ML20004C808

Forwards Response to NRC 810218 Generic Ltr 81-10.Info Provided Includes Task Function of Individuals Required to Rept to Technical Support Ctr for Each Emergency Class & Description of Data Transmission Sys

ML20004C808
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	06/01/1981
From:	Nichols T SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8106050334
Download: ML20004C808 (16)

Text

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SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC a gas COMPANY post orricc so:: 74 I g 4

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x (1 JUN 051981 > -8 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director $ 7 **8 ?

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation \ ^

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (

Washine. 'n, D. C. 20555  %

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Subject:

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Docket No. 50/395 "mergency Operations Facility (EOF)

Dear Mr. Denton:

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As requested in Generic Letter 81-10 dated February 18, 1981, South Carclina Electric and Gas Company herewith provides the following information:

(1) task functions of the individuals required to report to the Technical Support Center (TSC) and EOF upon activation and for each emergency class (see attachment 1);

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(2) descriptions of TSC instrumentation, instrument quality, instru-ment accuracy and reliability (see attachment 2);

(3) descriptions of TSC power supply systems, power supply quality, reliability and availability, and consequences of power supply interruption (see attachment 3);

(4) descriptions of the design of the TSC data display systems, plant records and data available and record management systems (see attachment 4);

(5) descriptions of the data transmission systeri to be installed bet-ween the TSC and control room (see attachment 5);

(6) description of data to be provided to the EOF (see attachment 6).

If you have any questions, please let us itnow.

Very truly yours, T. C. Nichols, Jr.

NEC:TCN:rh cc: Page two D

8106050 334 f

Mr. Harold R. Denton

' June 3, 1981 Page Two cc: V. C. Summer

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G. H..Fischer T. C. Nichols, Jr.

H. N. Cyrus D. A. Nauman W. A; Williams, Jr.

- R. B. Clary O. S. Bradham A. R. Koon '-

H.'N. Browne *

, B. A. Bursey Dr. J. Ruoff s!- < ' ' ~J. L. Skolds / ~

J. B. Knotts, Jr.

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ATTACHMENT I As described in section 5 af the Virgil C. Summer Radiological Emergency Plan, task functions of the individuals required to report to the Tech-nical Support Center' (TSC) :upon activation for an alert, Site or General Emergency classification are as follows:

1. Emergency Director The Emergency Director is the Station Manager. The primary alternate is the Assistant Station Manager. The Emergency Director is responsible for overall supervision of emergency operations onsite. The Emergency Director will base his operation from the Technical Support Center.

Additional duties are:

a. Verifies correct control room response to the emergency condition.

b. Initiates activation of additional plant personnel as indicated by stu,.the existing conditions based upon his analysis of the likely duration of the emergency (

c. ' Confirms the activation of appropriate emergency facilities.

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d. Confers with the Supervisors in the Onsite Emergency Organization in regard to necessary additional facilities, equipment, supplies, or

. technical services which may be needed.

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e. Determines which design and construction / repair problems and procurement activities will be turned ovec to the Offsite Emergency Organization,

f. Deterrines which functions in the Onsite Emergency Organization must be manned on a continuous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> operations schedule for a protracted period and makes the appropriate assignments of plant personnel-to assure adequate relief for continuous coverage.

g. In the case of a General Emergency the Emergency Director is responsible

, for making recommendations to the offsite authorities responsible for taking protective actions 'n behalf of the general public.

h. The Emergency Director has the authority to downgrade an Alert, Site Emergency, or General Emergency to a lower class.

2. Technical Support Supervisor The Technical Support Supervisor in the Onsite Emergency Organization

, is the Technical Support Supervisor from the normal plant organization.

l The primary alternate is the plant Lead Engineer. Technical Support l Supervisor will base his operations in the Technical Support Center. The Technical Support Supervisor and the personnel he supervises will be responsible for assessing plant status, developing recommendations and procedures for emergency plant operation, assisting in the resolution of operating requirements with the NRC representatives in the Technical I-l 4

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4 i Support Center and provide technical support as required.

