ML20008D779
| ML20008D779 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Midland |
| Issue date: | 01/13/1969 |
| From: | CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8007300680 | |
| Download: ML20008D779 (23) | |
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TAELE OF CO?CE;TS Section g
6 EGI?.:.t.nED SAFEGUARDS 6-1 6.1 HGENCY IN'ECTION 6-1 6.1.1 EESIGN BASIS 6-1 i
6.1.2 EESCRIP:' ION 6-2 6.1 3 EESIGN EVALUATION 6-3 6.1 3 1 Energency Injection Restonse 6-6 6.1 3 2 Srecial Features 6-7 6.1 3 3 Check Valve Leakase - Core Floodine Syster 6-7 6.1 3.h Core Flooding Tank Information 6-S 6.1.L TEST AND INSFECTIONS 6B 6.2 REACTOR BUILDI?G SFRAY SYSTBi 6-10 6.2.1 EISIGN BASES 6-10 6.2.2 EESCRIPTION AND OPERATION 6-10 25 l6.2 3 EESIGN EVALUATION 6-10a 6.2.L TESTS A?C INSFECTIONS 6-12 63 REACTOR BJILDI?G AIR RECIRCULATION AIiD COOLI?G SYSTE 6-13 6.3 1 EESIGN BASES 6-13 632 EESCRIPIION AND OPERATION 6-13 633 DESIGN EVALUATION 6-1L 6 3.L TESTS AND INSFECIIONS 6-15 h
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Table No.
Title Page 6-1 Core Flooding Syste: Ferf:r ance and Equipment 'ata 6-5 l
6-2 Emergency Injection Equipment Performance Testing 6-9 6-3 Reacter Buildirg Spray System Ferformance and Equipment Data 6-11 t
6L Reactor Building Air Cooling Unit Ferformance and Equipment Data 6-la l
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LIST CF FIGURES Firure No.
Title 6-1 E=ergency Injection Safeguards 6-2 Makeup Pu=p Characteristics 6-3 Decay Heat Removal Pu=p Characteristics 6h Reactor Building bpray Syste:
6-5 Reactor Building cooling Syste=
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6 ENGINERED SAEaUARD3 3
g Engineered safeguards for each nuclear unit are provided to fulfill fcur i functions in the unlikely event of a serious less-of-coclant accident:
a.
Protect the fuel cladding, b.
Mairtain reactor building integrity.
Reduce the driving feree fer reactor building leakage.
c.
d.
Reduce iodine from the reacter building atmosphere.
Emergency injection of coolant to the reactor coolant syster satisfies the first l tions. function above, while building at:0 sphere cocling satisfies the latter three func-Each of these operations is perfer:ed by two or more systems which, in addition, e= ploy cultiple ec=penents t0 insure operability.
All equipment re-quiring electrical power for operation is supplied by the emergency electrical power sources as described in 8.2 3 The engineered safeguards include core flooding tanks, high-pressure coolant injection, low-pressure coolant injection, the reacter building air recircula-tion and cooling syste=, and the reactor building spray system. Figures 6-1, 6-h, and 6-5 show the operation of these systers in the engineered safeguards mode, together with associated instrumentation and piping.
Applicable codes and standards for design, fabrication, and testing of c0=po-nents used as safeguards are listed in the introduction te Section 9, and seistic requirements are given in Secticn 2.
The safety are' -is presented in Section 14 demonstrates the perfor:ance of installed equip.
.n relation to functional objectives with assumed failures.
Several of the engineered safeguards functions noted above are accceplished with the postaccident use of equipment serving ner:al functions. The design apprcach is based on the belief that regular use of equipment provides the best pcssible means for monitoring equipment availability and conditions.
Because some of the equipment used serves a nor:a1 function, the need for periodic testing is minimited. In cases where the equipment is used for energencies only, the sys-tems have been designed to permit meaningful periodic tests. Additional des-criptive information and design details en equipment used for normal operation are presented in Section 9 This Section 6 vill present design bases for safe-guards protection, equipment operational descriptions, design evaluation of equip =ent, failure analysis, and a preli=inary operational testing program for i
syste=s used as engineered safeguards.
