ML20004F739

Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Construction of Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station,Unit No. 2.Docket No. 50-471.(Boston Edison Co,Et Al.)

ML20004F739
Person / Time
Site:	05000471
Issue date:	05/31/1981
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
NUREG-0022, NUREG-0022-S05, NUREG-22, NUREG-22-S5, NUDOCS 8106220253
Download: ML20004F739 (33)

Text

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NUREG-0022 Supplement No. 5 to NUREG-75/054

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Safety Evaluation Report related to the construction of Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50471 Boston Edison Company, et. al U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation May 1981 R%)

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CONTENTS

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

AND GENERAL DISCUSSION..........................

1-1 1.1 Introduction......................................................

1-1

1. 8 Outstanding Issues................................................

1-2 13.3. Emergency Planning.....'...........................................

13.3-1

21.0 CONCLUSION

S.......................................................

21-1.

APPFNDIX A:

An Evaluation of the Evacuation Time Estimates Submitted by the Applicants for the Pilgrim 2 Nuclear Power Station A-1 APPENDIX'B:

Letter from Thomas Urbanik 'II,- Texas Trrnsportation Institute, to Tom McKenna, NRC, dated March 4, 1982 9"5 ject:

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INTRODUCTIONLAND GENERAL DISCUSSION.

1. C INTR 000CTION TheNuclearbegulaturyCommission(NRC) Safety lEvaluationReport(SER).inthe matter of the application by the Boston Edison Company and other utilities (applicants) to construct and operate t M proposed Pilgrim Nuclear Generating

. Station Unit 2 (Pilgrim Unit 2, plant _r. facility) was issued _on June 27,

'1975.-

Sectinn'1.8 of the,SER_identifled several matters which required, resolution before the' staff could complete'its review of this application.

Supplement No.21 to the.SER, which was issued on November 3,.1975, presented

.the staff evaluation of additional information submitted by the applicants since the issuance'of the SER and identified two.new matters requiring resolution.

t As' a result of that staff evaluation,- three of the outstanding issues--(1) the

' design'of.the containment spray actuation logic, (2) preoperational testing of

~the emergency core cooling system, and (3) financial qualification--were acceptably resolved.

Supplement No. 2 to the SER, issued on January 27, 1976, presented the staff evaluation of additional information submitted by the applicants since the

-issuance offSupplement No. 1.

As a result of this review, two more of the outstanding issues--(1). turbine missiles and (2) reactor pressure vessel supports--were acceptably resolved.-

Supplement No. 3,71ssued on August 31, 1977, presented the staff evaluation of.

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additional.information submitted by the applicants since the issuance of Supplement No. 2.

As a result of this review, all of the previously remaining-outstanding issues were acceptably resolved except for two issues.

These two issues--(1) definition of the boundary of the low population zone and (2) the design acceleration value for the safe-shutdown earthquake--concerned staff positions established shortly before Supplement No. 3_was issued.

The applicants did not commit to these until after the supplement was issued.

Supplement No. 3 identified a new outstanding issue involving the uncompleted staff review'of revistd financial information submitted by the applicants to reflect minor changes'Lin' ownership shares.and updated plant cost data.

SER Supplement No. 4, issued in January 1979, presented the. staff's evaluation of additional information submitted by the applicant since the issuance of

-Supplement No. 3.

This information related to population and population distribution, design basis' earthquakes, and an analysis of financial qualifica-Etions that resulted from a change in ownership of Pilgrim Unit 2.

Other areas addressed in Supplement No. 4 were comments made by the Advisory Committee on Reactor f,afeguards (ACRS) in its report of October 12, 1977, which was

~ issued after the issuance of Suppi cent No. 3; continuation of the chronology of Radiological review of Pilgrim Unit 2; and generic issues.

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-This supplement presents tio staff's anal'ysis of Preliminary Saf0tyL Analysis

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Report (PSAR) Amendments 40 and 41, dated October 10, 1980 and March 16, 1981.-

These Amendments were submitted by the applicant in response to the Final

. Emergency Planning Rule (10 CFR Parts 50 and 70) and' staff questions-dated

March 3, 1981.

' 1.'8 Outstanding _ Issues i

NUREG-0660,."NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident," was developed to provide a comprehensive and integrated plan fcr the actions

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judged appropriate by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to correct.or improve the regulation and operation of' nuclear facilities based on the experience from the accident at Three Mile Island, Unit 2, and the. official studies and

-investigations of the accident.

The:TMI-2 Action Plan, NUREG-0660 dces not specifically address requirements for construction permit (CP) or manufacturing' license (ML) applications.-

There are currently pending six CP applications (Pilgrim Unit 2 is in this group) for 11 plants and one ML application for eight floating nuclear plants.