3. Radiological Assessment'S'upervisor The Radiological Assessment Supervisor is the Health Physics Supervisor.

- The primary alternate is the Assistant Health Physics Supervisor. The Tech-

'nical Support Center is the base'of operations-for the Radiological Assessment Supervisor. .The Radiological Assessment Supervisor is responsible for determining the extent and magnitude of the radiological hazards.

associated with an emergency situation. After the Radiological Assessment Supervisor arrives at the site, he will be responsible for performing dose assessments both onsite and in the nearsite areas. Following the activation of the Off-Site Radiological ~ Monitoring Coordinator, the offsite radiation monitoring and sampling of media will become the responsibility of the Off-Site Radiological Monitoring Coordinator.

'4. Security Supervisor M W' [TheSecuritySupervisorforth'eOnsiteEmergencyorganizationistheSecurity c[q , Supervisor in the normal plant organization. The primary alternate is the

- * ' Captain of the Security Force. The Security Supervisor will reside in the Technical Support Center. He will be responsible for the physical secuilty of the plant, access control to the plant protected area and access control to plant vital areas.

5. TSC Communications coordiantor The.TSC Communications Coordinator is an Engineer or Technician on the plant staff. The primary alternate will also be an Engineer or Technician on the plant staff. The TSC Commur.ications Coordinator will relay status and assessment information to the offsite authorities responsible for coordinating and implementing offsite emergency measures. He will also provide the notification of offsite emergency response agencies should the Emergency Director subsequently revise the emergency classification.

sg;f . Task functions of the individuals required to report to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) upon activation for a Site or General Emergency classification are as follows:

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i 1. Emergency Control Officer The Emergency Control Officer is the Vice President, Group Executive, Nuclear Operations. The primary alternate will be the Vice President, Group

! Executive Engineering and Construction. The Emergency Control Officer has the authority, management ability, technical knowledge, and procurement authority to commit corporate resources and to manage the overall emergency and recovery operation. The Emergency Control Officer is responsible for:

a. Overall management of SCE&G's response to emergencies.

b. Ensuring effective liaison with Westinghouse, Gilbert ' Associates, and other service and equipment contractors.

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c. Determining ~if a recovery organization is required and if required the' scope and functions of the recovery organization.

d. Activating additional corporate resources beyond those listed below " ' ' -

to respond to emergencies.

2. Offsite Emergency Coordinator The Offsite Emergency Coordinator will be the central coordinator for the-offsite organization. The Offsite Emergency Coordinator will be the General Manager, Nuclear Operations. Ther primary alternate will be the Group Manager, Nuclear Services. The Offsite Emergency Coordinator will be responsible for:

a. Maintaining awareneas of plant status and offsite consequences of the emergency.

". , .b. Coordination between the Onsite Emergency Organization and the Offsite Emergency Organization, wh'en activated, in regsrd to obtaining necessary additional facilities, equipment, supplies, personnel, or technical services.

c. Management and supervision of the activetion and activities of the Emergency Operations Facility, d..SIrvingastheprimaryonsitecontactforFederal, State,andCounty radiological emergency response agencies which dispatch personnel to the plant vicinity. The Offsite Emergency Coordinator will periodically update these representatives on the status of the plant.

e. Keep the Emergency Control Officer and the Emergency Director apprised of the actions taken.

f. Informing the various emergency response groups when the recovery respcase phase organization is to be implemented.

g. Approve announcements to be released by the Media Coordinator and will contact the Emergency Director when participation of members of the onsite emergency organication in media briefings is desirable.

3.. Technical Support Coordinator The Technical Support Coordinator is the Group Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Licensing. The primary alternate is the Manager, Nuclear Engineering.

The Technical Support Coordinator is responsible for design activities that are assigned to the Offsite Emergency Organization by the Emergency Director.

The Technical Support Coordinator is responsible for:

a. Establishing necessary agreements with Westinghouse and Gilbert Associates to provide support for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station on an emergency basis.

b. Provide contact with Westinghouse and Gilbert to resolve technical matters.

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c. Staff the Emergency Operations Facility to ensure design and engineering

. activities are adequately staffed in a timely manner.

d. Provide input to the General Services Coordinator in regard to facili.;ies needed in the Emergency Operations Facility to support technical support technical support activities.

e. Direct, coordinate, and approve engineering and design activities.

