ML20009G792
| ML20009G792 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 07/24/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009G791 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8108040670 | |
| Download: ML20009G792 (3) | |
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1 Enclosure SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION CONTROL ROD GUIDE TUBE WEAR IN FACILITIES DESIGNED BY BABC0CK AND WILCOX (B&W)
A degradation of control rod guide tube walls was observed during post irradia-tion examinations of fuel assemblies removed from several pressurized water In the investigation of this problem the NRC requested information reactors.
from B&W designed facilities related to the susceptibility of their facilities B&W prepared report BAW-1623, June 1980, to significant guide tube wear.
" Control Rod Guide Tube Wear Measurement Program" for the B&W Mk-B User's Group to provide this requested information. The findings of this report are as follows.
Several flow-related mechanisms may cause Control Rod Assembly (CRA) vibration The first is and guide tube wear; two of these appear to be the most probable.
turbulent flow along the rod or crossflow across the control rods in the upper internals, resulting in wear at the lower tip of the rod when in the park posi-The second hypothesized mechanism is axial flow inside the guide tube and tion.
In both cases, an increase in primary coolant a turbulent vibration rev:onse.
flow could result in higher rod.ibration and possible higher wear; however it is felt that turbulent flow with sono possible crossflow ia the internals area is the most probable cause of rod viLeation.
B&W's 15x15 array fuel assembly design includes 16 Zircaloy guide tubes for the Each CRA has 16 stainless steel clad control rods connected to a control rods.
Full stainless steel spider which is in turn connected to the drive mechanism.
length guidance for each CRA is provided by the guides in the upper plenum assembly and in the fuel assembly. The control rod tip always remains inside the fuel assembly guide tube during normal operation. When the control rod is
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in the full out (parked) position, the tip of the control rod is approximataly nine inches inside the fuel assembly guide tube. The CRAs and guide tubes are I
designed with flexibility and clearances to permit freedom of motion within the fuel assembly guide tubes throughout the stroke of the CRA.
The B&W upper reactor internals design, in addition to the full-length guidance for the CRAs, has two features that minimize crossflow excitation and turbulence The first is an upper plenum, which directs approximately 82% of on the CRAs.
the flow in an axial direction while allowing only 18% of the flow to be taken 8108040670 810724 PDR ADOCK 05000302 PDR P
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out directly into the outlet nozzles. This strong tendency towards axial flow will minimize any dependence of CRA vibration on outlet The second feature is the use of the full-length nozzle location.
upper plenum tubes enclosing each CRA in the upper reactor internals.
These full-length tubes provided additional protection for the CRAs against crossflow and turbulence.
Fuel assemblies were selected from across the core and for various effective full-power days (EFPD) of control rod operation in the safety position to determine the effect of core-position, time, fluence exposure, To obtain the effect of flow rates on guide tube wear, fuel as-etc.
semblies were examined at Oconee 1, Oconee 3. and Rancho Seco, the nominal Two flows of which run from approximately 109 to 114% of design flow.
The first concern is that potential areas of concern were investigated.
any one guide tube could wear through at the control rod park position (approximately 9 inches from the top of the control rod guide tube).
The second concern is that smaller amounts of wear in all 16 guide tubes in a fuel assembly could cause high stresses in that fuel assembly.
The results from the Rancho Seco examination (high flow rate) indicates that the largest measucad wear was 57% (through-wall wear).
In general, the wear was located approximately 9 inches down from the top of the guide tube, which corresponds to the location of the lcwer tip of the control This location also cor-rods of the safety banks in their park position.
responds to the control rod park position for control banks in some reactors.
Four Rancho Seco fuel assemblies indicated wear ranging from 6.9 to 14.9%
for one and one half cycles of operation. The other five assemblies examined indicated no wear.
The results from the Oconee examination (low flow rates) indicate less wear than Rancho Seco, with a maximum measured indication of 27% (in Oconee 3).
The average wear for each Oconee fuel assembly was low, with a maximum of 6.7%.
The second concern was that each guide tube would have some wear and that A stress analysis was performed that unacceptable stresses could occur.
This showed that through-wall wear for a single tube was acceptable.
Two analysis a 'S considered the case with some wear in each guide tube.
types of wear were considered - localized wear on only one side of the The results of this tube and uniform wear around its circumference.
analysis show an allowable of 100% wear for localized (one-sided) defects Therefore, if the average-and 55% wear for uniform circumference wear.
wear in any fuel assembly (average of 16 tubes) does not exceed 55% uni-form wear, the fuel assembly will maintain a positive design margin.
. The results of both the Oconee and Rancho Seco measurements show small average wear with the maximum average of 14.9% for one Rancho Seco assembly witn 1 1/2 cycles of operation. The 14.9% was one-sided wear which is compared to an allowable wear of 100%.
The results from the Rancho Seco statistical analysis indicate the pro-bability of one guide tube wearing a hole is very low and is not expected.
The probability that a hole will occur in 150 weeks of operation is 0.000011. The results from this analysis also indicate that the proba-bility of the average of 16 tubes in one assembly reaching 55% wear is also very low and is not expected. The probability of the average of 16 tubes reaching 55% wear is 0.000001 for 150 weeks of operation. This case assumes uniform circumferential wear, which is not expected. The more likely case is wear occurring on only one side of the guide tube.
This case has a higher allowable wear (100% versus 55%) and hence a signi-ficantly sm,'ller probability of reaching this wear.
(The assumed maximum core residt :e time for a fuel assembly with an installed CRA is 150 weeks.,
The NRC staff has found that the B&W Report accounts for all of the major variables that affect the control rod guide tube wear process. Based on our review, we conclude that the control rod guide tube wear has an acceptably low likelihood of keeping within allowable wear limits.
Dated:
' JULY 2 4 081