ML20004C130
| ML20004C130 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 05/22/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20004C127 | List: |
| References | |
| IEB-79-01B, IEB-79-1B, NUDOCS 8106010584 | |
| Download: ML20004C130 (34) | |
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D SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION BRA: "i FOR NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY PRAIRIE ISLAND UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET N0. 50-282/306 i
I 81060105M 1
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CONTENTS Page 1
Introduction...............................................
1 2
Background.................................................
1 2.1 Purpose...............................................
2 2.2 Scope.................................................
2 3
Staff Evaluation...........................................
2 3.1 Completeness of Safety-Related Equipment...
3 3.2 Service Conditions....................................
4 3.3 Temperature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions Inside Containment....................................
4 3.4 Temperature, Pressure-and Humidity Conditions Outside Containment..
5 3.5 Submergence...........................................
5 3.6 Chemical Spray........................................
5 3.7 Aging.................................................
5 3.8 Radiation (Inside and Outside Containment).............
6 4
Qualification of Equipment.................................
7 4.1 Equipment Requiring Immediate Corrective Action.......
7 4.2 Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action.....................................
7 4
4.3 Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable............................................
9 5
Deferred Requirements......................................
9 6
Conclusions................................................
9 APPENDIX A Equipment Requiring Immediate Corrective Action APPENDIX B Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action APPENDIX C Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable APPENDIX D Safety-Related Systems List j
Letter from the Foxboro Company dated March 12, 1981, l
regarding the deficiencies in the Model Ell and E13 i
transmitters.
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SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION BRANCH FOR NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY PRAIRIE ISLAND UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NO. 50-282/306 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 1 INTRODUCTION General Design Criteria 1 and 4 specify that safety related electrical equip-ment in nuclear facilities must be capable of performing its safety-related function under environmental conditions associated with all normal, abnormal, and accident plant operation.
In order to ensure compliance with the cri-teria, the NRC staff required all licensees of operating reactors to submit a reevaluation of the qualification of safety related electrical equipment which may be exposed to a harsh environment.
2 BACKGROUND On February 8,1979, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) issued to all licensees of operating plants (except those included in the systematic evaluation program (SEP)) IE Bulletin IEB 79-01, " Environmental Qualification of Class IE Equipment." This bulletin, together with IE Circular 78-08 (issued on May 31, 1978), required the licensees to perform reviews to assess the adequacy of their environmental qualification programs.
Subsequently, Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21 (issued on May 23, 1980) states that the 00R guidelines and portions of NdREG-0588 (which were issued on January 14, 1980, as enclosures 4 and 5 to IEB-79-018) form the requirements that licensees must meet regarding environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment in order to satisfy those aspects of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC)-4.
This order also requires the staff to complete safety evaluation reports (SERs) for all operating plants by February 1, 1981.
In addition, this order requires that l
the licensees have qualified safety-related equipment installed in their plants by June 30, 1982.
l Supplements to IEB 75-01B were issued for further clarification and definition i
of the staff's needs. These supplements were issued on February 29, September 30, and October 24, 1980.
In addition, the staff issued orders dated August 29, 1980 (amended in September 1980) and October 24, 1980 to all licensees.
The August order required that the licensees provide a report, by November 1, 1980, documenting the qualification of safety-related electrical equipment.
The October order required the establishment of a central file location for the maintenance of all equipment qualification records.
The central file was mandated to be
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established by December 1, 1980.
The order also required that all safety-related electrical equipment be qualified by June 30, 1982.
In response, the licensee submitted information through letters dated March 3, May 12 and 23, Juif 10, and October 31, 1980.
2.1 Purpose The purpose of this SER is to identify equipment whose qualification program does not provide sufficient assurance that the equipment is capable of performing the design function in hostile environments. The staff position relating to any identified deficiencies is provided in this report.
2.2 Scope The scope of this report is limited to an evaluation of the equipment which must function in order to mitigate the consequences of a loss-of-coelant accident (LOCA) or a high-energy-line-break (HELB) accident, inside or outside containment, while subjected to the hostile envirr ments associated with these accidents.
3 STAFF EVALUATION The staff evaluation of the licensee's response included an onsite inspection of selected Class IE equipment and an examination of the licensee's report for completeness and acceptability. The criteria described in the D0R guidelines and in NUREG-0588, in part, were used as a basis for the staff evaluation of the adequacy of the licensee's qualification program.
The NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement performed (1) a preliminary evaluation of the licensee's response, documen;ed in technical evaluation reports (TERs) and (2) an onsite verification inspection (September 17, 1980) of selected safety-related electrical equipment.
The systems inspected at both Units 1 and 2 included the cooling water, safety injection, main and auxiliary steam and steam dump, containment air handling, containment purge, containment spray, and reactor coolant.
The inspection at both units verified proper installation of equipment, overall interface integrity, and manufacturers' nameplate data.
The manufacturer's name and model number from the nameplate data were compared to information given in the Component Evaluation Work Sheets (CES) of the licensee's report. The site inspection is documented for l
Units 1 and 2 in a letter dated September 26, 1980 from D. W. Hayes (Region III) to E. L. Jordan (IE).
(See Attachments 2 to the TERs attached to this report for a copy of the letter and noted deficiencies.)
Regarding the issue of limit switches used on the letdown isolation orifice control valves, the licensee stated that these switches have been replaced with switches which are qualified for a LOCA environment, but which do not 1
meet the flood requirements.
The licensee also stated that he (the licensee) believes this requirement is not a licensing issua.
Nevertheless, the staff position is that IEB-79-018 refers to all safety-related systems (listed in Appendix 0 of this report) and their components.
Consequently, if the switches in question are components of a safety system, tten those switches should meet
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the requirements of IEB-79-018.
For this review, the documents referenced above have been factored into the overall staff evaluation.
3.1 Completeness of Safety-Related Equipment In accordance with IEB 79-01B, the licensee was directed to (1) establish a list of systems and equipment that are required to mitigate a LOCA and an HELB and (2) identify components needed to perform the function of safety-related display information, post-accident sampling and monitcring, and radiation monitoring.
The staff developed a generic master list based upon a review of plant safety analyses and emergency procedures.
The instrumentation selected includes parameters to monitor overall plant performance as well as to monitor the per-formance of the systems on the list.