NRC staff review of these applications has'been suspended since the TMI-2 accident p'ending the formulation of a licensing policy to appropriately reflect

~ he lessons-learned from the accident. Therefore, the NRC staff initiated a t

! program to propose for' Commission approval a course of action that would lead to the establishment of TMI-2 related requirements for these applications.

-NUREG-0718, " Licensing. Requirements ~for Pending Applications for Construc u s,.

Permits and; Manufacturing License," dated March 1981, is the result of that program.

On March 23, 1981, the ERC published'in the Federal Register (46 FR 18045) pro-posed amendments to the Commission's Rules of Practice, TO DR Part 50. -The amendments, if adopted, would add a set of licensing requirements applicable only to CP and ML applications pending at the effective date of the final rule.

The staff-propsed the final rule to the Comission on May 27, 1981. The sub-stance of the rule is provided in NUREG-0718.

NUREG-0718 describes the TMI-related requirements and provides guidance the staff believes should be followed in order to meet the requirements of the proposed rule (10 CFR 50.34(e)).

The staff is presently in the process of addressing the TMI-related issues for Pilgrim Unit 2.

Its analysis of these issues will be presented in SER Supplement No. 6.

t 1-2

13.3 -Emergency Planning Pilgrim Unit 2 is. located in the township of Plymouth, Massachusetts.

The plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), established for the site, is.

located entirely within the State of Massachusetts.

Its boundary extends 9.5

-to 12 miles from the site and includes portions of five townships.

Fipure 13.1 shows the Pilgrim plume exposure EPZ.

The ingestion pathway EPZ extends into portions of the. State of Rhode Island.

10 CFR 50.34(a) requires each applicant for a construction permit to include

.in the PSAR preliminary plans for coping with emergencies. - The minimum infor-mation, to be included in the PSAR, to meet the requirements of 50.34(a) is set forth in Part II of Appendix E to-10 CFR 50.

To show compliance with 10 CFR:50' Appendix E the applicant filed PSAR.imendments 40 and 41, dated October 10, 1980 and March 16, 1981.

In the-following discussions the staff has evaluated the applicants' submittals and finds that the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Part II, including the means by.which the standards of $50.47(b) will be met, are satisfiad.

A.

Regnirement Describe "on-site and off-site organizations for coping with emergencies and the means for notification, in the event of an emergency, of persons assigned to-the emergency organizations."

Discussion The Pilgrim Unit 2 emergency organization, described in PSAR Amendments 40 and 41,'will consist of onsite :,.d offsite Boston Edison personnel.

Figure 13.2 shows the structure of the erergency organization including the primary point of interface with offsite support agencies listed in Table 13.1.

The station workforce will be capable of meeting the minimum emergency staffing requirements of NUREG-0654, Table B-1 during normal working hours.

During the backshift and on weekends, the onshift staffing levels will be met, call lists of offshift personnel will be used to augment the backshift to the levels specified in NUREG-0654, Table B-1 in the times specified.

The applicants have identified the primary responsibilities of the major elements of the emergency organization.

The onduty Watch Engineer will become the Emergency Director, who will be respon-sible for accident assessment, accident classification, and the decision to notify offsite authorities and provide protective action recommendations to them.

Conclusion Based on its review, the staff concludes that the information submitted by the applicant is sufficient to meet the requirements of of Appendix E, Part II, Item A.

8.

Requirement Describe " contacts and arrangements made and documented with local, state and federal governmental agencies with responsibility for coping with emergencies, including identification of the principal agencies."

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l Figure 13.1 Emergency planning zone for plume exposure pathwy, Pilgrim Station Source: PSAR Amendment 41, March 16,1981

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13,3-3 j

Discussion In PSAR Section 13.3.8 the applicants identified several agencies and organi-zations that could be involved in event of an emergency at Pilgrim 2.

'Section 13.3.8 also provides-letters indicating the willingness of these organizations to provie e-:rgency services.

Table 13.1 lists the offsite agencies within the plume exposure EPZ that_have emergency roles.

Draft radiological plans for the States of Rhode Island and Massachusetts and the townships within the plume EPZ have been submitted to the NRC for Pilgrim Unit 1 in response to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54.

Conclusion The draft radiological plans along with the letters of agreement in the Pilgrim Unit 2 PSAR, demonstrate that preliminary contacts and arrangements have been l

made with all offsite agencies with respect to Pilgrim 2.

The staff therefore concludes that the requirements of Appendix E, Part II, Item B are satisfied.

C.

