ML20005B022
| ML20005B022 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1981 |
| From: | Brey H PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0696, RTR-NUREG-696 GL-81-10, P-81178, NUDOCS 8107060231 | |
| Download: ML20005B022 (34) | |
Text
.
e o m.,
puhtic service company *F Conorado y M{l
]
12015 East 46th Avenue, Suite 440; Denver, CO 80239 ha W
June 30, 1981 Fort St. Vrain Unit No. 1 P-81178 Mr. Darrel G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Emergency Response Facilities
References:
(1) Generic Letter 81-109 (2) PSC letters P-81116 dated April 8,1981 (3) P-81159 dated June 1, 1981
Dear Mr. Eisenhut:
Attached is PSC's conceptual design submittal in response to l
The Emergency P,esponse Facilities presented in our Conceptual Design are based upon the emergency functions that are deemed to l
i be necessary for the Fort St. Vrain (FSV) HTGR per the FSV Radi-ological Emergency Response Plan (RERP). As has been indicated in previous correspondence, many details of emergency response for the FSV HTGR are different from those of A LWR facility.
The following is offered in response to the documentation, in regards to NUREG-0696, requested by Generic letter 81-10.
l Documentation 1.
NRC Position Provide description of task functions of individuals requ' red to report to the TSC and E0F upon activation for each emergency class.
l j
j 8107060231 0106 i
II i
fDRADOCK 050002 7
$1 j
4 P-81178 Pag 2 2 June 30, 1981 PSC Response Functional responsibilities are provided by the ERF Concep-tual Design. Additional detail may be found in the Fort St.
Vrain Radiological Emergency Response Plan.
2.
NRC Position Provide descriptions of TSC Instrumentation, Instrument Quality, instrument accuracy and reliability.
PSC Response This is provided by the ERF Conceptual Design.
3.
NRC Position Provide descriptions of TSC ' Power Supply Systems, power sup-ply quality, and consequences of power supply interruption.
PSC Response This is provided b.s the ERF Conceptual Design.
4.
NRC Position Provide Descriptions of the design of the TSC Data Display Systems, Plant Records and data available and Record Manage-ment Systems.
PSC Response This is provided by the ERF Conceptual Design.
5.
NRC Position Provide Descriptions to the Data Transmission System to be installed between the TSC and Con trol Room.
PSC Response This is provided by the ERF Conceptual Design.
6.
NRC Position Provide Description of data to be provided to the E0F.
..--r..
m_-.
a P-81178 Paga 3 June 30, 1981 PSC Reply This is provided by the ERF conceptual design.
Implementation Schedule NRC Position The implementation schedule has been changed for the ERF to be operational by October 1,1982.
PSC Reply PSC currently has established an OSC, TSC and E0F per the ex-isting FSV RERP. These facilities will be upgraded and the SPDS will be established to the levels described in-the ERF Conceptual Design.
Following discussion with manufacturers and reviewing Engineering time required, it is felt that an optimistic schedule for Full Implementation of the Conceptual Design is May 1, 1983.
It is PSC's intention to provide a staged implementation of the ERF Conceptual Design as equipment becomes available and design details are completed.
PSC will proceed in an expeditious manner toward the above schedule.
. Very truly yours,
/b/
H.L. Brey, Manager Nuclear Engineering Division HLB / MEN:pa Attachment
EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES NUREG-0696 CONCEPTUAL DESIGN FOR PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORAD0's FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION PREFACE The following conceptual design is being submitted in accordance with The Requirements of NRC Guidelines and NUREG-0696.
PSC is currently involved in the detailed design of the requisite EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES (ERF). This design presents the basis for meeting the ERF Requirements as they apply to a HTGR.
Since the proposed modifications and equipment procurement require long lead time, it is especially important to receive timely NRC approval of this Plan.
The Plan is arranged in Sections and numbered corresponding to the sections of NUREG-0696 to facilitate review.
All f;gures are numbered accordingly to the corresponding section of NUREG-0696.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
As indicated in previous responses to TMI Action Plan requirements, the Fort St. Vrain High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor (HTGR) utilizes a completely different reactor concept than that of a LWR.
PSC has continually been placed in the position of interpreting documents written around LWR Technology and applying the requirements to a HTGR.
This has necessitated establishing our own design criteria for the implementation of an Emergency Response Program.
Efforts have been made to present and explain specific differences as they relate to PSC's implementation of action plan requirements in our previous submittals.
It is imperative that the philosophy of previous Emergency Response l
Plan submittals be integrated into the review of this plan in order for PSC's position on certain elements of the Emergency Response Facilities to be appreciated and understood.
1.1 Background
PSC has been responsive to the NRC's post TMI-2 requirements. This responsiveness has required a large PSC effort in terms of manpower and expenditures. Much of the PSC effort has been required to interpret those l
requirements, written around LWR technology, and applying them to the FSV HTGR.
