ML20005H277

Forwards Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant Exercise, on 890621-22.No Deficiencies Identified.Four Areas Requiring Corrective Action & Several Areas Recommended for Improvement Noted

ML20005H277
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	01/08/1990
From:	Kwiatkowski D Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Congel F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20005H278	List: ML20005H277
References
NUDOCS 9001240370
Download: ML20005H277 (1)

Text

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Division of Radiation Protection-and Emergency Preparudness 3

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Dear Mr. Congel:

JEncl$ sed is a copy of the' final exercise report for the June 21-22, 1989, fullL participation joint exercise of the offsite radiological' emergency

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. preparedness plans' site-specific to the Crystal-River Nuclear Power Plant.

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'Ihe State; of Florida:and Citrus and levy Counties, both located in the 10-i faile plume emergency planning zone, fully participated in'the exercise.

LIV staff of.the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

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'Ihere were no deficiencies identified during this exercise. There were, CT however,Lfour.~ areas: requiring ~ corrective action and several areas

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recomendedifor improvement. 'Ihe exercise report was prepared by the Region e

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. Based ~ on the-results of this exercise, the offsite radiological' emergency f plans and preparedness are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that

' appropriate measures' can be taken offsite.to protect the health and safety _

of-the public-in the event of a_ radiolcgical emergency at the site.

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,Iherefore, the-44:CFR 350 approval granted on February 15, 1984, will remain iinLeffect.1 1

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x FDR? Region IV staff will furnish a copy of this final exercise report to

the State of. Florida., 'Ihey will assure ccxtpletion by the State of the necessary corrective actions.

i If;you'should have any questions, please contact Mr. Craig S. Wingo, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-3026.

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Dennis H. Inia s

pf Assistant Associate Director j

office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs l

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FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION IV I snejjg

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i CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1

EXERCISE

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{D Conducted on June 21-22, 1989 l

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Exercise Report September 22, 1989 i

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_. Utility:

Florida Power Corporation Plant Location:

Crystal River, Citrus County, Florida Participating State and Local Governments:

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State of Florida Citrus County Levy County

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m TABLE OF CONTENTS 8

Pace I.

EXERCISE:

SUMMARY

1 II.

DETAILED ~ DISCUSSION 2

3 State of-Florida 2

-f in State' Emergency; Operations Center-(SEOC) 2

-: Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)-

3 i

Dose Assessment

-4 i

Emergency. News Center-(ENC) 5 L-Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL) 6 i

l Radiological Field Monitoring Teams 7

Citrus-County 12 l

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 12 l

i JOther Activities =

14 4

' Levy-County 17 Emergency-Operations Center (EOC) 17 Other Activities 19

III.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF INADEQUACIES 22 i

IV'.

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SUMMARY

LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT 23 J.

V.

APPENDICES 26 L

A.

Evaluator List and Assignments B.

Exercise Objectives and Scenario

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EXERCISE

SUMMARY

I The Crystal River full participation plume and ingestion pathway

' Cxercise was conducted on June 21-22, 1989, and was observed by twenty-four Federal evaluators representing six Federal agencies.

The' evaluation was based on NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev.

1,

" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency. Response Plans in Support of Nuclear Power Plants".

The' Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant is owned and operated by the Florida Power Corporation.

It is located in Citrus County epproximately seven and one-half miles northwest of the town of

' Crystal River.

Parts of Citrus and Levy Counties lie within the 110-mile Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).

'All or parts of Alachua, Dixie, Gilchrist, Lake, Levy, Marion, Citrus, Hernando, Sumter, and Pasco Counties lie within the 50-mile Ingestion Exposure Pathway.

During this exercise, Citrus and Levy Counties fully participated end implemented their emergency response plans.

The. State of Florida also: fully participated and staffed the State'EOC, the

Emergency Operations Facility, the Emergency News Center, and the Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory.

Three field monitoring teams were deployed.

This exercise included the following major participants:

Florida Power Corporation Florida Division of Emergency Management Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Citrus County Emergency Management Levy County Emergency Management

-All. exercise objectives were demonstrated, and no NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev.

1, deficiencies were identified.

There were, I

however, four areas requiring corrective actions and several areas recommended for improvement which are listed in Sections III and IV of this report.

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-II.-

DETAILED DISCUSSION-1 l

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Exercise Time Ling I

Alert 9:19 a.m.

I Site Area Emergency 10:12 a.m.

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Gene:Jal Emergency 12:20 p.m.

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State of Florida State Emercency ODerations Center (SEOC)

-The State Emergency Operations Center is located in Tallahassee,

-Florida, andlis an excellent facility.

The SEOC is capable of operating for an extended period of time.

Outstanding leadership and organization was demonstrated during Lthe two-day exercise.

State agencies demonstrated their capabilities and participated-in briefings to explain their role and to update other SEOC personnel on the status of their

' actions..

I i

All" displays and status boards were of sufficient size and quantity and were'kept up-to-date as required.

l The overall' operation of the State EOC functioned extremely well in support'of the EOF during the two-day Plume Exposure and Ingestion Pathway exercise at Crystal River.

SuDerior Items:

1.

Overall management of the emergency operation.

Deficiencies:

None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None

-Areas Recommended for ImDrovement:

None i

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Emeraency Ooerations Facility (EOF)

The State of Florida emergency response organization at the d

utility EOF consisted of a well-organized group led by the Governor's Authorized Representative (GAR).

_ Command, direction, and control were superior.

l Specific directions were issued in accordance with the State emergency response plan.

Protective actions recommended by Florida Power Corporation (FPC) were discussed with the State and

. agreement was reached promptly.

Once the decision was madelthe representative contacted the State EOC, Levy County EOC, and Citrus County EOC to discuss the decision.

The conference l

communications went very well and protective actions were 4

initiated in a' timely manner.

Technical information issued by FPC did not confuse the State personnel.

The technical data was transmitted to the State and counties directly.

This indicated a detailed knowledge of plant operations and. terminology.

At the General Emergency level, the counties preempted the evacuation recommendation due to town, county, and area boundaries.

The counties decided to evacuate all sectors out to i

10 miles.

The counties demonstrated the ability to reduce confusion and misdirection by recommending a larger area for i

evacuation.

The status boards were very difficult to read from the rear of the room; wind direction was listed but never displayed, and the plant schematic.was never used to demonstrate the point of containment leakage.

Upon arrival of the NRC, the private conference room noise increased due to placement of the NRC dose assessment equipment.

On the second day, the DHRS Operations Officer took an active role in determining the ingestion pathway " footprint".

Command and control continued to be-exemplary.

Detailed maps indicating

-the dairy, produce, surface water, and other areas were not available.

This caused some confusion as to whether samples were being taken or being considered.

Later, maps were hand drawn to indicate the extent of contamination.

State briefings at the EOF lacked the detail necessary to determine where assistance was needed, what samples were being

.obtained, specific areas of contamination, and what actions were being taken to protect the population.

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,, 'T overall',Lthe exercise was' handled very,well.

f, Suoerior Items:

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Command,sdirection, and control.

2

, Mobilization ofl emergency personnel.

Deficiencieg:

None Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:

None Areas Recommended for~Imorovement:

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Detailed 50-mile EPZ maps identifying locations of_ fish markets,-packers, water sources, farms, dairy farms, etc. would enable rapid identification of samples.

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_ Listings were used along with county maps to identify locations.

2.

Status boards should be marked in' black only to enhance 1 readability at a distance.

3.

Existing maps and schematics should be used during I

briefings to better describe wind direction, plant problems, and evacuations, j

4.

