ML20009A738
| ML20009A738 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1981 |
| From: | Bickwit L NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | Mcgarry M DEBEVOISE & LIBERMAN |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009A733 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8107140047 | |
| Download: ML20009A738 (17) | |
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UNITE] STATES
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NUCt. EAR REGl}LATORY COMMISSION C f O'). f..
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$ b;!! i [ 7 E 07 8
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June 23, 1981
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8 J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.
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p Debevoise and Liberman k
1200 Seventeenth Street, N.F.
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Washington, D.C.
20036
Dear Mr. McGarry:
The Commission has scheduled an open meeting for Wednesday, June 24, 1981 at 2:00 p.m. as part of its consideration whether the Licensing Board's May 26, 1981 decision should become. effective.
At this meeting the Commission requests that the parties address orally the following questions:
1.
In view of the fact that substantial gaantities of hydrogen were evolved during the TMI accident before containment pressure significantly exceeded 3 psig, what is t.he basis for selecting the 3 psig containment pressure signal as the appropriate trigger for energizing the igniter system?
Should the trigger instead be safety injection?
2.
In view of the fact that the effectiveness of the hydrogen control system depends in part on opera-tion of air return fans and the hydrogen skimmer fans in conjunction with the igniters, is it rea-sonable to switch cn the igniters at a lower pressure than the trigger set point for the air return fans and the hydrogen skimmer fans?
Is it feasible to switch on the air return fans and hydrogen skimmer fans at containment pressures less than 3 psig without the possibility )f nega-tive containment pressure or other adverse factors?
Sincerely, i
m Leonard Bickwit, Jr.
I General Counsel 8107140047 010623 PDR ADOCK 05000369 T
CESG HANDOUT FROM 6/24/81 COMMISSION MEETING ON MCGUIRE 32 20 Hydrogen bum
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asit 16 E
12 m
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10 12 14 Time After Turbine Trip (hours)
Figure HYD 2.
Reactor Building Pressure Versus Time' l
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f Table 5.2.2.
Reactor Coolant-System Design Pressure Settings (Psig)
Hydrostatic Test Pressure (Cold) 3107 Design Pressure 2485 Safety Valves Open 2485 --"
High Pressure Reactor Trip 2385 Power Relief Valves Open 2335 ---
High Pressu,re Alarm
. 2335 Proportional. Spray Full On 2310 Pressurizer Spray-Valve Begin to Open 2260 Proportional Heaters Off 2250 Design Nominal Operating 2235 Proportional Heaters Full On 2220 Backup Heaters On 2210 Low Pressure Alarm 2185 Low Pressure Reactor Trip (typical, but finalized per set point studies) 1785 1
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- 3..N:zzles to tha sefaty, railsf, and sprcy linss.
fe"g 4.
Nozzic-tc-sEfs-snd atttchm:nt walds.
5 All girth ~and longitudinal full penetration welds.
6.
Manway attachment welds.
The liner within the safe end nozzle region extends beyond the weld region to maintain a uniform geometry for ultrasonic inspection.
~
Peripheral support' rings are furnished for the removable insulation modu 1es.
_The pressurizer quality assurance program is given in. Table 5.5.10-2.
5.5.11
. PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK 5 5.11.1 Design Bases Design data for the pressurizer relief tank are given in Table 5.5.11-1.
Codes and raaterials of the tank are given in Section 3.2 and 5.2.3.
The tank is designed to accept a steam discharge from the pressurizer equal to -110 percent of the. pressurizer steam volume at full load.
This steam volume is approximately the volume which would result from a complete loss of load without reactor scram due to turbine trip, but with scram initiated by high pressurizer level and pressure.
The precsurizer relief tank normally is cooled by circulating the contents thi cugh the reactor coolant drain tank heat exchanger.