Requirement Describe " protective measures to be taken within the site boundary and within each EPZ to protect health and safety in the event of as accident; procedures by which these measures are to be carried out (e.g., in the case of an evacuation, who authorizes an evacuation, how the public is to be notified and instructed, how the evacuation is to be carried out); and the expected response of off-site agencies in the event of an emergency."

Discussion The~four standard emergency classes (Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency) have been established by the applicant and State and local governments.

The applicants will develop emer-gency action levels which will be used to classify events in accordance with Appendix 1 to'NUREG-0654.

The methodology for classification of Site and General Emergencies will not require any calculations, analyses, or other actions by personnel which cannot be completed within 15 minutes.

The appli-cants will initially notify officials of the State and of the town of Plymouth within 35 minutes of declaration of the emergency.

They will recommend protec-tive action for consideration by offsite authorities.

These recommendations will be based on plant conditions or projected doses, and on the applicants' offsite protective action strategies and EPA Protective Action Guides.

As required by 10 CFR %, Appendix E, the applicants are designing, for Pilgrim 1, the means for prov' ding an early warning and an information message to the population in the plume EPZ within 15 minutes.

In the event of an emergency at the Pilgrim station, the Rhode Island authorities will be notified by either the Emergency Director or the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency, depending on the level of the emergency as characterized by the Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

Information will be made available to the public, on a periodic basis, on how they would be notified and what their initial action should be in an emergency.

The. dissemination of this information will be by general mailing and hand distribution.

It will include methods to reach the transient population on a town-by-town basis (see PSAR Section 13.3.6).

13.3-4

Table 13.1 Offsite support' agencies Aaency Responsibilities Plymouth Fire Department 1)

Fire Protection 2)

Rescue Assistance Plymouth Police Department 1)

Access Control to Town Roads 2)

Initiate evacuation of the public, if required 3)

Emergency Ambulance Service.

4)

Notify other. Town agencies.

Police Departments for the 1)

Initiate Evacuation of the Towns of Kingston, Duxbury public, if. required.

'Harshfield, Carver, Plympton, 2)

Notify other Town agencies.

Wareham and Bourne Local Of fices of Emergency 1)

Initiate and maintain an Preparedness for the active, updated Nuclear towns of: Plymouth, Kingston, Incident Plan.

Duxbury, Marshfield, Carver, 2)

Implement protective Plympton, Wareham, Bourne actions as recommended by MDPH.

Medical Services of Cape Cod 1)

Ambulance Service Jordan Hospital, Plymouth 1)

Emergency Medical Services Massachusetts State Police 1)

Alert the MDPH, MCDA and Town Police 2)

Access Control to the site from State Highway.

3)

Assist in evacuating the public, if required.

4)

Emergency transportstion for the NIAT and BECo environmental monitoring teams.

5)

Assist Pilgrim 2 Security Force.

Massachusetts Department of 1)

Activate and coordinate Public Health the Nuclear Incident Advisory Team (NIAT).

2)

Assist in determining the extent and magnitude of the emergency.

3)

Recommend protective actions to control and limit public exposure.

Source:- PSAR Amendment 40, October 10, 1980 13.3-5 L

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. Table 13.1, continued Agency

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Responsibi11ty Massachusetts Civil Defense 1)

Assist local Offices of' Agency Emergency Preparedness in implementing protective actions recommended by MDPH.

2)

Coordinate evacuation activities

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to reception towns.

3)

Coordinate all state agencies during emergency.

U.S. Coast Guard-1)

Access control to the site from Cape Cod Bay.

2)

Plume tracking via he'licopter National Weather Service 1)

Position and expected movement of weather fronts and system centers of concern 2)

Type, timing and intensity of precipatation 3)

Wind flow patterns and fluctuations at the site over a period of time 4)

Wind speed and direction and the variability of each 5)

The current and expected stability condition t

The Children's Hospital.

1)

Consultation in genetics Madical Center, Clinical 2)

Technical support of the Ganetics Division -

cytogenetics laboratory

' Boston Shriner's Hospital for 1)

Emergency Medical Services Crippled Children Burns

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13.3-6 l

e General plans for recovery and reentry will be developed.

Once the hazard potential has passed, steps will be taken to recover from the incident.

The applicants will consider. the emergency under control and in the recovery phase only when the following general guidelines are met:

(1) Radiation levels in all in plant areas are stable or are decreasing with time.

(2) Releases of radioactive materials to the environment from the plant are under control or have ceased.

(3) Any fire, flooding, or similar emergency-conditions are controlled or have ceased.

Conclusion Based on its review of the information submitted by the applicants, the staff concludes that the requirements of Appendix E, Part II, Item C are satisfied.

D.

Requirement Describe " features of the facility to be provided for on-site emergency first aid and decontamination and for emergency transportation of on-site individuals to off-site treatment facilities."