Provide more detailed State briefings at the EOF.

~ Dose: Assessment The State Radiological Health (DHRS) activities were performed in a well-organized and coordinated manner.

Dose calculations were performed on computer and confirmed with FPC using the same computer program.

The calculations were used for dose projections and later confirmed by the field teams.

The field monitoring. teams were well directed by the Dose Assessment personnel in the EOF.

Proper surveys were taken and the decision to use KI was made by EOF Dose Assessment personnel based on dose projections.

Communications overall went well.

There was trouble with one

-radio, which was later replaced.

The noise level in the Dose

-Assessment area was excessive.

However, the overall control of the. operation went well.

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_The IngestionLPathway portion of the exercise was well organized.

Dose Assessment personnel performed proper calculations on soil,

water,

milk, and vegetation samples and compared them with the

'FDA PAGs.-

Decisions on recovery and reentry were based on field measurements in:and around the " footprints".

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Suoerior Items:

1.

Command and control of field teams.

2.

Overall dose assessment-activit

's in the EOF.

3.-

Good communication and comparise of results with FPC.

j Deficiencieg:

None-Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

1.

Reduce the excessive noise and traffic levels in Dose Assessment area.

l 2.-

Provide better maps and overlays in the Dose Assessment l

area.-

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-Emercency News-Center (ENC)

The Emergency News Center is located, along with the Emergency

-Operations-Facility (EOF), at the utility's Nuclear Operations Training Facility in Crystal River.

State,~ county, and utility PIO's and support personnel were co-

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located, as they were during the previous (June 1988) exercise.

This-co-location of staffs,_as well as the nearness of the ENC and EOF, facilitated the coordination of' news releases and expedited the transfer of emergency response information.

The physical facility, arrangement of working space, and equipment and displays were generally adequate.

There was no "significant events" status board in the PIO work area.

Five news media briefings were conducted during the first day of the exercise and three on the second day.

Media briefings were managed well.

The mock media were, at various times, aggressive and insistent in their questioning; however, the chief spokesmen handled the situation well and were always in control of the 1

1

Nm briefings. ' County, State, and-utility spokespersons briefed the media representatives well and often.

Media kits, all news 1

releases, and sufficient working area and telephones were available.to-the' media.

News' releases, in general, were adequate.

However, advisories to the public concerning the consumption of agricultural crops and information regarding the sampling of public water supplies were-not included'in the earlier Ingestion Pathway news releases, j

L overall, the activities of the Emergency News Center were well i

-organized and coordinated.

Several of the recommendations of the 1988 exercise were implemented.

Deficiencies:

None i

Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:

None Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

1.

Provide a "significant events" status board.in the PIO work area.

2.

Utilize geographical boundary descriptions of EPZ sectors when feasible.

3.

Include all precautionary instructions in news releases concerning the Ingestion Pathway.

Mobile Emeraency Radiolocical Laboratory (MERL)

The Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL) staff was notified at their location in Crystal River, and arrived at the MERL location before the Alert status on the first day.

The MERL

" hot line" was established soon after arrival in an exemplary manner, and MERL was operational by approximately 9:20 a.m.

Field monitoring teams (air and iodine sampling) were dispatched from the MERL' location but were directed and controlled by " Rad Control" at the EOF.

Air and iodine samples were processed on day one, and results were provided to the EOF in a timely manner.

l

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-During the Ingestion Pathway portion of the exercise, the MERL was relocated to the Forestry Station on US 41 south of Floral J

City.

Departure time from Crystal River was approximately 7:30 a.m.

Upon arrival, at approximately 8:30 a.m.,

the MERL staff began immediately to establish the sample " hot line", sample preparation' area, and to bring the MERL to an operational status.

By approximately 9:05 a.m. MERL was operational and ready for receipt of environmental samples.

l Sampling teams delivered air, vegetation, milk, water, soil, and simulated citrus samples to the MERL for analysis.

The samples were processed through the hot line and monitored for external contamination.

Samples were appropriately marked with location and time.

Samples were prepared and properly labeled before

. entering MERL for analysis.

MERL staff properly analyzed the samples for the predominant j

radionuclide, Il31, using gamma scintillation spectroscopy.

Analyses were accurate and results were provided to the EOF in a i

timely. manner.

Deficiencies:

None 1

Argas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

None Radioloaical Field Monitorina Teams Field Monitorina Team (RAD-1) - Objective 4 on communications was met.

The radiological field team vehicle was equipped with a VHF radio and a. local government radio (LGR) which were both repeatedly demonstrated successfully throughout the exercise.

Communications were established with the Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL), the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), as well as other radiological field teams.

A cellular telephone.was also available, but not demonstrated.

Appropriate radio protocols were generally-observed throughout the exercise.

No communications failures were noted, although some areas in the city of Brooksville were subject to " dead spots" because of hilly terrain.

Delays in communication were minimized, usually less than a few minutes.

Objective 6 on emergency worker exposure control was met.

On days one and two, each emergency worker was equipped with three dosimeters:

0-5R, 0-20R and 0-200mR.

A thermoluminescent dosimeter was also issued.

Dosimeters were approximately zerced and' initial readings recorded on a control log.

A personal log was also issued to each team member.

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Dosimeter readings were noted and recorded every 30 minutes

- throughout the exercise.

Team members were aware of the 500mR limit noted in the plan as well as the need for authorization by

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the Field Team Director to exceed that limit.

Objective 7 on ambient radiation monitoring was met.

The team c

was equipped with a CDV-700 low-range gamma-beta survey _ meter as well as a CDV-715 high-range gamma survey meter.

They also had a

_l Ludlum 125 micrometer and a Ludlum Model 2200 Sodium Iodide Scintillation detector.

All instruments were battery and source checked before deployment.

Spares were available in the MERL if i

needed.

All instruments had been calibrated since January 30, 1989.

Instruments were properly bagged in plastic to protect from contamination.

i At each monitoring location, team members used appropriate techniques and procedures as specified in the plan to monitor at

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approximately waist level (3 feet) and at ground level (6 inches).

Readings were appropriately logged and then 4

communicated by radio to the Field-Team Director at the Emergency Operations Facility.

Monitoring locations were noted clearly on a large-scale

" Environmental Survey Team Map" of the 10-mile EPZ.

Field team members had no difficulty in promptly finding and traveling to designated monitoring points.

Objectives 8 and.9 on airborne iodine and particulate monitoring, respectively, were met.

The team used a low-volume air sampler powered from the field team vehicle.

External power plugs on the front of the vehicle permitted rapid and convenient connections to the sampler.

Samples were taken by the team with meticulous attention to procedures at all times.

The sample was taken for five minutes at 1.8

-1.9 cubic feet per minute, somewhat low for adequate precision.

The team then left the area, proceeded to a low-background area where the cartridge and particulate filter were purged of any noble gases for 15 seconds using the sampler.

The samples were counted using a Ludlum Model 2200 Sodium Iodide Scintillation detector and surveyed with a survey meter.

The sample count was transmitted by radio to the EOF 51 minutes after it was taken.

The team then transported its sample to the MERL as well as another picked up from another team, arriving there about one hour and 20 minutes after the sample was taken.

objective 27 on sampling in the ingestion exposure pathway was met.

The team arrived at the MERL at 8:40 a.m. on day two.

Ingestion sampling kits were issued at 9:10 a.m.

and inventoried and checked out by 9:20 a.m.

Survey meters were battery and source checked.

The team was briefed at 9:26 a.m. and deployed at 9:45 a.m. to T.

