ML20005D938

Proposed Tech Specs Reducing Min Acceptable Core Spray Flow Rate from 3,600 to 33 Gpm

ML20005D938
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	12/11/1989
From:	BOSTON EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19310C585	List: ML20005D927 ML20005D938
References
NUDOCS 9001020293
Download: ML20005D938 (9)

Text

I LIBLTING CONDITION FOR OPERATION StBVEILLANCE REOUIREMENT 3.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING 4.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS SYSTEMS golicability Aeolicability Applies to the operational status of Applies to the Surveillance the core and suppression pool cooling Requirements of the core and subsystems, suppression pool cooling subsystems which are required when the' corresponding Limiting Condition for Operction is in effect.

Obiectiva Obiective To assure the operability of the core To verify the operability of the core '

and suppression pool cooling and suppression pool cooling subsystems subsystems under all conditions for under all conditions'for which this which this cooling capability is an cooling capability is an essential essential response to station response to station abnormalities, abnormalities.

Soecification Soecification A, Core Soray and LPCI Subsystems A. Core Sorav and LPCI Subsystem

1. Both core spray subsystems shall 1. Core Spray Subsystem Testing.

be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the vessel and prior to lies Frecuency reactor startup from a Cold j Condition, except as specified in a. Simulated Once/ Operating 3.5.A.2 below. Automatic Cycle Actuation test, t

b. Pump Operability Once/ month I

c. Motor Operated Once/ month Valve Operability

d. Pump flow rate Each pump shall I

deliver at least L

3300 gpm against l a system head i corresponding to I

a reactor vessel l- pressure of 104 psig.

e. Core Spray Header A p Instrumentation 9001020293 89.1211 DR ADOCK 0500 { 3 Revision Amendment No. 42, 62, 114 103

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BASES: 4 3.5.A Core Sorav and LPCI Subsystem This specification assures that adequate emergency cooling capability is  ;

available whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel. '

Based on the loss of coolant analysis performed by General Electric in ,

accordance with Section 50.46 and Appendix K of 10CFR50, the Pilgrim I i Emergency Core Cooling Systems are adequate to provide sufficient cooling to the core to dissipate the energy associated with the loss of coolant accident, to limit calculated fuel clad temperature to less than 2200'F, to limit i calculated local metal water reaction to less than or equal to 17%, and to  ;

limit calculated core wide metal water reaction to less than or equal to 1%.

General Electric Company Proprietary Report EAS-65-0989, " Safety Evaluation '

for Interim Operation of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station with Reduced Core Spray ,

-- System Flow Rate" (September 1989) calculates a peak fuel clad temperature of '

less than 2200*F'with a Core Spray pump flow of 3240 gallons per minute  ;

(gpm). A flow rate of 3300 gpm ensures adequate flow for events involving  !'

degraded voltage.

The limiting conditions of operation in Specifications 3.5.A.1 through 3.5.A.6 i specify the combinations of operable subsystems to assure the availability of I the minimum cooling systems noted above. No single failure of CSCS equipment occurring during a loss-of-coolant accident under these limiting conditions of {

l operation will result in inadequate cooling of the reactor core, j Core spray distribution has been shown, in full-scale tests of systems similar in design to that of Pilgrim, to exceed the minimum requirements by at least 25%. In addition, cooling effectiveness has been demonstrated at less than 1 half the rated flow in simulated fuel assemblies with heater rods to duplicate '

the decay heat characteristics of irradiated fuel. The accident analysis  :

takes credit for core spray flow into the core at vessel pressure below 205 l psig. However, the analysis is conservative in that no credit is taken for  ?

spray cooling heat transfer in the hottest fuel bundle until the pressure at rated flow for the core spray (104 psig vessel pressure) is reached.