6.1 E'ERGENCY INJECTION 6.1.1 DESIGN 3ASES The principal design basis for e=ergency injection is as follows :
Energency core injection is provided to prevent clad melting for the entire spectrum of reactor ecolant syster failures ranging
[i from the smallest leak to the complete severance of the largest
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Emergency core cooling includes pumped injection and the core flooding tanks.
Pumped injection is subdivided so that there are two eparate and independent strings, each including both high-pressure and low-pressure coolant injection, and each capable of providing 100 percent of the necessary core injection with the core flooding tanks. The core flooding tanks are passive components which are needed for only a short period of time after the accident, thereby assuring l
100 percent availability when needed.
High-pressure injection is prcvided to prevent uncovering of the core fer small coolant piping leaks at high pressure and to delay uncovering of the core for intermediate-sized leaks.
The core flooding system and the decay heat removal system (which provides low-pressure injection) are provided to recover the core at intermediate-to-low pressures to maintain core integrity during leaks ranging from intermediate to the largest size.
(Refer to Figure IL-51. ) This equipment has 'been conservatively sized to limit the temperature transient to a clad temp-erature or 2,300 F or less.
6.1.2 DESCRIPTICN Figure 6-1 is the schematic flow diagram for the emergency injection and asso-ciated instrumentation.
Emergency injection fluid, pumped to the reactor coolant system is supplied in each case from the borated water storage tank. This tank contains the volume of borated water necesnary to fill the fuel transfer canal during refueling operations and is connected to the injection pump suction headers by two lines.
s Additional coolant for emergency injecticn supply is contained in core flooding tanks which inject coolant without fluid pumping as described later in this section.
E=ergency injection into the reactor coolant syste: vill be initiated in the l event of (a) an abnormally low reactor coclant system pressure of 1,500 psi, or (b) a high reactor building pressure during power operation. Either cf these signals vill automatically increase high-pressure injection flow to the reactor coolant syste vith the following changes in the operating mode cf the
=akeup and purification system described in Section 9: (a) two makeup pumps vill be energized from the engineered safeguards buses, and (b) the injection valve in each of four injection lines will open. Energency high-pressure injection vill continue until reactor coolant syste= pressure has dropped to the point where core flooding tanks begin e=ergency injection. The flow char-acteristic curves for each =akeup pu=p are given in Figure 6-2.
i The core flooding system is composed of two flooding tanks, each directly con-l nected to a reactor vessel no::le by a line containing two check valves and one stop valve. The syste provides for autotatic flooding injection with initia-tion of flow when the reactor coolant system pressure reaches approximately c00 psi. This injection provision does not require any electrical power, auto-tatic switching, or operater action to insure supply of emergency coolant to the reactor vessel. Operator action is required only during normal reactor cool-down, at which time the stop valves in the core flooding lines are closed to contain the contents of the core flooding tanks. The combined coolant content of the two flooding tanks is sufficient to recover the core hot spot assuming no N\\
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liquid remains in the reactor vessel, while the gas overpressure and flooding line sizes are sufficient :: insure ecre reficoding within approximately 25 se:0nds after the largest pipe rupture has 00:urred.
The decay heat rencval syste: (described in Secticn 9) le ---~ ally =aintained en standby during pcVer operation and provides supplemental core flooding fiev through the two c:re flooding lines after the rea ter coolant syste pressure reaches 135 psi.
Energency Operation cf this systen vill be initiated by a re-actor coolant syster pressure of 200 psi er by a high reacter building pressure during any accident. The flev characteristics of each decay heat pu=p for in-jection are shown in Figure 6-3; each pu p is designed to deliver 3,000 gp:
f10v into the reacto:.* vessel at a vessel pressure cf 100 psi.