K. Smith Dairy, north of Brooksville.

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arrived there at 10:07 a.m.

At the dairy, they collected milk, soil, vegetation, stored feed, and water samples.

Again meticulous' care was taken to follow procedures to avoid cross e

contamination.

Procedures were readily available on the

" " Environmental Team Survey Map".

Samples were properly bagged E

and tagged with type, location, date, time, and name of L

the sample returned to the MERL by 11:23 a.m.

At the MERL, the individual.

Sample collection was completed at 11:10 a.m. and 1

team was surveyed and redeployed to collect raw and finished

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water samples from the pumping station in Brooksville.

Again, proper procedures were used.

Superior Items:

l 1.

Rad Team-#1-was extremely-professional in using and following all operating procedures and demonstrated a i

clear understanding of underlying monitoring and sampling philosophy.

Deficiencieg:

None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

1.

Prior to deploying into a contaminated area for t

ingestion sampling, teams should prepare and separate all sampling containers.

Partial pre-filling out of sample-tags can expedite the collection process.

-Different-colored plastic bags should be used to hold waste and samples.

To the extent possible, the vehicles should be divided into a waste side and sample side.

Field Monitorina Team (RAD-2) ~ The communication capability among field teams, the field team captain, and the mobile laboratory was fully demonstrated.

The radio communication systems are excellent.

Transmissions were clear and good radio protocol was used.

Field team members were supplied with three self-reading dosimeters in the ranges of 0-200mR, 0-5R, and 0-20R, and one bulb-type TLD.

The team members read and recorded their dosimeters every 30 minutes.

The team was very knowledgeable in exposure control procedures, turn-back values, and procedures in case pre-determined values were exceeded.

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Ambient radiation monitoring procedures were demonstrated by the team ~in accordance'with-their operating procedures.

All equipment was operationally checked prior to leaving staging area.

All equipment was in current calibration.

Readings were taken at both ground and waist high levels and promptly relayed to:the team. captain.

The maps used by the teams were

' outstanding.-

'The ingestion pathway team included-two members from the radiation control unit and one person from the Department of Agriculture.

Collection-of environmental samples was demonstrated.

Samples of milk, water, a011, grass, hay, and i

oranges were collected, double bagged and properly labeled.

Teams followed their operational procedures manual step by step.

The-team was very knowledgeable and went about their assignment 1

in a professional manner.

Suoerior Items:

1.

Radio communications.

2.

Ability to monitor radiation levels.

3.-

' Equipment condition.

Deficiencies:

None Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:

None ArgA3 Recommended for Imorovement:

None Field Monitorina Team (RAD-3) - Team #3 was prepositioned in Homosassa at the Comfort Inn.

They proceeded to the MERL location in Crystal River at 8:50 a.m., and arrived at the Mobile Lab at 9:15 a.m. where they received their equipment and supplies.

The team consisted of two RAD technicians and a L

controller.

They were deployed to their first assignment at L

10:19 a.m.,

following the equipment check-out and briefings.

Their radio-system consisted of the local government radio and a car-to-car frequency.

The teams proceeded to their assigned locations promptly and conducted the requested surveys for radiation in an efficient manner.

All radiological survey and counting instruments were recently calibrated and operating satisfactorily.

Air sampling o

I for both particulates and radioiodines were performed.

The team displayed professionalism and an excellent knowledge of the instruments.

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The1 team members were aware of the personnel exposure problems Land conscientiously read and recorded their dosimetry readings i

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., throughout the exercise.

They displayed a knowledge of the problems associated with the I

collection of soil, vegetation, water, and milk samples.

This Eawareness was especially evident in the careful handling of the i

. samples.during1the collection and packaging process.

Field Team' j

1. 3 was knowledgeable, efficient, and professional during the i

accomplishment of their assignments..

Suoerior Items:

Ll.

Knowledge of survey _ instrumentation and packaging and tagging of field samples.

Deficiencies:

None i

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

None

.Incestion Pathway Field Monitorina Team - The team was knowledgeable of procedures and equipment for dealing with i

radiological surveys.

The team set up their equipment at the

' weigh station on Interstate 75.

The team demonstrated field techniques by scanning a slowly-passing truck.

The truck set off the' alarm level which required hands-on scanning to further i

pinpoint the location of radioactive " hot spots" on the truck.

Samples'were found, properly bagged, labeled, and transported to the MERL.

LA vegetation sample was taken and transported to the MERL.

Proper techniques for bagging and labeling of both the sample, equipment, and waste was also demonstrated.

Each field team member had adequate dosimetry.

Readings were taken and recorded every 30 minutes.

The demonstration was concluded at the MERL Hot Line when the samples were transferred from the team to the Lab.

Suoerior Items:

3 1.

Team members' knowledge of department procedures.

Deficiencies:

None l

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Areas Rebuirina Corrective' Actions:

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' Areas R commended for Imorovement:

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Wear l cotton gloves under surgical gloves.

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Qitrus County IJ LEmeraency Ocerations Center-(EOQL

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a LThe1 Citrus County EOC is co-located with the 911 emergency; 1di'spatch center in'Lecanto, Florida.

The EOC provides all'the o

qs Lamanities to support'. emergency operations.

The operations room,

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although small,owas adequate.

Appropriate displays and status

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boards. ware posted in the operations room.

The status boards I

were:kept up-to-date with thefchanges.in plant conditions.

Protective. action' decisions were announced to the staff during

' briefings, but they were not posted on the status boards.

,The EOC used-th'e " Hot Ring Down Phone" to communicate with the

State,l Levy County, and the utility.

The commercial telephone was the primary means for all other communications.

The EOC has can adequate. number.of. telephone lines in the-EOC and'the Sheriff's-Department. communications center.

State-wide radio communications 1to Stateland local governments and law enforcement L

l agencies was available.

RACES provided back-up communications to

'theDEOF_and' Levy _and Hernando Counties.

!The Emergency-Management Director and the Director of Operations L

feffectively managed-emergency operations.

Representatives from thirteen city-and county agencies, the American Red Cross, and

' Florida! Power Corporation were in the EOC.

The staff was

. knowledgeable and effectively performed their duties.

' Rumor. control was handled effectively by four operators who answered numerous-calls'.

The operators were in close proximity

to:the operations _ room to facilitate communication.

While there

.was"some. confusion initially.regarding the emergency

classification levels, this situation improved as the exercise L

' progressed and the frequency of briefings by the PIO increased.

Information given out was generally accurate and timely.

The only publication of the rumor control number was in the emergency D

public information calendar until a 2:15 p.m. press release from L

the' Media Center.

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4 FollowingLa 10:22 a.m. protective action decision coordinated by

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the State and Citrus and Levy counties, Citrus County activated the public alert and notification system at 10:35 a.m.

This simulated activation of the public alert and-notification system met the-FEMA time requirement.

At 12:35 p.m.,

after the

- declaration of a General Emergency, Citrus County coordinated the decision to evacuate the 2-mile radius and out to 5 miles in Sectors F, G, H, and I and agreed to activate the sirens and broadcast an.EBS message at 12:40 p.m.

The development of the EBS message delayed the broadcast and siren activation until approximately 1:05 p.m.

(E.6.)

This delay was caused in large part by the awkwardness of the geographical boundary descriptions.

The second protective action EBS message, which-expanded the evacuation area to 10 miles, was issued within ten minutes of the decision to issue protective actions.

citrus County received. regular updates on plant conditions and Echanges in the Emergency. Classification Level-until the declaration of the General Emergency at 12:20 p.m.