The systems list was established on the basis of the functions that must be performed for accident mitigation (without regard to location of equipment relative to hostile environments).
The list of safety-related systems provided by the licensee was reviewed against the staff-developed master list.
Based upon information in the licensee's submittal, the equipment location references, and in some cases subsequent conversations with the licensee, the staff has verified and determined that the systems included in the licensee's submittal are those required to achieve or support:
(1) emergency reactor shutdown, (2) containment isolation, (3) reactor core cooling, (4) containment heat removal, (5) core residual heat removal, and (6) prevention of signifi-cant release of radioactive material to the environment.
The staff therefore concludes that the systems identified by the licensee (listed in Appendix D) are acceptable, with the exception of those items discussed in Section 5 of this report.
Display instrumentation which provides information for the reactor operators to aid them in the safe handling of the plant was not specifically identified by the licensee.
A complete list of all display instrumentation mentioned in the LOCA and HELB emergency procedures must be provided.
Equipment qualifi-cation information in the form of summary sheets should be provided for all components of the display instrumentation exposed to harsh environments.
Instrumentation which is not considered to be safety related but which is mentioned in the emergency procedure should appear on the list.
For these instruments, (1) justification could be provided for not considering the instrument safety related and (2) assurance should be provided that its subsequent failure will not mislead the operator or adversely affect the mitigation of the consequences of the accident.
The environmental lualifi-cation of post-accident sampling and monitoring and radiation monitoring equipment is closely related to the aview of the TMI Lessons-Learned modifications and will be performed in conjunction with that review.
The licensee identified 347 items of equipment which were assessed by the staff.
Because Units 1 and 2 are nearly identical, the review can be per-formed as one. Where necessary, differences in the units will be noted for clarity. m m
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3.2 Service Conditions Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-60-21 requires t M. the DOR guidelines and the "For Comment" NUREG-0588 are to be used as the criteria for establishing the adequacy of the safety-related electrical equipment environmental quali-fication program. These documents provide the option of establishing a bounding pressure and temperature condition based on plant-specific analysis identified in the licensee's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) or based on generic profiles using the methods identified in these documents.
On this basis, the staff has assumed, unless otherwise noted, that the analysis for developing the environmental envelopes for Prairie Island Units 1 and 2, relative to the temperature, pressure, and the containment spray caustics, has been performed in accordance with the requirements stated above. The staff has reviewed the CES to ensure that the qualification data envelope the specifi-cations established by the licensee. During this review, the staff assumed that for plants designed and equipped with an automatic containment spray system w1ich satisfies the single-failure criterion, the main-steam-line-break (MSl~) environmental conditions are enveloped by the large-break-LOCA environ-mental conditions.
The staff assumed, and requires the licensee to verify, that the containment spray system is not subjected to a disabling single-component failure and therefore satisfies the requirements of Section 4.2.1 of the D0R guidelines.
Equipment submergence has also been addressed where the possibility exists that flooding of equipment may result from HELBs.
3.3 Temperature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions Inside Containment The licensee has provided the results of accident analyses as follows:
Max Temp ( F)
Max Press (psig)
Humidity (%)
LOCA 268 46 100 l
MSLB Not Provided Not Provided Not Provided l
The staff has concluded that the minimum temperature profile for equipment qualification purposes should include a margin to account for higher-than-average temperatures in the upper regions of the containment that can exist due to stratification, especially following a postulated MSLB. Use of the steam saturation temperature corresponding to the total building pressure (partial pressure of steam plus partial pressure of air) versus time will provide an acceptable margin for either a postulated LOCA or MSLB, whichever is controlling, as to potential adverse environmental effects on equipment.
The licensee's specified temperature (service condition) of 268 F does not satisfy the above requirement. A saturation temperature corresponding to the peak profile (294 F peak temperature at 46 psig) should be used instead. The licensee should update his equipment summary tables to reflect this change.
If there is any equipment that does not meet the staff position, the licensee must provide either justification that the equipment will perform its intended function under the specified conditions or propose corrective action. _..
1 3.4 Temperature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions Outside Containment The licensee did not provide sufficient information on pressure, temperature, and humidity outside containment.
For this review, the licensee should provide service condition profiles that include pressure, temperature, and humidity limits for areas outside containment that are subject to a potential HELB.
Room numbers or other applicable designations should be used to specify the area to which each profile applies.
3.5 Submergence The maximum submergence levels have been established and assessed by the licensee.
Unless otherwise noted, the staff asstmed for this review that the methodology employed by the licemee is in accordance with the appropriate criteria as established by Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21.
The licensee stated that the maximum flood level of 705 ft 9 in is based on a LOCA, and that some components are located below flood level.
However, those components that are below flood level and are required only for an HELB, will not be modified because they are located well above the HELB flood level (approximately 700 ft), and they will not be required in the event of a LOCA.
For this review, the licensee should specify the components that are below LOCA flood levei and provide an assessment of the failure modes associated with the submergence of those components. The licensee should also provide assurance that the subsequent failure of those components will not adversely affect any other safety functions or mirlead an operator. Additionally, the licensee should discuss operating time, across the spectrum of events, in relation to the time of submergence.
If the results of the licensee's assess-ment are acceptable, then those components may be exempt from the submergence parameter of qualification.
It is not clear from the information submitted that submergence of safety-related electrical equipment outside of containment was addressed. The licensee should address this area more specifically in the 90-day response and upgrade the CES as appropriate.
3.6 Chemical Soray The licensee's FSAR values for chemical concentration are 30 wt% NaOH and the caustic necessary to assure a pH of 10.5 in the spray and a pH greater than 7 in the recirculated water.
For this review, the exact chemical concentration of Na0H and caustic used in qualification testing should be discussed.
Therefore, the effects of chemical spray will be considered unresolved.
The staff will review the licensee's response when it is submitted and discuss the resolution in a supplemental report.
3.7 Aging Section 7 of the 00R guidelines does not require a qualified life to be estab-lished for all safety-related electrical equipment.
However, the following actions are required:.
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(1) Make a detailed comparison of existing equipment and the materials identified in Appendix C of the D0R guidelines. The first supplement to IEB-79-01B requires licensees to utilize the table in Appendix C and identify any additional materials as the result of their effort.