Icv-pressure injection, with supply frc= the berated water storage tank, using the decay heat pumps vill continue until a lev level signal is received from the tank. At this time, this signal vill open the valves controlling suction frc: the reacter building sump, clcse the valves fre berated water storage tank, and recirculation of coolant frc: the surp to the reacter vessel vill begin. The decay heat coolers will cool the recirculated fl0v, thus re=cving heat frc the reactor building fluid and preventing further reactor building accu =ulation of decay heat generated by the core.
The decay heat re: Oval pumps are located at an elevation belev the reacter build-ing sump with dual suction lines routed cutside the reactor building to the pumps. The lines have been sized so that each vill be capable of handling the gs total potential recirculation flev Of 3,000 gp: frc: ene decay heat re=cval pump, and 1,300 gp: fro: one reacter building spray pump.
The calculations for available NPSH at the reactor building spray and decay heat re: val pu=ps suction include a cargin over the NPSH require ents of these pumps. The calculations assure conservative water level in the berated water storage tank and the reacter building susp, and include an estimate of the vapcr pressure of the pumped fluid in accoriance with the reactor building pressure transient analysis in Section 1L.
The heat transfer capability of the decay heat coolers at the su=p te=perature corresponding to reactor building pressure transient analysis in Section IL is in excess of the haut generation rate of the core felleving storage tank in-jection.
Lesign data for core flooding components are given in Table 6-1.
Lesign data for other emergency injection e eponents are given in Section 9 except for these shevn in Figures 6-2 and 6-3
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c.1 3 us:A i. _i n21 u in establishing the required ec=ponents for the energency injection the fol10v-ing factors were considered:
a.
The probability of a major reactor cociant system failure is very lov.
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The fraction of a given component lifetime for which the component is unavailable because of maintenance is estimated to be a small part of lifetite. On this basis, it is estimated that the probability of a major reactor coolant syste= accident occurring while a pro-tective component is Out for maintenance is two orders of =agnitude below the low basic accident probability.
i c.
The equipment downtime for maintenance in a well-operated plant often can be scheduled during reat*,or shttdown periods. When maintenance of an engineered safeguards componet is required during operation, the periodic test frequency of the remaining equipment can be in-creased to insure availability.
d.
Where the systems are designed to operate normally or where meaning-ful periodic tests can be performed, there is also a low probability that the required emergency action would not be performed when needed.
That is, equipment reliability is improved by using it for other than emergency functions, e.
Three makeup pu=ps are installed. One makeup pu=p is normally oper-ating, and one pump can be down for maintanence. One pump is re-quired for engineered safeguards.
f.
Two core flooding tanks are installed. During nuclenr unit operation both tanks are lined up to the reactor pressure vessel with an open
-(~'T stop valve in each line.
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Tuble 6-1 Core Floeding Syster Perfernance and Equinrent reta Core Flooding Tanks Number 2
Design Pressure, psig 700 Nermal Pressure, psig 600 Ees.ign Temperature, F 300 Operation Temperature, F 110 Total Volume, ft3/ Tank 1,L10 3,
Normal Water Volume, ft-/ Tank 9ho Material cf Construction Carbon Steel, SS-Lined Check Valves Number per Flooding Line 2
Size, in.
IL Material SS Design Pressure, psig 2,500 650 (Valve Near RFV)( ))
Lesign Temperature, F 300 (Valve Near CFT)
Isolation (Stop) Valves Nunber per Flooding Line 1
,s Size, in.
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Material SS
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Design Pressure, psig 2,500 Ee:sicn Temperature, F 300 Piping I! umber of Flooding Lines 2
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la Material SS Design Pressure, psig 2,500 (To Stop Valve) 700 (Between Step Valve and CFT)
Design Te=perature, F 650 (To Stop Valve) 300 (Between Stop Valve and CFT)
(+))Eesigned to ASME Section III, Class C CFT - Core Flooding Tank RFV - Reactor Pressure Vessel f
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6.1 3 1 Emergency In'ection Respense s
The ecergency high-pressure injection valves are designed to open within 10 seconds. One makeup pump is normally in operation, and all the pipe lines are filled with coolant. The four high-pressure injectict lines contain thermal sleeves at their connections into the reactor coolant piping to prevent ovar-stressing of the pipe juncture when the berated water is injected into thene high temperature lines during emergency operations.