, f. Ensure that design and design review activities are controlled and that cognizant portions of the emergency organization are aware of planned actions.

g. Coordinator the integration of Westinghouse, Gilbert, or other engineering personnel into the emergency organization.

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- Construction / Repair Coordinator T "

The Construction / Repair Coordinator is the Group Manager / Production >

,' Engineering /Q.C. and Construction. The primary alternate is Manager / Quality

..,"? Control. The Construction / Repair Coordinator will base his operations from the Emergency Operations Facility. The Construction / Repair Coordinator.is responsible for:

a. Staff the Emergency Open tions facility to ensure construction / repair

, activities are adequately staffed in a timely manner.

b. Provide input to General Services Coordinator in regard to facilities or material required to support construction / repair activities.

c. Direct construction activities.

d. Ensure that construction activities are controlled and ensure that cognizant portions of the emergency organization are aware of planned activities.

e. Coordinate the integration of contractor personnel with other SCE&G personnel brought to the site.

4. Offsite Radiological Monitoring Coordinator The Offsite Radiological Monitoring Coordinator is the Manager, Nuclear Health j Physics and Environmental Programs. The primary alternate is a Corporate i

Health Physicist. The Offsite Radiological Monitoring Coordinator will base his operations from the Environmental Laboratory at the Parr Steam Plant.

The Offsite Radiological Monitoring Coordinator will be responsible for:

l a. Conducting radiation surveys and sampling of environmental media'in

areas outside of the exclusion zone,

b. Coordinating offsite surveys with other surveys conducted by 1c~al and Federal teams.

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,- c. . Retrieving the.TLD's located'offsite and determining cumulative

,population. doses.-

.d. Reporting data to'the Radiological Assessment Supervisor and toLthe . _ i--

EOF Coordinator.

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e. -If requested, arranging support for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day offsite radiation _

. Jmonitoring capability.

f. ~Providing technical assistance .in the e'v aluation of' offsite and onsit'e -

a 11 . radiological conditions including dose projectiens. -

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2 '5. ' Media Coordinator

.The Media Coordinator is the Coordinator of Nuclear Information. The .r--

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primary alternate is The Director, Corporate Communications, Northern .

-: Division.' ' The Media Coordinator will.be responsible for disseminating

,information to the public via the media. , ' He will report directly to che HW %. +- W {Offsite Emergency Coordinatcr.( He will prepare and issue official press gj t releases as approved by the Offsite Emergency Coordinator, arrange press conferences, and-prepare technically accurate information for release to a;. c e?, .

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the public. .,

6. Security Coordinator The, Security Coordinator is the Manager-of Security.- The primary' alternate is the Deputy-Security Supervisor. .Upon'the establishment of the Emergency

, Operations Facility, the Security Coordinator will reside in the facility and report directly to the Offsite Emergency ~ Coordinator. He will be respon ,

sible for coordinating site security force and necessary to maintain security,

"- and for interfacing with local law enforcement officials as needed.

The Security Coordinator-will be responsible for screening personnel for l access, training outside personnel who need to go onsite, and issuing badges and dosimetry, n

7. General Services coordinator ,

I The General Services Coordinator is the Manager of Purchasing, Production and Conctruction. The primary alternate is the Senior Buyer. The General Services Coordinator will be responsible to the Offsite Emergency Coordinator ,

will be respensible to the Offsite Emergency Coordinator for all other needed support services and supplies. This'will include typing and reproduction services, transportation, personnel accommodations, temporary.offsite.

facilities and communications, meals, safety and first sid.

The General Services Coordinator will also be responsible for procurement ,

and receipt of items requested by the Technical Support Coordinator and the Construction / Repair Coordinator.

< 8. EOF Communicator .

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The EOF Communicator will be the Emergency Planning Coordinator or his l-l designated alternate. The Communicator will be responsible to the Offsite I-5

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Coordinator and-the other Centers.'

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ATTACHMENT 2 The Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Technical Support Center (TSC) is described in Section 7.7.3 of the FSAR. The TSC Computer Based Instru-mentation and Data Display System is described in detail in Reference 1.