I l
i
PSC was responsive commiting to NUREG-0578 and other NUREG's and Regulatory Guid s wh n they were in their
" preliminary" and " draft" status.
These commitments were made in good faith and in some cases carried through to the design and construction phases to meet NRC imposed deadlines.
Now that the documents are being issued in their final form, with
.significant changes, we are forced into major reevaluation, redesigning and replanning efforts.
PSC's previous correspondence canmiting to the ERF are listed in Attacht.ent 1.
These previous commitments will be discussed in this Implementation Plan as follows:
A)
Camnitments that have not changed will be reiterated.
B)
Commitments that necessitate revision will be revised if final design data is available.
C)
Commitments made to the previous guidance (i.e.
NUREG-0578) that differ from NUREG-0696 but meet the intent of NUREG-0696 will be justified.
This will result in having all of the PSC commitments for the ERF in one document and thus be easier for both the NRC and PSC to follow.
1.1.1 PSC Position PSC supports the overall concept of the emergency facilities, and in fact was developing an ERF concept similar tc those proposed by NUREG-0696 prior to the TMI-2 event.
While PSC supports the concept of a TSC, OSC, and EOF, it is also felt that NUREG-0696 contains guidance in many areas that is unnecessary for efficient energency response management and guidance in some cases which is a detriment to the overall response management.
1.1.2 General Philosophy PSC's overall emergency response plan has been established as shown schematically in Figure 1.1.2 which provides for several emergency centers to include a Technical Support Center (TSC), a Personnel Control Center (OSC in NRC terms), a Forward Command Post (E0F in NRC terms), an Executive Command Post, and the Emergency Operations Center (E0C).
These emergency centers are established with the following primary in mind.
l
1.1.2.1.
Technical Support Ceater
. The Technical Support Center (TSC) is located adjacent to the reactor building within the protected area. This center will be equipped with necessary instrumer.tation and displays and will-be staffed in an emergency to provide plant management, technical support, and overall on-site management of the emergency in Lthe following areas:
A.
Plant Conditions and Assessments to include overall diagnosis of plant conditions, evaluate trends, coordinate analyses, and provide technical and operational support to the control room for terminating and/or mitigating the consequences of the emergency.
B.
Provide engineering and technical analysis for plant operations.
C.
Provide health physics and radiological support and assessment, project off site doses, and recommend radiological protection measures.
D.
Determine and recommend repair / damage control and corrective actions that may be necessary in terms of mechanical / electrical repairs or maintenance.
E.
Evaluate instrument and control systems and coordinate repair / damage control in terms of repair, maintenance and/or modification activites.
F.
Provide general on site administrative and logistics support and serve as the primary communications center between v.irious other emergency organizations with primary emphasis on the Personnel Control Center (OSC), the Forward Command Post (E0F), and the Control Room.
G.
Overall operational emergency management will take place in the TSC.
1.1.2.2 Personnel Control Center (OSC)
The Personnel Control Center is located on-site (two alternate locations). This center is provided primarily as a gathering location for plant support personnel and to provide coordination for plant support in terms of personnel. This center is equipped
4 with necessary equipment and staffed with personn:1 for the following functions in support of the TSC.
A.
Maintain continued personnel accountability, handle personnel
-contamination surveys and conduct decontamination if necessary.
B.
Provide logistics support for first aid, medical transportation and assist in search and rescue efforts as may be required.
C.
Provide coordination for on-site monitoring teams and provide coordination for contract environmental monitoring teams. The center serves as a collection point for such monitoring information in support of the TSC.
D.
Provides coordination of special response teams such as fire fighting and rescue teams.
E.
Coordinates with security for site access of personnel and emergency vehicles.
1.1.2.3 Forward Command Post (E0F) i The Forward Command Post is located approximately twelve (12) miles southeast from the site. The Forward Command Post is staffed with necessary personnel including a corpos' ate l
officer of the Company for overall l
coordination of Federal, State, and Local entities in managing the off-site and environmental aspects of the emergency and coordinating with the Executive Command post for overall Company administrative, contract, and logistics support.
In this respect the Forward Command Post was never, and is not now, intended to provide a role of plant diagnosis or operational assessment.
Contrary to the guidance of NUREG-0696, and given the emergency response facility assignments, it is not PSC's intent to l
continually provide diagnostic information in l
the form of displays or instrumentation (i.e.,
l SPDS or TSC Data Set) to the Forward Command l
Post. This data will be available on a call up basis only. Radiological and meteorological data will be provided on a continuous basis for dose assessment.
The l
4-l State Health Department.will be coordinating i
their field monitoring teams from ths Forward l
Command' Post' as will other State, Federal, and 1.ocal. enti ties..