Injection response of the core flooding system is dependent upon the rate of reduction of reactor coolant system pressure. For an LOCA, the core flooding system is capable of reflooding the core to the hot spot within a safe period after a rupture has occurred.
Energency low-pressure injection by the decay heat removal syste= will be delivered within 25 seconds after the reactor coolant system reaches the actuating pressure cf 200 psig. This anticipated delay time consists of tnese intervals :
a.
Total instrumentation lag -
-1 s b.
Emergency power sourca start -
<15 s c.
Pu=p operation (from the time the pump motor line circuit breaker closes
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until the pump delivers water) -
=10 s
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Injection valve opening time -
<10 s Total (Only b and e are additive ) -
=25 s 1
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To insure that no temperature increase will occur in the tank, even at higher leakage rates, portions of the line will be left uninsulated to promote con-l..
vective losses to the building atmosphere.
In su= mary, reactor operation may continue with no adverse effects coincident with check valve leakage. Maximum permissible limits on core flooding tank parameters (level, temperature, and boron concentration) will be establis>ed
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to insure compliance with the core protection criteria and final safety analyses, j
6.1 3.h Core Flooding Tank Information Method of Adding Water Water is added to each of the two core flooding tanks independently.
Normal fill and makeup water will be added from the makeup and puri-fication system.
Im= unity of the Fair of Tanks to a Single Failure of the Ng Pressurization System The two tanks are considered to be totally ic=une to a single failure which could in any way affect safety. This includes a single failure of N2 pressurization system. As mentioned above, all makeup, including the addition of N2, is made to each tank independently. The tanks are located outside the secondary shield and are separated from each other as indi-t
( (%(,)
the tank contains a check valve. With the piping and check valve arrange-cated by the plan drawings in Section 1.
Each of the makeup lines entering ment used, even a failure of the common N2 supply system would not result in depressurization of either of the core flooding tanks.
Use-Pate of Ng During Nor al Operation It is expected that the use-rate of N2 during normal operation will be approximately zero.
(See Leak Characteristics of Relief Valves below. )
Leak Characteristics of Relief Valves The industry standard for relief valves serving a function such as those installed on the core flooding tanks allows a leakage rate of 0.75 SCFD.
6.1.L TEST AND INSPECTIONS All active components of the emergency injection equipment, as listed in Table 6-2 will be tested periodically to demon..cate equipment readiness: In addi-tion, normally operating components will be inspected for leaks from purp seals, valve packing, flanged joints, and relief valves.
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4 F.ergency Injecticn Fauir-ent Perfer.ance Testing Makeup Pu=ps One pu=p is operatire continuously. Tne other two pu=ps will be periodically tested and rotated into service.
1 uish-Pressure Injection The re=otely operated stop valve in each line Line Valves will be opened partially, one at a ti=e.
?ne flow devices will indicate flow through the lines.
i 1
Makeup Pu=p Suction Valves The takeup tank pressure vill be raised to t
equalice the presrure exerted by the borated water storage tank. Tne valves vill then be j
opened individually and closed.
Decay Heat Purps In addition to use for shutdown cooling, these pu=ps vill be tested singly by openire the j
bypass in the borated water storage tank fill line. This vill allov vater to be pu= ped fro = the borated water storage tank through each of the injection lines and back to the tank.
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Borsted Water Storage Tank Durir4 this test, each of the valves vill be Outlet Valves tested separately for flow.
With pu=ps shutdown, these valves will be Icv-Pressure Injection j'
Valves opened and reclosed by operator action.
Valve for Suetion Fro:
-With pu=ps. shutdown and borated water storage Su=p tank outlet valves. closed, these valves vill be opened and reclosed by operator action.
i 4
. Valves.in Core Flooding Valves can be operated durire each shutdown to Tank Injection Lines-
-deter =ine perfor ance. Isolation valves vill be closed to contain Vater in core flooding tanks during shutdown.
