ML20008D781
| ML20008D781 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Midland |
| Issue date: | 01/13/1969 |
| From: | CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8007300683 | |
| Download: ML20008D781 (21) | |
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TABLE OF COICE."f5 J
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8 EIlrTRICAL SYSTDG 8-1 8.1 DESIGN EASES 8-1 8.2 ELECTRICAL SYS3 DESIGN 8-1 8.2.1 NEI' WORK IICERCONNECTIONS AND RELIABILITY 8-1 8.2.1.1 System Diarrams 8-1 8.2.1.2 Reliability Considerations 8-1 8.2.2 STATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 8-3 8.2.2.1 System Design and Single Line Diagram 8-3 8.2.2.2 Station Power and Start-up Transformers 8-h 8.2.2 3 6900 Volt Auxiliary Sy. tem 8-h 8.2.2.h h160 Volt Auxiliary System 8L I
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8.2.2 5 E80 Volt Auxiliary System 8-5 8.2.2.6 D-C System 8-6 8.2.2 7 120 Volt Instrurent A-C System 8-7 8.2.2.8 120 Volt Preferred A-C System 8-7 8.2.2 9 Evaluation of Electrical Distribution System Layout 8-7 8.2.2.10 Control Rod Drive Power 8-9 1
8.2.2.11 Lighting 8-9 8.2 3 DERGENCY PO'ER SYSTEM 8-9 8.2 3 1
System Design
8-9 8.2 3 2 Emergency Diesel Generators 8-9 8.2 3 3 Station Eatterv 8-12 8.3 TESTS AND INSPECTIONS 8-12
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LIST OF TABLES Table No.
T ^' ** 1 e Page 8-1 Energency Diesel Generator Icads (LOCA Sequence) 6-11 l
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l LIST OF FIGUP.ES Firure No.
Title 8-1 Single Line Midland Station Switchyard 8-2 Projected 1975 Midland Transmission connections 8-3 Plant single Line Diagra l
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8 ELECTRICAL SYSTDG 8.1 DESIGN BASES The plant is designed to be electrically self sufficient with adequate aux-iliary equipment and standby pcVer to assure safe handling of all normal and emergency situations.
To prevent the concurrent loss of all auxiliary power, the various sources of power, including emergency diesel generators, are independent of and iso-lated from each other. The power supplies and centrol of equipment providing engineered safeguards are arranged to mintnize the possibility of a loss of their operating functions due to physical damage.
Electrical equipment vill be purchased and tested to stringent requirements for reliability and quality, including appropriate NEMA, USASI and IEEE electrical standards.
8.2 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM DESIGN 8.2.1 NETWORK INTERCONNECTIONS AND RELIABILITY a
Electrical energy generated at 22 kV and 24 kV is stepped up to 3h5 kV trans-mission voltage by separate main transformers for each unit. Two 3b5 kV cir-cuits on sepsrate steel towers transmit energy from the main transformers to
'~'T the station switchyard. The 3h5 kV switchyard circuit breakers are arranged e
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in a two bus, breaker-and-one-half switching scheme. Five 3h5 kV transmission circuits and three 3h5/138 kV step-down transformer exits emanate from this switchyard. Switchyard control power is' supplied from a 125 volt d-c battery located in the switchyard.'
8.2.1.1
~ System Diagrams Figure B-1 is a single line diagram of the station switchyard buses and cir-cuits.. Figure B-2 gives the projected 1975 transmission connections at Midland.
8.2.1.2 Reliability Considerations Reliability considerations to minimize the probability of power failure due to faults in the electrical system are as follows:
a.
The transmission system is designed to maintain stable opera-tion of both Midland generators for a three phase zero resis-tance fault at the Midland 3h5 kV switchyard cleared by local breaker backup protection. Also, system stability vill be main-tained for tests as outlined in East Central Area Reliability Document No. 1, Reliability Criteria for Evaluation and Simulated Testing of the ECAR Bulk Power Systems. Simulated testing as Loutlined in this document vill be directed to consideration of
'the following' contingencies:
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00327 8-1 Amendment No. 2 5/28/69
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(1) Sudden outage of any trans=ission circuit at a time when any
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co=bination of three generating units is out of service.
