ML20006E717

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Forwards Summary of 900111 Meeting W/Util in Util Corporate Ofc Re Program to Control Safeguards,Per Insp Rept 50-482/89-26.Attendee List & Licensee Handouts Also Encl
ML20006E717
Person / Time
Site: Wolf Creek Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation icon.png
Issue date: 02/13/1990
From: Collins S
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To: Withers B
WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.
References
NUDOCS 9002260264
Download: ML20006E717 (12)


See also: IR 05000482/1989026

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In Reply Refer To: .

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Docket: ;STN 50-482/89-26c

Wolf. Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation

ATTN: Bart D. Withers _

i President' and: Chief Executive Officer

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P.O. Box-411-

Burlington, Kansas :66839

Gentlemen:-

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-;This. refers to the meeting l conducted at our request in your Wichita corporate

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office on January 11, 1990.. This meeting related to activities authorized by-

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NRC Operating License NPF-42 for the Wolf Creek Generating Station, and was-

attended by those listed on the enclosed attendance list.

The. subjects discussed at this meeting are described in the enclosed Meeting

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Summery.

It is our opinion'that this meeting was beneficial and has provided a better

understanding.of the issues involved,

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-In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2

Title 10, Code.of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter will be placed in

the NRC's Public Document Room.

'Should you have any questions concerning this matter,:we will be pleased to

discuss them.;

Sincerely,

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Samuel-J. Collins, Director

Division of Reactor Projects

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Enclosures:

1.

Meeting Summary

2.

Attendance List

3.

Licensee Handout

cc w/ Enclosures:

WolfLCreek Nuclear Operating Corp.

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-ATTN: - Gary Boyer, Plant Manager

P.O. Box 411-

Burlington, Kansas 66839

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Wolf? Creek Nuclear Operating-; Corporation:

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S aw,!Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge

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ATTN: LJay S11 berg, Esq.-

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.1800 M Street, NW

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Public Service Commission

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ATTN: ;Chr.is,R. Rogers, P.E.

Manager,. Electric Department

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'P.O.' Box 360'

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thS. Nuclear Regulatory Commissior,

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Regional Administrator, Region III

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799. Roosevelt Road

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Glen.Ellyn, Illinois 6013'l

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ATTN: Otto'Maynard, Manager

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Regulatory; Services-

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Burlington, Kansas 66839

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ATTN:

Robert Elliot,. Chief. Engineer

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Office of the Governor .

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-Attorney General

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Ist: Floor --The Statehouse

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! Chairman, Coffey County Commission

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Burlington,, Kansas 66839-

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. Kansas Department of Health

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LBureau:of Air' Quality & Radiation

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Control

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-ATTN: . Gerald Allen, Public

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Health Physicist

Division of Environment

Forbes Field Building 321

' Topeka ~, . Kansas 66620

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U.S. Nuclear ~ Regulatory Commission-

ATTN:: Senior' Resident Inspector

P 0; Box 311.

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' Burlington, Kansas ~ 66B39

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'U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

' ATTN: . Regional Administrator,; Region IV/

611 Ryan. Plaza Drive, Suite 1000:

. Arlington, Texas 76011

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bec w/ Enclosures:,

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bec to DMB (IE45)

R. D. Martin:

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-Resident-Inspector.

-SEPS File

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.D.-A.: Powers

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.DRP' File

- Section Chief, DRP/D

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Project-Engineer, DRP/D

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P. O' Conner,.NRR Project Manager

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B.- Earnest.

..R. . A';: Caldwell

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-ENCLOSURE:1$

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MEETING SUMMARY?

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Licensee:

- Wo1f Creek Nuclear' Operating. Corporation'

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' Facility:i

' Wolf Creek Generating Station

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License No.:

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. NPF-42

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Docket No.:

50-482

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MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS WCNOC PROGRAM T0

CONTROL SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION

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A management conference was. held at NRC's request to discuss the licensee's-

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program;for. controlling safeguards information (SGI). The NRC' concerns on SGI

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, controls arose from inspection findings that.were documented in NRC Inspection

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-Report 50-482/89-26. -During the meeting,-discussions were held concerning,

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these licensee-identified events that' occurred o'er the past 2 years when.SGI:

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Lwas_potentially compromised at the WCN0C corporate offices and the Wolf Creek

Generating Station. 'Also discussed'were the licensee's previous and. current

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corporate-facilit_ies' and the protection afforded for ensuring'the proper

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handling of'SGItat those facilities. A tour of the current corporate offices

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wasialso provided.' The licensee presented their new methodology.for_ evaluating

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Jtheineed:for? logging and reporting = events involving' potential-compromise of

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SGI .