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DQ 6.2 REACTOR BUILDING SPRAY SYSTIM 6.2.1 DESIGN BASES The reactor building spray syste= is provided to re=ove heat and fission prod-ucts from the reactor building at=osphere following a less-of-coolant accident in order to li=it the reactor building pressure to the design value and to re-duce the post-accident level of fission products in the reactor building at-
=osphere. Chemicals are added to the water coming fro = the borated water stor-age tank after a LOCA to establish a basic pH by addition of sodiu hydroxide and to provide for iodine retention by addition of sodiu: thiosulfate.
6.2.2 DESCRIPIION AND OPERATION The sche =atic flow diagra= of the reactor building spray syste= is given in Figure 6-4.
Each unit utilizes identical equip =ent and sche =atic arrange =ent.
The system serves no function during nor=al plant operation.
Removal of heat and reduction of fission products is accomplished by directing spray water into the reactor building at=osphere. The syste= is sized to fur-nish the required cooling capacity if the reactor building air recirculating iand cooling syste= is inoperative. The spray syste heat re= oval rate at its 0 Btu /h, which is equal to the decay heat rate less design capacity is 200 x 10 the heat removal rate of the building beat sinks at the time the syste= is brought into service (approxi=ately 35 seconds after the IccA). The iodine removal require =ents will be met with only half the syste= in operation.
V}
The syste= for each unit consists of two half-capacity spray, thiosulfate, and i
hydroxide pumps, two half-capacity reactor building spray headers, isolation valves, one thiosulfate tanh, one hydroxide tank, and the necessary piping, instru=entation and controls. Duplicate heat tracing and controls are provided on each chemical si.orage tank. The pu=ps and re=ote operated valves of each unit can be operated from the control roc =. The so
.u= thiosulfate is pu= ped directly into the suction of each spray pu=p and the sodiu= hydroxide is pumped into the piping fro the borated water storage tank which connects to the suction of both the spray pumps and the decay heat pu=ps.
The spray pattern fro = the two independent spray headers is designed to give complete area coverage with either half of the syste= operating and mini =u=
interference with both halves of the syste= operating. The spray headers vill be located in the reactor building do=e to give a free fall height of the i
spray water of approx 1=ately 90 feet.
4 Upon a signal (high reactor building pressure) fro the engineered safeguards actuation syste=, the two spray pu=ps start, taking suction initially free the borated water storage tank. Si=ultaneously, the chemical additive injection pu=ps start and the valves open, allowing injection of the chemical solution into the spray pu=p suction lines. The reactor building spray syste shares the borated water storage tank and the suction lines frc= the borated water storage tank with the high-and low-pressure injection systems.
-A A=end=ent No. 2 0071t 5/2s/69 Amendment No. h 6-10 9/26/69
i After the water in the borated water storage tank reaches a low level, the spray pump suction is auto =atically transferred to the reactor building sump.
This same signal effects closure of the chemical additive injection valves.
4 The reactor building su=p water is cooled by the decay heat removal system as described in 6.1.
After mixing of the chemicals is complete, the initial composition of the mixed solution will contain 1 percent by weight sodium thiosulfate and will have a pH of approximately 9.o to 9 5 Pu=p motor power is supplied from normal and standby sources with backup sup-plied from the emergency diesel generators. Design data for the reactor build-ing spray system components are given in Table 6-3 Design data for co=ponents of the decay heat removal systems used in the recirculation phase of engineered safeguards operation are given in 9 6.1 and supplemented by Figure 6-1.
6.2 3 DESIGN EVAIDATION This system provides 100 percent of the required heat re= oval capacity to maintain building pressure at or below the design value. The system design flow of 2,350 gpm is based on the spray water reaching thermal equilibrium with the steam-air mixture within the reactor building.
