ML20006B761
| ML20006B761 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 01/06/1990 |
| From: | Carr K NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Kostmayer P HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20005H003 | List: |
| References | |
| CCS, KOSTMAYE-900106, NUDOCS 9002050327 | |
| Download: ML20006B761 (2) | |
Text
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(b) A significant number of: people that the plan is intended
. to protect are not likely to avoid lethal radiation doses l
t within the first eight hours after a major accident? If not, why not?
ANSWER..
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Commission regulations.and practice applicable to the siting'and design j
.of; reactors, for example those in 10 CFR Parts 50 and 100, provide assurance that-licensed nuclear power reactors do not pose any significant risk'of lethal doses of radiation to the public. The
- Commission's emergency planning regulations further the Commission's objective of assuring adequate protection of the public health and safety
-by requiring' measures to acconnodate a spectrum of accidents (including L
those beyond design-basis) to further enhance the protection offered by H
' design, siting, and operational controls.
In light of the foregoing, then, the
. premise of the question is incorrect.
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' Analyses'of severe accidents conducted by NRC indicate that'the vast L
majority of severe accidents would not lead to lethal radiation doses 1
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=off site within the first eight hours after a major accident. All of the
' nformation available to the NRC indicates that the chances of-a severe i
,L fuel damage accident are very low, perhaps one chance in ten thousand reactor years of operation.
Even in the event of a severe fuel damage o
, accident, associated safety systems would, in the great majority of
' cases, prevent lethal radiation doses off site within the first eight 9002050327 900117 PDR COMMS NRCC
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-Ouestion 2b. (Continued) hours.after the onset of the accident. Consequently, for the major portion of
-the spectrum of potential accidents, including all design basis accidents, there, are no projected early fatalities, and protective actions would signifi-cantly reduce radiation exposure for nearby populations. Thus, protection of the public from the consequences of extremely low probability accidents is accomplished by limiting the probability of their occurrence through system t
design and operating procedures, and by providing mitigation features, such as containment systees, as well as by requiring the capability for emergency response protective actions.
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