NUREG-0696. infers (by requiring data on a real time basis)' that site activities and plant -
operations will be managed from the Forward Command Post (E0F).
PSC mainfains that this is not the function of this facility and that voice communication between the TSC and Forward Command. Post is adequate to provide
- the emergency response management at the E0F.
1.1.2.4 -
Executive Command Post This center is located in PSC's corporate
~ ffices in Denver for-the primary purpose of o
providing corporate support for the emergency and providing overall coordination.for Company resources. This centar will be staffed to provide:
A.
Technical support in tems of design, 1
liason with technical experts, detailed studies or evaluations, and liason with consultants as may be necessary.
1 B.
. Coordination of communications, media relations, preparation of press releases, announcements, and interviews.
y C.
Coordination of Company manpower, equipment and resources including legal, 4
i -
financial, general office support, transportation, security assistance, and related logistics support as may be i
required.
i ~
1.1.2.5 Emergency Operations Center I
This is a State facility located at Camp George West in Golden, Colorado. This facility is the primary location from which the State execises control of all emergencies whether the emergency involves floods, l
tornados, radiological incidents, or any other emergency that is normally handled by the Division of Disaster Emergency Services (D0 DES). The Governor or his designee will exercise overall State control from this center.
Public Service Company will provide technical support people at this center. This center will be the primary location for media briefings and press releases and for coordination of Federal Agency response such I
i
as FEMA, Radiological Assistance Teams (RAT),
and IRAP as n cessary.
1.1.3 ERF Staffing and Specific Responsibilities The ERF staffing and specific details of the energency response organization and functions are contained in the Fort St. Vrain Radiological Emergency Response Plan as submitted via P-81074, dated February 27, 1981.
1.1.4 Activation and Use Activation and use of the ERF's will generally follow the criteria of Table 1.
1.2 Control Room The Responsibilities of Control Room Personnel during activation of the TSC and E0F are provided in the FSV Emergency Response Plan.
The Data System equipment to be provided in the Control Room to meet its ERF function are illustrated by Figure 1.2.
The-communications equipment to be provided in the control room to meet its ERF function is as follows:
-NRC Hotline
-NRC Health Physics Network (HPN)
-Dedicated Line to TSC
-Dial Telephones Switched Network
-Gai Tronics In-Plant Communications
-Dedicated Intercom to TSC
-Radio Canmunications to OSC, TSC & E0F See Figures 1.6.1 and 1.6.2 for further details 1.3 Emergency Response Facilities Details of management plans, facility staffing and other ERF operational details shall be contained in the FSV Emergency Response Plan.
1.3.1 Technical Support Center (TSC)
The FSV Technical Support Center was designed and constructed in accordance with the guidance and schedule provided by NUREG-0578.
Details of the FSV TSC are provided by Section 2 of this plan.
1.3.2 Operational Support Center (0SC)
Conceptual Design information is provided in Section 3.
1.3.3 Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)
Conceptual Design information is provided in Section 4.
1.3.4 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)
Conceptual Design of the FSY SPDS is provided in Section 5 of this plan.
1.3.5 Nuclear Data Link (NDL)
See Section 6 for discussion regardiag the NDL.
1.4 Activation and Use ERF activation and use details are provided in the FSV Emergency Response Plan. This plan will be updated as new ERF eoaipment and/or facilities are placed into se rvice.
1.5 Reliability The data systems and instrumentation of the ERF are being designed and contructed to provide a very high degree of reliability.
NUREG-0696 specifies certain unavailability factors; however, the basis upon which these factors are to be calculated appear to be unacceptable.
For example, operating time is defined as "any length of time the reactor is above cold shutdown status and down time is defined as any length of time the data systems are out of service. There is no definition, however, of the time frame over which the various parameters are to be considered.
Due to lack of any guidance PSC is assuming that unavailability is to be determined on an overall basis assuming a twelve month operational period.
Otherwise the unavailability factor is somewhat meaningless.
The SPDS cold shutdown unavailability is even harder to implement.
For example if the unit should be down for a short duration and SPDS system should be brought down at the same time for repair or maintenance the SPDS down time divided by cold shutdown time could easily approach unity.
In our opinion, this formula is invalid and cannot be applied to the SPDS system for all circumstances.
1.6 Communications NUREG-0696 specifies a communication system wherein every emergency facility is talking with every other facility. We object to these types of communications especially direct communications from various facilities
4 to the control room. These types of communications can only lead to confusion in overall management tf the emergercy.
Initially the control room has all communications responsibility, but once the TSC is established it should serve as the on site communications center. Communications to the control roon at this point should be limited to the TSC-Control Room interface. The TSC will then interface with the OSC and the E0F.
See figures 1.6.1 and 1.6.2.
2.0 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER 2.1 Fu,nction The FSV onsite TSC will provide the fc110 wing functions:
A)
Provide plant management and technical support to plant operations personnel during energency conditions.