(2) Sudden outage of any double-circuit tr as=ission tower line at a time when any ec=bination of two generating units is out of service.
(3) Sudden outage of any generating unit at a time when any two other generating units are out of service.
(h) Sudden outage of all generating capacity at any generating plant.
(5) Sudden dropping of a large load or a =a.ior load center.
(6) Sudden outage of all transmission lines on the sa=e right of way.
(7) Sudden outage of any trans=ission station, including all generating capacity that may be lost as the result of such an outage.
(8) Sudden outage of any tower line at a ti=e when any other one circuit is out of service.
b.
Flexibility and capability are designed into the 345 kV network
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interconnections by installing five 345 kV transmission circuits V
fro = the generating station switchyard to switchyards in the area transmission network and by installing a 3h5/138 kV step-down substation at the Midland location. The area 3L5 kV and 138 kV transmission systen is capable of trans=itting all area generation to load centers with sny' one line out of service.
c.
The five circuits are installed on three double circuit towers; space for one additional circuit vill be available on the in-stalled structures leaving the Midland switchyard.
d.
The data for each 3k5 kV line connected to the Midland switch-yard is described as follows:
Mini =u= Longtime Expected Annual Length Carability Outage Rate Livingston ~ 116 Miles-1200 MVA 1.7/100 Miles / Year Tall =adge 106 Miles 1200 MVA-1 7/100 Miles / Year Thetford 59 Miles 1200 MVA 1 7/100 Miles / Year Thetford 55 Miles 1200 MVA 1.7/100 Miles / Year.
Thetford 55 Miles 1200 MVA 1.7/100 Miles / Year
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1 Approximately six line outages per year are anticipated for all lines terminated at the switchyard, more than 90 percent of which are of transient nature. Outages for greater than a sc=entary period are expected to be approximately one every two years.
These estimates are made on the basis of routine maintenance being perfor=ed at the time of nor:al plant shutdown for maintenance and refueling.
The bus arrangement in Figure 6.1 provides two 3L5 kV main buses.
e.
Primary and backup relaying is provided for each circuit along with circuit breaker failure backup protection. The switchyard d* sign permits the following:
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l (1) Any circuit can be switched under normal er fault conditions without affecting any other circuit.
(2) Any sing 1( circuit breaker can be isolated for maintenance without interrupting the power or protection to any cther circuit.
(3) Faults on a main bus will be isolated without interrupting service to any circuit.
4 (h) Backup relaying vill insure against primary relaying failure to trip.
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s Similar network interconnection and reliability consideration as described above vill apply;during the interim period when only one of the Midland units is in service on the system.
8.2.2 STATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
I The plant distribution system consists of the various electrical systems nee-essary to provide reliable electric power during all modes of operation and shutdown conditions. Equipment is provided with relay protection and with grounding and mechanical safeguards necessary to assure adequate personnel pro-tection and to prevent or limit equipment damage during system fault conditions.
8.2.2.1-system Design and single Line Diagram The ~ plant auxiliary. electrical system is designed with sufficient power sources,
. redundant buses, and switching to perform the required functiens during all modes of start-up, operation, and shutdown.
Engineered safeguards auxil-1 aries are arranged so that less of a usingle bus for any reason vill still leave sufficient redundant auxiliaries energiced to safely perform their
~ ~ protective. function. IDae system is arrange' so that ~ automatic switching restores power if the normal supply is lost. On co=plete loss of normal and standby power the emergency diesel. generators will start automatically.
Figure 8-3 is a single line diagram of the station distribution system. A multiple bus system insures the reliability of the normal station auxiliaries.
Each bus has access to:
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i The nomal running power source via station power transfomers.
a.
b.
The 345 kV syste= via the 3k5/138 kV step-down transformers and the start-up transformer.
In addition, the emergency buses for engineered safeguards auxiliaries can be povered from the emergency diesel generators.
The station distribution system is capable of starting the largest drive j
vith the remainder of the required connected motor load in service.