The LPCI subsystem is designed to provide emergency cooling to the core by flooding in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. This system functions in combination with the core spray system to prevent excessive fuel clad temperature. The LPCI subsystem and the core spray subsystem provide adequate cooling for break areas of approximately 0.2 square feet up to and including i the double-ended recirculation line break without assistance from the high pressure emergency core cooling subsystems. '

The allowable repair times are established so that the average risk rate for repair would be no greater than the basic risk rate. The method and concept are described in reference (1). Using the results developed in i

Revision 113 Amendment No.

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p LIMITING CONDIT10NS'FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENT 3.5 CQRE AND CONTAINHENT COOLING 4.5~ CORE AND CONTAINMENT C00LJ1G SYSTEMS SYSTEMS Apolicabi1Lty Aeolicabilitv-Applies to the operational status of Applies to the Surveillance the core and suppression pool cooling Requirements of the core and subsystems, suppression pool cooling subsystems which are required when the corresponding Limiting Condition for operation is in effect.

Obiective Ob;iective To assure the operability of the core To verify the operability of the core and suppression pool cooling and suppression pool cooling subsystems subsystems under all conditions for under all conditions for which this which this cooling capability is an cooling capability is an essential '!

essential response to station response to station abnormalities. '

abnormalities.

So. eci fi cation Soecification ,

A. Core Sorav and LPCI Subsystems A. Core Sorav and LPCI Subsystem

1. Both core spray subsystems shall 1. Core Spray Subsystem Testing.

be operable whenever irradiated O

l fuel is in the vessel and prior to Ltem Freauency  !

y/ reactor startup from a Cold  !

Condition, except as specified in a. Simulat:d Once/ Operating 3.5.A.2 below.

Automatic Cycle l Actuhtion test. .

l b. Pump Operability Once/ month l

l c. Motor Operated Once/ month Valve Operability / j

d. Pump flow rate  !

l Each pump shall i

I de ver at least gpm against  !

system head 33o0 corresponding to a reactor vessel pressure of 104 psig.

e. Core Spray Header op Instrumentation Revision h ,

Amendment No. 42, 62, 103

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3.5.A Core Sr,rav and LPCI Subsystem ,

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-This specification assures that adequate emergency cooling capability is available whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel.

Based on the loss of coolant analysis performed by General Electric in accordance with Section 50.46 and Appendix K of 10CFR50, the Pilgr,im I Emergency Core Cooling Systems are adequate to provide sufficient cooling to the core to dissipate the energy associated with the loss of coolant accident, to limit calculated fuel clad temperature to less than 2200*F, to limit calculated local metal water reaction to less than or equal to 171, and to limit calculated core wide metal water reaction to less than or equal to 11.

f The limiting conditions of operation in Specifications 3.5.A.1 through 3.5.A.6 specify the combinations of operable-subsystems to assure the availability of "

the minimum cooling systems noted above. No single failure of CSCS equipment occurring during a loss-of-coolant accident under these limiting conditions of operation will result in inadequate cooling of the reactor core.

Core spray distribution has been shown, in full-scale tests of systems similar in design to that of Pilgrim, to exceed the minimum requirements by at least 25%. In addition, cooling effectiveness has been deinonstrated at less than -

half the rated flow in simulated fuel assemblies with heater rods to duplicate the decay heat characteristics of irradiated fuel. The accident analysis ,

takes credit for core spray flow into the core at vessel pressure below 205 //

psig. However, the analysis is conservative in that no credit is taken for / *

,m spray cooling heat transfer in the hottest fuel bundle until the pressure at /

/

j rated flow for the core spray (104 psig vessel pressure) is reached.

W The LPCI subsystem is designed to provide emergency cooling to the core by l

l flooding in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. This system functions in combination with the core spray system to prevent excessive fuel clad temperature. The LPCI subsystem and the core spray subsystem provide adequate cooling for break areas of approximately 0.2 square feet up to and including

the double-ended recirculation line break without assistance from the high l~ pressure emergency core cooling subsystems.

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! The allowable repair times are established so that the average risk rate for L repair would be no greater than the basic risk rate. The method and concept I

are described in reference (1). Using the results developed in 1

y 113 Revisionh AMEMOMEM No.

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t GENERAL ELECTRIC C0MPANY .