Although this system was designed and bought prio: to the issuance of NUREG-0696, " Functional Criteria for Emergency Rec;,onse Facilities", it does meet this criteria with a few differences. These differences are tabulated in Appendix A.

The TSC parameters which are listed in Reference.1 are derived from the-existing protection, control and post accident monitoring instruments and therefore have the same quality, accuracy.and reliability that is required for their function in these existing systems. These signals, with appropriate isolation, are input-to the TSC computer which is designed to meet the unavailability requirement of .01.

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Meteorological and radiation monitoring data is collected by the Health Physics computer system located in the TSC. The system, which is being designed to perform the functions required by NUREG- 0654 and R.G.1.23

.is based around a Hewlett Packard 1000 mini computer. Inputs from plant radiation monitors, selected flow meters, primary and secondary meteorologic towers and a pressurized ion chamber ring are logged by the HP-1000 on magnetic storage media. The HP-1000 transmits a set of this data to the TSC computer system and, in addition, performs the -required Class A dose projection calculations.

The input data as well as the dose projection information is available for display on an HP-9845C computer in the TSC. - This computer functions as an intelligent color display for the system. Color maps with plume overlays are a typical display capability.

Reference 1: WCAP-9725, " Westinghouse Technical Support C< lex" June, 1980, D. V. Gennaro and J. L. Little.

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APPENDIX A Differences Between the Westinghouse Technical Support Complex Design Installed *- i at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Star.on and NUREG-0696 - Functional criteria for emergency response facilities.- ,

Section 1.4 The-SPDS shall.be operational during all plant operating , conditions, including accidents.

Response: The (W) PSSD (SPDS) is designed to perform during plant operating modes from cold shutdown through power operation. The refueling mode of operation was not specifically included in the design basis for the following reasons.-

The justification for requiring a safety parameter display.

system was for r'easons of human factors considerations.

The role of the operator is to detect and respond to

. incipient threats to plant safety which, during normal operating modes, can arise from a large number of sources, and in some cases, with consequential effects. The design of existing plant control rooms was deficient in.that there was no concentration of critical plant parameters from which

,7 the safety state of the plant could be inferred and the main-tenance of critical plant safety functions verified. The-refueling mode of operation-is a non-complex one in that the transients feasible are limited to reactivity excursions and possibly radioactive releases. The other systems in the plant are in a non-operational state and operating staff is not occupied with the plant control functions. It is felt that the current control room and plant instrumentation provides a more than adequate mechanism to respond to any possible transient.

Section 2.9 Technical Data and Data System As a mitimum, the set of type A, B, C, D and E variables specified in Regulatory Guides 1.97, Revision 2, " Instrumentation for Light ,

Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Palnt and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident", shall be-available for display and printout of the TSC.

Response: The definition of the data set for the TSC was not predicated upon the requirements of the Reg. Guide 1.97, which was not finalized at the time the TSC was designed, rather the data set was defined in rader to support the tasks facing the personnel in the Technical Support Center: monitoring the safety state and functions in the plant, reviewing the accident sequence, determining mitigation strategies and evaluating the extent of damage t'o plant systems.

A review of the TSC data set versus- Reg. Guide 1.97 reveals some discrepancies as shown in Tabl 1. The Tsc data system is in com-pliance with the Reg.-Guide 1.97 parameter set to the extent"that the plant ~ currently is in compliance. Instruments which are added to meet the requirements of Reg. Guide l.97, Rev. 2 will be added

~1 to the TSC data set.

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R.G.'1.97 Data Type B, C, D and E Variables Variable Type Comment Boron Centration B- Not measured directly Hot Leg, Cold Leg B Current ranges are 0-700 F Temperatures Radioactivity Level'in C Primary coolant letdown activity Primary Fluid is monitored with letdown isolated available only through sample

' analysis-Coolant Gamma Spectrum .E Currently available only through

. sample analysis

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Reactor ~ Coolant Pump Motor '

D Breaker position and reactor coolant Current flow used as a more direct measure-ment Pressurizer Heater Current D Breaker position provided in place of current Containment Sump Liquid D Not currently available Temperature Reactor Shield Annulus , E Not required Radiation Monitoring i

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, Section 2.9 . Data storage and recall capability shall be provided for the TSC , ,

data set.- At least two hours of pre-event data'and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of' I post-event data shall'be recorded.

