ML20005F762

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Proposed Tech Specs Re Emergency Equipment Cooling Water Sys
ML20005F762
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/03/1990
From:
DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20005F760 List:
References
NUDOCS 9001170228
Download: ML20005F762 (6)
v • d • e


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:- - ... . . . . . . . . . , _ ' a . , i c PLANT $YSTEMS 

             -               EMERGENCY 1001PMtN1 t00 LING WiER SYSTEM LIMITING COND1T10N FOR OPERATION

[ 3.7.1.2 Two independent emergency equipment cooling water (IECW) system r subsystems shall be OPERABLE gith each subsystem comprised of:

a. One OPERABLE EECW pump, and b.

An DPERABLE flow path capable of removing heat from the associated safety-related equipment, CPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 2, 2, 3, 4, and 5. APPL 1CAE1L11Y: k ACTION: 

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                                  $URVElttANCE REQUIREMENTS
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4.7.1.2 The emergency equipment cooling water system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: l 4. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power- i operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equi  ; position. b. At-least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each  ! automatic valve servicing nonsafety-related equipme starts on an automatic actuation test signal. t 9001170228 900103 - PDR ADOCK 05000341 PDC P 3/4 7-3 FERM1 - UNIT 2 e 

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1 1 INSERT (PAGE 3/4 7-3) 3 ACTION:

a. In TERATIOl&L CO!OITION 1, 2 or 3, with one EECW systen subsystem inoperabic:
1. Take the ACTION, if any, required by SpOCif 3 cation i 3.4.9.1.

2.- Operation may continue and any further ACTION due to the inoperability of the EECW system subsystem is not required provided that within 2 hours: a) The normal non-safety-related cooling water system. I (Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water) is determined to be developing normal operating , pressure and a cooling flow path'is verified for  : the safety-related conponents-normally supported by the inoperable EECW syste subsystem, and b) The ADS

  • is verified to be TERABLE, and c) All required systems, subsystems, trains, couponents and devices that depend on the remaining TERABLE EECW systen subsysten'are also verified to be TERABLE.

Otherwise **, be in at least HOT SHUIDOWN within the next:12 J hours and in COLD SHUIDOWN within the following 24 hours.

3. Restore the -inoperable EECW system subsystem to TERABLE status within 72 hours or be in' at'least HOT 1 SHUIDOWN-within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUIDOWN l within the following 24 hours.

b.- In @EPATIONAL CO!OITION 4 or 5, determine the TERABILITI of the safety-related equipnent associated-with an inoperable EICW systen subsystem and take any ACTIONS required by the applicable Specifications. l

  • ADS is 'not required to be @EPABLE when reactor steam dome j_ pressure is less than or equal to 150 PSIG.

l-Except for an inoperable Drywell Cooling Unit, required by Specification 3.7.11, that depends on the remaining TERABLE EBCW system subsystem. In this case, take the ACTION required by-Specification 3.7.11 for the inoperability of both required - Drywell Cooling Units.

a PLANT SYSTEMS EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.3 Two independent emergency equipment service water (EESW) system subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

a. One OPERABLE emergency equipment service water pump, and
b. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction fr EECW heat exchanger, l

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. f; . APPLICABILITY: * ! ACTION: b1 'l n emergency equipment service water system subsystem inopera n at least l, tem to OPERA. B LE status within 721 OWN within the following h*8 VIf4 the inoper - HOT SHUTDOWN within t e urs and 1 ted equipment inoperable and 

                                                                                                                                            .5.1, 3.5.2, ice,7 -          24 hours, and declare the as:y apecifications 3.4. .                              ,           .

take the ACTION. 3.9.11.1, . . and 3.9.11.2, as applicable. 3.6 ( $URVElu.ANCE REQUIREMENTS 5.7.1.3 The emergency equipment service water system shall be demonstrated CPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by) verifying that each valve (manua power-operated, or automaticis not locked, sealed, or otherwise secur -

correct position. 6. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by . 3/47-4 FERMI - UNIT 2

INSFRT (PAGE 3/4 7-4) ACTION: With one EEfM systs subsysts inoperable, declare the associated EICW - system subsystem inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.2. 4 h 9 

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l.. , 1 ' 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS . BASES 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the service water systems ensures that sufficient cooling . 1 capacity is available for continued operation of 6afety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of these systems, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident conditions within acceptable limits. l 3/4.7.2 CONTROL- ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM l The OPERABILITY of the control room emergency filtration system ensures that (1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature 

        .          for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel duripp and following all design basis accident conditions. Continuous operation of the system with the heaters OPERABLE for 10 hours during each 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of poisture on the'adsorbers and HEPA filters.

The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalent. This limitation is con-sistent with the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A, - 10 CFR Part 50. , r 3/4.7.3 SHORE BARRIER PROTECTION 

                            The purpose of the shore barrier is to protect the site backfill                    ,I from wave erosion.

Category I structures are designed to withstand the impact of waves up to 5.4 feet. So long as the backfill is in place, waves greater than 5.4 feet cannot impact Category I structures because of the lack of sufficient depth of water to sustain such waves. The shore barrier can sustain a high degree of damage and still perform j its function, protecting-the site backfill from erosion. Thus the operability condition for operation of the shore barrier has been written to ensure that severe damage to the structure will not go undetected for a substantial period of time and provide for prompt NRC notification and corrective action. 3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE'150LAT10N COOLING SYSTEM The reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system is provided to assure , j adequate core cooling in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat ' sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel without requiring actuation of any of the Emergency Core Cooling system equipment. The RCIC system is conservatively. required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor pressure exceeds 150 psig. This pressure is substantially below that for which the low pressure core cooling systems can provide adequate core cooling for events requiring the RCIC system. The RCIC system specifications are applicable during OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 when reactor vessel pressure exceeds 150 psig because RCIC is the primary non-ECCS source of emergency core cooling when the reactor is pressurized. FERM1 - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-1

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d When one Energency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system subsystem is  ! inoperable in TERATIOEL CO!OITIONS 1, 2 or 3, there is an additional . ACTION requirenent to verify that all required' systems, subsystems, -t i i trains, couponents' and-devices, that depend on the remaining @ERABLE EBCW system subsystem are also TERABLE. @is requirement is intended to provide accurance that 'a loss of the. normal nonsafety-related  ! cooling supply will not result in a conplete loss of safety function of critical systems during the period one of the EICW systen subsystems is inoperable. The normal nonsafety-related cooling supply is also determined to be~ in operation and a cooling flow path to ' safety-related conponents supported by the inoperable EECW system subsystems is verified. A determination that normal system operating  ; pressures exist is required to assure the system is operating j normally. The acceptance criteria developed- for the plant [ performance monitoring program is @propriate for this determination. j Continued operation is allowed if the above ACTIONS are coupleted. l The term verify as used in the context = of these ACTION requirenents means to administratively check by examining logs. or other information l i to determine if certain conponents are out-of-service.for. maintenance or other-reasons. . It does not mean to perform the surveillance requirements or valve line-ups needed to denonstrate the TERABILITY- ' of the conponent. In TERATIONAL COtOITION 4 or 5, the inpact of a loss of EICW cooling may depend upon the intended function of the supported equipment-in ' , l ' these @ERATIORL COtOITIONS. An engineering evaluation which takes into consideration the specific circunstances present, may determine  ; l that the loss of EECW cooling does not inpact the ability of certain l ' equipment to perform its intended function. 2 erefore,-the supported  ! equipment may not be inoperable under the evaluate 3 conditions. The 1 time requirements for any ACTION requirenents determined to be applicable start when the EIEW cooling is found or .made: inoperable.- l l 1}}

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