AFFIDAVIT I, J. S. Charnley, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows: (

1. I am Manager, Fuel Licensing, General Electric Company, and have been delegated the functicn of reviewing the information described in paragraph 2 which is sought to be withheld from public disclosure and have been authorized to apply for its withholding.

2. The information sought to be withheld is contained in

• Safety Evaluation for Interim Operation of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station with Reduced Core Spray System Flow Rate," EAS-65-0989, dated September 1989.

3. In designating material as proprietary, General Electric utilizes the definition of proprietary information and trade secrets set forth in the American Law Institute's Restatement of Torts, Section 757. This definition provides:

"A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in ,

one's business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.... A substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that, except by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring information.... Some factors to be considered in determining whether given information is one's trade secret are: (1) the extent to which the i

information is known outside of his business; (2) the L

extent to which it is known by employees and others .

involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken l

by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others."

4. Some examples of categories of information which fit into the definition of proprietary information are:

Information that discloses a process, method or apparatus where a.

prevention of its use by General Electric's competitors without license from General Electric constitutes a competitive econom-ic advantage over other companies;

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b. Information consisting of supporting data and analyses, includ-ing test data, relative to a proces:, method or apparatus, the application of which provide a competitive economic advantage, e.g., by optimization or_ improved marketability;

c. Information which, if used by a competitor, would reduce his expenditure of resources or improve his competitive position in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance of quality or licensing of a similar product;

d. Information which reveals cost or price information, production capacities, budget levels or commercial strateg'es of General Electric, its customers or suppliers;

e. Information which reveals aspects of past, present or _ future General Electric customer-funded development plans and programs of potential comercial value to General Electric;

f. Information which discloses patentable subject matter for which it may be desirable to obtain patent protection;

g. Information which General Electric must treat as proprietary according to agreements with other parties.

5. Initial approval of proprietary treatment of a document is typically made by the Subsection manager of the originating component, the person who is most likely to be acquainted with the value and sensitivity of the information in relation to industry knowledge.

Access to such documents within the Company is limited on a "need to know" basis and such documents are clearly identified as proprie-tary.

6. The procedure for approval of external release of such a document typically requires review by the Subsection Manager, Project Manag-er, Principal Scientist or other equivalent authority, by the Subsection Manager of the cognizant Marketing function (or delegate) and by the Legal Operation for technical content, competitive effect and determination of the accuracy of the proprietary designation in accordance with the standards enumerated above. Disclosures outside General Electric are generally limited to regulatory bodies, custom-ers and potential customers and their agerts, suppliers and licensees and then only with appropriate protm. ion by applicable regulatory provisions or proprietary agreements.

7. The document mentioned in paragraph 2 above has been evaluated in accordance with the above criteria and procedures and has been found to contain information which is proprietary and which is customarily held in confidence by General Electric.

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8. The information to the best of my knowledge and belief has consis-tently been held in confidence by the General Electric Company, no public disclosure has been made, and it is not available in public  ;

sources. All disclosures to third parties have been made pursuant to regulatory provisions of proprietary agreements which provide for ,

maintenance of the information in confidence.

9. Public disclosure of the information sought to be withheld is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the General Electric Company and deprive or reduce the availability of profit making opportunities because it would provide other parties, includ-ing competitors, with valuable information. -

STATE OF CAllFORNIA ) ss:

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA ) .

J. S. Charnley, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

That she has read the foregoing affidavit and the matters stated therein are true and correct to the best -of her knowledge, information, and ,

belief.

. Executed at San Jose, California, this M ay of 1 197 M

'd .h: ChaYnTey~~ //

gin'eral Electric Compant' SubscribedandswornbeforemethiQf_hayof d~lul98f_.

V W $Y NOTARY /PUBLIC, STATE OF CALIFORNIA 4

OFFICIAL SEAL f

MARY L KENDALL Nossy Puta>Cabomin ,

SANTA CWIA COUNTY uy comm. Exp. Mar. 26,1983

__