While the plume exposure emergency planning zone had been evacuated, the county did not receive word of a radioactive release at the plant

until the following day.

Dosimetry kits were distributed at the Citrus County EOC by the County RADEF Officer and staff.

Individual sign out forms are issued with each kit.

The kit contains the appropriate dosimeters, a supply of KI, and an-emergency worker tag.

The RADEF staff was knowledgeable, well-trained, and organized.

Deficiencies:

None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

1.

E.6. - Develop procedures and prescripted messages, including geographical descriptions for all sectors, to

+

assure the timely broadcast of all EBS messages.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

1.

Post all significant actions, both internal and external, on the status boards.

2.

Publish rumor control telephone number in an early news release or EBS message.

3.

Establish procedures to brief the rumor control operators prior to the arrival of the PIO.

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Other Activities i

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School Evacuation - Three public schools in Citrus County are l

' located in the Crystal-River plume exposure emergency planning zone.-

A. School-Board representative was:present in the EOC and two principals were interviewed.

They were knowledgeable of the plan and their duties to protect the health and safety of the students' If an evacuation is ordered the students are taken to-schools in Inverness where their parents can pick them up.

All students will'be transported.

A brochure has been developed and distributed.by Citrus County to the parents.

The private school and day-care center within the EPZ have developed their own plans.

.and.the county will assist them as necessary.

Deficiencies:

None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

None Belocation Center - Although not designated in the plan, the Lecanto Middle School was used to demonstrate registration, monitoring, decontamination, and congregate care.

The design of "the building provided an excellent flow pattern for the monitoring and decontamination process and the segregation of clean and contaminated individuals.

Appropriate equipment, supplies, and disposable clothing was available and used in the demonstration.

'Approximately 60 individuals were monitored and registered.

Two

' people were directed through a well prepared decontamination route to the showers, remonitored after showering and then

' directed to the registration area.

The staff was generally knowledgeable and well trained.

The initial monitoring team members knew the monitoring process, but monitored too quickly (20-30-seconds per individual).

Identifying information was not obtained from evacuees outside the shelter registration area unless they were found to be contaminated during the initial monitoring.

The shelter was staffed by personnel from the Citrus County Board

-of Education, Emergency Management, Sheriff's Department, American Red Cross, RACES, and the Deaf Services Center.

Personnel interviewed were knowledgeable of their particular responsibilities, and a spirit of cooperation and teamwork was evident.

i

r

^

3

\\ ~

LStaffing for.the exercise was-inadequate.

There was no traffic control, no; security in the shelter, no nursing personnel in the shalter, and no food service representative on hand.

(J.12.)

4 While:it-is recognized that these personnel are probably

-available in Citrus County, they nonetheless were not present for this-exercise.-

Participation by the-Deaf Service Center'of West Central Florida was innovative and commendable.

This non-profit organization was l

present-to provide assistance to evacuees with hearing impairments.'

i Red Cross participation in Citrus County has improved markedly over the past several years, although they were understaffed for this exercise.

Suoerior Items:

I 1.

Participation by the West Central Florida Deaf Center.

2.

Overall commitment and enthusiasm of monitoring personnel.

Deficiencies:. None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

1.

J.12.i-Provide full staffing for registration and shelter operations, and modify plan to include Lecanto Middle School as a shelter.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

1.

Utilize evacuees that are able to go through normal

_ procedures.

2.

Provide additional training of monitoring personnel.

Traffic Control - one traffic control point was established by the Citrus County Sheriff's Department at the intersection of SR-44 and County Highway 486.

Two patrol cars and three Deputy

. Sheriffs were dispatched to this location and arrived on station at 10:00 a.m.

The personnel assigned were familiar with protective actions, evacuation routes, location of shelters, and access control responsibilities.

Simulation of traffic impediments was not demonstrated but a discussion of this subject indicated that adequate procedures were established to expeditiously remove impediments to traffic.

l

i Communications capability was demonstrated between the TCP and

.the Citrus County EOC.

No communication delays were encountered and communications were satisfactory.

Each emergency worker observed was issued a dosimetry kit consisting of a 0-200R and a 0-200mR self-reading dosimeter, a TLD, simulated KI, and appropriate chargers.

(K.3.a.)

The TCP personnel received an exposure control briefing that covered authorized exposure, use of KI, exposure record keeping, who to contact for authorization to incur exposure in excess of EPA PAG's, and what to do if they received exposure higher than authorized.

The Citrus County Sheriff's Department has approximately 150 deputies-of which 72 have received radiological training.

This is a good effort and training continues with a goal of 100%

radiologically-trained personnel.

Traffic control point activities were adequately demonstrated.

Deficiencies:

None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

1.

K.3.a. - Provide a low-range dosimeter (0-5 or C-20R) to be used with 0-200R dosimetry.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement.:

None Boat Ramos - Warning /information signs have been installed adjacent to public boat ramps within the 10-mile EPZ in Citrus County.

These signs are strategically placed and provide boaters with information concerning EBS monitoring if sirens are sounded.

This action on the part of Citrus County satisfies the area requiring corrective action found during the June 9, 1988 exercise.

Deficiencies:

None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None Areas Recqmpended for Imorovement:

None l

1

e

-Aerial Alert and Notification - The Citrus County Sheriff's

> Department deployed a helicopter to warn boaters not able to hear i

^

sirens.'

A weighted bag containing protective action recommendations was dropped from the helicopter and retrieved by a boat in the bay.

This was a successful demonstration-of Citrus County'- ability to warn this segment of the population.

EN Deficiencies:

None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

None Decontamination - The Connell Heights Volunteer Fire Department

. established a vehicle decontamination station at Meadowerest on Highway 44 East.

One car and driver were monitored and j

decontaminated.

i This location on Highway 44 offered ample roadway and parking space to keep clean and contaminated cars segregated as well as a natural slope for flow of contaminated water.

The mobile shower

-for vehicles and personnel provides expedient and thorough washing.

The volunteer firemen were well organized, knowledgeable, well trained, and conducted an excellent demonstration of the proper procedures for monitoring und decontaminating both vehicles and personnel.

Suoerior Items:

1.

Enthusiastic and well-trained staff.

Deficiencies:

None Areas Peauirina Corrective Actions:

None Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

None Levy County Emeraency Operations Center (EOC)

Although operating from a relatively small and austere EOC, the Levy County Emergency Management Director and his staff efficiently coordinated an appropriate response to the incident at the Crystal River facility.

In all major respects the response fulfilled the established requirements.

l

The Chairman of the County Commission was present in.the EOC during the entire exercise and participated actively in the response coordination and decision-making process.

Staff i

interaction was excellent, being characterized by thorough coordination of all proposed actions.

The County Director

' routinely briefed the EOC staff and solicited appropriate discussion.

County officials had taken positive steps to remedy most of the shortcomings noted in last year's exercise and had adopted several of the-suggestions for improvement..Especially notable were new provisions for the Sheriff to access his department radios from.the EOC.

This arrangement allowed him to spend more time in the EOC coordinating his responsibilities with other county agencies.

The County Director had developed new rumor control approaches, thereby relieving himself of this duty.

j Commercial telephone service in the EOC still needs improvement.

Individual work stations do not have their own set of numbers, b

In an actua' emergency, access in or out to a particular functional representative would be haphazard at best.

The County Director indicated that a study of his requirements was being requested of the State emergency management organization.

3 Superior Items:

1.

Staff interaction and response coordination.

2.

Active participation of elected officials.

Q_sficiencies:

None Arees Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None hreas Recommended for Imorovement:

1.