(2) Establish an ongoing program to review surveillance and maintenance records to identify potential age-related degradations.
(3) Establish component maintenance and replacement schedules which include considerations of aging characteristics of the installed components.
The licensee identified a number of equipment items for which a specified qualified life was established (for example, 4.4 years, 5 years, or 40 years).
In its assessment of these submittals, the staff did not review the adequacy of the methodology nor the basis used to arrive at these values; the staff has assumed that the established values are based on state-of-the-art technology and are acceptable.
For this review, however, the staff requires that the licensee submit supple-mental information to identify and verify the degree of conformance to the above requirements.
The response should include all the equipment identified as required to maintain functional operability in harsh environments.
Ihe licensee indicated that this phase of the response is outstanding and that the review is in progress. The staff will review the licensee's response when it is submitted and discuss its evaluation in a supplemental report.
3.8 Radiation (Imide and Outside Containment)
The licensee has provided values for the radiation levels postulated to exist following a LOCA.
The application and methodology employed to determine these values were presanted to the licensee as part of the NRC staff criteria con-tained in the DOR guidelines, in NUREG-0588, and in the guidance provided in IEB-79-01B, Supplement 2.
Therefore, for this review, the staff has assumed that, unless otherwise noted, the values provided have been determined in accordance with the prescribed criteria.
The staff review determined that the values te which equipment was qualified enveloped the requirements identified by the l kensee.
The valve required by the licena.e inside containment is an integrated dose of 3.6 x 107 rads.
The radiation service condition lowerthanprovidedinthe00Rguidelines(4x10grovidedbythelice1seeis rads) for gamma and beta radiation. The licensee is requested to either provide justification for using the lower service condition or use the service condition provided in the D0R guidelines for both gamma and beta radiation.
If the former option is chosen, then the analysis--including the basis, assumptions, and a sample calculation--should be provided.
A required value outside containment of 2.7 x 106 rads has been used by the licensee to specify limiting radiation levels associated with the containment hydrogen control.
This value appears to consider the radiation levels influenced by the source term methodology associated with post-LOCA recirculation fluid lines and is therefore acceptable..
6 4 QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT The following subsections present the staff's assessment, based on the licensee's submittal, of the qualification status of safety-related electrical equipment.
The staff has separated the safety-related equipment into three categories:
(1) equipment requiring immediate corrective action, (2) equipment requiring additional qualification information and/or corrective action, and (3) equip-ment considered acceptable if the staff's concern identified in Section 3.7 is satisfactorily resolved.
In its assessment of the licensee's submittal, the NRC staff did not review the methodology employed to determine the values established by the licensee.
However, in reviewing the data sheets, the staff made a determination ar, to the stated conditions presented by the licensee. Additionally, the staff has not completed its review of supporting documentation referenced by the licen-see (for example, test reports).
It is expected that when the review of test reports is complete, the environmental qualification data bank established by the staff will provide the means to cross reference each supporting document to the referencing licensee.
If supporting documents are found to be unacceptable, the licensee will be required to take additional corrective actions to either establish qualifica-tion or replace the item (s) of concern. This effort will begin in early 1981.
An appendix for each subsection of this report provides a list Of equipment for which additional information and/or corrective action is >: quired. Where appropriate, a reference is provided in the appendices to identify deficiencies.
It should be noted, as in the Commission Memorandum and Order, that the deficien-cies identified do not necessarily mean that equipment is unqualified.
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they are cause for concern and may require further case-by-case evaluation.
4.1 Equipment Requiring Immediate Corrective Actior.
Apcendix A identifies equipment (if any) in this category.
The licensee was asked to review the facility's safety-related electrical equipment.
The licensee's review of this equipment has not identified any equipment requiring immediate corrective action; therefore, no licensee event reports (LERs) were submitted.
In addition, in this review, the staff has not identified any safety-related electrical equipment which is not able to perform its intended safety function during the time in which it must operate.
4.2 Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action l
sppendix ".dentifies equipment in this category, including a tabulation of deficiencies.
The deficiencies are noted by a letter relating to the legend (identified below), indicating that the information provided is not sufficient for the qualification parameter or condition.
Legend R
radiation T
- temperature QT qualification time !
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RT - required time P
pressure H
- humidity CS - chemical spray A
- material-aging evaluation; replacement schedule; ongoing equipment surveillance S
submergence M
- margin I
- HELB evaluation outside containment not completed QM qualification method RPN equipment relocation or replacement; adequate schedule not provided EXN - exempted equipment justification inadequate SEN - separate effects qualification justification inadequate QI qualification information being developed RPS - equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided As noted in Section 4, these deficiencies do not necessarily mean that the equipment is unqualified.
However, the deficiencies are cause for concern and require further case-by-case evaluation. The staff has determined that an acceptable basis to exempt equipment from qualification, in whole or part, c6n be established provided the following can be established and verified by the licensee:
(1) Equipment does not perform essential safety functions in the harsh environ-ment, and equipment failure in the harsh environment will not impact safety-related fuactions or mislead an operator.
(2a) Equipment performs its function before its exposure to the harsh environ-ment, and the adequacy for the time margin provided is adequately justified, and (2b) Subsequent failure of the equipment as a result of the harsh environment does not degrade other safety functions or mislead the operator.
(3) The safety-related function can be accomplished by some other designated equipment that has been adequately qualified and satisfies the single-l failure criterion.
(4) Equipment will not be subjected to a harsh environment as a result of the postulated accident.
The licensee is, therefore, required to supplement the information presented by providing resolutions to the deficiencies identified; these resolutions should include a description of the corrective action, schedules for its completion (as applicable), and so forth. The staff will review the licensee's response, when it is submitted, and discuss the resolution in a supplemental report.
l It should be noted that in casu vnere testing is being conducted, a condition l
l may arise which results in a determination by the licensee that the equipment l
does not satisfy tha qualification test requirements.
For that equipment, the l
licensee will be required to provide the proposed corrective action, on a i
timely basis, to ensure that qualification can be established by June 30, 1982.
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e 4.3 Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable Based on the staff review of the licensee's submittal, the staff identified the equipment in Appendix C as (1) acceptable on the basis that the qualifi-cation program adequately enveloped the specific environmental plant para-meters, or (2) conditionally acceptable subject to the satisfactory resolution of the staff concern identified in Section 3.7.