The system has a fast transfer to the standby source (start-up transformer) following a turbine generator trip without the loss of auxiliary load. The start-up transformer is sized to provide full standby capacity for the sta-tion power transformers during normal load or e=ergency operation.
Protective relaying is arranged for selective tripping of circuit breakers, thus limiting the loss of power to the affected area.
8.2.2.2 Station Power and Start-Up Transformers a
During normal operation of the plant, two station power transfomers per unit connected to the respective generator isolated phase buses provide the primary source of electrical power for plant auxiliaries. During unit start-up and normal shutdown and after unit trip, plant power is provided from the 4(
start-up source which actually comprises two transformers as shown in Figure 8-3 Tha start-up transformers are sized to start each unit separately or shut-down both units safely.
8.2.2 3 6900 volt Auxiliary Syste=
Two 6900 volt buses per unit are provided for the or ation of reactor coolant pu=p motors. During nomal operation, each bus is 2ed from the associated sta-tion power transfomer. During start-up and shutdown, the buses on both units are fed from the X winding of Start-Up Trantfo mers 1 and 2.
Nor::;al " live-bus" transfers between the start-up transformer source and the station power trans-former source during start-up and shutdown are manually initiated with momentar-j source paralleling during transfer. On loss of the station power transfor ers or turbine generator trips, there is an automatic " fast" transfer to the X vind-ing of Start-Up Transfor=ers 1 and 2.
8.2.2.h 4160 Volt Auxiliary Syste Four 4160 volt buces are provided for each unit..Two of these buses provide power to nonengineered safeguards 4 kV auxiliary motors and 4160/h80 V load center transfomers, as well as feeders to the engineered safeguards buses.
Normally, these buses are fed from their respective station power transformers.
During start-up, shutdown, or standby operation, the buses are fed from the Y
.vinding of Start-Up Transformers 1 and 2.
No =al " live-bus" transfers between the station power and start-up sources are similar to the 6900 volt system bus N TN transfers. Also on loss of the' station power transformers or turbine generator -
Q trips, there is an automatic " fast" transfer to the Y vinding of Start-Up Transfomers 1 and 2.
06.M Amendment No. 2 g-3 5/28/69
When the Unit 1 NSS is shut down for refueling, Unit 1 turbine is supplied
- by Unit.2 NSS. During this period, Unit 2 turbine generator is shut down and the Unit 2 NSS auxiliaries can be supplied through Start-Up Transformers 1 and 2 or through Station Power Transformers 2-1 and 2-2 after removing the Generator 2 disconnect links.
The two kl60 volt engineered safeguards buses for each unit supply equipment essential for the safe shutdown of the plant. Upon loss of normal and stand-by power sources these two buses.are energized from their respective diesel generators. Bus load sbedding, bus transfer to the diesel generator, and pick up of critical loads are automatic.
All breakers on the engineered safeguards buses are capable of being con-trolled fro = two locations, the control roc = and the switchgear.
Electrical feeder cables from the diesel generators to emergency safeguards bu.aes are installed in tornado protected areas or in underground ducts.
No single failure of emergency power sources or initiating controls shall
- result in the loss of more than one engineered safeguards switchgear bus per unit. The redundant leads at the L160 volt level are fed from separate
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buses.
No single failure shall prevent the connection of a power source to a suffi-cient number of buses to safely shut down both reactors.
/~N No single failure even with.a loss of normal and standby power shall result
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'in a total elapsed time, starting at initiation by protection systems and 1
ending at full speed of the high-pressure injection and decay heat pumps, of more than 25 seconds.
All safeguards buses can be tested as follows:
a.
Compenents connected to any engineered safeguards bus can be manually tested individually at any time.
b.
Tripping bus supply breakers for any engineered safeguards bus vill initiate starting of the appropriate diesel generator through bus undervoltage.