B)
Relieve the reactor operators of peripheral duties and conmunications not directly related to reactor system manipulations.
C)
Prevent cor.gestion in the control room.
D)
Perform E0F functions for the Alert Emergency, for the Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency until the E0F is functional.
The TSC will be activa ed and utilized as indicated in the PSC Emergency Response Plan. See Section 1.1.2.1 for further details.
2.2 Location The TSC is housed on the second floor of a new building located immediately east of the plant control room. The location is within two minutes walking distance from the control room (See Figure 2.2).
2.3 Staffing and Training The TSC will be manned by PSC technical and plant management personnel according to the PSC Emergency Response Plan and the class of emerger.cy action. A Senior Member of Plant Management will coordinate TSC activities in support of accident mitigation and recovery operations and will serve as an interface between the TSC, E0F and Control Room.
TSC staff personnel will participate in periodic activation drills in order to maintain their proficiency.
v
,e,a-,.
--..c,-.---
,,4
2.4 Siz, PSC proc;cd:d, in good faith, with tha c:nstruction of a TSC based on the lisited guidance of NUREG-0578.
The construction of a new building which houses the TSC is now complete.
Approximately 1015 square feet are provided for the TSC.
The guidelines of NUREG-0696 now indicate that space should be provided for 25 people at 75 square feet per person or a-total of 1875 square feet.
The FSV Emergency Response Plan anticipates a maximum of 15 people in the TSC (10 PSC personnel and 5 NRC personnel).
The available space is more than adequate for this number of people and we do not anticipate further construction.
A private NRC conference room is not available in the TSC room.
Facilities are available immediately adjacent to the TSC room that ave adequate for conferences.
2.5 Structure The TSC complex is a reinforced concrete structure designed to be able to withstand the most adverse conditions reasonably expected during the design life of the plant including: (1) earthquakes (per uniform building code), (2) high winds other than tornadoes, and (3) floods.
2.6 Habitability The TSC is designed to have the same level of radiological habitability as the plant control room under accident conditions. TSC personnel are protected from both direct and airborne radioactivity during accident conditions.
The TSC is constructed of prestressed concrete designed to provide the required protection from postulated direct radiation sources.
l The TSC ventilation system includes high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) and charcoal filters to prevent i
l airborne contaminants other than noble gases from entering the TSC.
The TSC ventilation system is not seismic Category I qualified.
The Ventilation System is designed to automatically go into the recirculation mode of operation upon detection of an elevated level airborne radioactivity outside of j
the TSC structure.
Radiation monitoring systems are being provided in the TSC. The monitoring systems will include both installed l
l i
and portable nonitors. The monitoring systems will have local alarms with trip levels set to provid2 early warning to TSC personnel of adverse conditions that may affect the habitability of the TSC.
Detectors will be able to distinguish the presence or absence of radiniodines at centrations as low as 10 microcuries/cc.
Protective equipment will be provided in the TSC that will allow TSC personnel to function in presence of low-level airborne contamination and/or travel between the TSC and Control Room.
2.7 CommJnications The TSC Voice Communication Systems will include intercom to control room, commercial telephones and radio network.
The TSC Voice Communications equipaent shall incluce:
-NRC Hotline
-NRC HPN
-Dedicated Line to OSC
-Dedicated Line to CR
-Dedicated Line to EOF
- Dial Telephones - Switched Network
-Gai Tronics In Plant Communications
-Dedicated Intercom to CR
-Radio Canmunications to CR, OSC, E0F & Field Monitor Teams
- Switched network provides access to Five (5) outside lines on the Greeley exchange One (1) outside line on the Longmont exchange Two (2) direct access Denver lines Eight (8) Denver exchange tie lines Two (2) of the dial telephones will be designated for NRC use.
The switched network will be utilized for facsimile transmission.
See Figures 1.6-1 and 1.6-2 for further details.
2.8 Instrumentation, Data System Eouipment and Power Supplies The TSC will be able to display data comparable in accuracy and reliability to the corresponding data displayed in the control room.
The TSC will be able to display necessary data independently from actions in the control room and without degrading or interfering with control room and plant functions.
See Section 7 of this
Conceptual Design and Figure 2.8 for further details on the TSC data system equipment.
The total TSC System of Instrumentation, Data System equipment and power supplies will be designed to achieve a functional unavailability goal of less than 1% per year above cold shutdown conditions.
The System of TSC Instrumentation, Data System Equipment and Power Supplies will. be designed such that circuit transients or power supply failures and fluctuations will not cause a loss of any data vital to the TSC function.
The TSC Data System Equipment will be powered from two independent noninterruptible power sources.
Simultaneous failure of both of these sources would have to occur before all Data System functions are lost.
TSC Building Systems are normally powered from PSC distribution system power and backed up by the Alternate Cooling Method Diesel Generator.
