
Doses due to airborne radioactive material in the Control Room have also been studied.
The Guidelines in Regulatory Guide 1.3 were followed with the exception that 1% of the release was assumed to be ground level and 99% elevated, though RG 1.3 recommends that an elevated release be assumed for BWRs with stacks.
This was an addi-10-7 Ci tional conservatism.
The source term utilized was 4.9 x released to the Containment Building atmosphere.
The source term was based on design basis containment leakage at 52 psig.
MSIV leakage was not added, since all MSIV leakage is accounted for in the determination of containment leakage during Type A tests.
The top of the stack is 124 ft from the Control Room air intake laterally and 320 ft vertically.
The minimum distance from the Containment Building to the CR air intake is 72 ft.
The Control Room ventilation system does not include HEPA or charcoal filters or leak-tight dampers.
Therefore, it was assumed the airborne concentration in the Control Room would be the same as outside the air intake for the ventilation system.
The Xp/Q term used for the ground release was 1x 10-2, and wind speed was assumed to Le 1 meter /sec.
The airborne dose to the Control Room occupants was estimated to be 300 m Rem whole body and 45 R to the thyroid for the first 100 days after the postulated accident.
The total wholc body dose from direct radiation and airborne radioactivity in the northside of the control Room is less than the acceptance criteria of 5 Rem whole body speci-fled in SRP 6.4.
As mentioned earlier, procedural guidelines advice Mr. Darrell G.
Eisenhut, Director LAC-7684 Division of Licensing July 22, 1981 the operators to avoid the southside of the Control Room, when possible, where higher doses can be received.
The thyraid dose of 45 R is greater than the 30 R specified in SRP 6.4, but it is.
based on a 24-hour per day occupancy.
Due to the conservatisms employed in the estimation, actual doses rcceived during the-postulated accident should not exceed the acceptance criteria.
Therefore, though the Control Room ventila-tion system at LACBWR does not meet the physical criteria of SRP 6.4, personnel are adequately protected against a radiological re-lease, since the goaloof preventing personnel from being exposed to hazardous doses is achieved by the present layout.
DPC committed to installing HEPA and charcoal filters in the TSC in Reference 4.
The results of this study show the filters are not necessary.
Doses received in the TSC would be approximately 6.8 R whole body and 45 R to the thyroid, based on 24-hour per day occupancy.
The whole body dose could be reduced to 3.6 R if per-sonnel rotate 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> in the TSC to 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 6 in the onsite OSC, if they can n o,t leave the site.
Therefore, DPC has decided not to install filters in the TSC ventilation system.
No emergency supplies of food and water are being maintained onsite.
There is a drinking fountain in the Control Room, which can supply unlimited water if the well water system is operational.
A first aid kit is maintained in the Control Room.
Supplies of food and water sufficient for five people for five days will be obtained and maintained.
The Control Room Emergency Zone for a radiological emergency includes the control rocm, shift supervisor's office, central alarm stations, washrooms, and lunchroom, which also serves the onsite OSC.
Thir meets the criteria of SRP 6.4.
The Control Room Emergency Zone for a toxic chemical emergency only includes the control room, shift supervisor's office and central alarm station.
This is considered to be sufficient due to the shorter duration of a toxic chemical
~
accident and the accessibility of other portions of the plant.
The modifications and additions identified in this letter will be installed by January, 1983, as required by Reference 1.
The addi-tional information requested is provided in Attachment 1.
Your letter (Reference 1) also requested a review of the performance of isolation condensers with noncondensibles. to this letter summarizes this review.
The seal injection system review required by your letter (Reference 1) is Attachment 3 t6 this letter.
- 3
Mr. Darrell G.
Eisenhut, Director LAC-7684 Division of Licensing July 22, 1981 If there are any questions, please contact us.
Very truly yours, DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE n.
~
Frank Linder, General Manager FL:LSG:eme cc:
J.
G.
Keppler, Reg. Dir., NRC-DRO III NRC Resident Inspectors l
I l
l 1
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f ATTACHMENT 1 III.D.3.4 INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR CONT!!OL-ROOM HABITABILITY EVALUATION (1)
Control-room mode of operation, i.e.,
pressurization and filter recirculation for radiological accident isolation or chlorine release The mode of operation is pressurized with respect to the turbine building only, with no isolation on high activity and only rough filters in the system.