E.

Requirement Describe " provisions to be made for emergency treatment at off-site facilities of individuals injured as a result of licensed activities."

Discussion Items D and E Decontamination and first aid facilities will be provided at the station.

If these facilities are not available, due to radiological emergencies, an area within the Emergency Operations Facility will be used for first aid and an adjacent location will be designated for decontamination.

A local ambulance service has agreed to provide transportation of contar.inated injured, and a nearby hospital and a hospital in Boston have agreed to treat contaminated plant personnel who are injured.

See letters of agreement in PSAR Section 13.3.8.

Enq1usionItems0andE The staff has reviewed the information presented in the PSAR on transportation and emergency first aid facilities and concludes that the requirements of i

Appendix E, Part II, Items D and E are satisfied.

j F.

Requirement Describs " provisions for a training program for employees of the licensee, including those who are assigned specific authority and responsibility in the event of an emergency, and for other persons who are not employees of the licensee but whose assistanco may be needed in the event of a radio-logical emergency."

13.3-7

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2 Discussion As. discussed in PSAR Section 13.3.7 the applicants' training program will include general orientation training and retraining for all plant personnel, as well as'special. training and retraining for.those who have specific duties and responsibilities.

This training will ensure that all plant personnel have a thorough knowledge of their duties during an emergency.

Each offsite Federal, State, and local support agency willibe invited to participate:in training on notification procedures,.the expected roles of the agencies, and. basic radiation protection.

Periodic drills 1and exercises will be conducted *.o evaluate major portions of the emergency response capability and to develop and maintain skills..

Conclusion The staff concludes that the applicants' training program, described in PSAR Section'13.3.7, meets.the requirements of Appendix E, Part II, Item F.

G.

Requirement Describe "a preliminary analysis that projects the time and means to be employed in the notification of state and-local governments and the public in the event of an emergency. A nuclear power plant applicant shall perform a preliminary analysis of the time required to evacuate various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations, noting major impediments to the evacuation or taking of protective actions."

Discussion The preliminary analysis that projects the time and means to be employed in notification is discussed in response to Item C.

The applicants have performed an analysis that projects the time required to evacuate various sectors:within the plume EPZ.

This analysis was undertaken

'by HMM Associates, Inc.,'of Waltham, Massachusetts, using available population data and EVAC, a computer-based traffic simulation model.

The results of the analysis-are presented in PSAR Appendix 13A.

This analysis did not indicate any problems.that would preclude evacuation as a protective measure.

An evaluation'of evacuation time estimates, prepared for the staff by Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, is presented in Appendix A.

Data on the population density and distribution within the Pilgrim II EPZ were taken from PSAR Appendix'13A the peak population case.

A total of 115,095 individuals are represented.

They comprise the permanent residents, seasonal residents, and peak transient populations for the area.

Because the peak population for

the Pilgrim II EPZ is expected to occur during a summer weekend, factories and

- schools were assumed to be closed during the evacuation.

The computer model CLEAR (Calculates Logical Evacuation and Response) was used to simulate the evacuation process for the purpose of calculating evacuation time estimates.

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Conclusions The results of calculations using the CLEAR model-indicate that the evacuation-times submitted by the Boston Edison Company for the EPZ surrounding the Pilgrim II Nuclear Power Station are realistic.

However, the staff's evalua-

' tion.of-the evacuation times revealed a possible bottleneck, outside the plume EPZ, 11.5 miles south of the site,-not identified by the applicants' study.

Based on the evaluation presented in Appendix A, the staff believes this bottleneck will not result in unwarranted delays in effective evacuation of the plume EPZ if consideration of this bottleneck is incorporated into state and local government's evacuation traffic management planning..Therefore, as part of the final planning effort, the NRC will require the applicants to E

extend the study to include the area-south of the site.to the Cape Cod Canal

- and to identify such potential problems as traffic battlenecks, whose resolution necessitates. advance traffic planning by state and local governments.

(See Appendices A and B.)

The staf f concludes that the requirements of Appendix E, Part II, Item G are satisfied.

H.

Requirement Describe "a preliminary analysis reflecting the need to include facilities, systems, and methods of identifying the degree of seriousness and potential scope of radiological consequences of emergency situations within and outside the site boundary, including capabilities for dose projection using real-time meteorological information and for dispatch of radiolog-ical monitoring teams within the EPZs; and a preliminary analysis reflec-ting the role of the onsite technical support center and of the near-site emergency operations facility in assessing information, recommer. ding protective action, and disseminating information to the public."

- Discussion A meteorological system and the atmospheric dispersion portion of the overall dose calculation and projection system will be implemented in accordance with the guidelines in Appendix 2 of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.