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As a-result-of.'the subject events, the licensee has established two successive

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. task-forces to investigate-the SGI control program, issued an SGI stop work

' order, and: issued Corrective Action Request 26. . The_WCNOC'SGI enhancement.

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. program resulting from the licensee's-: current-evaluations-are thef

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centralization of storage and control over corporate SGI documents, the'

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? reduction ofcSGI documentation,'and revision of.the main procedure that

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establishes the responsibilities and activities for controlling _SGI.

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activities. underway include-staff training and improved quality assurance

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~ trending. ;The licensee anticipates completion of the enhancement program in

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-July'1990.

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iThe -NRC staff committed to provide at a later date reporting clarification in

response to a111censee question. The question concerned the time afforded to

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the licensee to' report pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71 to NRC.an event wherein a

compromise of SGI has occurred.

Specifically, the licensee questioned the time

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permitted to. evaluate and establish the significance of the compromised SGI

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~ after the actual discovery of the event. After consultation with NRC program

. office personnel, the staff responded to the licensee that as specified in

NUREG-1304, " Reporting of Safeguards Events," missing SGI that is significant

in:that it could significantly assist a person in an act of radiological

sabotage or theft of special nuclear material should be reported within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />

of discovery.

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l ENCLOSURE 2

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' ATTENDANCE-LIST

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at the WCNOC Wichita'

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Attendance at the WCNOCl- NRC Meeting on January-11,1990',-

office.

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Harold Chernoff,LSupervisor, Licensing

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Merlin G. Williams, Manager,_ Plant Support,

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John-W.PJohnson, Chief of Security

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W.-Mike.Lindsay, Manager, Quality-Assurance-(QA)

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Dave Pe'avler, QA Specialist III

Forrest Rhodes, Vice President, Engineering & Technical Services-

Jack Pippin, Manager,' Nuclear Power Engineering-(NPE)

R~:Kevin'Steinbroek, NPE Engineer

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Ed Asbury, Supervisor, Configuration Management

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l Gene Rathbun, Manager, NPE-Wichita

' John Goodwin;_ Manager, Management Systems

Robert C. Hagan,~ Manager, Nuclear Services

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NRC

L..A. Yandell, Deputy Director, Division of Radiation Safety and

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Safeguards (DRSS)_

.D;-A. Powers, Chief, Security and Emergency Preparedness Section, DRSS

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7'However,31f' the significance:of the missing SGILis not. apparent, the. licensee

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is expected to actively pursue:such a determination upon discovery.' _ It is not

.the NRC staff's11ntent that a' licensee report compromised SGI.without.first.

establishing the significance of such SGI. iThe-NRC staff recognizes <that'to:

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establish the significance lof .some- eventst will? require time to- acquire a copy

oflor reconstruct.the missing documentation ~and then'to perform-an evaluation.

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Dale A. Powers, Chief-

' Security and Emergency

Preparedness'Section.

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ENCLOSURE 3:

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?WCNOC MEETING:WITH NRC REGION IV-

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. SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION7 CONTROL

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JANUARY 11, 1990

W$LF CREEK

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NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION

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INTRODUCTION

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FACILITY DESCRIPTIONS / TOUR

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-IIL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATIONS

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OPEN1 DISCUSSION OF SELECTED EVENTS

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'WCNOC SI CONTROL ENHANCEMENTS -

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.VI.

CONCLUSION

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SIGNIFICANCE REVIE2-

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Potential'SI Event Reported

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No

Is the information SI

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10CFR73.21 KGP-1106

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Is the

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information

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information

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stamped SI?

stamped SI?

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Enter document (s)

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Declassify

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action

control procedure

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(identify why the

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document.was stamped)

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Could the information be used

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to gain unauthorized or un-

detected access to the facil-

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ity if uncompensated or sig.

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nifiantly. assist an individ-

ual in damaging the facility

or in the theft of SNM

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Yes

Not a significant

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compromise of SI

Loss to be rsported to

the NRC within one hour

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Identify actions to be

taken to mitigate-the

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consequences of the loss

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SIGNIFICANCE REVIEW-

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Things to evaluate to determine significance

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- 1. E LWhere did the event occur? Evaluate the people who may have had

access.

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How=long was the information uncontrolled?:

3.

Has there been any attempt to sabotage the plant?

4.