8.2.2.5 h80 volt Auxi]iary system The' h80 volt. system is divided into seven load center buses per unit, five for the normal L80 volt reactor / turbine. auxiliaries and two for the engineered safeguards h80 volt auxiliaries. Power for each bus section is supplied from a separate station service transfor=er. The transformers are fed from
.the kl60 volt system and arr.nged so that each transformer of a double-ended load center unit is fed from a different h160 volt bus. The engineered safeguards.480 volt load centers are single ended and each is fed from a Jdifferent kl60 volt engineered safeguards bus. The system is arranged so that multiple pieces of equipment'vith a common function are fed from opposite Ynb 8-5 00'3M.
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buses; thus, the loss of any k80 volt bus or tne failure of any single com-ponent of the 4160 volt or 480 volt, sys*, ens would not deprive the plant of all equipment associated with that particular function.
Various h80 volt motor control centers are located throughout the plant to supply power to normal or engineered safeguards equipment within the respec-tive areas. A k80 volt emergency a-c bus, capable of being supplied fro =
either k80 volt engineered safeguards load center by m*.nual, " Kirk" key-interlocked changeover of the supply breakers, is arranged to supply such loads as e=ergency lighting, standby battery chargers and turbine turning gear.
The key interlock positively prevents paralleling of sources while pe:::itting
.a degree of flexibility in supplying nonsafeguards emergency loads.
8.2.2.6 E-C System The d-c systems provide reliable continuous power for control, instrumentation, emergency lightire, and d-c motors.
The 125 volt d-c systems are two independent and isolated systems each of which is supplied from its own station battery. Each battery is co= mon to both units.
Each system consists of two battery chargers and tvc buses, one for each unit.
Either of the two chargers is capable of supplying the normal d-e-loads on both buses and simaltaneously recharging the battery in a reasonable time.
The two independent 125 volt distribution panel buses in each unit supply d-c control, instru=ents, emer<3ency lighting, and 120 volt a-c inverters.
Each 125 volt battery is located in a separate room in the auxiliary building.
One 250 volt d-c motor control center bus per unit supplies the 240 volt d-c turbine auxiliary motors. Each 250 volt battery and charger is located in a separate area in the turbine building. A standby battery charger is also pro-vided for each 250 volt d-c bus.
The battery cell containers are =anufactured of extra strength plastic, com-pression sealed to prevent leakage of the electrolyte. Internal cell parts are permanently aligned and protected from breakage. The cells are mounted on earthquakeproof racks with high impact plastic or wood spacers between cells to prevent them from shifting. Battery racks, supports, bracing, end stirrups and spacers are manufactured to Class I standards.
Power for the 125 volt d-c system is nortally supplied through the chargers from the h80 volt engineered safeguards motor control centers (MCC) which, in turn, have diesel power available. The two chargers supplying each j
battery are fed from separate MCC.
l Each charger can supply the nor=al d-c losds and battery floating charge plus
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occasional equalizing charge. Two chargers can be operated in paral?el for fast recovery or emergencies.
Battery capacities are. adequate to provide a safe and orderly hot shutdown in the event that all a-c power is lost.
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Amendment No. 6 12/26/69 e
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I 8.6 Submit your cable installation design criteria for preserving the inde-pendence of redundant reactor protection system and engineered safety feature circuits (instrumentation, control, and power). For the purpose of cable installation, the protection system circuits should interprete in their broadest sense to include sensors, instrument cables, control cables, and power cables (both ac and de), and the actuated device (e.g., breakers, valves, pumps, etc.).
In this regard, provide the following information:
1.
Cable separation considered in terms of space and/or physical barriers between redundant cables with regard to (1) the sep-aration of power cables from those used for control and instru-mentation, (2) the intermixing of control and instrument cables within a tray, conduit, or ladder, (3) the intermixing of cables for different protection channels, and (4) the intermix-ing of non-vital cabling with protection system cabling.
2.
Your criteria with respect to (1) the separation of penetration areas. (2) the grouping of penetrations in each area, and (3) the separation of penetrations which are mutually redundant.
3.
A discussion of cable tray loading, insulation, derating, and overloading protection for the various categories of cables.
4.
A discussion of your criteria with respect to fire stop, protec-tion of cables in hostile environments, temperature monitoring f[~'N of cables, fire detection, and cable and wireway markings.