The monitors described in Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2 for Type E variables will be used for

- real-time dose projections. These variables include containment radiation, area radiation, airborne radioactive material released from the site, environs radiation and radioactivity, postaccident sampling, and real-time meteorology.

In case of an offsite release, the applicants will provide for offsite monitoring, including plume tracking.

Tne applicants will establish:

(1) an Emergency Operations Facility near the site where licensee activities can be coordinated with offsite authorities during emergencies; (2) a Technical Support Center, which will provide technical support to plant operations personnel; (3) an Operations Support Center, which will serve as an assembly area for personnel who will support station emergency response; and (4) an Information Center, where, during an emergency, media representatives can receive current information.

- The' adequacy of the proposef locations and roles of these facilities will be covered in an SER. Supplement dealing with the lessons learned from the accident

- at Three Mile Island.

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. Conclusion

.The staff concludes that' the infcrmation submitted by the applicant is sufficient to meet the requirements of Appendix E, Part'II, Item H.

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13.3-10

21 CONCLUSIONS

. The staff's conclusion that the issuance of a permit for construction of the facility will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public, as' stated in Section 21.0 to the Safety Evaluation Report, was conditioned on the favorable resolution of outstanding matters identified in Section 1.8 of the Safety Evaluation Report and its supplements. The staff has discussed each of_these outstanding issues in Supplements No. 1, 2, 3, and 4 and in this supplement and has indicated a favorable resolution of each matter.

Therefore, subject to the satisfactory resolution of the outstanding issues identified in Section 1.8 of this supplement, the staff will be able to affirm its conclusions as. set forth in Section 21.0 of the Safety Evaluation Report.

21-1

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-d APPENDIX A AN EVALUATION OF THE EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES SUBMITTED BY THE APPLICANTS FOR THE PILGRIM 2 NUCLEAR POWER STATION M. P. Moeller T. Urbanik II A. E. Desrosiers l

March 1981 Prepared for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i

Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories Richland, WA 99352 A-1

s Table of Contents Page

. Introduction.....................,.........

... A-5 Method.................................. A-5

~ Results A-7 Discussion........-...-..................... A-8 Conclusiors

............................._,.. A-9 Re fe re n c es................................ A-10 Appendix A................................ A-11 Appendix B................................ A-15 Appendix C................................... A-17 l

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- EVALUATION OF. PILGRIM II EVACUATION TIME' ESTIMATES

! Introduction On February 18th and 19th, Matthew P. Moeller, ' Scientist, Pacific. Northwest x

Laboratory, and Thomas Urbanik -II,. Traffic Engineer, Texas Institute of Transportation, conducted an on-site evaluation of.the transportation network' around the Pilgrim II-Plant..The analysis included driving all major roadways in the EPZ to record the number o.f lanes, nominal speed, intersecting roadways, and condition of each segment.

In addition, observations and radar-

tests were made of important routes and intersections. ~ As a result of this

-work, M. P. Moeller and T. Urbanik II were able' to devise a system of.

evacuation. paths for the population within_the-EPZ, This evacuation network.

was used as, input for'the calculation of evacuation time estimates.

Method Data'on the population density and distribution within the Pilgrim-II.EPZ were taken from the HMM Associates' Document No.79-048 for the peak. population

case. A total of Il5,095' individuals are represented.

They comprise the permanent residents,-seasonal residents, and peak transient populations for

.the area. Because the peak population for the Pilgrim II EPZ is expected to occur during a summer weekend, factories and schools were assumed to be closed i

'during the evacuation.

The computer model CLEAR (Calculates Logical Evacuation and Response) was used to simulate the evacuation process for the purpose of calculating evacuation time estimates for the Pilgrim II EPZ. M. P..Moeller, author of the code, prepared the-input data and ran the calculations.

The following assumptions were made for or-by the CLEAR'model:

1.

Peak Population occurs in fair weather on summer weekend with no schools or' factories open.

2.

Peak Population is:

All pemanent residents at home; Seasonal units full; All transient facilities at capacity.

3._

Double Counting was used; i.e., many persons at beaches are permanent residents, seasonal residents, or transients.

4.

Auto Occupancy:

Three persons per vehicle.

5.

Free Flow Rate:

1700 vehicles per lane-hour at vehicle speeds between 55 and 15 mph.

6.

Minimum speed for any roadway segment is 15 mph when vehicle population is at or exceeds density at which traffic jams begin (" jam density").

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Minimum ~ effective vehicle iength is 14.20 m at 15 mpa.

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Warning time is.30 minutes.:

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10. LA staggered delay'between notification and departure N

'(preparation. time) results:in gradual loading of the

. populations onto the evacurtion network.