The heat transfer
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capacity of the reactor coolant drain. tank heat exchanger is sufficient to cool the contents of the PRT to 120*F within eight hours following a design s team discharge. A backup for this cooling mode is provided by spraying in cool water and draining out the tank to the recycle holdup tank via the reactor coolant drain tank pumps.
The tank design is based on the requirement to absorb the pressurizer dis-charge during a step load decrease of 10 percent.
This is equivalent to a discharge of pressure steam equal to 110 percent of the volume above the full power pressurizer water level setpoint.
The tank is not designed to accept a continuous discharge from the pressurizer. The volume of water in the tank is capable of absorbing the heat from the assumed discharge, assuming an initial temperature of 120*F and increasing to a final temperature of 200*F.
If the temperature in the tank rises above 120*F during unit ope ra t ion, the tank is cooled by spraying in cool water and draining out the warm mixture to the Liquid Waste Recycle System.
5.5.11.2 Design Description The pressurizer relief tank condenses and cools the discharge from the pressurizer safety and relief valves.
Discharge from smaller relief valves located inside or outside the Containment is also piped to the relief tank.
The tank normally contains water and a predominantly nitrogen atmosphere.
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' Steam is discharged through a sparger pipe under the water level.
This condenses and cools the steam by mixing it with water that is near ambient g-*g tempe ra tu re.
A flanged nozzle is provided on the tank for the pressurizer.
discharge line connection.
5.5.11.2.1 Pressurizer Relief Tank Pressure The-pressur.Izer relief tank pressure transmitter provides a signal to close the_ vent header isolation valve, should there be a steam discharge into the pressurizer relief tank when the vent valve is open.
5.5.11.2.2 Pressurizer Relief Tank Level The pressurizer relief tank level transmitter supplies a signal for an indicator with high and low level alarms.
9 5.5.11.2.3 Pressurizer Relief Tank Water Temperature The temperature of the water in the pressurizer relief tank is indicated, and an alarm actuated by high temperature informs the operator that cooling of the tank contents is required.
5.5.11.3 Design Evaluation The volume of water in the tank is capable' of absorbing heat f rom the pressurizer discharge during a loss of load from full power without a turbine trip scram.
Water temperature in the tank is maintained at the nominal Containment tem-O pe ra t u re.
The rupture discs on the relief tank have a rallef capacity equal to the combined capacity of the pressurizer safety valves.,The tank design pressure is twice the calculated pressure resulting from the maximum design safety valve discharge described above. The tank and rupture discs holders are also designed for full vacuum to prevent tank collapse if the contents cool following a discharge without nitrogen being added.
The discharge piping from_the safety and relief valves to the relief tank is sufficiently large to prevent backpressure at the safety valves from exceeding 20 percent of the setpoint pressure at full flow.
N 5.5-32 s
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8-1 9.n ANALYSIS OF HYDROCEN PERN!NG DiRING THE TFI-2 ACCIDENT on March 28,1979,,pproximately 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> and 30 ninutes af ter the turbine trip that initiated the T". -2. accident a prer ore epike of approxirately 28 psig was observed within the containment building.
The cause of tais pressu c rise is believed to be hydrogen burning.
T:.e purpose of this analysis is to assess the nature and ext.nt of hydrogen burnin;; required to produce such a pressure increase and to consider it ;
potential i~plications.
C.1
'.:ons 1 lorat ion of the Observatlont at TMI-2 "v-the purpose of this analvsis the containment atrospSe -
c ond ; '. i ons
-!or t > the turbine trip r re taken to l e 1/+.,' p u i a a m !
!20*'.
with a rel.itive humidity of
~0 percent.
The contain wnt.ree vo t tne i :.
3;!ve: as 2.1 x 10
't in the TMI-2 FSAR.
These valjes lead to an initini dry,ir invsr. tory in the containment o I.,675.5 lb ~ '.%;
th!.
w..
.. c d r
as the sta rt i n;; po int of the <ubsequent a ni. t y s e s.