3 Response: The-(W) Techneial Support Complex is an integrated data system for' '~~

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- both the-SPDS and TSC functions. Thirty: minutes.of pre-event: data 4

and twenty-four hours of post-event data storage is provided withcut :

- the need for: archiving. Archiving-of the data for times beyond the' initial' twenty-four hours is possible without in;erruption offacqui- '

sition or system function._

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,.._ Section'2.9 If the SPDS system in:the contro11 room is composed-of multiple

llsplay units, = multiple displays must also ~ be provided .in the-TSC.

The requirement for identical numbers ofLSPDS units in the technical'

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Response

support center as in the-control room has no basis from human factors standpoint. The number of monitors in each' location' is determined from an analysis of the number and type of users in' addition'to the-a y , . tasks they perform. ,In the Westinghouse design, which integrates -

j the. SPDS and -TSC functions, .the . SPDS displays .are. a subset of the '

_ display system available cnt the TSC consoles.

This was intentionally 4

done for the purposes of providing improved communication-between-

! ' TSc personnel and control room personnel. The only_ exception is that the top level iconic display, used primarily for detection purposes, is implemented on a dedicated SPDS console in.the TSC. t

Section 5'5 . SPDS Display Considerations-

! Also, where feasible,-the SPDS should include some audible modifi-cation to alert personnel. of an ' unsafe. operating condition. --

a-4 Response: It is felt thatthe requirement for an audible annunciator is some-what arbitrary and might further compound-a problem which already

, exists with respect.to the large number.of audible alarms used'in control rooms today. Rather, the (W) PSSD utilizesfa top level iconic display which provides an easily recognizable mechanism for 4

indicating if a threat to plant safety develops.

Section.5.6 Design Criteria The function of the SPDS is to aid the operator in the interpre-tation of transients cud accidents. This function shall be provided i during and following all events expected to occur during the life of the plant, including' earthquakes. To achieve this function, the display system shall not only take adequate account of human factors-2 the man machine interface- but shall also be sufficiently durable to '

fuention during and after earthquakes. Because of current technology, it may not be possible to satisfy these criteria within one SPDS system.

From an operating viewpoint, it is preferred that only one display

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4 system be used for evaluating the safety status of the plant. . One

, display system simplifies the man-machine interface and thus minimized operator. errors. However, in recognition of the restraints. imposed 2 by current technology, an alternative is to design the overall SPDS function with a primary and a backup display system

(1) 'the primary -  ?

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PDS display would haveLhigh-performance'an'd flexibility and be human factored.but need not bel seismically qualified: and (2) the backup display: system would be . operable duringJ and follow--

- ing. earthquakes, such as the normal control room displays needed ~~ " ' ~ ~

to comply with Reg. Guide 1.97. . The display system (or systems) 1

.provided for.the SPDS functior-shall be capable of. functioning:

during'and following~all design basisLevents for the plant.

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In all cases, both the primary SPDS-display and the': backup SPDS seismically qualified portion of the displayishall be sufficiently human factored in its design to allow the control room op_erations

[ . staff .to' perform the safety status assessment task in a ' timely manner. Dependence on poorly human-engineered Class 1E seismicallys

. qualified instruments that are scattered over the control board,~

rather than concentrated for rapid. safety status assessment,'is not, acceptable for this function.-'An acceptable approach would be to

-concentrate the seismically qualified . display into one segment of '

the control board.

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In the intial conce,ptual design phases of the (W) PSSD in early Response: .

qxg January 1980,.the question of seismic qualification was addressed.

It was-decided that because of the serious human factors: deficiencies

' imposed by a seismic design requirement that a CRT 'oased. display

. system'with'high availability and fault tolerant 1 capability.would provide the .best possible ' solution to a clear human factors problem.

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,<1 Because of other regulatory requirements, primarily in the areas of.