Ninety minutes is~the maximum preparation time.. Population departure

. rates used are as follows:

10%

. of ' peak population departure by 22.5 minutes.

- 32.5%' of peak population departure'by 45.0 minutes.

77.5% ' of peak population departure by 77.5 minutes. -

100%

of peak population departure by 90 minutes.

11. Peak population distribution b'y sector (see. Appendix A).

12.

Initial population assigned to a roadway segment is proportional to length of the roadway segment.

13. -Pre-planned evacuation routes are devised for populations within the EPZ based upon field analysis and evaluation.

' 14.

Route 3 (North and South) has two lanes in the direction of^the evacuation, all other roadway segments are one lane in width.

~ 15.. : People not withip.he pl&nned EPZ boundaries would not choose'to evart d' d<cing the EPZ evacuation.

This includes the ocsu!r a of Cape Cod.

s

. 16.

Evacuation times are calculated for the area within a 10-mile radius and for the EPZ described by the licensee.

However, the transportation network and evacuation process was simulated to include major intersections up to twenty miles from the Pilgrim II riant.

The area which includes these major intersect 1oci is called the

" extended EPZ"- in this report.

The time required for the EPZ' population to exit the extended EPZ is also calculated.

17.

The network was empty at the beginning of the evacuation, j-e.g., non-resident or non-transient cars on network and normal traffic on Route 3 between Boston and Cape Cod was not simulated.

l l

A-6 Lx

S J

• s18.' Population as'sumptions~:

Kingston - 85% of the population lives within110 miles

-15%1of..the population lives outside the EPZ.

7 g

Carver

.- 8,000: permanent residents.of khich 1/3 live within the EPZ'(east'of Route 58)~.

t

~

' Duxbury - 75% of the population lives within 10 miles 25% of th; population lives outside the EPZ.

19.

The -priority. for; the advancement. of sehicle at.

intersections is modelled according to the relative

' demands of each intersecting route.

20. - The EPZ and' extended EPZ are as shown in Appendix B.

s

.Results The evacuation time estimates' calculated by PNL are as follows:

EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES-FOR PEAX-POPULATION CASE (MINUTES)'

' Area l Licensee (HMM Associates)*

CLEAR-(PNL)**

l.-

360* 2 Miles.

70...........................

145 12.

-360' 5-Miles

.........................................160 3.

1360' 10 miles

......................................... 225 4.

360* EPZ 345........................... 295 5.

360' Extended EPZ......................................... 410 6.

North 2 Miles

.........................................120 8.

' North.10 Miles 120...........................

160 9.

North EPZ 180........................... 295

)

10.

No rt h ~ Ex t e n ded E PZ......................................... 3 3 0

.I1.

West 2 Mi1es

.........................................120 12.

West -5 Miles 200...........................

160

- 13.

West 10 Miles

.........................................160

14. West EPZ.

240........................... 200

15. -. South 2 Miles'

.........................................145

16.. South 5 Miles 150........................... 160 s

17.

South 10 Miles 160...........................

185 18... South EPZ 160...........................

185

19.. So u th Ex t e nd ed E P Z......................................... 410

~* JInstantaneous departure.

'** Staggered departure over 90 minutes.

A-7

C x

Discussion

-The'CLEAP, model' estimated evacuation time based on a conservitive scenario.

Infeffect..this means that the majority of the Plymouth population would evacuate via Route 3, either north' or south.

Consequently, the^ evacuation time estimates for the north and south sectors are larger than that for the

~

west sector.

.It is_ apparent from the estimates _ submitted by theilicensee that.the

.eucuation scenario devised by HMM Associates resulted in a higher percentage-of the Plymouth population utilizing evacuation routes to the west than the scenario used for th' CLEAR calculations.

As expected, _ therefore,_ the e

evacuation time; estimates calculated by HMM Associates are larger in the west sector then-in the north-or south sectors.

~

As is apparent from.the table of: evacuation ti m, estimates were calculated for~ several Emergenby Planning Zones.

Both the hMM Associates model and CLEAR calculated evacuation time estimates. for the population within the ten mile radius.- Although the population. figure is determined for a ' ten mile radius, an EPZ for a plant may extend beyond ten miles to include potentially critical routes or intersections or to include geographical or political boundaries.

. For the Pilgrim II plant,-HMM Associates defined an EPZ which included several areas.beyond ten miles. When reviewing the EPZ for the CLEAR calcul.ations, it was detennined that several intersections which could significantly effect the evacuation process lay beyond the EPZ defined by HMM Associates.

As a result, an EPZ was planned for the CLEAR calculation to include these critical

-intersections..The analysis of this EPZ, labeled as the extended EPZ, proved beneficial in providing new information on this previously undefined problem area.