Telephone service to the EOC could be improved by providing a set of rotary numbers for each functional

. area work station.

2.

Traffic control points should be posted on EOC operations map.

I o

L !

l Other Activities i

School Evacuation - School evacuation procedures were reviewed through interviews with Levy County School Board personnel.

The Assistant Superintendent, Transportation Director, and principal of Yankeetown School were questioned.

All three were well versed 1

in the evacuation procedures.

A detailed SDP with an updated phone list was available.

There are nine schools in Levy County, with only one in the 10-i mile EPZ.

The school inside the 10-mile EPZ, Yankeetown, has 350 students.

Five school buses are required to evacuate the children; three of these are located at the school during a normal school day.

Additional buses can be dispatched to-LYankeetown in a satisfactory time; this was demonstrated earlier in the year during a drill.

The students are evacuated to Bronson High School which is of ample size to receive and handle 350 students, if necessary.

The school trains all its faculty in evacuation procedures and

. issues this and other pertinent information to all parents of students-in the school.

The students have field trips to Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant as part of the science curricula on several levels.

Suoerior Items:

1.

The preparedness and knowledge of evacuation procedures by the principal of Yankeetown School.

2.

The communication and distribution of nuclear plant evacuation information to the parents.

Deficiencies:

None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1.

The method of notification to the school by the school superintendent and the County EM Director.

Two-way radios and car phones are in School Board personnel vehicles, but only normal land lines link Yankeetown School and Levy County EMA and the School Board.

A dedicated line, tone alert and/or two-way radio between the involved parties should be set up.

Since Yankeetown is the only school in the EPZ, this could be done quickly and with minimal cost.

l l

i L.

M.,

i Traffic Control - One traffic control point was established by the Levy' County Sheriff's Department at Lebanon Station at U.S.

Highway 19 and 98, ten miles north of Inglis, Florida.

Two deputies arrived on scene.: Both were knowledgeable of their reporting procedures of dosimetry equipment.

Most of the Levy County Sheriff's Department have received training in dosimetry equipment'.

TLD badges were' worn.

Traffic control personnel were l

knowledgeable of their role concerning protective actions, evacuation routes, access control, and relocation centers.

Road blocks were simulated.

Traffic impediments were not demonstrated, but adequate procedures are in place-to request equipment for clearing traffic impediment.

Communications with the-EOC were. effected through relay at the Sheriff's Department.

Levy County traffic control personnel fully demonstrated the ability and capacity to effectively carry out their assigned roles.

Deficiencies:

None Areas Resuirina Corrective Actions:

None Areas Recommended for ImDrovement:

None Boat Ramos - Levy County has only one public boat ramp within the

'10-mile EPZ, and information/ warning signs have not been installed adjacent to this boat ramp.=

(G.2.)

This was'an area recommended for improvement from the June 9, 1988 exercise and is now an area requiring corrective action.

Deficiencies:

None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

1.

G.2.

- Install information/ warning ~ signs adjacent to the public boat ramp within the 10-mile EPZ.

-Areas Recommended for Improvement:

None Decontamination - The Levy County decontamination demonstration was conducted at the intersection of U.S. Highway 19 and Florida State Highway 121 at 3:00 p.m. by a team of volunteer firemen from the Inglis Fire Department.

l

- For the demonstration, the fire department utilized two fire pumping units capable of pumping 2,600 gallons of water.

In reserve:were two additional pumpers in the town of Inglis with

,1 1',000 gallon storage.

Additional water was available 250 yards 4

from the decontamination station at the Cross Florida Barge

]

canal. :The fire department has ample fire hose to reach the

~

- canal.

Should_the decontamination task become a man power or equipment

'otrain on the Inglis Fire Department, the department has a Memorandum of Agreement with.the Yankeetown and Gulf Hammock Fire Departments"to assist them.

Both Yankeetown and Gulf Hammock Fire Departments have trained decontamination personnel.-

The Levy County decontamination team was well trained in i

monitoring and decontamination procedures.

The staff wore l

protective clothing,-and the probes of their instruments were properly covered.

The on-site area was roped off for clean and contaminated personnel, with plainly-marked containers for i

contaminated, clothing, gloves, and other articles.

The team had 1

permanent and direct-reading dosimeters, and were aware of the I

taxposure limits for emergency workers and reporting procedures.

Notable was the capability of the entire team, with special recognition to the Incident Commander, the Assistant Commander, and the Assistant Fire Chief who lead the team in the' monitoring activities.

-Suoerior Items:

1.

Intensity and enthusiasm of entire team.

2.

Leadership, direction, and control.

l

3. -

Knowledge of task.

Deficiencies:

None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

None t

'gi i

._ _ __ _ __ _ _ n;,

p _.

III.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF INADEQUACIES Facility or NUREG Corrective Scheduled Activity 1113 Action Date of ConDietion Deficiencies None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions Citrus E.6.

Develop procedures and County prescripted messages, including geographical descriptions for all sectors, to assure the timely broadcast of all EBS messages.

J.12.

Provide full staffing for registration and s'.elter operations, and modify plan to include Lecanto Middle School as a shelter.

K.3.a.

Provide a low-range dosimeter (0-5 or 0-20R) to be used with 0-200R dosimetry.

Levy G.2.

Install information/

County warning signs adjacent to the public boat ramp within the 10-mile EPZ.

< 1 IV.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for Innrovement EOF 1.

Detailed 50-mile EPZ maps identifying locations of fish markets, packers, water sources, farms, dairy farms, etc.

would enable rapid identification of samples.

Listings were used along with county maps to identify locations.

2.

Status boards should be marked in black n

only to enhance readability at a distance.

3.

Existing maps and schematics should be used during briefings to better describe wind direction, plant problems, and l

evacuations.

4.

Provide more detailed State briefings at the EOF.

Dose-1.

Reduce the excessive noise and traffic Assessment levels in Dose Assessment ai sa.

2.

Provide better maps and overlays in the Dose Assessment area.

ENC.

1.

Provide a "significant events" status board in the PIO work area.

2.

Utilize geographical boundary descriptions of EPZ sectors when feasible.

3.

Include all precautionary instructions j

in news releases concerning the Ingestion Pathway.

I

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ l Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for Imorovement Field Monitoring 1.

Prior to deploying into a contaminated Team (RAD-1) area for ingestion sampling, teams should prepare and separate all sampling containers.

Partial pre-filling out of shaple tags can expedite the collection process.

Different-colored plastic bags should be used to hold waste and samples.

To the extent possible, the vehicles should be divided into a waste side and sample side.

Ingestion Pathway 1.

Wear cotton gloves under surgical Field Monitoring gicves.

Team Citrus County 1.

Post all significant actions, both internal and external, on the statas boards.

2.

Publish rumor control telephone number in an early news release or EBS message.

3.

Establish procedures to brief the rumor control operators prior to the arrival of the PIO.

4.

Utilize evacuees that are able to go through normal procedures.

5.

Provide additional training of monitoring personnel.

Levy County 1.

Telephone service to the EOC could be improved by providing a set of rotary numbwrs for each functional area work station.

2.

Traffic control points should be posted on EOC operations map.

...... Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for Imorovement Levy County 3.

The method of notification to the school (Continued) superintendent and the County EM Director.

Two-way radios and car phones are in School Board personnel vehicles, but only normal land lines link Yankeetown School and Levy County EMA and the School Board.

A dedicated line, tone alert and/or two-way radio between the involved parties should be set up.

Since Yankeetown is the only school in the EPZ, this could be done quickly and with minimal cost.