For the equipment identified as conditionally acceptable, the staff determined that the licensee did not clearly (1) state that an equipment material evaluation was conducted to ensure that no known materials susceptible to degradation because of aging have been
- used, (2) establish an ongoing program to review the plant surveillance and main-tenance records in order to identify equipment degradation which may be age related, and/or (3) propose a maintenance program and replacement schedule for equipment identified in item 1 or equipment that is qualified for less than the life of the plant.
The licensee is, therefore, required to supplement the information presented for equipment in this category before full acceptance of this equipment can be established.
The staff will review the licensee's response when it is sub-mitted and discuss the resolution in a supplemental report.
5 DEFERRED REQUIREMENTS IEB 79-01B, Supplement 3 has relaxed the time constraints far the submission of the information associated with cold shutdown equipment and TMI lessons-icarned modifications.
The staff has required that this information be pro-vided by February 1,1981.
The staff will provide a supplemental safety evaluation addressing these concerns.
6 CONCLUSIONS The staff has determined that the licensee's listing of safety-related systems and associated electrical equipment whose ability to function in a harsh environment following an accident is required to mitigate a LOCA or HELB is complete and acceptable, except as noted in Section 3 of this report.
The staff has also determined that the environmental service conditions to be met by the electrical equipment in the harsh accident environment are appropriate, except as noted in Section 3 of this report.
Outstanding information identi-fied in Section 3 should be provided within 90 days of receipt of this SER.
The staff has reviewed the qualification of safety-related electrical equip-ment to the extent defined by this SER and has found no outstanding items which would require immediate corrective action to ensure the safety of plant operation.
However, the staff has determined that many items of safety-related electrical equipment identified by the licensee for this review do not have adequate documentation to ensure that they are capable of withstanding the.
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e harsh environmental service conditions.
This review was based on a comparison of the qualification values with the specified environmental values required by the design, which were provided in the licensee's summary sheets.
Subsection 4.2 identified deficiencies that must be resolved to establish the qualification of the equipment; the staff requires that the information lack-ing in this category be provided within 90 days of receipt of this SER.
Within this period, the licensee should either provide documentation of the mirsing qualification information which demonstrates that such equipment meets t% D0R guidelines or NUREG-0588 or commit to a corrective action (requalifi-cation, replacement, relocation, and so forth) consistent with the requirements to establish qualification by June 30, 1982.
If the latter option is chosen, the licensee must provide justification for operation until such corrective action is complete.
Subsection 4.3 identified acceptance and conditional acceptance based on noted deficiencies. Where additional information is required, the licensee should respond within 90 days of receipt of this SER by providing assurance that these concerns will be satisfactorily resolved by June 30, 1982.
The staff issued to the licensee Sections 3 and 4 of this report and requested, under the provisions to 10 CFR 50.54(f), that the licensee review the deficien-cies enumerated and the amifications thereof tv determine whether safe opera-tion of the facility would be impacted in consideration of the deficiencies.
The licensee has completed a preliminary review of the identified deficiencies and has determined that, after due consideration of the deficiencies and their ramifications, continued safe operation would not be adversely affected.
Based on these considerations, the staff concludes that conformance.ith the above requirements and satisfactory completion of the corrective actions by June 30, 1982 will ensure compliance with the Commission Memorandum and Order of May 23, 1980. The staff further concludes that there is reasonable assurance of continued safe operation of this facility pending completion of these corrective actions.
This conclusion is based on the following:
(1) that there are no outstanding items which would require immediate correc-tive action to assure safety of plant operation (2) some of the items found deficient have been or are being replaced or relocated, thus improving the facility's capability to function following a LOCA or HELB (3) the harsh environmental conditions for which this equipment must be qualified result from low probability events; events which might reasonably be anticipated during this very limited period would lead to less demanding service conditions for this equipment.. _. -
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APPENDIX A Equipment Requiring Immediate Corrective Action (Category 4.1)
No equipment in this category.
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o APPENDIX B Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action (Category 4.2)
LEGEND:
Designation for Deficiency R - Radiation T - Temperature QT - Qualification time RT - Required time P - Pressure H - Humidity CS - Chemical spray A - Material aging evaluation, replacement schedule, ongoing equipment surveillance S - Submergence M - Margin I - HELB evaluation outside containment not completed QM - Qualification method RPN - Equipment relocation or replacement, adequate schedule not provided EXN - Exempted equipment justification inadequate SEN - Separate effects qualification justification inadequate QI - Qualification information being developed RPS - Equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Valve Operator Limitorque (SM8-00)
MV-32242 R,T,A Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32243 R,T,A l
Valve Operator Limitorque (SM8-00)
MV-32248 R, T, A i
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32249 R,T,A Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32166 R,T,A Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32199 T,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA180)
CV-31325 T,P,A l
Limit Switch NAMCO (EA180)
CV-31326 T,P,A l
Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA180)
CV-31327 T,P,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA180)
CV-31347 T,P,A r
B-1 1
APPENDIX B (Continued) iquipment
, Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency j Limit Switch NAMCO (EA180)
CV-31348 T,P,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA180)
CV-31349 T,P,A Limit Switch imMCO (D2400X)
CV-31325 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (D2400X)
CV-31326 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV-31327 RPN,A
/
Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV-31347 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (02400X)
CV-31348 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (02400X)
CV-31349 RPN,A Dome Recirculation Fan Joy (600277-69) 11 CS,A Dome Recirculation Fan Joy (600277-69) 12 CS,A Dome Recirculation Fan Joy (600277-69) 13 CS,A l
Dome Recirculation Fan Joy (600277-69) 14 CS,A 1
Dome Recirculation Fan Joy (600277-69) 21 CS,A l
Dome Recirculation Fan Joy (600277-69) 22 CS,A Dome Recirculation Fan Joy (600277-69) 23 CS,A Dome Recirculation Fan Joy (6G0277-69) 24 CS,A r
Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP-8321A1E)
SV33371 A,QM,R,T,P, H,CS Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP-8321A1E)
SV33372 A,QM,R,T,P, H,CS Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP-8321A1E)
SV33373 A,QM,R,T,P, H,CS Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP-8321A1E)
SV33374 A,QM,R,T,P, H,CS Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP-8321A1E)
SV33375 A,QM,R,T,P, H,CS Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP-8321A1E)
SV33376 A,QM,R,T,P, H,CS B-2 4
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o APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Solenoid Valve AS Q (NP-8321A1E)
SV33377 A,QM,R,T,P, H,CS Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP-8321A1E)
SV33378 A,QM,R,T,P, H,CS Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA180)
CD34072 T,P,H,CS,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA180)
C034074 T,P,H,CS,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA180)
CD34076 T,P,H,CS,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA180)
CD34078 T,P,H,CS,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA180)
C034080 T,P,H,CS,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA180)
CD34082 T,P,H,CS,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA180)
CD34084 T,P,H,CS,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA180)
CD34086 T,P,H,CS,A Solencid Valve ASCO (RHT8321A1)
SV33389 RPN,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (RHT8321A1)
SV33390 RPN,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (RHT8321A1)
SV33391 RPN,A Solencid Valve ASCO (RHT8321A1)
SV33392 RPN,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (RHT8321A1)
SV33393 RPN,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (RHT8321A1)
SV33394 RPN,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (RHT8321A1)
SV33395 RPN,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (RHT8321A1)
SV33396 RPN,A Valve Operators Limitorque (SM8-000)
MV-32293 CS,H,A Valve Operators Limitorque (SMB-000)
MV-32295 CS,H,A Valve Operators Limitorque (SM8-000)
MV-32274 CS,H,A Valve Operators Limitorque (SMB-000)
MV-32276 CS,H,A Solenoid Valves ASCO (NP-8320A194E)
SV-33990 QM,A Solenoid Valves ASCO (NP-8320A194E)
SV-33991 QM,A B-3 l
APPENDIX B (Centinuid)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Solenoid Valves ASCO (RHB-8320-A7)
SV-33992 RPN,A Solenoid Valves ASCO (RHB-8320-A7)
SV-33993 RPN,A Solenoid Valves ASCO (8321A1)
SV-33440 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (02400X)
CV-31311 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV-31315 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV-31634 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV-31636 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
CV-31311 A,RPN Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
CV-31315 A,RPN Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
CV-31634 A,RPN Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
CV-31636 A,RPN Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-170)
CV-31310 QM,P,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-170)
CV-31312 QM,P,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-170)
CV-31569 QM,P,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-170)
CV-31621 QM,P,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-170)
CV-31622 QM,P,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-170)
CV-31633 QM,P,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV-31313 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV-31317 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (02400X)
CV-31570 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (02400X)
CV-31575 RPN,A Limit Switch Honeywell CV-31625 P,H,QM,A (BZ-2RW899A2)
Limit Switch Honeywell CV-31630 P,H,QM,A (BZ-2RW899A2)
Limit Switch Honeywell CV-31631 P,H,QM,A (SZ-2RW899A2)
B-4
APPENDIX B (Ccntinuid)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Limit Switch Honeywell CV-31624 P,H,QM,A (BZ-2RW899A2)
Limit Switch NAMCO (0-2400X)
CV-31314 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (0-2400X)
CV-31316 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D-2400X)
CV-31574 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (0-2400X)
CV-31627 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D-2400X)
CV-31628 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D-2400X)
CV-31635 RPN,A Motor Electric Machinery Co. #11 QT,T,H,A Motor Electric Machinery Co. #12 QT,T,H,A Motor Electric Machinery Co. #21 QT,T,H,A Motor Electric Machinery Co. #22 QT,T,H,A Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-0)
MV-32096 QM,T,P,H,A Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-0)
MV-32097 QM,T,P,H,A Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-0)
MV-32108 QM,T,P,H,A Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-0)
MV-32109 QM,T,P,H,A Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-0)
MV-32103 QM,T,P,H,A Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-0)
MV-32105 QM,T,P,H,A Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-0)
MV-32114 QM,T,P,H,A Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-0)
MV-32116 QM,T,P,H,A
- Pressure Transmitter Foxboro (E11GM-SADI)
PT-21164 QM,A,R
- Pressure Transmitter Foxboro (E11GM-SADI)
PT-21165 QM,A,R
- Prer.;ure Transmitter Foxboro (E11GM-SADI)
PT-21166 QM,A,R
- Pressure Transmitter Foxboro (E11GM-SADI)
PT-21167 QM,A,R
- See Attachment 1:
Foxboro letter (3/12/81), " Potential Deficiency Affecting Foxboro Transmitters," for corrective action.
B-5
APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency
- Pressure Transmitter Foxboro (E11GM-SADI)
PT-21168 QM,A f
- Pressure Transtt',w r Foxboro (E11GM-SADI)
PT-21169 QM,A
- Pressure Transmitte' Foxboro (E11GM-SADI)
PT-21170 QM,A,R
- Pressure Tr 'mitter Foxboro (E11GM-SADI)
PT-21171 QM,A,R Level Transmitter Magnetrol (A-153-FEP) 16796 3DN,A,5 Level Transmitter Magnetrol (A-153-FEP) 16811 RPP,A,5 Level Transmitter Magnetrol (A-153-FEP) 16909 RPN,A,S Level Transmitter Magnetrol (A-153-FEP) 16910 RPN,A,5
- Flow Transmitter Foxboro (E13DH) 23021 QM,A
- Flow Transmitter Foxboro (E13DH) 23022 QM,R,A
- Flow Transmitter Foxboro (E13DH) 23024 QM,R,A
- Flow Transmitter Foxboro (E13DH) 23025 QM,R,A
- Flow Transmitter Foxboro (E13DH) 23026 QM,R,A
- Flow Transmitter Foxboro (E13DH) 23027 QM,R,A
- Flow Transmitter Foxboro (E130H) 23028 QM,R,A Accelerometer Endevco (2773AM20)
QI,A Charge Amp Unholz-Dickey (22CA-2TR)
QI,A
- See Attachment 1:
Foxboro Letter (3/12/81), " Potential Deficiency Affecting Foxboro Transmitters," for corrective action.