The omission of a critical bottleneck might leave the evacuation time estimates _ reported by the licensee open to some criticism.

The problem area, approximately 11.5 miles-from the Pilgrim Plant, is the' rotary at the intersection of Route 3, Route 6, inmediately north of the Sagamore Bridge

-which spans the Cape Cod canal.

In the present analysis, it is assumed that the rotary will accept one lane of traffic at 15 mph.

The effect of a segment with relatively minimal speed and capacity is to cause major traffic jams and delays. Furthermore, it is possible that vehicles backed up in a queue from this rotary will be within ten miles of the Pilgrim Plant.

Consequently, the

. fact that ' elculations performed by HMM Associates did not ~ address this major c

intersection which effects the evacuation of the Pilgrim II EPZ could cause difficulties for local government. officials who might attempt to carry out an evacuation based on the estimates submitted by the licensee.

The input to the CLEAR' code assumes that traffic evacuating through the rotary bottleneck is not impeded by traffic existing from Cape Cod.

The management

'of Cape Cod traffic must be decided by state or local government officials.

The present analysis assumes that there is no northbound traffic on the Sagamore Bridge during the evacuation.

If this were determined to be A-8

e h

unrealistic, the evacuation. routings could be revised!to eliminate all or most-outbound traffic on. Route 3.: Furthermore, such rerouting would probably

' reduce the :410 minute ; estimate for. the population of the. extended EPZ.

p Conclusions l-1The results of calculatio_nsfusing the CLEAR model indicate that the evacuation times submitted by the Boston' Edison Company for the EPZ surroundingithe

~ Pilgrim II Nuclear Power Station are realistic..The evacuation time estimates-

. submiited by the licensee do n'ot, however, reflect the effects of ~a major

' bottleneck 11.5 miles = south of Pilgrim II.

Evacuation time estimates calculated by. CLEAR for an extended EPZ which include this bottleneck reveals such-problems should be explicitly analyzed in the evacuation times estimates t

submitted by.the licensee.

Potential delays caused by this critical rotary intersection may be reduced by-rerouting evacuation traffic.to.the north and weste It is quite possible that such routings were, in fact,-used by the licensee.

Hence, the PNL estimates of 295 to1410. minutes are comparable'.to the estimate of 345 minutes submitted by the licensee for the evacuation of the EPZ.

Further studies of the important intersections within the extended EPZ are recommended prior to inclusion of the evacuation time estimates into emergency.

evacuation procedures.

f I~

L A-9

-References I M. A Moeller and-' A. 'E. Desrosiers, " CLEAR - A Generic Transportation Network Model for.the Calculation of Evacuation Time Estimates," PNL-3770 (inpreparation).

' 2 T. Urbanik, A. Desrosiers, M. Lindell, C. Schuller, " Analysis of Techniques for Estimating Evacuation Times for Emergency Planning 1 Zones, NUREG/CR-1745, BHARC-40L/80-OL7, November 1980.

5 1

1 l

A-10

' PILGRIM NUCLEAR.' POWER STATION EVACCC POPULATION DATA Appendix A TYPE:

PEAK POPULATION N

NW NE.

33789

,,= r '-

\\

/

-[

2808 5

/

s?,

f 374 Yi I

i, I,-

]

'E f W

22876 17779 612 i

2

(

392 7063/

j 1453 1895 4710 i

N,.

5574 A

_s-1427 SE SW 6141 8202 1

S 0-2 MILES: 9894 2-5 MILES: 32766 TOTAL:

115,095 5 - 10 MILES: 72435 A-11

p lLGR ill ::UCL EhR ' Pot:ER S T A T I O-:t

~ EyACCC POPULAT IO!I DAT A TYPE:.fEP**h!!Elli.. ROP.ULAi!ON-_ _.

,_,. w.

N tlE IW 17459

\\0 701 h*

96 W

13599 6498 475 E

185 49

~

1683 974 I'

2239 409

~..

210 SW SE 745 S

0- 2 tilLES:

2237 2-5 filles: 12095 TOTAL: _ 46,754 5-10 !41LES: 32422 A,

PILGRIN'i4UCLEAR~ POWER STATION l

EVACCC POPULATION DATA

. TYPE: SEASONAL POPULATION N

9 NW NE 4193 N

/

1109

\\,

\\

10-

\\

W 2891 303 34 l

E 28 l

370 4254/

i 132 2544

/

2276

-g 532 SE SW 1763 3568 S

0-2 MILES: 12947 2-5 MILES: 6364 TOTAL:

24.007 5 - 10 MILES: 4696 A-13

r I'l d9 lit ;;UCl.1:AR PO':E.R STAi10N',

EVACCC.POPULAT10!!.DAIA.

