ML20008D680

Forwards LER 79-053/01T-0

ML20008D680
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	12/21/1979
From:	Cooney M PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:	Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20008D681	List: ML20008D680 ML20008D682
References
NUDOCS 8001140402
Download: ML20008D680 (2)

Text

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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY u e Q' 2301 MARKET STREET 6 P.O. BOX 8699 .

PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 (21si e4 t-4ooo

^

g D e c e mb e r 21, 1979 Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement kegion I United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUBJECT:

Licensee Event Report Narrative Descriotion The f ollowing occurrence was rep orted t o Mr. Greenman, Region I, Office of Inspection and Enforcement on December 7, 1979.

Reference:

Docket No 50-277 Report No: LER 2-79-53/1T Report Date: December 21, 1979 Occurrence Eate: December 7, 1979 Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station RD 1, Delta, Pennsylvania 17314 Technical Specification

Reference:

Technical Specifications 6.9.2.a (2) states " Operation of the unit or affected system when any parameter or operation subject to a limiting condition is less conservative tnan the least conservative aspect of the limiting condition f cr cp era tion established in the Tech nical Specifications.

Technical Specifications 3.7.D.2 states "In the svent any isolation valve specified in Table 3.7.1 b e comes inoperable, react or p ower operation may continue provided at least one valve in?each line having an inoperable valve shall be in the mode cofresponding to the is ola tion condition." -

I O

T00lI40903 l

Mr. Boyco H. Crior Page 2 6

Description of the Event:

A jumper was installed in the control circuit on 5/20/79 during an investigation of the inability of the Unit.2 recirculation system sample is olation valve (AO-2-2 930) to open in response to a manual signal f ollowing a modification to assure electrical separation. Because the jumper restored panual operation and because the individual doing the work believed that

the jumper only restored circuit continuity, no testing of the

' isolation capability of the valve was done. The jumper was duly logged in the jumper log per p rocedure. On 12/7/79, during preparation for testing of another modification, this jumper was recognized to inhibit automatic isolation of that valve.

Consequences of Event The inner isolation valve was not af fected and would have au t oaa ti ca lly is olated upon request. Because the inner isolation valve would have isolated and the outer isolation valve could be operated manually, the line could have been isolated if necessary.

Cause of Event The cause of this event was an individual p ers onnel error.

The individual involved f ailed to identify any other actions that would either be blocked or caused by the installation of this jumper.

l Corrective Action l The jumper was removed upon discovery. Both valves were tested for manual and automatic isolation and were found to be fully operable. The imp or t anc e of properly identifying all actions caused by the installation of a jumper or lif ting of a l lead in an electrical circuit was stressed to the individual

! inveived. Additionally, an immediate review was made of jumper log entires ccncerning the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS), Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS), and Reactor Protection System (RPS) circuitry and no abnormaliticJ were found.

Very truly yours, i k /

i-

, ,J. ooney t perintende t '

eneration Divisihn-Nuclear Attachment cc: Director, NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement Mr. Norman Haller, NRC-Office of Management & Prcgram Analysis

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