2.9 Technical Data and Data System The TSC Data Set will include the following as they apply to the FSV HTGR:
A)
Regulatory Guide 1.97 Revision 2 - Type A, B, C, D and E variables B)
SPDS Data Set C)
E0F Data Set.
D)
Any Other Data Transmitted Offsite for ERF Functions Most of the TSC Data Systems will be fully integrated with the FSV plant computer.
Data storag! and recall ability will be provided for the TSC Data Sec as follows:
A)
Two (2) hours pre-event data B)
Twelve (12) hours of post event data C)
Two (2) weeks of additional post event data The data acquisition and storage will be provided with a time resolution commensurate with the characteristics of each parameter.
Data display and printout capabilities will consist of the following:
A) sufficient number of CRTs for viewing alpha num:ric and/or graphical representations of pertin:nt:
Plant System Variables Inplant Radiological Variables Meteorological Information Offsite Radiological Information B)
Data Printer C)
' Full Graphics Capability D)
CRT Hardcopy Device The TSC displays will be designed so that call up, manipulation and presentation of data can be easily performed.
The SPDS will be displayed in the TSC with the same CRT display capability that is provided in the Control Room.
2.10 Records Availability and Management NUREG-0696 specifies ready access to certain records by TSC and E0F personnel to include drawings depicting conditions of plant structures down to the component level. Our records, drawings, etc., are stored in the onsite Records Center and as such TSC personnel have reasonable access to these records and drawings. Within the TSC itself we do maintain an up-to-date set of documents which include:
Technical Specifications Operating Procedures Emergency Operating Procedures FSAR Reference Design Books Process and Instrumentation Diagrams Electrical Schematics I & C Schematics PSC maintains that the above documents provide the basis of immediate emergency response management. Other records and detailed drawings are readily accessible from the onsite Records Storage Center but are not stored as such within the confines of the TSC.
Of greater concern is that essentially tM same list of documents is specified by NUREG 0696 for the E0F.
Based on this criteria three separate Records Centers would be required for an immense volume of documents especially when one considers the volume of documents necessary to define plant conditions down to the component level. We have indicated that we do not see the functions of the E0F as managing plant operations and we therefore see no value in maintaining the type of records system speci fied.
4 Th2 records which we intend to maintain at the TSC and E0F are outlined in Table 2.
3.0 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER 3.1 Functions To provide,a gathering location for pla'nt support personnel and to provide coordination for plant support in terms of personnel.
See Section 1.1.2.2 for further details.
3.2 Habi tability No special habitability features, other than existing -
plant radiation monitoring systems, are provided for the SC Ag lg g e OSC has been designated should habitability bec 3.3 Communications The OSC Communications equipment to meet its intended function will consist of the following:
Dedicated line to TSC
-Dial telephone switched network
-Gai Tronics in plant communications
-Radio communications TSC, CR & field monitor teams The alternate OSC will be equipped with essentially the same communications equipment with the exception of the dedicated line. See figures 1.6.1 and 1.6.2 for further communication system details.
4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY 4.1 Functions Detailed functions of the EOF are provided in the FSV t
Emergency Response Plan. See Section 1.1.2.3 for further infonnation.
4.2 Location, Structure and Habitability l
The FSV E0F will be located in the PSC Ft. Lupton District Office Building.
This location is acceptable to state and local organizations participating in FSV's l
Emergency Response efforts.
The FSV EOF is approximately 12 miles Southeast of the FSV plant site.
l The structure was originally constructed for heavy duty warehouse or industrial use and has a life expectancy of l
at least that of the design life of the FSV plant.
There are no radiological concerns at the E0F due to its location.
This eliminates the need for radiation and ventilation protection other than provided by the normel l
HVAC System and E0F structure.
4.3 Staffing and Trainino The FSV E0F will Fa staffed and operated per the FSV Emergency Response Plan.
E0F staff personnel will participate in periodic activacion drills in order to maintain their proficiency.
4.4 Size Approximately 3360 square feet will be provided for EOF personnel and equipment.
4.5 Radiological Monitoring To ensure adequate radiological protection of E0F personnel, portable radiation monitors shall be provided in the E0F per the FSV Emergency Response Plan.
These monitors will provide a continuous indication of radiation conditions in the E0F and include local alarms for early warning of E0F personnel.
4.6 Communications The E0F Voice Communication equipment will include:
-NRC hotline
-NRC HPN
~
-Dedicated line to TSC
-Dedicated line to the State Emergency Operations Center
- Dial telephones, switched network
-Radio communications (PSC frequency) to TSC, CR and field monitoring teams
- Three (3) of the dial telephones will be designated for NRC use.
- The State Communication Network f s established by means of a mobile communications van, and as such, this communicaitons system is totally independent of that provided by PSC.