~

s l V.

APPENDICES A.

Evaluator List and Assignments B.

Exercise objectives and Scenario

FEDERAL EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENTS CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXERCISE June 21-22, 1989 CHIEF EVALUATOR AND RAC CHAIRMAN John Heard EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF)

Richard Stuhler (DOE)

Jon Richards (EPA)

Dot Nevitt (USDA)

STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (SEOC) - TALLhHhSSEE, FL Jack Morgan (FEMA)

MEDIA CENTER Tom Hawkins (FEMA)

Bill McSwain (FEMA)

MOBILE EMERGENCY RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORY (MERL)

Ray Boyett (FEMA)

RADIOLOGICAL _ MONITORING FIELD TEAMS Frank Wilson (FEMA)

Carl Hunckler (FEMA)

Tony Foltman (FEMA)

CITRUS COUNTY Larry Robertson (FEMA)

Virginia Baker (FEMA)

Mary Lynne Pate (FEMA)

Tom Carroll (FEMA)

Bill Knoerzer (FEMA)

LEVY COUNTY Don Hammonds (FEMA)

Tim Dowd (FEMA)

Josh Moore (FEMA)

Robert Perdue (FEMA)

Denise Hunt (FEMA)

MOBILE EVALUATORS Al Hall (FEMA)

Lamar Arrendale (DOT)

MOBILE RADIOLOGICAL EVALUATORS Brad Eichorst (DOE)

Belinda Collins (DHHS/FDA)

s ',t

'

• s,,

[,/-M 5h:i h i

~ ~. jf.

~

ST ATE OF FLORID A DEPARTMENTOFCOMMUNITYAFFAIRS 2740 CENTtRVIEW DRIy(.TA1LA HA55ti.

ILORI DA 32399 000 MARTINEZ THOMA5 G. PELH AM Gommar suman April 20, 1989 Mr. Glenn C.

Woodard, Chief Natural and Technological Hazards Division Federal Emergency Management Agency 1371 Peachtree Street, Northeast Atlanta, Georgia 30309 D3ar Mr. Woodard:

Enclosed are the revised objectives for the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant Exercise to be held on June 21 and 22, 1989.

These objectives reflect the addition of objectives 21 and 22 (Relocation Centers) as you requested.

If you have any questions about these objectives, please call Chip Hultquist at (904) 487-4915.

Sincer ly Gordon L.

G e

Director GLG:che Enclosure EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

• HOU51NG AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

• RESOURCE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

GOALS AND OILTECTIVES CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT INGESTION PATHWAY EXERCISE 23, 1989 June 21 The following goals and objectives reflect full staffing by tho State of Florida in the State Emergency Operations Center.

Tho licensee's Emergency Operations Facility will be staffed by tho Governor's Authorized Representative and the Public Information Officer located at the Emergency News Center.

The oxorcise will demonstrate emergency response and communications cepabilities among state and local governments, and the licensee.

Goals To evaluate portions of the Florida Radiological Emergency Management Plan for Nuclear Power Plants and confirm its adequacy for response to an emergency situation at the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant.

Specific portions of the plan to be addressed are:

A.

Annex F - Crystal River Site Plan B.

Annex B - Emergency Response Organizations and Responsibilities C.

Annex C - Direction and Control D.

Annex D - Emergency Classification System E.

Annex E - Notification and Activation F.

Annex F - Emergency Communications G.

Annex G - Public Information H.

Annex H - Emergency Facilities I.

Annex I - Accident Assessment J.

Annex J - Radiological Exposure Control K.

Annex K - Protective Response

Obiectives The following objectives will be demonstrated by indicated cgoncies during the exercise:

1.

Emergency Classification Levels (Citrus and Levy counties, DEM, DHRS) 2.

Mobilization of Emergency Personnel (Citrus and Levy counties, DEM, DHRS) 3.

Direction and Control (Citrus and Levy counties, DEM, DHRS) 4.

Communications (Citrus and Levy counties, DEM, DHRS) 5.

Facilities, Equipment and Displays (Citrus and Levy counties, DEM) 6.

Emergency Worker Exposure Control (Citrus and Levy counties, DHRS) 7.

Field Radiological Monitoring - Ambient Radiation Monitoring (DHRS) 8.

Field Radiological Monitoring - Airborne Iodine Monitoring (DHRS) 9.

Field Radiological Monitoring - Particulate Activity (DHRS) 10.

Plume Dose Projection (DHRS) 11.

Plume Protective Action Decisionmaking (Citrus and Levy counties, DEM, DHRS) 12.

Alert, Notification and Emergency Information - Initial Alert and Notification (Citrus and Levy counties) 13.

Alert, Notification and Emergency Information - Public Instructions (Citrus and Levy counties) 14.

Alert, Notification and Emergency Information - Media (Citrus and Levy counties, DEM) 15.

Alert, Notification and Emergency Information - Rumor Control (Citrus and Levy counties) 16.

Use of KI (DEM, DHRS) 18.

Implementation of Protective Actions - Plume EPZ (Citrus and Levy counties) 19.

Implementation of Protective Actions - Evacuation of Schools (Citrus and Levy counties)

20.

Traffic Control (Citrus and Levy counties) 21.

Relocation Centers - Registration, Monitoring, and Decontamination (Citrus County) 22.

Relocation Centers - Congregate Care (Citrus County) 25.

Decontamination - Washdown of Emergency Vehicles (Citrus and Levy counties) 27.

Ingestion Exposure Pathway - Sampling (DHRS) 28.

Ingestion Exposure Pathway - Lab Operations (DHRS) 29.

Ingestion Exposure Pathway - Dose Assessment (DHRS, DEM) 30.

Ingestion Exposure Pathway - Protective Action Recommendations (DHRS, DEM, DACS)

r ;..

.a ST ATE OF F LORID A DEPARTMENTOFCOMMUNITYAFFAIRS 2740 CiNTERViEW DRIVE 7 A LLAHA55EE FLORIDA 32399 toB MARTINEZ THOMAS G. PELH AM comw summ May 5, 1989 Mr. Glenn C.

Woodard, Chief Natural and Technological Hazards Division Federal Emergency Management Agency 1371 Peachtree Street, Northeast Atlanta, Georgia 30309

Dear Mr. Woodard:

Enclosed is the scenario for the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant Ingestion Pathway Exercise.

The first day of the exercise will begin at 8:30 a.m.

and conclude at 5:00 p.m.

on June 21, 1989.

The second day of the exercise will begin at 8:30 a.m.

and end at 2:00 p.m.

The scenario was developed by representatives of Florida Power Corporation, Florida Division of Emergency Management, Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS), Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Citrus County Division of Emergency Management and Levy County Department of Emergency Management.

The scenario is adequate to test and demonstrate capabilities as required by the exercise objectives.

Control messages continue to be developed to assure full demonstra-tion of state and local response.

I have also enclosed a roster of personnel assigned for the exercise.

The State, Citrus County and Levy County Emergency Operations Centers will be activated for the exercise.

The emergency operations facility, emergency news center, DHRS radiation control personnel with the Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory, EMERGENCi MANAGEMENT

• HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

• RESOURCE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

Mr. Glenn Woodard I.

M2y 5, 1989 Poge Two and the DHRS field teams will be fully activated and exercised.

DHkS will demonstrate milk and soil sampling in Hernando County on the second day of the exercise.