Reg. Guide 1.97 qualifications and human' factors improvements to-existing control boards,'it was felt that the control board with1 .

qualified indicators could provide 'an adequate backup to the SPDS

>- for what was' considered a low probability event: a concurrent accident and seismic event.

I The Main. Control Boards at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station have undergone extensive human factors evaluations and improvements.~ -

The class 1E seismically qualified post accident monitoring instru-

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ments are functionally. located with their systems..to provide effective control / display relationships for both normal and post accident modes of operation. These qualified post accident monitoring. instruments are uniquely labelled and are provided with range and setpoint scale markings for quick and accurate identification and reading.

A separate panel grouping of class 1E seismically qualified instru-ments for use as a backup SPDS was considered and found unacceptable ,

from a human factors standpoint.

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! ATTACHMENT 3 TSC POWER DESCRIPTION The V. C.~ Summer Unit 1 Technical Support Center (TSC) can be powered from either the 480 volt substation XSW1DA2 or XSW1DB2 through a manual transfer switch located within the TSC. Distribution within the-TSC' consists of 480 volt and 120_ volt panels.

The quality and reliability of_the TSC power is consistant withlthat of the safety related power distribution system within the plant. That distribution systems parameters are as follows:

When Supplied From Off Site Power Diesel Generator u:c..

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Frequency 60HZ i 0.5HZ 60HZ' O.5HZ-Voltage Range.95% to 103.5% -l%

These numbers do not consider transient conditions such as degraded off site voltageordieselgenerationloading. During these conditions bus voltage will be lower.

In the event of loss of off site power the diesel generator will be connected to the bus within ten (10) seconds. Should the selected power train's diesel-generator fail to start or unexpectedly trip while running, restoration of power from the alternate train will be made by utilizing the manual transfnr swith in the Control Room.

! The computer memory has an Integral Battery backut. Power Supply so that an interruption of power will not result in the loss of any stored information.

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. ATTACHMENT 4-The following is a description of the plant records and data available, "

and record management systems for the Technical Support Center. _ , , , ,

I. Procedures A. Administrative Procedures B. General Operating Procedures C. Syttem Operating Procedures D. Energency Cperating Procedures _

E. Fire Protection Procedures F. _ Fuel Handling Procedures G. General Maintenance . cocwiures -

H. Health Physics Procedures II. Final Safety Analyais Report including the Environmental Report, Technical Specifications, and Environmental Technical Specifications

'III. ~ Complete set of facility Snd's'ystem drawings IV. Set of selected Tech. Manuals for. major components and systems V. Precautions, Limitations and Setpoints ~

VI. Title,10, Code of Federal Regulations

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VII. State and County Ra'diological Plans VIII. NRC Monthly and Yearly Operations Reports e

IX. Other non-controlled information A. System Descriptions B. Mitigating Core Damage Manual C. Transient and Accident Analysis Manual D. Text Book

1. Nuclear Theory

2. Heat Transfer ,

3. Fluid Flow i

4. Thermodynamics

5. Chemistry

6. Health Physics l 7. Radiation Shielding l ,

X. Radiation Dose Projection Overlays and Maps.

l Document Management a nd Control will be done in accordance with Station Administrative Procedure AP-301.1, " Document Control",-for items I, II, III, IV, V, VI, and VII. Record Management and Control will be done in i accordance with Station Administrative Procedure'AP-301.2, " Nuclear Operations Records Control Procedure", for item VIII.

The TSC Data display systems are described in WCAP 9725, " Westinghouse Technical Support Complex", June 1980. D.V. Gennaro and J. L. Little.

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ATTACIDfENT 5

,The Virgil C. Summer TSC Computer System i; located in'the Control Building adjacent to the Control Room, the Instrument Equipment Room, and the Plant Process Computer Room. The TSC Computer inpWcs are hardwired from the Instrumentation and Control Equipment and .t.he Plant Process Computer inputs with appropriate isolation devices where required.

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ATTACHMENT 6

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. The data available in the EOF will be the same data which is provided in the TSC., The method of data display in the EOF will be similar to the TSC. ,The

. detailed design of the EOF data transmission and display system is not com-plete at this time.

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