Any of the following combinations of equipnent will provide sufficient heat removal capability to mainttia the post-accident reactor building pressure be-low the design value:
(b
)
a.
Two reactor building spray pumps.
I b.
Four air cooling units.
c.
Two emergency cooling units and one reactor building spray pump.
The reactor building spray system is designed to deliver 2,350 gpm through the 11 spray nozzles within 35 seconds after the LOCA based on the diesel generators loading sequence in Table 8-1.
The spray pumps for each unit are located in separate rooms in the lowest level of the auxiliary building. This insures the availability of 50 percent of the system and also insures sufficient NPSH to the pumps. The chemical additive pumps are also located in separate rooms.
There is complete redundancy in the system with respect to iodine retention capability. Technical support infor=ation for the system is found in Pro-prietary Topical Report BAW-lool 7 which has been submitted to the AEC.
Amendment No. 2
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Table 6-3 Reactor Building Spray System Performance and Eauipment Data Component Data Reactor Building Spray Pumps Number 2 (Each Unit) lRatedFlov,Gpm 1,300 Motor Horsepower, Ep Approx 250 Material SS Design Temperature, F 310 Sodiu Thiosulfate Pump Number 2 (Each Unit)
Flov, Gp=
LO Sodiu= Hydroxide Pu=p Number 2 (Each Unit)
Flow, Gpm 30
~ Sodium Thiosulfate Tank Number 1 (Each Unit)
Volume, Gal 10,000 Material SS Sodiu= Hydroxide Tank Number 1.(Each Unit)
Volume, Gal 8,000
-Material CS Spray Header Nu=ber 2
Spray Droplet Size 1,000 Micron Mean Spray No::les Number (Total) 150
' Type Spraco No. 1713 Material SS Piping ~
SS 00783 Amendment No. 5-6-11 11/3/69 a
I 1
1 6.2.h TESTS A'O INSPECTIONS Cc=ponents of the reactor building spray syste= are tested on a regular j
schedule as follows:
Reactor Building These pu=ps are tested singly by closing the Spray pu=ps spray header valves and opening the valves in the test line. Each pu=p in turn vill be i
started by operator action and checked for flev g
by recirculating to the storage tank. This test will also verify flow through each of the berated water storage tank outlet valves.
Sodiu Thiosulfate These pumps are tested by recirculating to their Pu=ps and Sodiu=
respective stcrage tanks.
l Hydroxide Pumps Borated Water Storage These nor= ally open valves are cycled by re=ote Tank Outlet Valves-operator action to insure isolation closure, i
Reactor Building Spray With the respective pu=ps shut down and the nor-Isolation and Chemical
= ally locked open block valves upstrea= closed, Injection Valves these valves are each opened and closed by 1
operator action.
Spray N zzles When the unit is shut down, air or s=che is blown
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through the test connections with visual observa-tions of the nozzles.
Reactor Building Su=p These valves will cach be cycled open and closed Valves by operator action.
11 (paragraph Deleted)
Provisions are cade for sampling the contents of the storage tanks to assure that chemical concentrations are within specified limits.
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A=end=ent No. h 6-12 9/26/69 1
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63 REACTOR BUILDING AIR RECIRCULATION AND COOLIIB SYSTEM 6.3 1 DESIGN BASES The reactor building air recirculation and cooling system is designed to remove heat and vapor from the reactor building atmosphere during norma 2 plant operation, and in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident, to limit the reactor building pressure rise and hence reduce the leakage of air-borne activity from the reactor building.
The reactor bu11 dire air recirculation and cooling system is independent of the emergency injection and reactor building spray systems, and is completely redundant to the reactor building spray system.
632 DESCRIPTION AND OPERATION The schematic flow diagram of the reactor building cooling system is shown in Figure 6-5 Both units utilize identical equipment and arrangement. Four air handling and cooling units located entirely within the reactor buildire are provided. Each unit consists of a roughing filter, fin tube cooling coils, and two direct-driven fans. One fan motor per unit is rated for the post-accident condition which is approximately 2-1/2 times the n;rmal operating load. For emergency cooling, all four units operate with the heat being rejected to the service water system.