B-6
APPENDIX B (Continuid)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Incore Thermocouple ETI (K81) 15456 QT,RPN,QM,R, T,P,H,CS,A Incore Thermocouple ETI (K81) 15454 QT,RPN,QM,R, T,P,H,CS,A Incore Thermocouple ETI (K81) 15458 QT,RPN,QM,R, T,P,H,CS,A Incore Thermocouple ETI (K81) 15459 QT,RPN,QM,R, T,P,H,CS,A Incore Thermocouple ETI (K81) 15610 QT,RPN,QM,R, T,P,H,CS,A Incore Thermocouple ETI (K81) 15611 QT,RPN,QM,R, T,P,H,CS,A Incore Thernioccuple ETI (K81) 15612 QT,RPN,QM,R, T,P,H,CS,A Incore Thermocouple ETI (K81) 15613
-QT,RPN,QM,R, T,P,H,CS,A Signal Converter Fisher Controls (5?6) SC35084 A,QT,RPN,QM,R, T,P,H,CS Signal Converter Fisher Controls (546) SC35029 A,QT,RPN,QM,R, T,P,H,CS Signal Converter Fisher Controls (546) SC35085 A,QT,RPN,QM,R, j
T,P,H,CS l
Signal Converter Fisher Controls (546) SC35028 A,QT,RPN,QM,R, T,P,H,CS Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP-8316E35E)
SV-33201 A,QM Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP-8316E35E)
SV-33202 A,QM Solenoid Valve ASCO (NF 8316E35E)
SV-33255 A,QM i
l Solenoid Valve ASCO (NF-8316E35E)
SV-33256 A,QM l
l Soleno!d Valve ASCO (821104)
SV-33260 A,QM,RPN l
Solenoid alve ASCO (821104)
SV-33261 A,QM,RPN Solenoid Valve ASCO (8211D4)
SV-33265 A,QM,RPN B-7 l
APPENDIX 8 (ContinuGd)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Solenoid Valve ASCO (821104)
SV-33266 A,QM,RPN Limit Switch NAMCO (02400X)
CV31098 QM,A,QT ~,P, H,R Limit Switch NAMC0 (D2400X)
CV31099 QM,A,QT,T,P, H,R Limit Switch NAMCO (02400X)
CV31116 QM,A,QT,T,P, H,R Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV31117 QM,A,QT,T,P, H,R Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV31107 QM,A,QT,T,P, H,R Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV31089 QM,A,QT,T,P, H,R Steam Flow Transmitter Barton (384) 23013 RPN,A Steam Flow Transmitter Barton (384) 23014 RPN,A Steam Flow Transmitter Barton (384) 23015 RPN,A Steam Flow Transmitter Barton (384) 23016 RPN,A Steam Flow Transmitter Barton (384) 23017 RPN,A Steam Flow Transmitter Barton (384) 23018 RPN,A Steam Flcw Transmitter Barton (384) 23019 RPN,A Steam Flow Transmitter Barton (384) 23020 RPN,A
Foxboro letter (3/12/81), "Petential Deficiency Affecting Foxoboro Transn. tters," for corrective action.
B-8
APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Comoonent No.
Deficiency
- Steam Level Transmitter Foxboro (E13DH-SAM-1) 24080 RPN,A,R
- Steam Level Transmitter Foxboro (E13DH-SAM-1) 24081 RPN,A,R
- Steam Level Transmitter Foxboro (E13DH-SAM-1) 24082 RPN,A,R
- Steam level Transmitter Foxboro (E13DH-SAM-1) 24083 RPN,A,R
- Steam Level Transmitter Foxboro (E13DH-SAM-1) 24084 RPN,A,R
- Steam Level Transmitter Foxboro (E13DH-SAM-1) 24085 RPN,A,R
- Steam Level Transmitter Foxboro (E13DH-SAM-1) 24086 RPN,A,R
- Steam Level Transmitter Foxboro (E130H-SAM-1) 24087 RPN,A,R
- Staam Level Transmitter Foxboro (E13DH-SAM-1) 24088 RPN,A,R
- Steam Level Transmitter Foxboro (E13DH-SAM-1) 24089 RPN,A,R "See Attachment 1:
Foxboro letter (3/12/81), " Potential Deficiency Affecting Foxboro Transmitters," for corrective action.
B-9
APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency
- Steam Level Transmitter Foxboro (E130H-SAM-1) 24090 RPN,A,R
- Steam Level Transmitter Foxboro (E13DH-SAM-1) 24091 RPN,A,R
- Steam Level Transmitter Foxboro (E13DH-SAM-1) 24092 RPN,A,R
- Steam level Transmitter Foxboro (E13DH-SAM-1) 24093 RPN,A,R
- Steam Level Transmitter Foxboro (E13DH-SAM-1) 24094 RPN,A,R
- Steam Level Transmitter Foxboro (E13DH-SAM-1) 24095 RPN,A,R Solenoid Valve ASCO (831654)
SV33763 RPN,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (831654)
SV33764 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
CV-31231 A,RPN,T,P,CS Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
CV-31232 A,RPN,T,P,CS Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
CV-31233 A,RPN,T,P,CS Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
CV-31234 A,RPN,T,P,CS Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP-831654E)
SV-33761 QM,A,R,T,QT,P, H,CS Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP-831654E)
SV-33762 QM,A,R,T,QT,P, H,CS Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
CV-31019 A,RPN,T,P,H,CS l
Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
CV-31092 A,RPN,T,P,H,CS Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
CV-31643 A.RPN,T,P,H,CS Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
CV-31129 A,RPN,T,P,H,CS Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV-31019 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV-31092 RPN,A i
Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV-31643 RPN,A l
Limit Switch NAMC0 (02400X)
CV-31129 RPN,A
^See Attachment 1:
Foxboro letter (3/12/81), " Potential Deficiency Affectng Foxboro Transmitters," for corrective action.