(2)
Control-room characteristica (a) air volume control room 3
21,350 ft in CR 3
35,000 ft in total air served by CR ventilation 1
(b) control-room emergency zone (control room, critical files, kitchen, uashroom, computer room, etc.)
The control room emergency. zone includes the reactor and generator plant control room, the Shift Supervisor's Office and the Security Central Alarm System,-the washroom and lunchroom.
For a toxic chemical emergency, the washroom and lunchroom are not in the emergency zone..
(c) control-room ventilation system schematic vith normal and emergency air-flou rates i
See Figure 1.
i.
(d) infiltration leakage rate The Control Room 'a at a negative pressure compared to the outside of -0.04"H O and a?. a positive pressure com-l 2
i pared to the turbine room of +0.05"H 0.
The infiltration 2
leakage rate has not been measured.
1 (c) high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter and charcoal absorber efficiencies There are no HEPA or charcoal filters installed'in the Control Room ventilation. system.
(f) closest distance between containment and air intake i.
i
. (Continued)
The closest distance between containment and the CR air intake is approximately 72 ft.
The closest distance'from the stack release point to the CR air intake is approxi-mately 124 ft laterally and approximately 320 ft vertically.
(g) layout of control room, air intakes, containment building, and chlorine, or other chemical storage facility with dimensions See attached Figure 2.
(h) control-room chielding including radiation streaming from penetrations, doorc, ducts, staircaya, etc.
This was addressed in completing the study discussed in Reference 3.
See attached Figures 3 and 4.
(i) automatic isolation capability-damper closing time, damper leakage and area The Control Room irlet damper is actuated solely on fire.
The CR ventilation outside air inlet damper is temperature controlled.
Neither damper closes completely.
(j) chlorine detectors or toxic gas (local or remote)
There are no toxic gas or chlorine detectors presently installed.
(k) celf-contained breathing apparatus availability (number)
There are 4 MSA masks available at the CR door and 5 additional masks nearby in the plant.
(L) bottled air supply (hours supply)
Each mask kit contains a bottle with a 20-30 minute air supply.
A spare bottle is stored with seven of the kits, including the four at the Control Room door.
A minimum of 12 one-hour capacity bottles are also maintained onsite.
^
The adjacent coal-fired unit has a supply of breathing air
-and the bottle supplier can deliver additional ~ air bottles within two hours.
l (m) emergency food and potable water supply (hou many days and how many people)
There is no emergency food and water supply maintained.
There is a drinking fountain in the Control R_om, which can supply unlimited water if the well water system is operational.
2-
=
i
, (Continued)
(n) control-room personnel capacity (normal and emergency)
The normal CR capacity is 2-4' individuals.
Emergency I
staffing would be 6 persons.
(o) potassium iodide drug: supply DPC does not utilize potassium iodide, (3)
Oncite storage of chlorine and other hazardous ch'amicata (a). total amount and size of container No chlorine is stored onsite. An 8,000 gallon capacity container of sulfuric acid is stored onsite.
Stored at the adjacent coal-fired facility is up to 2,000 gallon of sulfuric acid, 2,000 gallon of liquid caustic soda, and 4,000 gallon of ammonia solution.
(b) cloce't distance from control-room air intake The closest distance from the onsite sulfuric acid tank to the CR air intake is approximately 132 ft.
(4)
Offaite manufacturing, storage, or transportation facilities of hazaraous chemicals Refer to Reference 2.
(5)
Technical specifications (zefer to standard teu:,
- cal specifi-catione)
(a) chlorine detection ayatem NA (b) control-room emergency filtration system ir. Luding the
. capability to maintain the control-room pressurization at l/8-in. water gauge, verification of isolation by test signale and damper closure times, and filter testing.
requirernehta.
The LACBWR Technical Specifications do not discuss control room ventilation. -Technical specifications will be proposed when the system is modified. - _-_ - _ _-___-__ ___- - -
s j
A TACHMENT 2 PERFORMANCE OF ISOLATION CONDENSER WITH NONCONDENSIBLES t
NUREG-0737, II.K.3.29 At the LACBWR, the shutdown condenser system provides a backup heat sink for the reactor in the event that the reactor is isolated from the main condenser.
The system consists of a condenser, piping, valves, and instrumentation equipment.
Natural circulation flow i
precludes the necessity of utilizing pumps.