The e r: >otitirm of th.-
dry a ir wa. t aken as 21 v/o 0, and 79 v/o N.,.
A key question with regard to the pressure spike le its Sae:a!
I
- extent, i.e.,
did the entire containment volume experienc this pre sure rise or was ;t localized. The 23 psig pressure spike wa" n.on su r e. '
the rear'. r cont aina cnt inilding pressure enitors as well as being i. : ce t e.
the re: eren, presso es of both the sti.m generaters.
S ece the w ster >
.;enerators are widelv separated it 'nay be inferred that the 28 psi." pree-:u e rise was ind ed seen throup,hout the containment voluac.
This need not necessari!. preclude the existence of incally n ' e.ber p ren mres.
" ;t prior to the time of ths pressure spike inside the cantainment the temperature and pressure were measured to be about 12 F' U and 1.~.
psi",
respectively.
This temperature may pnssibly not be representativ" of the entir, containment atmosphere, though it was assumed to be so in tois analysis.
Assuming tb" quantity of air to be unelanged from that initia11-
'o the con-tainment and keeping, the tota' pressure at 1.5 psig, various quant'tlet of hydro.;en were added to the atmosphere; as the a :ount of hydrogen w. inc rea. -d
s 8.c t he r;uaatit;. of water vapor was decreased, since the total moles of gas are constant.
The' pressure inside the containment was then cal-colated for a number of such atmosphere compositions, assuming uniform mixing ana constant volume, adiabatic burning of all the hydrogen.
F r o.;. usese calculations it was determined that the combustion of %4 lb of nyoroge.' would be rei,uired to raise the p re s.,u re to 42.7 psia [26 psi ;).
The inferred composition of the atmosphere just prior to tha hydrogen burn is 30.7 v/o air, 5.2 v/o hydro;;en, and 8.1 v/o water vapor.
This compo.,ition is on the edge of the flammability region and well away f rot: cm.aon1:. accepted detonable limits.
.he f i r:, t post accident analyses of the containment b u ild in;;
atmusphere were rerformed on March 31, 1979, and gave the f ollowin;;
avs r...;c r e.,u i t s on a dry gas basis:
1.7 v/o hydrogen, 16.1 v/o c.<ygen, and c /..' v/ o n i t ro;;e n.
Using the resatts of these analyses together with the previously et termined initial air inv atory, an u.sjgen de;)letion of 238.5 lo
<. a.. oc t e r:r. t n e a. This c o t. c :. pt, n u.- to thu.,urning of '217.0 lb-mole (IUF. lb) of hydrogen.
If this quantity of hydrc, gen as well as that re:ca inin,; at the time of the analyses were preser.t in the c on t a in:ce n t atmu,,nere l;u s t prior to the bydrogen burn, the inferred atmosphere com-posiLion would have i>een 66.7 v/o alq,11.0 v/o hydrogen, anu 2.3 v/o water vapor.
Thia composition is well into the flammable region but not near tue accepte.1 detonable ilmits.
If the quantity of hydrogen borned deter-mined ! ro.r ti.e oxygen depletion analyses is assuned to be uniformly distributed throughout the containment volume and undergoes constant volume burning the resulting containment pressure would be about 62 psia.
i~h i s in, of course, substantially higher than the measured ;1eak pressure.
l ihe fore.;oing analy.ses were based on the assum;>t ion of uniform it i
nydronen d t.st ribut ion throu;;hout the containment volume.
There 12., of w ide variety of inhomogenous hydrogen-air distributions possible, h
l course,.i Sone 1imiting eases were considered and are discussed below.
If all the j
hydro;en L a.. L hurned was concentrated in a localized volume together with
[
the.toichiometric qt.antity of air required for the reaction, this hydrogen-air "hubble" would only occupy some f raction of the total contain:nent volume.
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M' 8~J Using the lefdrogen burned as determined from the oxygen depletion as the reference, this bubble was found to occupy about one-third of the total volume.