B-10
APPENDIX B (Continu;d)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP-8320A186E)
SV3365 QM,A,T,P,H, CS,R Solenoid Valve ASCO (RHT8321A1)
SV33661 RPN,A Solenoid Valve ASJO (NP-8320A182E)
SV33738 QM,A,T,P,H, CS,R Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP-8320A182E)
SV33739 QM,A,T,P,H, CS,R Solenoid Valve ASCO (RHT8320A19)
SV33740 RPN,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (RHT8320A19)
SV33741 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV31296 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (02400X)
CV31300 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV31303 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV31298 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV31637 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (02400X)
CV31638 RPN,A Limit St' itch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV31305 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (02400X)
CV31307 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV31639 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV31640 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV31235 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV31236 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV31237 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV31238 RPN,A l
Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV31239 RPN,A l
Limit Switch NAMC0 (D2400X)
CV31240 RPN,A t
I Motor Westinghouse (RSD-P)
- 11 QM,A,QT Motor Westinghouse (RSD-P)
- 12 QM,A,QT B-11 l
l
APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Motor Westinghouse (RSD-P)
- 21 QM,A,0T Motor Westinghouse (RSD-P)
- 22 QM,A,QT Flow Transmitter Barton (332) 23073 QT,A Flow Transmitter Barton (332) 23074 QT,A Flow Transmitter Barton (332) 23075 QT,A Flow Transmitter Barton (332) 23076 QT,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP-8321A1E)
SV-33281 QM,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (RHT832427)
SV-33282 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
CV-31741 RPN,T,P,H,CS,A Limit Switch NAE 0 (EA-180)
CV-31743 RPN,T,P,H,CS,A Limit Switch NAMCO (D2400X)
CV-31741 RPN,A Limit Switch NAMCO (02400X)
CV-31743 RPN,A
- 0. C. Instrument Panels Greiger Electric 153 RPN,A D. C. Instrument Panels Greiger Electric 163 RPN,A D. C. Ins'.rument Panels Greiger Electric 253 RPN,A
- 0. C. Instrument Panels Greiger Electric 263 RPN,A Fuse Holder Bussman (HEB-A)
QT,A,P,T Terminal Blocks Allen-Bradley 1492-C03 QI,A Splice Kit Okonite 640-92-1571 A,S,QT Power Cable Okonite A,S,QT Power & Control Cable Okonite HTK & FR A,5,QT l
l Instrument Cable Boston Insulated A,S,QT,QM Electrical Penetrations P.G. O' Brian SN PR-110 A,QT,CS l
I Electrical Penetrations P.G. O' Brian SN PR-12 A,QT,CS l
Electrical Penetrations P.G. O' Brian SN PR-2 A,QT,CS Splice Kits Kerite D5-1001-05-1002 QM,A B-12 i
APPENDIX B (Continuid)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency
- Pressure Transmitter Foxboro (E11GH-SAE1) 21146 A,R
- Pressure Transmitter Foxboro (E11GH-SAE1) 21147 A,R
- Pressure Transmitter Foxboro (E11GH-SAE1) 21148 A,R
- Pressure Transmitter Foxboro (E11GH-SAE1) 21150 A,R
- Pressure Transmitter Foxboro (E11GH-SAE1) 21154 A,R
- Pressure Transmitter Foxboro (E11GH-SAE1) 21155 A,R
- Pressure Transmitter Foxboro (E11GH-SAE1) 21156 A,R
- Pressure Transmitter Foxboro (E11GH-SAE1) 21157 A,R "See Attachment 1:
Foxboro letter (3/12/81), " Potential Deficiency Affecting Foxboro Transmitters," for corrective action.
B-13
APPENDIX C Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable (Category 4.3)
LEGEND:
R - Radiation T - Temperature QT - Qualification time RT - Required time P - Pressure H - Humidity CS - Chemical spray A - Material aging evaluation, replacement schedule, ongoing equipment surveillance S - Submergence M - Margin I - HELB evaluation outside containment not completed QM - Qualification method RPN - Equipment relocation or replacement, adequate schedule not provided EXN - Exempted equipment justification inadequate SEN - Separate effects qualification justification inadequate QI - Qualification information being developed RPS - Equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency __
Dome Recirculation Fan Joy (600277-69) 11 A
Dome Recirculation Fan Joy (600277-69) 12 A
Dome Recirculation Fan Joy (600277-69) 13 A
Dome Recirculation Fan Joy (600277-69) 14 A
Dome Recirculation Fan Joy (600277-69) 21 A
Dome Recirculation Fan Joy (600277-69) 22 A
Dome Recirculation Fan Joy (600277-69) 23 A
Dome Recirculation Fan Joy (600277-69) 24 A
Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP831654E)
SV-33515 A
Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP831654E)
SV-33516 A
Operator Valve Limitorque (SMB-3)
MV-32023 A
C-1
APPENDIX C (Continu::d)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Operator Valve Limitorque (SMB-3)
MV-32024 A
Operator Valve Limitorque (SMB-3)
MV-32028 A
Operator Valve Limitorque (SMB-3)
MV-32029 A
RTD Rosemount (176KS) 15314 A
Level Transmitter Barton (F386-351) 24041 A
Level Transmitter Barton sF386-351) 24042 A
Level Transmitter Barton (F386-351) 24043 A
Level Transmitter Barton (F386-351) 24046 A
Level Transmitter Barton (F386-351) 24047 A
Level Transmitter Barton (F386-351) 24048 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV32016 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV32017 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV32019 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV32020 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV32195 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV32196 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV32197 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV32198 A
I Motor Westinghouse (HSD-P)
A Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32163 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32162 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32190 A
l Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32191 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32206 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32207 A
i C-2
APPENDIX C (Continued)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32208 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32209 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-3)
MV-32174 A
.,ve Operator Limitorque (SMB-3)
MV-32175 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-1)
MV-32077 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-1)
MV-32078 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-1)
MV-32178 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-1)
MV-32179 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-1)
MV-32180 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-1)
MV-32181 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-1)
MV-32075 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-1)
MV-32076 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32177 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32073 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32176 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32074 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-0)
MV-32084 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-0)
MV-32085 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-0)
MV-31287 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-0)
MV-32188 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (5MB-1)
MV-32071 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-1)
MV-32072 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32171 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32068 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32173 A
C-3
APPENDIX C (Continued)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32070 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-1)
MV-32167 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-1)
MV-32168 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-1)
MV-32064 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-1)
MV-32065 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32170 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32067 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32069 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32172 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SM8-00)
MV-32184 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32185 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32186 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32081 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32082 A
Valve Operator Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32083 A
Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP-8321AIE)
SV-33283 A
l Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP-8321A1E)
SV-33284 A
Valve Operators Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32043 A
Valve Operators Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32040 A
Valve Operators Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32046 A
Valve Operators Limitorque (SMB-00)
MV-32049 A
Lubricating Oil Mobil DET-HVY-MED A
Lubricating Grease Chevron SRI-2 A
Epoxy Varnish GE 74010/74010A A
Solenoid Valves ASCO (NP831654E)
SV-33515 A
Solenoid Valves ASCO (NP831654E)
SV-33516 A
C-4
.,.. ~. _ -...