5.
A discussion of the provision made for administrative control of the foregoing items (1-4) during design and installation.
Answer:
See Amendment No. 22, Appendix 8-A," Detailed Criteria and Administrative Procedure for Installation of Protection and Emergency Power Systems Cable and Raceway".
In addition, the criteria with respect to the separation of penetrations which are mutually redundant are as follows:
22 1.
Separation between four channels is maintained through the electrical penetrations. Two electrical cable penetration areas physically separated from each other are located on elevation 62 8'-6" and two on elevation 614'-0".
2.
Within one area, the penetrations are grouped to maintain separation between voltage levels.
3.
Mutually redundant penetrations are separated into these four areas.
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8.6-1 Amendment No. 22
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The criteria with respect to temperature monitoring of cables and fire detection are as follows:
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Temperature monitoring of cables is not employed, j
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All electrical penetration and cable spreading rooms will contain fire detection systems.
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D-c systems are ungrounded and are equipped with ground detectors for con-
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tinuous monitoring.
Charger failure and low bus voltage are annunciated in i
the control room.
I 8.2.2.7 120 Volt Instrument A-C System 1
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One 120 volt a-c distribution panel bus per unit supplies nonessential reactor, turbine-generator instruments, and instrument auxiliaries.
This bus is supplied through a 480-120 volt, three phase transformer from the emergency a-c motor control center.
lThetransformerisratedtocarryfullbusload.
Lov bus voltage and bus transfer are annunciated in the control room.
8.2.2.8 120 volt Preferred A-c system The 120 volt preferred a-c system provides a source of reliable continuous power for essential plant controls and instruments.
i The preferred a-c system consists of four distribution panel buses for each unit supplied through four static inverters from the four 125 volt d-c buses.
The static inverters are filtered for harmonics and buffered against line
. transients.
2 The a-c buses provide four independent power sources for the reactor pro-tection system channels. Additional essential instrumentation and indication is distributed and connected to these four panels.
Inverter trouble and low bus voltage or low frequency are annunciated in the control room.
8.2.2 9 Evaluation of Electrical Distribution System Layout The physical locations of electrical distribution system equipment are such as to minimize vulnerability of vital circuits to physical damage as a result of accidents. Principal equipment locations are as follows:
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8-T' g ~ g~ s Amendment No. 8 2/9/70
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a.
Station power transformers and startup transformers are located out-of-doors. The startup transformera are separated from the station power and main transformers by location on another side of the turbine building. Lightning arresters are used where applicable 22 for lightning protection. All transformers are located over rock filled su=ps and are protected by automatic water spray deluge systems to extinguish oil fires quickly and prevent the spread of fire.
t b.
The 6900 volt and 4160 volt non-engineered safeguards switchgear buses are located in the turbine building. Engineered safeguards 4160 volt switchgear and 480 volt load centers and motor control centers are located within the Class 1 structures to minimize exposure to mechanical, fire, and water damage. This equipment is properly designed electrically to permit safe operation under normal and short circuit conditions.
c.
480 volt motor control centers are located in the areas of electrical load concentration. Those associated with the turbine-generator auxiliary system in general are located below the turbine-generator operating floor level. Those associated with the nuclear steam supply system are located in areas so as to minimize their exposure to mechanical, fire, and water damage.
d.
Switchgear bus interconnections are by insulated, shielded cable in raceways as described in Appendix S-A. Routing is such as to minimize exposure to mechanical, fire, and water damage.
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e.
The application routing and identification of control, instrumentation and power cables is described in Appendix 8-A. Cable insulations in the reactor building are selected to minimize the harmful effects 22 of radiation, heat, and humidity. A prototype of each type of cable used for engineered safeguards in the reactor building has been proof tested under the combined LOCA conditions of temperature, pressure, and humidity to assure that it will function for the required length of time under those LOCA conditions. Prototype cables were irradiated to the design level prior to prooftests. Instrumentation cables are shielded to minimize induced voltages and magnetic 26 I interferences. All power and control cables and wiring used will meet l
the vertical flame resisting test as described in the latest edition of 22 Insulated Power Cable Engineers Association Publication S-61-402 in effect on the date of purchase.