It the hydroden-air bubble is assumed to burn at constant volume and then e::pand into the cold or' unburned gas until.the pressure throughout v'-
containment equaliaes, the resulting pressure iq 46 psia.
The pressure in the reteteu,,;as prior to expansion id 127 pdia; tb[ pressure would not be seen by the sntire containment, however. The foregoing assumption of constant volume burning followed by adiabatic expansion were made for analytical convenience; physically, these conditions could only be approached i f L:.e hyd ro.;en-a i r mixture unde rwent detonation.
In a defla,; ration the prewures t h rou;;hou t the containment volume would remain equalized.
We have nut calculated the detonation parameters for the above conii ;u ra t ion; baued on si:'.:lar analyses ir. the past, however, we would ex;>ect that t he s~.hapman-dou;;e t pressure, ': detonation did take place, would be approximate?. twice the a'ove c
q uas : cipdl ibrium p re..su re in the burned r.:in Wh:lc use aaove highl; ideal-
. m;..e p r ox i.... L i on t o toe burning of a non-homogeneous hydro >;en-a t.
uxture
- .ay or r:ay not represer.L what actually took place. the calculc.tcJ f.rul
(,, ; /
,i re e.o u r e 1:. suf t aciently close to the racoau red v..lue to ler.d plausinality ql to an explauation of this type.
ine quant ity of hydrogen burned as detera.ined f rom ta measured
..s I
ox y,;t.. depletion is substantially at variaace.elth that required to raise tue containment pressure to 26 psig under homogeneous burning arsumpt ions.
i A pose..ble scenario :or reconcilln;; the high quantity of hydrogen burned as indte.. Led by the oxyr,en depletion with the observed pressure increase was presented.
Some further comments relating to this apparent d i ci.o t omy are noted below.
If t he quantity of hydrot;en burned was limited to thc.t required to produce ti e observed pressure increase under the assumption of unit'orm distriaution,
..e., '264 lb, then the inferred containn.ent atmosphere,; u s t prior to the burn would have been:
36.7 v/o air, 5.2 v/o hy6ronen, and a.1 v/o water vapor.
Such a composition would be on the horcerline of the flareahility region aad, if ignited, would no,t he expected to result in complete reaction of the hydrogen.
it the residual hy dro,;en ao indicated
g_4' H
by the-March 31 contain= cat atmosphere analyses were included the'resultinn atmospnere. composition would be:
66.7 v/o air, 6.S v/o hydrogen, and 6.5 v/o water. vapor.
This' composition is still near the cage of the fla::cability re;;10q and would not be expected to result in a completc reaction; hydrog c.
" concentrations-in excess of about S v/o are believ d t en e ' o be rer;uired to
'approuca complete reaction.
k'hile there is undoubtedly some containment atmospnere ' on;)osition which would result in the burning of th c
e abova quantity of. hydro, en, such a composition would require a signi fleantly greater initial quantity of hydrogen than the above 364 lb and imply a residual hydrog n euntent sushstantially greater than that measured.
e 1
The riuantity of hydrogen burned as inferrcd from the oxygen depl
't;cn dnalyses is-substantially e-the measured coatainment pressure increasegreater than the quantity required to This' discrepancy can apparently i
he ex;)iained by assumin>; a nonuniform distribbtfon of tue hydr egen.
Implicit b Lhis explan.ttion are the following.
La
- 1) The measured 28 psig pressure increase existed throughout th. containment volume.
2)~ Much higher pressures could have existec locally.
1)'
j If such higher pressures did indeed take placo, the i n.; t ru-
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f s
untation that recorded the containment pressure response i[
3 a
either did not experience these localized pressures or was P
n not capable of recording them.