APPENDIX D Safety-Related Systems Listi Function System Emergency Reactor Shutdown Reactor Coolant Instrument and Protection (RPS-SA)
Chemical and Volume Control Containment Isolation Containment Isolation 2 Main Steam Main Feedwater Safety Injection Residual Heat Removal Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control Cooling Water Auxiliary Feedwater Steam Generator Blowdown Containment Purge Containment Sump l
Reactor Core Cooling Safety Injection (High Pressure Injection)
Residual Heat Removal (Low Pressure Injection)
l
'The NRC staff recognized that there i.re differences in nomenclature of l
systems because of plant vintage and engineering design; consequently, some systems performing identical or similar functions may have different names.
In those instances it was necessary to verify the system (s) function with the responsible IE regional reviewer and/or the licensee.
2 Includes other systems with isolation valves not listed below.
D-1
APPENDIX D (Continued)
Function System Containment Heat Removal Containment Air Handling Containment Sump Containment Spray Residual Heat Removal Core Residual Heat Removal Residual Heat Removal Power Operated Relief Valves Main Steam Main Feedwater Steam Dump Cooling Water Auxiliary Feedwater Prevention of Significant Containment Air Handling Release of Radioactive Material to Environment Containment Purge Containment Spray l
(Iodine Removal) l
(
Containment Hydrogen Control Radiation Monitoring Reactor Hot Sampling Supporting Systems Emergency Power Control Room and Safety Equipment Area Ventilation D-2
ATTACHMENT 1 Foxboro.MA 02035 U.SA The Foxboro Company
<sm Som0 12 March 1981
Subject:
Potential Deficiency Affecting Foxboro Transmitters, Model Numbers N-Ell, N-E13 or Ell, E13 with suffix Codes /MCA, /MCA/RRW, or /MCA/RR Gentle =en:
Our records indicate that you have received one or more of the Foxboro =odel nu:bered transmitters listed above.
This letter is to notify you that two deficiencies have been discovered in so=e of these trans=itters which may exist in the units shipped to you. The transmitters in question operate at a signal level of 10-50=A.
Similar model nu=bered units operating at 4-20cA are not affected.
The first issue involves the possible use of incorrect insulating sleeving en transistor and =ener diode lead wires in the a=plifier. The second issue involves the use of a specific vendor's capacitor which is not hermetically.
sealed (although claimed to be so). As a result, the capacitor electrolyte can leak under adverse service conditions, specifically heat and time. The
(
f ailure code is a decrease in resistance across the capacitor resulting in electrical leakage. The transmitter operation can be affected by limiting the output to something less than full value which, in time, can degrade to no output at,all.
Insulating Sleeving - Radiation resistant sleeving consisting of a silicone coated glass fiber braid has been substituted by a teflon sleeving in soce transmitters.
Tests have shown that teflon will become brittle and deteriorate with a substantial integrated radiation dose. Foxboro testing has demonstrated that the teflon sleeving used in these devices vill withstand an integ-sted dose af 10 =egarads with no noticeable da~cerioration. Tests to 200 megars.a produce the brittle conditions which c;a result in the teflon flaking from the wires.
Based on these tests, op. rating plants not expected to exceed an integrated dose of 10 megarads have no potential problem and no action is required.
Where the integrated dose rate could execed 10 =egarads, then units in service should be inspected to determine if the proper insulating material has been used. This can be accomplished by opening the trans=itter in accordance with Foxboro Master Instruction MI 20-145.
The amplifier cover =ust be re=oved exposing the a=plifier asse=bly. At one end of the asse=bly, a transistor and a zener diode are =ounted in the' base casting which serves as a heat sink. The insulating caterial in question is a sleeving slipped over the lead sites from these two co=ponents.
The proper =aterial is white and heavy looking. Positive FOXBORO
hge. 2.
12 March.1931
Subject:
identification can be made by inspecting one end of the caterial to establish that the outer caterial covers an inner braid. Teflon, if used, will be a single layer material and could, be either clear or white.
If i= proper insulation is present, then the corrective action is to replace the-
'a_plifier (Foxboro P/N N0148PW). Replacement amplifiers can be purchased from your local Foxboro Sales or Service Representatives.
If you prefer to have Foxboro Service Personnel inspect the equipment and, if necessary, replace the a=plifier, this can be arranged at standard service rates.
Capacitor - The capacitor degradation problem was discovered over ti=e thr'ough tracking failure situations.
Internal corrective action has been taken to remove the vendor involved from the qualified vendor list and to purge all tysk of capacitors from this vendor. Degradation of this capacitor is a function of time and service conditions with heat being a pri=ary contributor.
This phenecenen was observed in recent tests of transmitters using these capacitors. The capacitor in question is manufactured by Cornell-Duebilier and ~can be specifically identified by a type nu=her in the form TX-65-XXXX as well as a monogram in a box followed by a date code, e.g.lCDZ 0874 l It is assigned Foxboro part nu=ber N0141MF.
To determine if this capacitor is present requires a visual inspection of the a=plifier which can be accomplished as described above for the insulating sleeving inspection. The recom= ended corrective action should the above described capaciter be present is to replace the amplifier (Foxboro P/N NO148PW) although is is possible to replace the capacitor with a Foxboro provided substitute. Use of Foxboro Service personnel to perform the inspection and replace,ent, if necessary, can be arranged at standard service rates as described above.
Due to lack of knowledge of specific application, redundancy, and the like, Foxboro cannot deter =ine if the NRC reporting requirements of 10CFR Part 21 are applicable.
j This determination is the responsibility of the user and any such reporting would be made by them after completing their evaluation of the situation.
If you have any questions regarding the above, please contact the undersigned directly.
Very truly yours, TEE FOIBORO COMPANY William Calder,. tager Corporate Quality Assurance joy 120381 Enclosure MI 20-145 FOXBORO M
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