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Amendment No. 26 8-8 4/74
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v 22 8.2.2.10 Control Rod Drive Power Two 480 volt, three phase sources are provided for the control rod drive power.
Each source is fed from separate 480 volt normal MCC buses and each source has the capacity to supply the total rod drive requirements.
8.2.2.11 Lighting Lighting is provided to permit the safe performance of operating and main-tenance duties. Adequate emergency lighting is provided in essential operating areas to permit the safe performance of emergency operating duties. The normal source of supply of emergency lighting is by 480-120 volt lighting transformers arranged for emergency energization from the
N diesel generators. An independent de lighting system for vital areas
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provides backup to the ac lighting and is automatically energized.
Portable battery powered light units are locally mounted to insure the safety of personnel in nonvital areas. Each unit is self-contained with an integral automatic charger and is arranged to provide illumination upon loss of normal ac power.
8.2.3 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM 8.2.3.1
System Design
The emergency power sources are designed to furnish on-site power to reliably shut down the reactor, to remove reactor decay heat, and to supply control and instrumentation power to monitor essential reactor parameters, initiate operation of protective equipment, and initiate reactor building isolation when required. Reliability is assured by the use of independent controls and sources to supply ac and de engineered safeguards loads.
8.2.3.2 Emergency Diesel Generators Two automatically started diesel generators provide emergency power for J
essential auxiliaries through two sets of independent buses.
The capacity of each diesel generator is sufficient to meet the coincident engineered safeguards demand caused by an LOCA in either unit and emergency hot shutdown of the other unit.
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v'O' 8-9 Amendment No. 22 00'137
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l Tne diesel generators are started on oce'errence of a reactor trip with no l'
standby power available or upon a turbine-generator trip. If no standby i
power is available the diesel generator loads automatically.
- l The diesel may be manually started and synchronized for testing at any l
2 time. The diesel generater leads and the sequence of starting en LOCA I
condition are shown in Table 8-1.
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The preliminary tabulated load is less than 2,800 kW on each diesel and is the basis for the selection of the diesel generator continuous load rating.
The loading sequence prevents system instability during motor starting. Lead transfer and starting sequence for cooldown of the non-LOCA unit is by op-erator action.
Each diesel generator feeds one emergency safeguards bus for each unit.
Class I fireproof walls are provided between the two diesel generators and between the engineered safeguards buses. Power and control cables for in-terconnection and control of the diesel generators and associated switchgear are routed to maintain two-channel separation.
The diesel engines are cooled by the plant service water system. On-site storage of diesel fuel is always adequate for seven days' operation of two diesels at load for LOCA on one generating unit while the other generating unit is being shutdcwn. This includes one " day tank" for each diesel with capacity for four hours' operation with the generators fully loaded. The installed tanks are designed to withstand flotation due to the maximum probable flood.
Each generator can be manually started and synchronized onto the bus with-out interrupting power to the bus.
Interlocks-prevent paralleling the diesel generators.
W 8.2 3 3 Station Battery i
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The station batteries are sized to provide power requirements for vital aux-111 aries, instrumentation, control equipment and minimum amount of emergency lighting for safe plant shutdown and to provide the controls to reenergize the plant auxiliary systems from the startup source.
The d-c system is normally ungrounded and has detectors to indicate when there is a ground existing on either the positive or negative side. ' A ground on one side of the d-c system does not cause any equipment to malfunction.
Ground faults are located by isolation of. individual circuits connected to the faulted system, while taking the necessary precautions to maintain the integrity of the vital bus supplies.
8.3 TESTS AND INSFECTIONS A program of regular inspections and functional checks of equipment and pro-tective devices common to normal central station practice insures the operability of auxiliary distribution system components.
Automatic transfers to the various emergency power sources are tested en a periodic basis to prove the operational ability of these systems. Periodic operating tests are performed on the diesel generators, the battery chargers, L --
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