See Figures 1.6.1 and 1.6.2 for further details.
4.7 Instrumentation, Data System Equipment and Power
. Supplies The ESF Data System equipment will be integrated into the FSV plant computer system. The use of the plant computer in this unction will not degrade the integrity of the data supplied to the E0F or the security of the software used to process the data.
The E0F data system equipment will perfonn its functions independently from actions in the control room and without degrading or interfering with control room and plant functions.
See Figure 4.7 for further details on the E0F Data System equipment.
Power for the E0F will be from the PSC distribution
~
system.
4.8 Technical Data and Data System The E0F Data Set will include the following:
A)
Meteorological Information B)
Inplant Radiological Variables C)
Offsite Radiological Information The computerized portion of the TSC Data Set, Data storage and recall ability will be provided for the E0F Data Set as follows:
Two (2) hours pre-event data Twelve (12) hours of post event data Two (2) weeks of additional post event data Data display and printout capabilities will consist of the following:
A)
CRT's B)
Data Printer C)
Full Graphics Capability D)
CRT Hardcopy Device The E0F displays will be designed so that callup, manipulation and presentation of data can easily be performed.
4.9 Records Availability and Management Ba' sed on the function of the E0F complete documentation of plant components will not be required.
See Section 2.10 for further details.
-5.0 SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM 5.1 Function The PSC SPDS will consist of two subsystems.
2.
,a-
,. m
-,un----,w,,
mn...
,..,,, -. n
,n._,
~.., --,
Th3 first subsyst:m will be int grat:d into the FSV Comput;r System and will be utilized to augment tha sic:nd subsystem.
CRTs will be utilized to display and trend plant parameters and/or derived variables representative of the safety status of the plant.
The second subsystem will be seismically qualified and will provide continuous indication of appropriate plant parameters and/or derived variables that represent the safety status of the plant.
Available human factors engineering will be incorporated into the. design of both SPDS subsystems.
See Figure 5.1.
5.2 Location A dedicated SPDS will be located in the CR and TSC.
The E0F Data System equipment is also capable of displaying the SPDS variables. Only the control room will have a seismically qualified SPDS.
5.3 Size The SPDS will be compatible with the existing available space in the control room.
It will not interfere with normal movement or with full visual access to other control room operating systems and displays.
5.4 Staffing No other personnel in addition to the normal control room operating staff are required for the operation of both SPDS subsystems.
5.5 Display Considerations The first SPDS subsystem will provide a single primary display format designed according to available human factors principles and will be displayed for each mode of plant operation.
These same parameters will be available via the non-seismic second subsystem of the SPDS. The second subsystem will also provide the capability to recall additional data on secondary displays for analysis and diagnosis function.
5.6 Design Criteria The first SPDS subsystem will be human factors engineered, integrated into the Plant Computer System and will have a performance level consistent with the parameters and trends of parameters being monitored.
This Subsystem will provide capability for rapid assessment of the safety status of the plant, will be flexible, and will be human factors engineered. This subsystem will not be seismically qualified.
The second SPDS subsystem will be human factors engineered and seismically qualified, thus it will be available during and following earthquakes.
6.0 Nuclear Data Link
. e understand from the Regional Meetings on NUREG-OtD6 that W
the NDL is not presently a requirement, and we along with many other utilities, feel that it should not become a requirement. The NDL as prescribed by the NUREG is to provide real time data tansmission to the NRC operations center for accident management. We fail to see any advantage of transmitting real time data with the intent of involving NRC Headquarters in emergency response management.
It is our position, therefore, that the NDL be eliminated and that information transmitted be limitad to dedicated voice communications.
7.0 ACQUISITION AND CONTROL 0F TECHNICAL DATA 7.1 Sources of Technical Data The parameters specified in Regulatory Guide 1.97 Rev. 2 and Regulatory Guide 1.23, as they apply to the FSV HTGR will be provided as inputs to the plant computer system.
The exact parameters selected and the basis for selection will be documented.
Isolation will be provided for all interfaces with safety systems.
7.2 Acquisition of Data Figure 7.1 repre!. ants the configuration of the plant computer system equipment currently being evaluated by PSC.
7.3 DAS Functional Limitations i
The FSV computer system will be utillzed for the DAS function in a manner such that external demands for processing or services that may also be required will not be degraded.
7.4 DAS Design, Verification, and Configuration Control A Functional Test to demonstrate and evaluate the integrity of the software and the plant computer as an integrated data acquisition system will be performed.
The test will be performed with the system operating continuously on live input signals.
The original DAS development and subsequent changes will be performed in accordance with existing engineering procedures.
l L
reliability consistent with the TSC, SPDS and E0F unavailability requirements.
8.0 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY INTEGRATION The ERF are integrated into the FSV Emergency Response plan to state and local emergency response facilities.