If you have any questions, please call Bill LeBlanc at (904) 487-4915 Sincer ly

,/ '

//

'p

/

or

. Guthrie Director GLG:ble Enclosures

O FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 1989 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN EXERCISE JUNE 22, 1989 DAY TWO BRIEFING PAPER FOR FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION The postulated accident at Crystal River Unit Three resulted in on offsite radiological release that exceeded EPA Protective Action Guides.

Based on a likely core melt situation, a GENERAL EMERGENCY was declared and a major release of radioactivity began shortly after.

Nonessential FPC personnel were evacuated from the Crystal River Generating Complex and Units 1,

2, 4 & 5 were brought to a safe shutdown condition.

Plant conditions at CR-3 continued to deteriorate as extensive core damage took place and the State of Florida began evacuation decision making, which they will discuss shortly.

At approximately 1:00 p.m.

cooling water was restored to the core when offsite power was restored and the breaker for Makeup Pump 1-C was repaired.

However, due to the activity in the reactor building and elevated reactor building pressure, the release of radiation to the environment continued.

At 1:30 p.m.

the reactor was placed in shutdown cooling mode and the plant was stable.

At 9:30 p.m.

the Reactor Building pressure had decreased signifi-cantly and the RB purge valve reseated and the release was terminated.

The predominate wind direction during the release was toward the south.

At 10:00 p.m.

FPC downgraded the Emergency Classification to an ALERT.

The State of Florida Field Monitoring Teams confirmed that radioactive deposition f rom the plume had e:: tended beyond the 10 mile EP" and into southern Citrus County and into Hernando County.

The State will discuss the details concerning offside activity.

a PRESENT STATUS:

The reactor remains stable in shutdown cooling.

Long-term planning is underway for the recovery of the unit.

Reentry into the Auxiliary Building has been made.

The Auxiliary Building is generally accessible with some exceptions.

All general area dose rates are elevated.

Preliminary general area survey results of the Auxiliary Building are as follows:

95' elev. = 400 - 1300 mr/hr 119' elev. = 650 - 4500 mr/hr 143' elev. = 2.5 - 10 R/hr 162' elev. = 450 mr/hr Contamination levels in the Auxiliary Buildina range from 40,000 - 4 million dpm/100 square centimeters.

Contamination levels within the owner controlled area are slightly above normal in the south coal yard area.

Health physics are continuing to sample that area.

There is no evidence of contamination outside of the RCA in any other direction within the site boundary.

Units 1, 2, 4& 5 are shut down.

FPC will evaluate the potential of restarting any or all of the Units.

Only essential personnel are on site at this time.

The Emergency News Center (ENC) will remain operational and will continue to provide periodic briefings.

Additional support from Claims, Risk Management, and Legal may be necessary for the ENC.

The Dose Assessment Team will be available to support the State during the recovery phase.

Radioation Levels here at the EOF are all at normal background levels.

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 1989 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN EXERCISE JUNE 22, 1989 i

DAY TWO BRIEFING PAPER i

FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA Most evacuation orders made yesterday as a result of the event at Crystal River Unit 3 are still in effect.

DHRS field teams began curveying areas in the 10 mile EPZ, giving first priority to creas that were not under the plume and were evacuated as a pre-cautionary measure.

Evacuation orders were lifted this morning at 7:30 a.m. in areas where no ground contamination was detected

.by ground surveys.

Thus all residents of Levy County and resi-donts of Citrus County who live east of U.S.

19 and north of

Routo 488 (Sectors Q,R, A,B,C,&D) are allowed to return to their i

homes and businesses.

Evaluation will commence this morning as f

to possible further relaxation of evacuation orders.

All roadblocks and security measures established during and after ovacuation were maintained throughout the night, and sufficient

-shelters had opened to accommodate all evacuees.

-At 10:00 p.m. yesterday evening DHRS field teams confirmed that plume deposition had extended beyond the 10 mile EPZ into southern Citrus County and into parts of Hernando County.

The plume cloud has moved from the area and has dissipated to the point that it no longer poses a threat.

DHRS field teams have established a rough location of the plume

" footprint" which is depicted on this map (attached).

As more data is received, decisions to relocate members of the public in couth Citrus and Hernando Counties will be made.

Activities today will demonstrate the effectiveness of the DHRS field teams sample collection and transport system; the ability of the MERL to analyze samples and relay the results to the

-proper authorities; and the capabilities of decision makers to assess the information received and make proper Protective Action Recommendations.

v1m;1nt, selve.W tsst t.s.Ap t1kt9 71.Ater tie:f?;ttent AvensAv Exscf t TSP

.fune 21-22, 1999 at MASTER SCIManto Evrerrs tJST (For Ereccise Controllers onlyt f

SCE: ARIO MESSAGE TIME (EST)

NO.

EVENT DESCRIPTION SENDER RECEfvER EXPECTED AU1088/NI,ER 19fSTPUCfl098 C:30 a.m.

Initial Conditions:

The plant has been at 1004 power for 115 days. Makeup Pump is (MUP-1BD is disassembled to determine the cause of high vibra-tion.

Diesel fuel truck on southeast berm preparing to ref uel emergency diesel ganarator tanks.

Air Handling Fan 7A (ARF-7At and associated dampers are disassambled and the motor is of f-site to be rewound.

Alarm computer is out of service due to software problems.

8:50 a.m.

A power supply failure causes a loss of annunciators. Plant electricians Engin troubleshooting. An ALERT is declared based on the loss of annunciators and computer alarms (plant computer alarms OOS).

The Technical Support Center ITSC) is activated and *in shop" accountability is performad per IM-205.

9:05 a.m.

State Warning Point receives notification of ALERT.

ryc gwP SWP initiates notification procedures 9:20 a.m.

A fork lift collides with a parked diesel fuel truck that is in the process of filling Diesel Tank A (located on the southeast barm).

The fili line and the shut off valve on the truck are severed, spilling fuel over the berm.

Both drivers aptwar to ba injured. The Control Room is notified and the Fire Brigade and Madical Emergency Team is dispatched.

Tha TSC is daclarad operational.

9:10 a.m.

The Fire Brigade and the Medical h rgency Team (MET) arrive at khe accident scene and observe the following:

- Diesel f oal has spread over the southeast barn and continuas to spill from the tank.

4-19-89

CRYSTAI. RIVEH NtJCf EAR statt:H l't.Aftr int;FSTIOtt l'AT19t3Y 13ERCISE - Jeune 21-22e 1999 i

3 MASTER SCEMR2fD fvEftrS LIST tror Enercise Controllars only) page 2 SCENARIO MESSAGE TIME lEST)

NO.

EVEfft DESCRIPTION SEfEDER RECEIVER EXPECTED ACTION / CONTROLLER ISISTRUCTION 9:30 a.m.

- The diesel truck driver is on the ground and corkscious but (Cont'd) appears to be hurt.

- The fork lift is on its side and the driver's foot is wedgad between the accelerator and floorboard. He doas not appear to ba injured anywhere else.

9:30 a.m.

The loss of annunciators is determinad to be a blown fuse.

The fusa is replaced and the annunciators are returned to service.

9:40 a.m.

Initial medical treatment is performed on the in jured drivers.

The diesel truck driver is able to walk but his hip and allww are very sore.

Tha fork lift driver's foot is freed and found to ba bleeding due to a cut on the ankle.

l'e is otherwise stable.

9:45 a.m.

The rire Brigade continues attampts to contain diesel spill.

9:55 a.m.

Annunciators fall agains repair crew begins troubleshooting.

10:00 a.m.

High winds thwart attempts by the rire Brigade to cover the spilled diesel fuel with foam.

10:05 a.m.