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.enta;nment t h.s i g n
- d
-su Cunnideration has also been given to the e feet of contain k
p
.ie;lan on the possible menu 6
implications of hydrogen burning of the rangnicode u
eeeurring during the TM1-2 accident, y
i.e., tne same was assu:.;ed tu take place hydrogen huraing event j
in dif ferent containment desh;ns.
In this way some ir.aight.could be developed on the relative vulnerability of different
- containment des i;,ns to this type os accident.
!.f w
the principal-threat to the TM1-2 containment was as.>ociated with
]
the 26-psig pressure spike from hydrogen hurning.
the course oi ' the accident the containment At all other times during m
]
pressure remained below 5 psig.
I 2.9 i<
8-5 Since the design pressure of the containment structure is 60 psig,- no real titreat to Lou integrity of the containment is believed to have i
t existed at any time during the accident.
Table 8-1 gives same of the key characteristics for a selection j
of designs representative of the snectrum of containments used for large ca.mercial reactcrs in this country.
Examination of the cha rac te ris t ics l
cf large dry containments indicates that these are comparable to the TMI-2 I
containment; thus, it would be expected that other contain:nents of this type would not have been threatened by the hydrogen burning experienced I
at 1M1-2.
Ine containments classified as being of tl.e pressure suppression i
t/pe are characterized by low design prassure or small free volume.
Some j
of thesc.:ay be more vulnerable to damage due to hydrogen burr.ing than are tae lar.;e d ry containment types, i.ach type of pressure suppre.,> ion con-I ta nment is discus 4ed below.
v-The Ice conJenser coriairment design is included n one of several being evaluated in the Reactor Safety Study Metc.oJolegv A;,plications reactors
' co g ra ;..
For the specific ice condenser containment con:idered in thi; p ro r,c ar.: a nominal fallure pressure of 45 psia has been determined.
This l a ;iu re pressure was based on stat ic loading conditions.
As applied in Line deactor Safety Study Methodology Applications Program, at tne nominal failere pressure there is a 50 percent probability of failure.
Tais prob-avility i r.c reas es above the nominal level and decreases below it.
1: the 2n psig pressure rise observed at '!M1-2 vere applied to the ice condenser
(;
1 I an ta i nmen t, a significant likelihood of failure would be expected.
U the 1o34 ih of hydrogen burned, as uctermined from tile oxygen depletion analyses, were un i fo rmi;. distributed and burned in this ice condenser containment, a j
pressure of 90 p.4ia would be predicted.
At this level, failure of the
'1 ntructu; uld have to be considered a virtual certainty, d
u rk 1 liWi< conta iament was one of the two designs evaluated in the heactor Satet s dtudy.
That particular design had a aesign pressure of psig and a predicted nominal failure pressure of 100 psig (173 p;ia).
ao anat containment was inerted, thus hydrogen burning was not a consideration
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r l( (( ({[((([(((( (((( (h(h((( J (_h(h 1 a= TRANSMITTAL TO: Document Control Desk, F 016 Phillips h 53 ADVANCED COPY TO: O The Public Document Room y ' cj:::.- DATE: June 25, 1981 m Attached are the PDR copies of a Commission meeting {6 transcript /s/ and related meeting document /s/. They are being forwarded for entry on the Daily Accession List and placement in the Public Document Room. No l:ip other distribution is requested or required. Existing g DCS identification ntunbers are listed on the individual g documents wherever possible. a= 1. Transcript of: McGuire Application for an Operating License, June 24, 1981. (1 copy) a. Three letters to: Jess Riley, President, Carolina Environmental Study Group; Edward G.
- Ketchen, OELD, J.
Michael McGarry, III, Debevoise and Liberman, from L. Bickwit, General Counsel, dated June 23, 1981. (1 copy) I' o b. CESG Handout from 6/24/81 Commission Meeting on McGuire. (1 copy) b rown i :e of the Secretary cu v-0. g JUN20193j. r g'g; q u.s.ugp ll %~* s e-s cid A l N bi i Emmememmwmunemmmwareyk}}