IYPE:

PEAK TRANS. LENT POPULATION N

/

NW 12137 NE

/

e-~~ %

gh

\\.'N

\\

998 5*'

[

g \\-

g f;

268 i

+

W 6386 l

10978 103 E

f b

179 231)/

i 100

\\

80 1192 1059 3969 685 SW SE /

j 3889

,/

S 0- 2 MILES: 2961 TOTAL:

44.334 2-5 MILES: 14307 5-10 MILES: 27066 A-14

\\

l Appendix B L

.[

3 Pilgrim 2 Emergency o

Planning Zones:

[:!;

• E] EPZ Extended EPZ BOSTON cpun,

93 ATLANTIC OCEAN 3A WEYMOUT

,cnuan 3

=

RANDOLPH

),

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=

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NEW BEDFORD i

If 4 9D NAN 1UCKET SOUND

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ATLANTIC OCEAN A-15

Appendix'C 10-MILE RADIUS EMERGENCY PLANNING MAP U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'- 1980

-70*45' 70 30'

^

l'

., n\\ s 7'.g " 1

,... NORTH

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p 4

APPENDIX B THE TEXAS' A&M -UNIVERSITY SYSTEM TEXAS TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE COL 1XOE STATIODI TEXA8 71643 I MMN N (713) 845-5017 March 4, 1981

. Tom McKenna Emergency Preparedness Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555

Dear Tom:

In reviewing the PUgrim Station evacuation roadway network, it appears that the only-items of note pending Battelle's running of the EVACCC model are relative to traffic control during an evacuation.

It would be especially

. important to contml traffic beyond the EPZ so that other traffic, e.g., on Route 3, did not add to evacuation traffic congestion.

Two notable points are Route 3 at Route 128 and Route 3 at the Sagamore Bridge. S:.athbound Route 3 should be closed at 128 as no detour routes axist between that point and Plymouth. Similarly, the Sagamore Bridge northbound should be closed so that evacuating traffic is not impeded at the rotary just north of the bridge. Cape Cod traffic could use the Bourne Bridge to Route 25.

Other traffic control may also be necessary in the area in order to effec-tively use available capacity, otherwise it is possible that Route 3 northbound would be needlessly overloaded. In summary, there is a need for an effecti've ti affic management plan. Please let me know if you have any questions Sincerely,

!= - -

Thomas Urbanik II Assistant Research Engineer TU:jem

-cc: Art Desrosier Battelle PNL P. 0. Box 999 Richland, WA 99352 l

TRANSPORTATDON RESEARCH ANO DEWLOPMENT B-1

~

3

~

U.S. NUCLE 50 REGULATORY COMM6951oM Ih 818LIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET.

dP@hl{8"75k$4

4. TITLE A 1 TIT LE MnM Vekrne Na, el eprerrearl.

2. fleave bimal cS:fA valuation Report related to the' construction of

. Pilgrim; Nuclear Generating Station,' Unit No. 2 3 RECIPIENT'S ACCESSION NO.

7. AUTHORISI.

5. DATE REPORT COMPLETED MONTH

.l YEAR May loa 1

9. PE!! FORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADOAESS (tactue le code / -

DATE REPORT ISSUEle MONTH l YEAR UcS.. Nuclear Regulatory Cosmaission May 1981

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

s. (Leave beansa Wa hington, D.C.

20555' fe

8. (Leave bemk}

12. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS (tactude le Co*J

10. PROJECT / TASK / WORK UNIT NO.

as 9.'a D e-II. CONTRACT NO.

13. TYPE OF REfCRT PE RIDO COVE RE D (inclusive daars)

15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. (Leave atm*)

Docket No. 50-471

16. ABSTR ACT 000 words or lesst Supplement No. 5 to the Safety Evaluation Report for the application filed by Boston Edison Compargr for a construction pemit to constmet the Pilgrim Nuclear Pbwer Station, Unit 2 (Docket No. 50-4711 located in the township of Elymenth, Massachusetts has been issued by the Office of Nuclear Reacbr Regulation of the c.S. Naclear Regulatory Coussission.. This supplement presents the staff's analysis of infomation submitted by the applicant in response to the Pinal Bnergency Planning Rule and related staff questions.

17. KEY WoRDS AND DOCUMENT AN ALYSIS 17a. DESCRIPTORS i

17b. IDENTIFIERS bPEN ENDED TERMS 18 AV AILA8tLITY ST ATEMENT 19 SE CURITY CLASS (Tnes report /

21 NO of P"SES Unclassified N PRICE Unlimited 20 SE AlQ Tges part N ec P ORM 33S 47 775 m

-._