• he Control Room receives indications of feedwater pump and flow oscillations.

10:15 a.m.

A loss of control oil pressure causes the main feedwater p+mnp to trip.

A 0.5 gge Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak begins and the Reactor Building Ategheric Monitor (RM-A6) trends upward slightly. Tha plant automatically runs back to 55%

power.

4 14-89

CRYSTAL,REVER HUCE.EAGE POWER Pl.AfrT If8GESTION PATIRfAY EXERCISE - Jurse 21-22e 1999' 54.

• MASTFR SCEfeARIO EVFNTS LIST tror Exercise Controllers Only)

Pege 3 ~

SCENARIO MESSAGE TIME iEST)

NO.

EVENT DESCRIPTION SEfeDER RECEIVER EXPECTED ACTION /COWrROLLER INSTRUCTION 10:20 c.m.

A SITE AREA DIERGEleCY is declared based on the loss of annon-clators and computer alerws with a plant transient. The Emergency Operations Faellity (EOF) is activated and the CR-3 protected area is evacuated.

10:25 a.m.

The annunciators are returned to service.

10:30 a.m.

The diesel fuel on the southeast berm ignites.

10:35 a.m.

State warning Point receives notification of a SITE AREA FPC SWP SWP initiates notification procedores GRia is advised of EOF activation EMERGEt0CY.

10:50 a.m.

Protected Area accountability is enmplete.

State may begin EOF operations 11:20 a.m.

The EOF is declared operational.

11:30 a.m.

The Fire Brigade exting*sishes the fire and reports damage to the control room.

There are no additional injuries and equip-ment damage is limited to the two vehicles.

11:55 a.m.

The RCS leak degrades to a small break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) of approilmately 3500 gpm releasing significant activity to the Reactor Building. The Reactor Building atmospheric monitor (RM-A6) alarms. Makeup Pump IC (MUP-lC) fails to start due to a breaker problem, thus limiting makeup coolant fi mr to the RCS.

An F>ergency Pepair Team is dispatched to the MtJP-lC Breaker cubicle to investigate.

The Reactor Building Purcy* Valves begin to leak with a slight increase in Reactor Building Pressure snd activity. The Reactor Building activity is released into the Auxiliary Building through the purge valves and the hole lef t by the removal of the Air Randt ing Fan.

The plant vent monitor RM-A2 begins to trend upward slightly; however, the release to the environment is below Technical Specification limits.

4-18-89

.us I n ma von em(s.,Au sinvEn 81.nwa satetzstus8 raTHWAT 1341tCIEE - June 21-22e 1999 MASTER SCENARIO EVt m 1.15T (For Exercise Controllers Onlyl Pagej4-SCENARIO MESSAGE TIME (EST)

NO.

EVENT U*SCRIPTION SENDER RECEIVER EXPECTED ACTION /L N LER INSTRUCTIOW 11:56 a.m.

The above transient causes a reactor trip.

G60 12:00 p.m.

Tha site loses powar tecause of a failure b= tie r Engineered Safeguards (ES), thus causing C 14 5 " hut down.

There is now no makeup flow to the RCS.

Emary n J p i r Teams are dispatched to the 4160 ES Switchgear RooE. an the tontrol Complex.

12:15 p.m.

A GE!8ERAL ENERGENCY is d*clared based on likely core damage.

Tha following protective action recommandations are made based on the plant and mateorological conditions trelease is still below Technical Spacification levels).

WIND DIRECTION: 318 DEGREES WIND SPEED:

3. 7 MPS ( 8. 3 MPH) 0-2 MILES: EVACUATE ALL SECTORS 2-5 MII,ES:

EVACUPTE SECTORS F, G AND M All non-essantial personnel are evacuated f ram the ganarating complex.

12:41 p.m.

Core uncovery starts and separ hast tamparatures are reached.

Peactor Building Pressure paaks at 15 psig causing the PB Purga va l vas to open further, thus increasing the relasse of activity out of the Reactor Buildino through the plant vent and to the pnvironment. Tha Environmental Survay Taam and Dose Assessment Team bagin pi tana t racit i ng.

12:47 p.m.

Fual cladding teaparature passes 1400 degrees F and gap acti-vity is releasad.

Protective actio.s reconenendations are upgraded as follows:

4-18-89

' vm.

MA:. e s.n.

s t Nast le, 9,yg,wg :, t.t St 1

(Fct Erarcise Controllers Only)

- pege $ { '

SCEMARIO MESSAGC TIME (EST)

NO.

WENT DESCRIPTION SEWER RECEIVER EXPECTED ACTIO88/ CONTROLLER 11STNUCT1088 13:47 p.m.

0-2 MILES:

EVACUATE ALL SECTORS (Cont'd) 2-10 Mll.ES: EVACUATE SECTORS F, G, H AND J SHELTER ALL REMAINING SECTORS 12:33 p.m.

The fuel cladding temperature is at 1800 degrees F and the Reactor Building's te v rature paaks.

Significant release to the environment contint9es.

12:54 p.m.

RCS pressure drops under 600 psi and Core Flood Tanks par-tially dumps however, tree cold water causes thermal stress f racturing of the fuel and increases the relesse rate.

1:00 p.m.

The A 4160 ES Ints is repaired, of fsite powar is restored, and MUP-1A is returned to service providing limited cooling to the core.

1:05 p.m..

MUF-IC breaker is repaired and the pep is returned to service providing adequate core cooling: however, the release con-tinues dua to the significant activity in the Reactor Building atmosphere.

1:30 p.m.

The radioactive release peaks at this point and then begins to trend downward.

1:37 p.m.

Low Pressure Injection is now providing cooling to the core.

The RCS is stabilizing.

3:00 p.m.

'Tha offsite releases continua to trend downward.

FPC and state monitoring teams continua plume tracking.

5:00 p.m.

The plant is stable and a slight offsite release continuas to decrease. DAv ONE OF THE EXERCISE IS TERMINATED.

4-14-89

j MASTER SCENARIO tygggyg I,gST

.g; (For Exercise Controllers Only)

. PeTe 61 EXPECTED ACTION /CONTRot,1.ER INST SCENARIO MESSAGE TIME lEST)

NO.

EVENT DESCRIPTIOtt SE90E" RECEIVER DAY 1WO EVEttrS 8:30 a.m.

Initial briefing conducted at EOF, SEOC, Citrus County and Levy County EOCs.

9:05 a.m.

The plant requests additional recovery support personnel.

130 flealth rhysics Tachnicians are required ASAP.

Also, additional monitoring aquipment is needed. The plant requests utility contacts to provide monitoring equipment.

9:30 a.m.

Fossil Operations requests that essential operations person-nal be allow *d on site.

The Energy Control Center reports high electrical demand and are requesting the restart of Units 4 s, $.

The Emergency / Recovery Director begins to eva-luate this requast.

10:15 a.m.

The Dnergancy Diesel Generators still require refaleling, the plant requests personnel to clean up the area of the diesel fule fire to prepare for another tanker. Maavy equipment is nacessary to move the burned vehicles.

10:30 a.m.

The '+9te of Florida requests an estimate of total activity rete se.

FPC Dose Assessmant personnel begin evaluation.

10:45 a.m.

flaalth rhysics reports that south coal pile has contamina-tion levels slightly above acceptable limits.

Fossil Operations has inquired as to the burning of coal from that pile.

Additionally, a coal train is dua to arrive on site in 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.

Fossil Operations requests that the train ba allowed access.

2:00 p.m.

THE EXERCISE IS TERMINATED.