The shutdown condenser system is automatically started when the reactor building steam iso-lation valve or turbine building steam isolation valve is not fully open, or when the reactor pressure exceeds 1,325 PSIG.
These are emergency conditions that also provide a scram signal to the reactor safety system.
The shutdown condenser is a horizontal U-tube heat exchanger, with reactor steam condensing inside the tubes.
Reactor coolant sensiole and latent heat is tr-asferred to boiling, demineralized water and/or river water on the shell side.
The shell side vapor is vented directly to the outside atmosphere.
The heat removal capacity of the shutdown condenser is well in excess of reactor decay heat generation rate for all times following reactor shutdown.
The system provides adequate emergency shutdown cooling capability by cooling reactor water at a rate of 50' F/ hour to 300*
F.
However, the normal mode of operation for reactor water cooling below 470* is the decay heat cooling system.
4 Natural circulation is the driving force behind the system.
Steam flows from the main steam lines into the shutdown condenser located ten feet above the main floor of the containment building.
Conden-aate is collected in the lower channel section and is returned to 4
the feedwater lines by gravity flow.
The condensate outlet nozzle is sized and shaped for a liquid velocity at the two-phase interphase of less than one foot /second.
This is done to prevent carryunder of eteam into the condensate.
The condensate line contains two vent i
lires which join together and return to the lower channel section of the condenser.
The vents are provided for returning any vapors and noncondensible gases which are present in the condensate lines back to the condenser.
This has been done to prevent perturbations in the condeneate flow which could be caused by a bu!1 dup of vapor and non-condensibles.
The lower channel section in turn is vented through the off-gas system to the waste gas system.
Flow in the vent line is restricted by a 1/16 inch orifice which is built 4nto and is an integral part of the shutdown condenser off-gas c-ntrol valve seat.
1-4
..m
_ = ~.
t 4
ATTACifMENT 2 (Continued)
PERFORMANCE OF ISOLATION CONDLNSER WITH NONCONDENSIBLES I
l During normal plant operation, the shutdown condenser is isolated from the reactor and other systems by air-operated control valves.
i Startup and operation of the shutdown condenser is completely auto-matic but may be overridden by a manual control system.
When system operation is initiated, the shutdown condenser steam valves and the off-gas valve to the waste gas system open immediately.
The conden-sate return valves open ten seconds later, providing sufficient time to pressurize the tube side.
The off-gas vent valve will close auto-matically after two minutes.
The two minute time delay allows suffi-cient time to purge the condenser of noncondensible gases for proper system opera ^ ion.
Should it become necessary, the vent-to-off-gas can be manually opened at any time to remove any noncondensibles which might build up during shutdown condenser operation.
Control power for the shutdown condenser off-gas valve is derived from the Reactor Plant 125V D.C.
Bus.
Control air for the off-gas valve is available from the backup air compressor, which is powered from Emergency Diesel Generator lA.
Thus, operation of this valve will be possible even in the event of loss of all normal on-site and off-site AC power.
I The steam inlet valves are cylinder-operated, requiring air to close l
against a spring action.
When air is exhausted from the cylinders, the valves are opened by the spring pressure.
The off-gas valve and the condensate return valves are diaphragm-operated requiring air to i
open and close, respectively.
Loss of control air or 125-V DC control j
power to the solene_d valves will cause the condenser steam valves to l
open, the off-gas valve to close and the condensate return valves to open.
I 1
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ATTACHMENT 3 EFFECT OF LOSS OF ALTERNATING-CURRENT POWER ON PUMP SEALS NUREG-0737, II.K.3.25 The La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor does not utilize seal water coolers.
The normal supply to the seal injection system comes from the condensate system.
If off-site power were lost the reactor would scram and the condensate pumps would be unavailable for service.
i The seal injection system has a backup s:1pply of makeup water for this. situation.
The overhead storage tank would automatically supply water to the seal injection system.
The supply capacity is normally 27,000 gallons beyond the quantity reserved for high' pressure core spray use.
The rate of seal injection use of this water is approximately 20 gpm.
The overhead storage tank, there-fore, would last more than 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> well above the 2 specified in NUREG 0737.
One of the two seal injection pumps is on a vital bus supplied by j
an emergency diesel generator and this system operation would be uninterrupted by a loss of off-site power.
The forced circulation
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pumps would trip on a loss ci off-site power.
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