The systems design of the ERF will ensure the following functional criteria are satisfied:
A)
The operation of any system or subsystem within the FSV ERF will not degrade the perfonnance or reliability of any reactor safety or control system or of any safety related displays in the control room.
B)
Actions in the control room and operation of control room systems will not degrade or interfere with the functional operation of ERF systems.
C)
Normal operation of any system or subsystem in the ERF will not degrade or interfere with the functional operation of other sytems in those facilities.
D)
The DAS hardware and software will be protected against unauthorized manipulation of or interference with input signals, data processing, data storage and data output.
The data set that will be available for display and use in the TSC and E0F will be as follows:
Regulatory Guide 1.97 Type A,B,C,D and E variables; Meteorological variables specified in Regulatory Guide 1.23 and NUREG-0654, Revision 1, Appendix 2; and variables displayed by the SPDS; as they apply to the FSV HTGR.
9.0 VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION CRITERIA The design, development, qualification and installation of
(
the SPDS, TSC, EOF and NDL facilities will be independently i
reviewed in accordance with existing Engineering and Quality Assurance Procedures, i
I l
ATTACHMENT 1 PSC has submitted details on the FSV TSC Design in the following correspondence:
Correspondence Number Date Subject P-79249 10-29-79 Follow up actions resulting from the NRC reviews regarding the TMI Unit 2 accident P-79298 12-12-79 FSV cnit No. 1 TMI lessons learned P-79299 12-12-79 Revised follow up actions resulting from the NRC Reviews regarding the TMI Unit 2 accident P-79312 12-28-79 Additional information regarding January 1, 1980 action items resulting fran the TMI unit 2 accident.
P-80028 2/20/80 Additional information resultina from TMI Unit 2 NRC review te a site visit of January 21-22, 1980.
P-80427 12-19-80 Revised schedule for post accident sampling capacity and on site Technical Support Center.
P-80438 12-20-80 Fort St. Vrain Unit No. 1 TMI action plan requirements NUREG-0737 P-81116 4-08-81 Fort St. Vrain Unit No. 1 Post TMI Requirements emergency operations facilities.
e
- - - +
-w
, --~- =
--,.._,.-r-
--re
- - - - ~
,n-v
~
_1 TABLE 1 TRANSFER OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUNCTIONS FROM THE CONTROL ROOM i; THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CEftTER AND THE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY l
I EMERGENCY CLASS 1
1 1
1
! Notification!
! EMERGENCY RESPONSE lof Unusual ISite Area
! General FUNCTIONS lEvent I Alert IEmergency ! Emergency 1 1
1 1
1 1
! Supervision of 1
1 1
1 1
1 Reactor Operations 1
1 land Manipulation I
lof Controls ICR ICR
!CR ICR 1
1 1
1
! Management of 1
1 1
!TSC ITSC
!TSC
! Technical Support Tol 1 Reactor Operations ICR(TSC)
ITSC
!TSC ITSC
! Management of i
1 1
ICorporate Emergency 1 1
lE0F 1
!TSC
1 1 Radiological Ef-Ifluent and Environs !
1
! Monitoring, Assess- !
Iment, and Dose
!E0F
!TSC 1(E0C) (FCP)lE0F (E0C) !
i
! Inform Federal,
! State, and Local
! Emergency Response !
!0rganizations and
!Make Recommendations!
Ifor Public
[TSC(E0F)lE0F
!E0F (FCP) !
! Protective Actions
!CR
!(FCP) 1(E0C) (FCP)!(E0C) s
l TABLE 1 TRANSFER Or EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUNCTIONS FROM THE-CONTROL ROOM TO THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER AND THE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY T'
1 EMERGENCY CLASS 1
1 1
1
! Notification!
! EMERGENCY RESPONSE lof Unusual
! Site Area
! General FUNCTIONS lEvent
! Alert IEmergency
! Emergency 1 1
1 1
1 1
! Event Monitoring 1
1 1
1 1
lby NRC Regional 1
1 IEmergency Response ITSC (E0F)lTSC & E0F !TSC & E0F !
! Team 1(FCP) 1(FCP)
!(FCP) 1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
'l
! Management of
!TSC (E0F)lTSC & EOF !TSC & E0F i 1 Recovery Operations ICR (TSC)
!(FCP) 1(ECP) (FCP)l(ECP)(FCP)!
1 1
! Technical Support of!
1 1 Recovery Operations ICR (TSC)
!TSC & ECP!TSC & ECP ITSC & ECP !
1 1
NOTE:
(Ch), (TSC), (E0F), or (TSC, E0F) indicates that activation of this facility (or the performance of this function) is optional for the indicated emergency class.
l Legend:
CR
- Control Room TSC
- Technical Support Center E0F (FCP) - Emergency Operations Facil;ty ECP
- Executive Command Post E0C
- Emergency Operations Center (State) j l
l
TABLE 2 ERF DOCUMENT / RECORDS Documents Maintained in ERF's/ Records Facility TSC E0F.