- O During nor=al plant operation, four units with both fans in operation remove i
Q the nor=al heat load although three units are capable of this duty.
The service water supply line for each cooler has a normally open isolation valve. The return line for each cooler has a nor= ally closed stop valve and a modulated control valve in parallel with the stop valve. The stop valves and fans may be manually operated from the control room. The control valve is operated by a signal from a tamperature controller in the cooler discharge.
In the event of a loss-of-coolant accident, the actuating signal vill open the return stop valve for full flow.
Each of these units can remove 50 x 10 Btu per hour under design reactor -
building temperature conditions. The design data for the cooling units are shor_. in Table 6-k.
During plant shutdown, the cooling units continue to operate as required.
6 The cooling system design heat re= oval rate under LOCA conditions, 200 x 10 i
Stu/h, is equal'to the decay heat rate less the heat removal rate of the building heat sinks at the time the system is brcught into service (apprcxi-mately 30 see after the LOCA).
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Table 6 L Eeactor Buildig Air Coolig Unit Performance ani Ecuit=ent Ista (Quantities Are fo2 One Nuclear Unit)
(Capacities Are for Single Cceponents)
Duty Ecuittent Data Emergency Nc =al No. of Units Installed L
L No. Required L
3 Feak Heat Icad, Btu /h 50 x 100 1.h3 x loo Fan Capacity, ef (Total per Uni + '
21,000 L2,000 Reactor Building Atmosphere Inlet Temperature, F 29T 120 Coolire Water Flow, gp:
1,200 3 00 6.3 3 IESIGN EVALUATION
- This syste= provides 100 percent of the required heat re= oval capacity to maintain buildire pressure at or below the design value.
Any of the follovira ec=binations of equip =ent will provide sufficient heat removal capability to maintain the postaccident reactor buildire pressure i
below the design value:
i
-w) a.- Two reactor building spray pu=ps.
b.
Four air coolire units.
c.
T.co emergency cocling units and one reactor building spray pump.
In establishing the design of'this syste=, the following factors have been considered:
a.
Direction of normal air flov toward the hotter equiptent, na:ely, the pri=ary coolant syste=, tends to maintain electrical equipment in a cooler environ =ent.
b.
The con capacity for the accident condition is based upon a cen-servative estimate of the highest possible service water temperature.
The cooling coil tubes are equipped with removable fittires to permit c.
cleanire of the water side with brushes. A foulira factor is in-cluded in the coil ratires.
d.
The reactor buildire cooling coils and fans are protected from physical damage by =issiles. This equipment is designed for seismic loads from earthquakes.
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The failure of the normal and standby electrical pcVer supply vill automatically connect the four accident-rated fans to e=ergency electric power.
f.
The fans and motors are designed to cperate under no. al er accident conditions. The =otors are directly connected to the fan wheels. The fans that remain running during an emergency are rated for the design load at the emergency condition, which is 2 -1/2 times the normal load. Therefore, they will nor= ally operate at a very light load, preserving insulation and bearing life.
g.
An excessive service water flev due to leakage frc= the coil is annunciated in the control room by high-water level in the cooler sump and high-water flow as measured by a flow device in the service water supply line.
h.
The components of the system are used during nomal cperation and hence are continuously monitored for availability fcr emergency coolire.
1.
Coolire ceils of similar design have been tested successfully under design accident conditions in connection with the Hadda: Neck and Palisades Plants.
A 6.3.L TESTS AND INSFECTIONS
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The active components of the coolire units will nor= ally be in operation.
The service water outlet stop valves vill be periodically cycled to insure that full rated flow can be established through the coils.
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12/26/69 EMERGENCY INJECTION l
SAFEGUARDS
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NAKEUP PUNP CHARACTERISTICS 43iT$,jQ
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DEC A1 HE AT REMovat pyyp CHARACTERISTICS fi2Ufe 6-3
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