If the information represents only the design features of the. Physical'

Protection System, does it reflect substantial amounts of information

to allow an adversary to breach the layered electronic' surveillance /

detection system and elude the Physical Protection ProgramL(Physical

Security Forces) to gain access to the Protected Area.(PA) and

ultimately Vital Areas (VA) without interdiction to-either steal SNM or-

sabotage the plant.

5.

If'the information represents only the Physical Protection. Program,

does it reflect substantial amounts of information to allow the

adversary to. circumvent the response force from interdiction and allow

the adversary to gain access to the PA and-ultimately the VA's to

either steal'SNM or sabotage the plant.

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6.

If both types of information are represented, is substantial amounts of

both types available to bypass the layered designed Physical Protection

Features and elude the response of the Physical Protection Program to

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either steal.SNM or sabotage the plant.

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If questions 4, 5 or 6 can be answered yes a significant compromise has

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occurred and a one hour report to the NRC is required.

(one hour frosa the

discovery of the' event)

SINCE NO COMPENSATORY MEASURE CAN ADEQUATELY COMPENSATE FOR A COMPROMISE

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OF SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION -- DOCUMENT WHAT ACTIONS ARE TO BE TAKEN TO

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MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE LOSS.

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The above review shall be completed by personnel cognizant of the content of

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the material.

(i.e. Security to review information related to the specifics

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of.the Physical Protection Program and NPE to review the information related

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to the' design features of the electronic surveillance / detection system).

Concurrence with the findings of the review between both groups is required

before the review can be approved.

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WCM0C'SI ENHANCEMENTS

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FINDING

CORRECTIVE ACTION-

'COPFLETION DATE: .'

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A.

Safeguards-Information Protection:

.1. . Upgrade..KGP-1106'

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03/15/90_

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Inability to adequately protect

a. Clearly establish:

safeguards information.

1. Responsibility

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2. Authority

Root Cause:

'3. Accountability

' Poor governing procedure,-lack of

4.. Security Investigation Report required

adequate training to improve under-

'for all events and control problems.

standing of the procedure and.an

5. Training requiremenets for general

indifferent attitude toward safeguards

employees and SI workers

information protection.

b. Review for level.of readability

2. - Training

a. Conduct GET training on how to'

07/30/90

recognize SI and what to do if

found unattended

b. Specific training for SI workers

07/15/90

on an annual basis or KGP-1106

major revisions

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B.

SI Event Precursors and

1.

Enhance QA trending activities and

06/30/90

Ineffective Corrective Actions:

information distribution for safeguards

Failure by Management /QA to identify re-

information problems.

occurring events and establish proper

ccrrective actions to be applied

project wide.

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Root Cause:

Lack of available trending data concern Ng

SI event precursors and an indifferent.

attitude toward safeguards information

protection.

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2C.. Security Notification'of SI, Events:'

1. -Upgrade-KGP-1106.to require' timely

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Lack of procedural requirements for

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. reporting of an SI control event to

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timely reporting of safeguard information

the Chief of. Security.

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control' events tolsecurity.

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. Root Cause:

2.

Upgrade KGP-1106 to require a written-

03/15/90:

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1 Failure to recognize new reporting-

follow-up of event;to security.

requirements for SI control events.

.

3.

SI worker training to include requirement for

07/15/901

' timely reporting of SI control.. events

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D.

Security Compensatory Measuresi

' 1.

Formalize significance review guidelines

- 03/31/90

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Failure to review in a timely manner a

safeguards information control event ~

2.

Develop procedures to document compensatory

- 02/02/90:

for significance to initiate measures"-

measures taken for SI control events

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to mitigate the-consequences of the

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loss as required.

Root Cause:

.

4

Failure to identify the need to establish

a formalized (documented) significance

determination procedure.

E.

Applicability Review for Reporting SI

1.

Review Regulatory Guida 5.62 and

02/02/90-

Events:

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NUREG 1304 to deteraine if other

A review is needed to establish if all

possible omissions occurred in adrif tion

new security reporting requirements

to the proper reverting of SI control events

_

have been reflected into WCGS procedures.

Root Cause:

Failure to proceduralize new reporting

requirements for SI control events.

F.

SI Magnetic Media Errors:

.

1.

KGP-1106 upgrade to include

-03/15/90.

Lack of provisions to allow account -

requirements for handling magnetic media

ability of all documents contained on~

magnetic media and to properly handle

2. . SI worker training to include instruction

07/15/90

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safeguards information on-magnetic

on magnetic media handling

media.

Root Cause:

Failure to recognize the need to document and-

properly handle information contained on.

magnetic media.

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