On-Site Record Center Technical Specifications X
X X
Operating Procedures X
X Emergency Operating Proce6 res X
X FSAR X
X X
Reference Design Books X
X Process and Instru-mentation Diagrams X
'X X
Electrical Schematics X
X X
Instr & Contr Diagrams X
X X
Offsite Population Data X
X X
Evacuation Plans X
X X
Licensee' Radiation Exposure Records X
Environs Radiological Records X
Drawings, Plant Structures & Syst.
X Safety Committee Records & Reports X
Plant Operating Records X
State RERP X
X X
FSV RERP X
X e
X
Technical Support Center TSC Personnel Control Center Control Room OSC CR Onsite Offsite Forward State Command Executive Command Emergency Post t
Operat: Jns Center EOF Post l
l ONSITE-OFFSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION FIGURE 1.1.2 l
l
Data Link Data Link Dedicated To To SPDS Link To Plant Computer Plant Computer Plant Computer Via Nova #1 Via Nova #2 Via TSC SPDS
\\
~
\\
/
Printer f
Printer CRT
\\
-)
./
Full liard Copy aphics SPDS Non Safety Inputs SPDS Seismic Safety Isolatio' Panel Inputs Outputs To Plant Computer CONTROL ROOM DATA SYSTEM EQUIPMENT Figure 1.2
. - - -. ~., _. -. -.,
TSC I~~~~~~
Onsfra Conmand
~~~~~~7 I
Post i
i I
l g
g i
i i
l i
(
i I
I l
l l
i i
i i
I l
1 I
l l
I I l
l l
Field
,)
g l
{
Monitoring l
l l
g Teams g
g I
g i
i I
l i
l l
/
I i
l i
I
/
l s
OSC CR Personnel Control Control Room Center Gaitronics Switched Network (Includes Paging Capability)
Dedicated Telephone Radio
% Intercom FSV ONSITE ERF COMMUNICATIONS FIGURE 1.6.1
Dedicated Telephone Switched Network (will also be used fcr Facsimile Transmission)
NRC I!otline/IIPN Radic (The Executive Command Post can also be contacted by radio dispatch from the CR or TSC via PSC's main dispatch center)
OSC Personnel Control Center Onsite ERF q) 4 3 Communications See Figure t
TSC CR Control Technical Support Room g
Center 1
i 1
O h
I I
I l
I l
l 8
4 If l
e i
i i
I...
i
{(
.___a e
EOF NRC l
Forward g
l I
Post
'. >. (
f%
l' g
State Field g
i g
Teams i
State Executive Emergency jJ g
Command
{
Operations 1 I
Post Center PSC IIcadquarters State Radio Communicationc ERF C0501UNICATIONS FIGURE 1.6.2
_a aMROe m xO s<UOa H G
gy nt sii agl Griac h a
, I l I, I'g,iIiI8 CF C m S o To R l t9
=
oA2 r
8 t m4 m
no oo ooL T o CRE 1
R 1
y 8 al 4 worr i
l L it E an l
l t o I
SC rg on ti cd al ei R uB OK O
O l
IJ l
l i
lli!
- l;;
i
- if i:llI
,i
Data Link Data Link Dedicated SPDS To To Link To Plant Computer Plant Computer Control Room Via Nova #1 Via Nova #2 Video Signal 4
From Control Room T
CCTV Camera Slave Printer CRT e
T CRT SPDS CRT Assignable Slave Recorders CRT f
T f
Hard Copy Gr 11 cs CR CCTV Monitor TSC DATA SYSTEM EQUIPMENT
(
FIGURE 2.8 l
l
1 Data Link To Plant Computer Via Remote Nova Printer i
CRT i
T CRT
}-
Full Hard Copy Graphics 1
EOF DATA SYSTEM EQUIPMENT i
FIGURE 4.7 l
r
I t
Data Link To Safety Non Safety l
Plant Computer Inputs Inputs f
Isola-tion SPDS Outputs To TSC J
f Plant Computer
~
Recorders
\\
SPDS CR T
Indicators u
SPDS SPDS First Subsystem Second Subsystem Non-Seismic Seismic SPDS SUBSYSTEMS FIGURE 5.1
1 Memory Coupling Channel Discs Discs Man-CDC CDC Machine i
System Control-System Tape 17 17 Tape ler CPU CPU 65K Words 65K Words Operator perators Console 600 NS Man-600 NS Console Machine
~
Control-1er i
i Line Printer Memory Coupling Channel r
Card Reader
- Y Plant Plant E
Inputs Inputs Plant PLANT COMPUTER EQUIPMENT Inputs FIGURE 7.1
.